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ABSTRACT 
The objective of this thesis is to be the first systematic study of the 
political instrumentalization of football in Francoist Spain from 1939 
to 1975. 
Seven separate and contrasting aspects of this political 
instrumentalization may be isolated, and, accordingly, this thesis will 
consist of a chapter examining each one of these seven aspects in turn. 
After a first introductory chapter, Chapter Two will examine the 
application of Fascist concepts to Spanish football. In the third 
chapter, the questions of whether and to wh 4E extent football was used 
by the Franco regime as a political soporific will be discussed. The 
theme of Chapter Four is the lack of democracy within the structures of 
the game, a situation that is alleged to have been deliberately imposed 
by the regime in order to not create an incomfortable comparison for 
itself with the lack of national and local political democracy. The 
poor working conditions of the footballers, which mirrored those of the 
great majority of Spanish workers during the Franco period, are the 
subject of Chapter Five. In the sixth Chapter, the political 
significance of the presence in Francoist Spain of a group of refugee 
players and coaches fromýýrp Europe will be examined. The diplomatic 
and ambassadorial significance of football, in particular of the 
1 
spectacular international triumphs of the Real Madrid club, will be 
discussed in Chapter Seven. The political significance of football as a 
focus for Basque and Catalan nationalist sentiment, in opposition to the 
centralist Madrid regime, is the subject of Chapter Eight. 
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PREFACE 
The objective of this thesis is to be the first systematic study of the 
political manipulation of football in Francoist Spain, from 1939 to 
1975. With the exception of the politicization of sport in general and 
of football in particular, practically every other social, political and 
economic aspect of Francoist Spain has been subjected to a serious 
academic examination in recent years. 
The political significance of football has been briefly alluded to 
in all of the general studies written in English about the Franco years, 
for example in Sir Raymond Carr's Modern Spain 1875-1980,1 in Spain: 
Dictatorship To Democracy by Carr and Juan Pablo Fusi, 2 and in Spain In 
Crisis, -edited by Paul Preston. 3 In these general studies, however, the 
subject has received only a necessarily superficial treatment. 4 The 
very existence of even these brief allusions to the political 
1. Sir Raymond Carr, Modern Spain 1875-1980, Oxford, 1981. 
2. Sir Raymond Carr and Juan Pablo Fusi, Spain: Dictatorship to 
Democracy, Oxford, 1980. 
3. Paul Preston, editor, Spain In Crisis, Sussex, 1976. 
4. In Carr and Fusi, op. cit., for example, the political manipulation 
of football is discussed in just two very brief paragraphs, p. 122. 
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significance of football in Francoist Spain demonstrates its importance 
and highlights the lack of a systematic academic study of the subject. 
With regard to Spanish publications, the only comprehensive study . 
of the political manipulation of football during the Franco period 
remains the author's own Fütbol y franguismo. 5 There have been several 
studies of the political manipulation of Spanish sport in general, the 
most notable being Deporte y estado by Luis Maria Cazorla Prieto, 6 
Historias del deporte by Vicente Marco, 7 and Politica y deporte by 
Manuel Vazquez Montalbän, written under the pseudonym of "Luis Davila". 8 
The politicization of football in Francoist Spain is discussed at 
various stages in these three studies, but in an anecdotal rather than 
analytical manner. - 
The excellent Julian Garcia Candau book El fütbol, sin ley was 
originally intended to be such a systematic study of the political 
manipulation of Spanish football in the Franco years, but failed to be 
so by concentrating too heavily on the situation during the transition 
from dictatorship to democracy. 9 El bisturi de Jose Mara Garcia, by 
the controversial sports journalist of the same name, 10 and La gran 
estafa del fütbol espanol by Garcia's Catalan colleague Alex J. 
Botinesll both touch upon the political significance of football in 
5. Duncan Shaw, Futbol y Franguismo, Madrid, 1987. 
6. Luis Maria Cazorla Prieto, Deporte y Estado, Barcelona, 1979. 
7. Vicente Marco, Historias del deporte, Madrid, 1982. 
8. Manuel Vazquez Montalban, Politica y deporte, Barcelona, 1972. 
9. Julian Garcia Candau, El futbol, sin ley, Madrid, 1980 
10. Jose Maria Garcia, El bisturi de Jose Maria Garcia, Madrid, 1974. 
11. Alex J. Botines, La gran estafa del futbol espanol, Barcelona, 1975. 
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Francoist Spain, but, in the sameýway as the three general studies 
bf. Spanish sport mentioned above, in an anecdotal and dramatic rather 
than systematic manner. 
There are several other books which concentrate usually on one 
particular aspect of the political manipulation of football in Francoist 
Spain. With regard to the poor, patronizing treatment received by the 
footballers from-the Francoist sporting authorities and the-football 
clubs, there is the detailed study Los esclavos de oro del balon by 
Tomas Martin Arnoriaga. 12 The social and political significance of the 
giant FC Barcelona club is specifically examined by Joan Josep Artells 
in Bar a, Barsa, Ba rä13 and by Jaume S. Sabartes in Barca: cara i 
creu, 14 whilst Historia del Athletic Club concentrates-on the Athletic 
de Bilbao club in a similar way. 15 
Several magazine articles have dealt with the political 
significance of football in Francoist Spain, the most notable being the 
humorous "La sociologic insolente del fütbol espanol" series by 
Francisco Cerecedo in Posible during the winter of 1974-1975.16 In 
addition, in February 1977 El Pais Semanal published the Julian Garcia 
Candau article "Cuarenta anos del nacional-futbolismo". 17 
12. Tomas Martin Arnoriaga, Los esclavos del oro del-balon, Madrid 1975. 
13. Joan Josep Artells, Barba, BarCa, Barca, Barcelona, 1972. 
14. Jaume S. Sabartes, Barca: cars i creu, Barcelona, 1982. 
15. La Gran Enciclopedia Vasca, Historia del Athletic Club, Bilbao, 
1984. 
16. Francisco Cerecedo, "La sociolog(a insolente del f tbol espanol", Posible (Madrid) No. 1-4, November 1974-January 1975. 
17. Jul Garcia Candau, "Cuarenta anos del nacional-futbolismo", 
El Pais Semanal (Madrid) 27 February 1977. 
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Given the lack of a'comprehensive study of the subject, until now 
the various aspects of the political manipulation of Spanish football 
had not been isolated and examined separately. These aspects have 
previously been clumsily bundled together, either because of 
unwillingness or inability to separate them. 18 
Seven different aspects of the politicization of football in 
Francoist Spain may be isolated, and this thesis will consist of a 
chapter examining each one of these seven different aspects in turn. 
Chapter Two will examine the application of fascist concepts to the 
game. In the third chapter, the questions of whether and to what extent 
football was used by the Franco regime as a political soporific will be 
discussed. The theme of Chapter Four is the lack of democracy within- 
football, a situation allegedly imposed deliberately by the-regime in 
order not to create an uncomfortable comparison with the lack of 
national and local political democracy. The poor working conditions of 
the footballers, which mirrored those of the great majority of Spanish 
workers during the Franco years, are the subject of Chapter Five. In 
the sixth chapter, the political significance of the presence in 
Francoist Spain of a group of refugee players and coaches from Eastern 
Europe will be examined. The diplomatic and ambassadorial significance 
of football, in particular of the spectacular international triumphs of 
the Real Madrid club, 'will be discussed in Chapter Seven. The subject 
of the eighth and final chapter will be football's political 
significance as a focus for Basque and Catalan nationalist sentiment, in 
18. See Carr and Fusi, op. cit., for example, p. 122. 
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opposition to the centralist Madrid regime. I 
It is necessary at this point to-offer a brief explanation-of the 
methodology employed in the gathering of material for this thesis. The 
primary sources used can be divided into four groups: newspapers; 
journals; -documents; personal interviews. 
The newspapers most useful to the research of this thesis can 
themselves be divided into two categories: the daily general newspapers 
ABC (Madrid), El Alcäzar (Madrid), -Arriba (Madrid), Pueblo (Madrid), Ya 
(Madrid), Informaciones (Madrid), La Vanguardia Espanola (Barcelona), La 
Gaceta del Norte (Bilbao), and, for the post-Franco period, El Pais 
(Madrid) and Diario 16 (Madrid); and on the other, the specialist daily 
sports newspapers Marca (Madrid), As (Madrid), El Mundo Deportivo 
(Barcelona), Sport (Barcelona) and Dicen (Barcelona): In addition, 
several other provincial newspapers such as: Murcia Deportiva (Murcia) 
have been consulted for information about specific events. 
In a similar-way, the journals consulted can be. dinided into those 
of general interest and those specifically concerned with sport. In the 
first category, the most useful journals have been Posible (Madrid), 
Triunfo (Barcelona) and Cuadernos Para el diälogo (Madrid) during the 
Franco period, and Cambio 16 (Madrid) and Tiempo (Madrid) during the 
transition to democracy. In the second category, Don Balon (Barcelona) 
and Barrabas (Barcelona) have been systematically consulted, in addition 
to the club journals Boletin del Real Madrid CF (Madrid), Aupa Atletico 
(Madrid), Barca (Barcelona), and the Boletin Oficial de la Delecacin 
Nacional de Deportes (Madrid). 
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The documentary material discovered in the course of the research 
for this thesis has been slightly disappointing. The archives examined 
have been those of the "Big Four" football clubs (Real Madrid, FC 
Barcelona, Atletico de Madrid and Athletic de Bilbao) of the RFEF, of 
the DND, of the Comite Olimpico Espanol (COE), and of the sports 
newspapers Marca, As and El Mundo Deportivo. The evidence obtained from 
these archives, however, has in many cases been far from conclusive. 
For example, it has been impossible to find documentary evidence either 
to prove or disprove the claim that the refugee players and coaches from 
Eastern Europe served as anti-Communist symbols for the Franco regime, 
or that the phenomenally high number of football matches broadcast live 
by Real Television Espanola (RTVE) actually contributed or not towards 
the maintenance of a high level of political passivity in Francoist 
Spain. 
The inadequacy of the documentary evidence in connection with 
certain of the abstract concepts of this thesis largely explains the 
high number of personal interviews conducted. These interviews have 
been with former Francoist sporting officials, football club officials, 
footballers, veteran sports journalists and commentators, as well as 
with historians and social scientists whose work has had some 
connection, however slight, with the social and political significance 
of sport in Francoist Spain. 
The questions asked in these interviews have obviously varied 
according to the specific areas of expertise and experience of the 
interviewee. For example, the questions to Ladislas Kubala, the most 
famous of the footballing refugees from Eastern Europe, naturally 
11 
centred on the political significance of his arrival in Francoist 
Spain, 19 and the questions to the Real Madrid Vice-President Raiumundo 
Saporta obviously centred on the diplomatic and ambassadorial importance 
to the Franco regime of the many spectacular international triumphs of 
that club. 20 
19. Author's interview with Ladislas Kubala, details of which are given 
in the appendix of interviews. 
20. Author's interview with Raimundo Saporta. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this Introduction is to provide the background inform- 
ation about football in Francoist Spain necessary for an understanding 
of the seven conceptual chapters that will follow. Accordingly, this 
Introduction will consist of: a brief history of the politicization of 
Spanish football up to 1939, a general survey of the political sig- 
nificance of sport in Francoist Spain; an examination of the political 
character of the Delegaciön Nacional de Deportes (DND) and the Real 
Federacion Espanola de Fütbol (RFEF); a brief insight into the general 
nature of the "Big Four" Spanish football clubs, Real Madrid, Atletico 
de Madrid, FC Barcelona and Athletic de Bilbao; an examination of the 
Spanish sporting Press during the Franco period. 
In order to place the politicization of Spainish football during 
the Franco period in its proper historical context; it is necessary at 
this point to offer a brief history of the game before 1939. 
Before the Civil War, Spanish football was only really politicized 
in its regionalist aspect. ' This lack of politicization in other 
1. See Garcia Candau, op. cit., and Artells, op. cit. 
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aspects was mostly due to the fact that governmental interest in the 
game was very low, thus giving the RFEF and the football clubs almost 
complete independence and autonomy vis-a-vis the Madrid authorities. 
Football was introduced into Spain at the end of the nineteenth 
century by visiting British sailors and engineers, and also by Spanish 
students returning from Britain filled with enthusiasm for a novel and 
exciting game. The big clubs of today were created by the combined 
efforts of Spaniards and foreigners, beginning with Athletic de Bilbao 
in 1898, FC Barcelona in 1899, Real Madrid in 1902, and Atletico de 
Madrid the following year. 
The RFEF was founded by these football clubs in 1902, and 
immediately organized a national knockout trophy under the patronage of 
the sports enthusiast King Alfonso XIII. In 1928, a national league was 
created, which brought with it professional players, coaches and club 
officials. Because of the small numbers of club members, however, the 
wages of these professionals were to remain relatively low until after 
the Civil War. 
With regard to action on the field, the dominant pre-Civil War club 
was Athletic de Bilbao. Together with the other Basque clubs, Bilbao 
won over half of the national cups disputed before 1936. The key to the 
success of Bilbao was their direct and aggressive style, the product of 
both the huge British influence at the club and climatic factors. This 
style was adopted by the mostly Basque Spanish Olympic football team 
that dramatically won the silver medal at the 1920 Antwerp games, and 
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was christened the "Spanish Fury" by impressed journalists. 2 Apart from 
Antwerp, however, the Spanish national team failed to make a major '' 
impact on the international football scene. After bravely falling to 
hosts Italy in the 1934 World Cup quarter-finals, it was hoped that 
success would follow in the 1938 tournament in France. For obvious 
reasons, though, the "Spanish Fury" was not on show in France. 
As stated above, Spanish football before the Civil War was really 
only politicized in its regionalist aspect. The two major Basque clubs, 
Athletic de Bilbao and Real Sociedad of San Sebastian, had a pan-Basque 
image because of their rigid policy of accepting only players born in 
the-Basque provinces of Vizcaya, Guipüzcoa, Alava and Navarre. The two 
clubs increased their political significance in the immediate pre-Civil 
War years when their respective boards of directors both issued 
statements in favour of the campaign for Basque autonomy. 3 Partly 
because of these official statements of support from both clubs, their 
stadia became centres of popular agitation for autonomy, with hundreds 
of ikurrina flags flying on the terraces, and with several explosive 
incidents between the crowd, the national policemen on duty and the 
visiting football teams, especially those from Madrid. 4 
Upon the outbreak of Civil War, the majority of the Bilbao and Real 
Sociedad directors and members rallied to the Republican cause. a As 
2. See El Mundo Deportivo, 27 June 1920. 
3. Revealed by an examination of the archives of the two clubs. 
4. For details, see La Gaceta del Norte, 12 May 1934 and 7 November 
1935. 
5. Revealed by an examination of the archives of La Gaceta del Norte. 
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shall be seen in Chapter Seven, certain prosperous Basque directors and 
members gave their-support to Franco, but they constituted only a very 
small minority. 
Many of the Basque players joined the militias to defend their 
homeland against the imminent Francoist invasion. The footballers' .. 
military careers, however, were to be shortlived. Jose Antonio Aguirre, 
the President of the autonomous Basque Republic who had originally 
earned his popularity as an Athletic de Bilbao centre-forward, decided 
to form a Basque national football team that would tour the world with 
the aim of collecting both funds and sympathy for the Basque cause. 
This team was christened, logically, El Euzkadi, and even included three 
Basque players from the Real Madrid-club. El Euzkadi left for Paris in 
April 1937, where its spectacular winning performances earned 
considerable money and sympathy for the Basque cause. After France, the 
team continued on to Czechoslovakia, Poland, the Soviet Union and 
Norway, by which time the Basque Country had been conquered by the 
Nationalists. The Basque players decided to move on to Mexico, where 
they played with distinction in the national league before dissolving 
the team in 1940. Only two players could bear the prospect of returning 
to an occupied Basque Country. The others signed for either Mexican or 
Argentine clubs, and promptly became the heroes of the exiled Basque 
communities in these countries. , 
The political significance of football in pre-Civil War Catalonia 
was not nearly as clear-cut as in the Basque Country, due to the bitter 
rivalry between the FC Barcelona and Espafiol clubs. Despite having been 
founded by foreigners, FC Barcelona, or Bam aas the club was popularly 
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known, had a far more Catalan image than its local rival. The gulf 
between the supporters of the two clubs was huge. 6 The great majority 
of the Barba followers were Catalan speakers who favoured regional 
autonomy, whilst the Espanol supporters were mostly middle-class 
immigrants to Catalonia from other regions, professional men, state 
officials, and even a good number of policemen and military personnel.? 
Practically none of the Espanol club members could speak Catalan, and it 
was widely thought that the very club name had been chosen as both a 
slight and a provocation to the native Catalans. e 
In this way, the political context of the FC Barcelona-Espanol 
rivalry was important from the very beginning of the century, and 
considerably contributed towards the many violent local derby matches. ' 
In April 1912, a pitched battle between the players and supporters of 
the two rival clubs led to the local authorities suspending these derby 
matches for two years. Similarly violent clashes occurred in October 
1921, March 1923, October 1927, May 1924 and March 1935. 
The hostility of the Ba_ rsa supporters, however, was directed with 
more ferocity towards actual manifestations of Castilian centralism than 
towards Espanol. In June 1925 during the centralist dictatorship of 
General Miguel Primo de Rivera, the military governor of Barcelona 
closed Bar a's Les Corts stadium for six months because the crowd had 
6. This gulf has been best illustrated by Artells, op. cit., p. 25-28. 
7. See Artells, op. cit. p. 27. 
8. This view has been expressed by Artells, op. cit., and in an 
interview with the author. This view has also been expressed to the 
author in many other interviews, for example with Manuel Vazquez 
Montalbän and Alex J. Botines. 
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whistled and jeered at the band of the British- Royal Navy playing the 
Spanish Royal March in a pre-match entertainment. ' The FC Barcelona 
supporters looked upon the wealthy and powerful Real Madrid club as a 
symbol of Castilian centralism, ý and, accordingly, the Madrid team was 
always granted an extremely hostile reception on its visits to the Les 
Corts stadium. 10 
Josep Sunyol, President of FC Barcelona from 1933 to 1957, was a 
typical Barca director. A wealthy textile manufacturer politically 
favourable to the moderate nationalism . of Lluis Companys and Josep 
Tarradellas, he brought the club clearly out in favour of both the 
Autonomy Statute and the short-lived independent Catalan Republic 
established in October 1934.11 Along with many Barca players, directors 
and supporters, on the outbreak of the Civil War, Sunyol joined one of 
the many Catalan militias and died fighting on the Jarama front in 
February 1937. 
As with their Basque counterparts, however, the Barca players were 
not to be militia men for long. In April 1937, the BarT team embarked 
upon a tour of Central and South America. Even though funds were-not 
returned to the Generalitat for the-defence of Catalonia from the 
Nationalists, the political convictions of the touring players and 
directors were just as clear as in the Basque case. Again, few of the 
players ventured to return afterwards to Francoist Spain, the majority 
9. Revealed by an examination of the archives of FC Barcelona. 
10. Revealed by an examination of the archives of El Mundo Deportivo. 
11. Revealed by an examination of the archives of FC Barcelona. 
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choosing to remain in either Mexico or Argentina. 
It was not only in the Basque Country and Catalonia, however, that 
the political sympathies of the footballers leant towards the Republican 
cause. 12 Many players lost their lives fighting against the military 
insurrection, whilst not a single one fell for the Nationalist cause. 
Only the Basque and Catalan players, nonetheless, collectively finished 
up in exile as a result of the conflict. It was only these players who 
had the satisfaction of knowing that their political convictions were 
shared by the great majority of their clubs' directors and supporters. 
The context of the politicization of football in Francoist Spain 
needs to be set not only by a brief history of pre-Civil War football, 
but also by a description of the general state of Spanish sport during 
the Franco years. 
The brilliance of the Real Madrid football team and a°handful of 
individuals such as the tennis star Manuel Santana, for example, served 
partially to cover up the poor state of Spanish sport in general. 13 As 
shall be seen very shortly, the sporting Press did its best to disguise 
this painful truth, contenting themselves with faithfully reproducing 
the myopic speeches of ministers and DND officials. In the best 
traditions of Spanish triunfalismo, this sporting Press went into 
12. See Garcia Candau, op. cit., pp. 17-19. 
13. Only two of the author's interviewees contested this widely-held 
opinion: Matias Prats, the ultra-nationalist football commentator on 
radio and television during the Franco years, and Jose Maria 
Lorente, the veteran Marca journalist. 
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flights of euphoria whenever one of the few Spanish victories occurred, 
even if the sport in question was as internationally insignificant as 
clay pigeon shooting or roller-skate. hookey. '4 
The facts, however, speak for themselves. In the six Olympic 
Games in which Spain participated during the Franco period, only one 
gold medal was won, two silver and two bronze. This is a pathetic 
record, worse than that of tiny countries such as Finland, New Zealand 
and the Irish Republic, and was certainly not the way for Francoist ' 
Spain to emulate the hallowed sporting achievements of Fascist Italy and 
Nazi Germany. 
The responsibility for this state of affairs largely lies with the 
Franco regime. As shall be seen in greater detail in Chapter Two, the 
direction of sport was handed to the Falange, the only permitted 
political party. The initial aims of Francoist sporting policy were 
twofold. Firstly, sport was supposed to serve as a means to create a 
healthy and virile race, and, secondly, as a focus for the international 
exhibition of rediscovered Spanish virility and national pride. 15 
Whilst Mussolini and Hitler, however, were p reared to invest 
massive amounts of money in sport in order to fulfill the same two 
objectives, Franco was not. The DND, a department of the Falange, was 
14. A good example of this exaggerated and inappropriate triunfalismo 
can be found with the Press coverage of the Conde de Teba's victory 
in'the May 1953 world clay-pigeon shooting championship. See Marca, 
23-25 May 1953. 
15. These aims were clearly expressed in the first edition-of the 
Boletin Oficial de la DND, Madrid, April 1943. 
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obliged to be practically self-sufficient, depending on the revenue from 
the football pools for the greater part of its money. In this way, as 
noted in the following perceptive document from the Partit Socialista 
Unificat de Catalunya the Franco regime wanted to impose a totalitarian 
model on Spanish sport, "but without paying for it: 
"The organization of sport in Spain is suffering from the 
consequences of the ambiguity which characterized the whole of the 
Francoist period. Between the "liberal" organizational model for 
sporting activity and the "totalitarian" model, the Franco regime 
chose the latter, maintaining its most formal aspects (sport as a 
panacea of the race and as a means of alienation of the masses) 
without ever disposing of sufficient economic resources to practise 
an authentic promotion of collective participation in sport. "16 
The principal Spanish sporting problem that the DND failed to 
resolve was the acute lack of public facilities. The opportunity 
regularly to play tennis, basketball or most other sports really only 
existed for the wealthy members of private clubs. 
The gulf between the triunfalistQ rhetoric of the DND and the 
sombre reality was enormous. According to the DND, everything was 
always progressing splendidly. In spite of all the Olympic failures, 
Spain was permanently on the point of becoming one of the leaders of the 
sporting world. Even in February 1969, after further failure in the 
Mexico games, then Delegado Nacional de Deportes, Juan Antonio 
Samaranch, was still trying to point out that everything in the sporting 
garden was rosy: 
"I ask all of you to continue with the same enthusiasm and with 
this exemplary dedication. And I also say to you that we are on 
the right road. The only thing that we have to do right now is 
16. Reproduced in Antonio Alcoba, El periodismo deportivo en la sociedad 
moderna, 1980, p. 254. 
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accelerate our pace, because our objective of creating a sporting 
consciousness will automatically arrive if we continue working with 
the same enthusiasm. "17 
This blind optimism of Samaranch, flying in the face of all the 
facts, is all the more surprising given that his predecessor in the job, 
Jos h Antonio Elola Olaso, had effectively admitted the partial failure 
of the DND in his farewell speech in December 1966. The official reason 
for the replacement of Elola Olaso with Samaranch was the former's ill 
health. 1e At the time, however, it was common knowledge that he was 
removed by his superior, the Minister-Secretary for the Movimiento Jose 
Solis, because of the continued Spanish failures in the Olympics and in 
other international competitions. 19 Unlike Samaranch, Elola Olaso was 
sufficiently honest upon leaving to admit that Spanish sport was not in 
perfect condition: 
"There is still a great deal to be done. In the path followed we 
have committed many mistakes. I am the first person to 
unconditionally accept this, and I blame myself for the failure. "20 
After the lack of public facilities, the other major problem for 
Spanish sport during the Franco period was the profusion of foreign 
imports. The football and basketball teams of Real Madrid, FC Barcelona 
and the other big clubs were packed with foreign players, ' many of whom 
became naturalized Spaniards and played for the Spanish national teams. 
17. Reproduced in Boletin Oficial de la DND (Madrid) No. 387, March 
1969. 
18. See Boletin Oficial de la DND, No. 281, January 1967. 
19. This view has been expressed to the author in many interviews, for 
example with Jose Maria Lorente, and With Juan Jose Castillo, the 
veteran editor of El Mundo Deportivo. 
20. Reproduced in Boletin Oficial de la DND, No. 281, 'January 1967. 
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This Spanish policy of including foreigners 'in the national sports teams 
provoked many protests from other countries over the years. In August 
1953, for example, there were strong Italian protests about the presence 
in the Spanish national pelota team of seven South Americans. In June 
1962, there were vociferous complaints from many countries about the 
Spanish national football team including four foreign-born players in 
the World Cup team in Chile. The Spanish team, nonetheless, failed 
again, but the complaints caused the international football governing 
body FIFA to tighten its rules on imported players representing their 
new country. 21 
The DND would undoubtedly have preferred Spanish-born champions, 
but foreign-born champions were obviously better than none at all. This 
was especially true when they shouted the Falangist Viva Espana slogan 
in the moment of triumph, as did the black Cuban-born boxer Jose Legrä 
upon winning the world featherweight title from Howard qfins tone in 
Porthcrawl in July 1968. 
The handful of sportsmen, whether Spanish or foreign-born, who 
actually achieved something in Francoist Spain did so in spite of rather 
than because of the sporting infrastructure. For every Manuel Santana 
or Jose Legra, there were thousands of Spanish youngsters trying to clay 
tennis or box on patches of waste ground, without the opportunity to 
either use a decent court or gymnasium or be guided by a professional 
coach. 
21. For details of the FIFA rule changes, see World Soccer, October 
1962. 
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In spite of the triunfalista rhetoric that poured every time a new 
Palacio de Deportes was opened, the DND was incapable of providing every 
Spaniard with the opportunity regularly to practise the sport of his 
choice. The DND received inceasingly large sums of money from the 
football pools because its percentage share of the total revenue 
generated constantly rose, and because the total revenue itself also 
increased in proportion to the increase in public interest in the game. 
During the years 1951-1957, the DND received only 3% of the pools 
takings. This share was increased to 10% during the period 1957--1962, 
and from May 1962 onwards to a considerable 22%. Thus in the football 
season 1962-1963, the DND received 261,856,206,280 pesetas, a figure 
which had risen to 1,969,285,473,100 pesetas by season 1971-1972, an 
increase of almost 100%. 22 Not even these sums of money, however, 
allowed the DND to raise the Spanish sporting infrastructure to normal 
European levels. 
A major consequence of this lack of public sports facilities was 
that practically the only sport accessible to the lower classes was 
football. Of course, football also suffered from a lack of pitches and 
training facilities, but the game could be played, unlike most other 
sports, on any patch of ground, in the squares or on the streets, with 
only a ball as essential equipment. Right across postwar Europe, a 
whole generation grew up kicking a football around the empty bombsites 
and in the relatively car-deserted streets. Whilst in most other 
European countries, however, the youngsters gradually began to play on 
22. Figures revealed by examination of the archives of the DND. 
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the newly-laid out grass pitches and in the new sports centres, the 
Spanish boys were compelled by the lack of public sports facilities to 
continue playing on the waste ground and in the streets. 
Partly because of the lack of facilities for other sports, football 
almost completely dominated the sporting life of the average Spaniard 
during the Franco years. As a boy, he would be playing all day in the 
streets, and would quickly be a supporter of one of the big clubs. Upon 
leaving school and begining work, he would be unable to continue playing 
due to lack of time, especially if he was trying to hold down two jobs, 
like so many during the Franco period. Therefore, he only had time to 
read one of the daily sports papers and see his favourite team play on 
Sunday afternoon. Even if he did have time to practise another sport, 
then the lack of public facilities and the high cost of joining one of 
the private clubs would quickly combine to dampen his enthusiasm. 23 It 
is hardly surprising, given these circumstances, that football came to 
be called the deporte-rey in Francoist Spain. 
In conclusion, therefore, it must be said that the most significant 
feature of Spanish sport during the Franco years was the striking 
contrast between the popularity of football as a spectator sport and the 
lamentably deficient sporting infrastructure. - 
23. This has approximately been the sporting history of most of the 
Spanish men who grew up in the Franco period that the author has 
interviewed. For details of the level of sports facilities in 
Francoist Spain compared to other countries, see Cazorla Prieto, op. 
cit., pp. 212-214. 
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It is now necessary to offer a brief illustration of the two 
institutions that governed Spanish football during the Franco years. The 
actions of the DND and the RFEF will be subjected to a close scrutiny on 
many occasions in the seven chapters that will follow. At this point, 
however, it would be appropriate to give an outline of the general 
character of these two institutions, before a conceptual approach to the 
politicization of football is adopted. 
The DND was created by a February 1941 decree signed by Franco 
himself. 24 The full title of the new sports governing body was to be la 
Delegacion Nacional de Deportes de Falange Tradicionalista Espanola y 
de las JONS. In this way, all possibility that sport could maintain a 
degree of independence from the new Francoist political order was 
swiftly destroyed. 
Three reasons can be given for -Sport in Francoist Spain being 
placed under the direction of the Falange. The first reason is that 
none of Franco's ministries had the means to attempt to administer 
sport. Secondly, by assigning sport to the Falange the Franco regime 
demonstrated its desire to apply the same concepts to sport as had done 
the regimes of Hitler and Mussolini, namely that sport should serve as a 
means of "improving the race" and of gaining international respect and 
prestige. 25 The third reason that can be offered is that Franco 
24. Reproduced in Boletin Oficial de la DND, No. 1, April 1943. 
25. This view is shared by Juan Pablo Fusi, Z leading historian of 
twentieth-century Spain, and by Dr. Sheelagh Ellwood, specialist 
Falange historian. For details of the political instrumentalization 
of sport in Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany see Cazorla Prieto, op. 
cit., pp. 170-188. 
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possibly realized that sport was an area in which the potentially 
dangerous Falange could do less damage with their ideas about a new 
radical social order than at, for example, the Finance or Interior 
Ministry. 26 
The founding decree of February 1941 gave the DND, in effect, 
complete contol over Spanish sport, a control far more complete than has 
ever been exercised by a Ministry of Sport in a pluralist democracy, the 
phenomenon having been confined to dictatorships of either the Right or 
Left. 
To begin with, the DND executive committee also served as the 
Spanish Olympic Committee. This arrangement was in clear contravention 
of the International Olympic Committee's rule that national Olympic 
Committees should be strictly "non-political" and have as little conn- 
ection as possible with central government. 27 As was the case with so 
many other international rulings and recommendations, however, the 
Franco regime cynically overlooked this rule. 
The regime-nominated head of the DND, known as the. Delegado 
Nacional de Deportes, was empowered by the February 1941 decree not only 
to name the President and Vice-President of each of the separate Spanish 
sports federations, but also to appoint all of the executive committee 
members of these federations. In addition, the Delegado Nacional was 
26. This view is similarly shared by Dr. Sheelagh Ellwood. 
27. Revealed by examination of the archives of the Spanish Olympic 
Committee. 
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to nominate the Presidents and Vice-Presidents of all the regional 
divisions of each sports federation. As if all of these powers were not 
sufficient to exercise complete control over Spanish sport, the fourth 
article of the decree empowered the Delegado Nacional to veto any 
decision of a national or regional federation that was not to his 
liking. Therefore, if the Delegado's chosen men did not do what was 
expected of them, then he would be able either to replace then with more 
obedient men or simply force them to change their decisions. 
As was pointed out with regard to the RFEF earlier in this 
Introduction, every Spanish sports federation had originally been formed 
by the various local clubs, and had enjoyed a very high level of 
autonomy from central government before the Civil War. The February 
1941 decree completely changed this situation, subjecting the 
federations to a degree of control that would possibly have caused their 
West European counterparts immediately to rebel. 
The DND was a Falangist institution, staffed largely, but not 
exclusively, with Falangists. Inspite of this, however, its first head 
or Delegado Nacional was the army general Jose Moscardo, the hero of the 
1936 siege of the Toledo Alcäzar. Moscardo was an exremely popular 
figure with the Falangists, however, because of the way in which he had 
been built up by the regime's propaganda machinery into a war hero, and 
because of the fulsome way in which he had praised the 200 Falangist 
militiamen who had fought alongside his regular soldiers in the Alcäzar 
siege. 
The appointment of Moscardo as the first Delegado Nacional should 
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properly be seen, as the awarding of a sinecure to an old war hero who 
was tired of the barracks and the parade ground. Despite his passion 
for equestrian sports and clay pigeon shooting, he was scarcely 
competent to be the effective Spanish Minister of Sport for fifteen 
years. Moscardö's ignorance of football, for example, by far the most 
popular and important Spanish sport, was practically total. He hardly 
ever attended a professional football match, not even to award the many 
trophies christened with his own name. In spite of this, however, he 
was the man with the greatest power to influence post-Civil War Spanish 
football. 
As shall shortly be seen in detail, Moscardo hired and fired the 
RFEF officials at very short intervals, in this way assuring that they 
were loyal and obedient Falangists. He was responsible for the 
Falangist-inspired "Blue Period" in football in the 1940s, personally 
insisting upon the introduction of a number of Fascist symbols into the 
game. The two most notable such symbols were the right arm symbol by 
the players and the crowd before every match at all levels, and the 
Spanish national team use of blue shirts instead of the usual red one. 
The powerful, irresistible leadership of Moscardo combined with the 
extensive powers given to the DND in the February 1941 decree to make 
the institution the uncontestably dominant force in Spanish sport. With 
the death of the old war hero in April 1956, the DND lost a certain 
amount of its power and influence. This was also partly due to 
Moscardd's successor, Jose Antonio Elola Olaso, being a rather weak 
personality and a dull, uninspiring leader. 
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Elola Olaso was as little of a sportsman and football expert as 
Moscardo had been. A Falangist volunteer in the Civil War, since 1940 
he had served as the head of the Falange's youth organization the Frente 
de Juventudes, and would have become Minister-Secretary of the 
Movimiento in the Cabinet reshuffle of 1957 had it not been for his 
virulent anti-monarchism. 
Only six months after his appointment to the post of Delegado 
Nacional, it befell to Elola Olaso to withdraw the Spanish team from the 
Melbourne Olympic Games, a gesture ordered by Franco's Consejo de 
Ministros as a protest against the Soviet invasion of Hungary. It is 
possible that Moscardö would have judged this boycott to be both futile 
and damaging for Spanish sport, and therefore have attempted, and most 
probably have succeeded, to persuade the Caudillo and his Cabinet 
against the withdrawal. 29 Elola Olaso, however, obediently accepted 
this decision from above and dutifully did his best to explain it to the 
disappointed sportsmen and sports journalists. 
Elola Olaso will be remembered in football circles for making an 
enemy of the powerful Real Madrid President Santiago Bernabeu. This was 
the consequence of the Delegado's August 1962 decision to prohibit the 
importation of any more foreign footballers, a decision which angered 
Bernabeu because Real Madrid's spectacular successes in the late 1950's 
were largely the product of their foreign stars. The following summer, 
Elola Olaso further annoyed the Real Madrid President by refusing to 
28. This view is shared by Matias Prats, Jose Maria Lorente and Juan 
Jose Castillo, op. cit. t 
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accept the resignations of the unpopular RFEF President Benito Pico 
Martinez and the°national team manager Jose Villalonga. 
His unpopularity with Bernabeu and most of the other influential 
figures in Spanish football contributed towards Elola Olaso's premature 
retirement in December 1966. The other important factor, as already 
stated earlier, was the continued Spanish failure in the Olympic Games 
and other international sporting competitions. 
Elola Olaso was replaced, as was generally expected at the time, by 
Juan Antonio Samaranch, the young director of the DND in Catalonia. 
Samaranch was undoubtably the most intelligent-and able sports 
administrator to emerge from Francoist Spain. A-Catalan of-independent 
means, one of his strengths in rising to the pinnacle of world sporting 
power, namely the Presidency of the International Olympic Committee, 
which he assumed in 1980, was his political ambiguity. He needed to be 
a model Falangist originally to establish himself in the DND, especially 
with the disadvantage of being Catalan, -but, in the 1970s, he realized 
that a move towards the democratic centre was necessary in order to make 
progress in the international Olympic movement. 
Samaranch was, and indeed continues to be, a very popular figure in 
Spanish sport. With regard to football, he was sufficiently wise to 
cultivate the support of the giant clubs Real Madrid and FC Barcelona, 
of both of which he was a fully paid-up member. 29 This support for 
29. Revealed by examination of the archives of Real Madrid, and of FC 
Barcelona. 
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Samaranch from the giant clubs was, on occasions, rather weak, largely 
because of his perseverance with the generally unpopular ban on foreign 
players. In contrast to Elola Olaso, however, he was looked upon by the 
football clubs as a man of`compromise and dialogue, a man genuinely 
committed to the progress of Spanish sport. For these reasons, his 
sacking in September 1970 was both a surprise and a disappointment to 
many involved in the game. 30 
The view exists that Samaranch's dismissal from the post of 
Delegado Nacional was due to the June 1970 Gureceta scandal, in which FC 
Barcelona's Camp Nou stadium was the scene of a violent pitch invasion 
after a dubious penalty award in a tense cup quarter-final match with 
Real Madrid. 31 Consistent with this view was the appointment of the 
Barra secretary Juan Gich as replacement for Samaranch, in an attempt to 
placate the furious Catalans. 
The indignation of FC Barcelona, however, was not directed towards 
Samaranch, a-fellow Catalan and club member, but rather towards RFEF 
President Jose Luis Costa and the chairman of the Central Referees 
Committee Jose Plaza. Furthermore, as shall be seen in greater detail 
in Chapter Eight, Bam had very little influence in the sporting 
corridors of power during the Franco years, because it was viewed as a 
30. This surprise and disappointment felt was expressed to the author by 
many veteran sports journalists, by several sportsmen, for example 
the tennis player Manuel Orantes and the footballer Manuel 
Velazquez, interviewed in Madrid, and also by two former Francoist 
sports officials, the ex-Delegado Nacional Benito Castejön and the 
former RFEF President Pablo Porta. 
31. See, for example, Marca and As, 9-13 September 1970. 
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Catalan club of dubious political character. Therefore, they could not 
have brought about the downfall of Samaranch even had they wanted to. 
The major reason for the removal of Samaranch was that his old 
friend Jose Solis had himself been dismissed by Franco as Minister- 
Secretary for the Movimiento in October 1969. The new Minister- 
Secretary Torcuato Fernandez Miranda followed Solis' example and 
appointed Delegado Nacional his own good friend Juan Gich. 
Compared to Samaranch, Gich was a weak and uninspiring leader, and 
was resented by the majority of the DND staff for being an outsider. 32 
In addition, being the former secretary of FC Barcelona, he was loathed 
and boycotted by an enfuriated Real Madrid, and mistrusted by most of 
the non-Catalan clubs. 
Gich organized, from June 1971 onwards, a massive publicity 
campaign encouraging Spaniards to play more sport, led by the slogan 
Contamos contigo. The campaign, however, met with only very limited 
success, because of both a sporting apathy on the part of the Spanish 
masses, and the acute shortage of public sports facilities. 
Gich made himself popular with the football clubs in May 1975, by. 
finally lifting the ban on foreign players. By 1975, the former Barga 
secretary seemed to have got the measure of the Delegado Nacional post, 
32. Revealed by the author's interviews with staff of the Conselo 
Superior de Deportes, formerly of the DND, in March and April 1986, 
and with Benito Castejön. 
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and was earning the respect of the majority of sportsmen and journalists 
for his consciencious hard work. In July of that year, however, Jose 
Solis made as surprise return to the post of Minister-Secretary of the 
Movimiento, and immediately tried to bring back his friend Samaranch 
to head the DND. Samaranch, though, had ambitions within the Inter- 
national Olympic Committee, and so the position went to the promising 
young technocrat Tomas Pelayo Ros. 
Pelayo Ros was as little of a sportsman as Moscardo and Elola Olaso 
before him, and as such was continually criticised by the ever bolder 
and more independent sporting Press, particularly by the new radical 
weekly Don Balön. 33 In the wake of the complete Spanish 
failure at the Montreal Olympic Games, Pelayo Ros was, as expected, 
dismissed as Delegado Nacional in September 1976. 
By this time the post-Franco transition to democracy had begun, and 
both the Movimiento and the DND were on the point of being dissolved. 
It is perhaps ironic, therefore, that after so many years of being the 
sinecure of ageing was heroes and ambitious Falangists, the post of 
Delegado Nacional was finally offered to a keen sportsman and efficient 
administrator in the shape of Benito Castejön. He was already-a 
respected man in Spanish sports as a result of having efficiently served 
as Samaranch's assistant from 1966 to 1970. 
Although not a member of the party, Castejon was-politically close 
33. See, for example, Don Balön, (Barcelona) No. 27,6 April 1976. 
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to the UCD of Adolfo Suarez, and as such was seen by the new centrist 
political leadership as the ideal man to preside over the transformation 
and democratization of Spanish sport. As shall be seen in greater 
detail in the Epilogue to this thesis, Castejon was to remain in his 
office in the Calle Martin Fierro until the socialist general election 
victory of October 1982, first as head of the provisional Direccion 
General de Deportes, and afterwards of the permanent Consejo Superior 
de Deportes. 
In conclusion, it must be stated that the DND failed in practically 
everything that it attempted to achieve. It failed to transform the 
Spaniards into a nation of sportsmen, largely because it failed to 
construct-the much-needed public sports facilities. The DND also failed 
to obtain much glory for Francoist Spain in the international sports 
competitions. Furthermore, the DND failed to gain the respect of the 
general pyblic, of sportsmen, and of the Press, once the latter had 
11 
-" become courageous-enough to express itself freely. 
>il 
The two major reasons for the general failure of the DND have been 
best expressed by Castejon. 
"The biggest cause of the lack of effectiveness of the DND was the 
extremely low level of State investment in sport, the lowest level 
in post-war Europe except for Portugal, Greece and the Irish 
Republic. This meant that practically the only money the DND had 
to invest in the sporting infrastructure was its share of the 
football pools revenue. The second major reason for this failure, 
in my opinion, is that most of the Delegados Nacionales, and indeed 
most of the Falangist DND staff, were in the job because of their 
political beliefs or personal connections, rather than because of 
any passion for or understanding of sport. I remember how shocked 
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and disappointed I was, upon arriving at the DND as Samaranch's 
assistant in 1966, at the lack of commitment, enthusiasm, 
imagination, efficiency and understanding that I found there. "34 
There was not a huge difference between the general character of 
the DND and the RFEF during the Franco years. By all accounts, the RFEF 
was also led and staffed by unenthusiastic Falangists. 35 Further- 
more, the RFEF, like the DND, failed in its two major objectives: to 
administer domestic football efficiently 
gto 
create a national team that 
would earn international prestige and glory for Francoist Spain. 
Compared to the other European football federations, the RFEF has 
little independence and few functions to perform during the Franco 
period, being sandwiched between the domineering DND and the busy 
regional federations, which administered the juvenile and amateur game. 
The RFEF only had to organize the national league, the Copa del 
Generalisimo, as the national cup tournament was known from 1939 
onwards, and the national team. Nevertheless, as shall be seen on many 
occasions in the course of this thesis, these few functions created a 
whole host-of problems for the RFEF. 
As stated above, it was the clubs who founded the RFEF in 1902 and 
dominated it without governmental interest or interferance until the 
Civil War. From 1939 onwards, however, the clubs were forced to accept 
34. Author's interview with Benito Castejon. 
35. This is the view of Benito Castejon, Pablo Porta, and of the 
majority of veteran sports journalists and football club officials 
who were well acquainted with the RFEF staff during the Franco 
years, expressed in interview to the author. 
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the new sporting order imposed by the DND and General Moscardo, and, as 
shall be seen in detail in Chapter Four, almost completely lost their 
power and influence within the RFEF. It was not until the final year of 
Francoism that the clubs began to regain part of this power and 
influence, after having suffered thirty years in the shadow of the DND. 
DND domination of the RFEF reached its height during the iron reign 
of General Moscardö from 1941 to 1956. As shall be seen below in 
detail, the war hero hired and fired the RFEF Presidents, Vice- 
Presidents and directors at will, regularly demonstrating his lack of 
patience with men who were not sufficiently zealous in applying Fascist 
symbolism to the game, or men who were unable to make the national team 
an unstoppable force in world football. Furthermore, Moscardö 
occasionally used his vast powers to the full extent and actually vetoed 
the decesions of the RFEF executive committee. In May 1950, for 
example, he vetoed the committee's plans for a four-day training camp at 
El Escorial for the national team about to fly to Brazil for the World 
Cup tournament, insisting upon a nine-day camp with a strict. 
disciplinary regime. 36 
The series of short-lived RFEF Presidents began with the retired 
army colonel and Civil War hero Julio Troncoso Sagredo in 1939. ° Under 
his leadership, the right-arm Fascist salute and the singing of the 
Falangist anthem Cara al sol'were made compulsory at every football 
36. Revealed by examination of the archives of the RFEF, in particular 
Circular No. 6 of May 1950. 
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match, at every level. 37 
Troncoso Sagredo died in April 1940, and was replaced as RFEF 
President by Luis Saura del Pan, a good Falangist and the first of six 
Presidents connected with the Real Madrid club, where'he had served as a 
director from 1930-1936. Like Troncoso Sagrado before him, however, 
Saura del Pan died after only one year in office. 
The next President was Javier Barroso, another Civil War army hero, 
connected this time to Atletico de Madrid. Barroso owed his ascendancy 
in large part to the influence of his brother Antonio, a powerful army 
general who would serve as Army Minister from 1957 to 1961. Moscardö 
fired Barroso from the presidency in June 1946, when the blue-shirted 
national team surprisingly lost in Madrid to the Irish Republic, one of 
the few countries as shall be'seen in Chapter Seven, prepared to play 
against Francoist Spain. 
Moscardo replaced Barroso with the Falangist Jesus Rivero Meneses, 
the former DND National Inspector, and another ex-Real Madrid director. 
The brief reign of Rivero Meneses ended in March 1947, after 
humiliatingly heavy defeats for the national team against both Portugal 
and the Irish Republic. Moscardo, however, was not content simply with 
the head of Rivero Meneses. He also dismissed one of the RFEF Vice- 
Presidents, the treasurer and four directors, so frustrated was he with 
the continual failings of the national team. 
37. Information from the archives of the RFEF, in particular Circular 
No. 3 of August 1939. 
38 
Rivero Meneses' successor was Armando Munoz Calero, a Falangist 
doctor who had served with the "Blue Division" fighting against the 
Soviets. He proved to be the most effective President since the Civil 
War, organizing the successful Spanish 1950 World Cup campaign, during 
which he increased his popularity within Francoist circles by sending 
the famous "Caudillo, we have beaten perfidious Albion" telegram to 
Franco minutes after the decisive victory over England. Had he wished, 
Munoz Calero could have remained in the presidency for many more years, 
but in July 1950 he stood down in order to serve as the Spanish 
representative on the executive committee of the world football 
governing body FIFA, and in order to devote more time to his medical 
practice. - 
The next RFEF President was the Falangist Manuel Valdes Larranaga, 
whose lack of commitment to the game was demonstrated in 1952, when he 
accepted the past of ambassador in Venezuela. He was succeeded by 
fellow Falangist Sancho Davila Fernandez, who was ousted by a disgusted 
Moscardo in 1954 after the humiliating World Cup exit at the hands of 
minnows Turkey. A third obedient and unimaginative Falangist to spend 
two years as RFEF President was Juan Touzön Jurjo, Moscardo's eighth man 
for the job in fifteen years. 
Touzön Jurjo was dismissed in 1956 when Elola Olaso assumed the 
leadership of the DND and installed his own man, his "Old Shirt" 
Falangist friend Alfonso de la Fuente Chaos. He was the fourth 
successive Falangist RFEF President, and the sixth one since 1939, the 
other two having been former army officers. These Falangists and 
retired Civil War heroes knew practically nothing about football, and 
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consequently failed to organize the national team and the domestic 
competitions efficiently. Neither were these dull men respected by the 
football clubs, who had become acutely frustrated at their lack of 
influence within the RFEF. 38 All that the clubs could do, as shall be 
seen in Chapter Four, was make recommendations to the RFEF executive 
committee at the annual assembly in July. These recommendations, 
however, could be and frequently were rejected by the Delegado 
Nacional. 39 
Elola Olaso apparently realized the frustration of the clubs, and 
thus decided to change tactics in 1960. His nominee for the RFEF 
presidency was neither a Falangist nor an ex-army officer, but rather 
the Real Madrid director Benito Pico Martinez, whom Elola Olaso hoped 
Would reestablish the confidence of the clubs in both the RFEF and the 
DND. 
This change of tactics, however, proved to be something of a 
failure because of Pico Martinez' uninspiring style of leadership and the 
continual failures of the national team. As shall be seen in detail in 
Chapter Four, the club most hostile in its opposition to Pico Martinez 
was, ironically, Real Madrid. 
38. This frustration was expressed to the author by Raimundo Saporta, 
the Vice-President of Real Madrid, by Agusti Montal, former 
President of FC Barcelona, and by Julio de Miguel, former President 
of Valencia CF. 
39. Revealed by examination of the archives of the DND. In July 1954, 
for example, the RFEF annual assembly recommended that a full-time, 
professional national team manager be appointed, but this proposal 
was rejected by the Delegado Nacional Moscardö. For further 
details, see Marca, 9-10 July 1954. 
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The new Delegado Nacional Samaranch appointed his own man to 
the RFEF Presidency in 1967, but continued with Elola Olaso's tactic of 
installing a director from one of the big football clubs. Samaranch's 
choice was Jose Luis Costa, another Falangist doctor who was on the 
Atletico de Madrid board. Costa proved to be just as ineffective and 
unpopular as all of the Presidents before him. During his reign, the 
national team hit an all-time low when it was eliminated from the 1970 
7 
World Cup qualifying competition by tiny Finland. The clubs angrily 
demanded Costa's resignation, but their lack of power and influence was 
still such that he remained in power until the fall of his overlord 
Samaranch in September 1970. 
The football clubs were gradually reasserting their influence 
within the RFEF, and instead of weekly accepting the decisions of the 
Delegado Nacional and his appointed President, they were becoming 
highly critical of the entire Francoist sporting hierarchy. The- 
criticisms of the clubs were were partly inspired by a new generation of 
dynamic and critical sports journalists, led by the previously mentioned 
Julian Garcia Candau, Jose Maria Garcia and Alex J. Botines. 
The next RFEF President to have to work in this increasingly 
critical ambience was Jose Luis Perez Payä, on paper a good choice by 
Delegado Nacional Juan Gich. Perez Payä, as shall be seen in Chapter 
Two, had been a Falangist football or playing for both of the Madrid 
clubs, before devoting himself to his law practice. He annoyed the 
clubs with his vacilation over the two major football problems of the 
day: the scandal of the South American players entering with false 
documents in a bid to traverse the ban on foreign players; and the 
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difficult question, as shall be seen in Chapter Five, of affiliation to 
the social security system for the players. Perez Payä had little 
capacity to solve either problem, being, in his own words, "sandwiched 
between the critical, demanding clubs on one side, and the intrasigent, 
uncomprehending DND on the other". 40 Furthermore, the national team 
failed to yield better results, being unable to qualify for the 1974 
World Cup. Given these problems and the subsequent criticisms, it is 
rather surprising that Perez Payä managed to remain in the presidency 
until being replaced by Pablo Porta in May 1975. 
Earlier in this Introduction, the irony of Benito Castejön, 
probably the most effective and certainly the most popular Delegado 
Nacional during the whole of the Franco dictatorship, being appointed 
right-at the end of that institution's existence was commented upon. 
The appointment of Porta should be seen in the same light, being largely 
regarded as the most effective RFEF President since the CivilWar. 41 
Like most of his predecessors, he had a Falangist past, having been a 
young blue volunteer in the Civil War, and then serving as the Falangist 
head of Catalan university sports from 1944 to 1947. He then dedicated 
himself to his business interests, later working as the secretary of the 
Espanol club, the footballing haven for Francoists in Barcelona, during 
the period 1958-1962. In 1962, Porta was appointed to the executive 
committee of the RFEF by Elola Olaso, and two years later to the 
presidency of the Catalan regional federation. Porta himself claimed 
40. Author's interview with Jose Luis Perez Payä. 
41. This is the view of the majority of the author's interviews, for 
example Benito Castejön, Jose Luis Perez Payä, Raimundo Saporta and 
Agusti Montal. 
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that he was offered the RFEF Presidency by Samaranch in 1976 and then by 
Gich in 1970, but turned down both offers because he realized that it 
was an extremely difficult post that would leave him with no time for 
his business interests. 42 
Porta finally accepted the presidency in May 1975, having been very 
critical of Perez Payä's leadership. As shall be seen in the Epilogue, 
Porta was so popular a President that he was re-elected three times by 
the democratic system that he himself had designed, and only retired in 
1984 because of a controverý'Ial Socialist government decree that pre- 
vented any sports federation President from remaining in office for more 
than three terms. 
The internal workings of the RFEF workings of the RFEF will be 
examined in detail in Chapter Four. Suffice it to say at this point, in 
conclusion, that the RFEF during the Franco years was a largely 
ineffective institution, chiefly as a result of being dominated by the 
equally unpopular and ineffective DND. The power and influence of the 
football clubs was strictly limited, which caused them to be 
increasingly critical of both the DND and the RFEF. The RFEF Presidents 
and directors were, in general, inept and uninspiring men, chosen by the 
various Delegados Nacionales for their political record, connections 
with the Madrid clubs, and docile and obedient personalities rather 
than for any knowledge of football or qualities of leadership. 
42. Author's interview with Pablo Porta.. 
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These leaders obviously prejudiced the international performances 
of the Spanish national team, and rarely managed to organize the 
domestic competetions efficiently. 
Of the 73 leagues and cups disputed during the Franco years, 60 of 
them were won by one of Spain's gianlfour football clubs, Real Madrid, 
FC Barcelona, Athletic de Bilbao and Atletico de Madrid. 'The "Big 
Four", therefore, won 80% of the trophies contested, or, expressed in 
another way, their monopoly of success was broken by a smaller club only 
once every five years. 
Although the "Big Four" clubs will feature heavily in the chapters 
that follow, it seems appropriate at this point to offer a brief 
illustration of the political character of each one during the Franco 
years. 
In particular, a special study of the political significance of the 
Real Madrid club should be made here. Indeed, an entire monographic 
study would be required to explain fully the political role played by 
that club during the Franco period. The objective of the following 
section is to offer a brief resume of the reasons for considering Real, 
on the one hand, to be the "proud and conscious team of the regime", 43 
or, on the other hand, the "defenceless victim of Francoist exploitation 
and manipulation". "" 
43. Author's interview with Manuel Väzquez Montalbän. 
44. Author's interview with Jose Maria Lorente. 
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This is a debate that has been held in thousands of Spanish bars 
and dinner tables, and the central figure is always Santiago Bernabeu, 
the domineering figure who presided over the fortunes of Real for a 
remarkable thirty-five years, from 1943 until his death in 1978. 
According to the great majority of Real Madrid supporters and a good 
number of sports journalists, 45 Bernabeu was a charismatic leader whose 
success had nothing to do with the Franco regime, but rather everything 
to do with his own commitment and imagination. According to many 
supporters of other clubs and critical sports journalists such as Manuel 
Vazquez Montalbän, +6 Julian Garcia Candau47 and Alex J. Botines, 48 
however, Bernabeu was an obvious Francoist who clearly took advantage of 
the favours lent to the club by the regime, which helped Real to achieve 
their five politically significant European Cup victories. 
The arguments against Bernabeu and Real may be reduced to the 
following five accusations: firstly, that Bernabeu was a Francoist who 
attempted to emulate Franco in his leadership of the club; secondly, 
that the great majority of the Real members and supporters were also 
Francoists; thirdly, that the club cultivated and was proud of the 
support of the Franco himself and most of his ministers; fourthly, that 
Real, because of this official support, dominated the RFEF and thus 
benefited from partial referees; fifthly, that the club consciously 
45. This is the view of the majority of veteran Madrid sports 
journalists, for example Jose Maria Lorente, Rodolfo Belarmino 
"Belarmo" of Marca, and Enrique Gil de la Vega "Gilera", as well as 
of most of the veteran Real Madrid supporters interviewed by the 
author. 
46. Author's interview with Manuel Vazquez Montalbän. 
47. Author's interview with Julian Garcia Candau. 
48. Author's interview with Alex J. Botines. 
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allowed itself to be used by the Franco regime in order to improve both 
the general overseas image and the concrete diplomatic position of 
Francoist Spain. 
With regard to the first charge, a brief study of the personal 
history of Bernabeu is enough to confirm his support for Franco. The 
son of a provincial lawyer, he studied Law himself in Madrid. His time 
in the capital, however, was mostly taken up by playing centre-forward 
for Real Madrid in the period 1912- 1927, and afterwards as trainer, 
secretary and director at the club. His administrative post at the 
Ministry of Finance and the 700 hectares farm which he inherited from 
his father made him a man of independent means. Upon the outbreak of 
the Civil War, he took refuge with several Real friends in the French 
embassy for two years. In 1938, Bernabeu managed to escape from Madrid 
and enlist as a Lieutenant in the Nationalist army. He then took part 
in the conquest of Cuenca under the command of Camilo Alonso Vega, and 
afterwards in the invasion of Catalonia with General Agustin Munoz 
Grandes. After the conflict, he returned to Madrid and the boardroom of 
Real, beginning his long presidency in September 1943. This personal 
history is sufficient to confirm Bernabeu's political sympathies. 
Furthermore, he made a number of politically revealing statements over 
the years, for example: 
"I am not political. In the war I was a volunteer against Commun- 
ism, and I would be again now, in spite of my age. "49 
Bernabeu also followed the Francoist line in expressing contempt for the 
49. Quoted in Garcia Candau, op. cit., p. 92. 
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regionalist movements. In July 1968, he provoked a bitter controversy 
by declaring to Murcia Deportiva: 
"Those who say that I don't like Catalonia are not correct. I love 
her and admire her, in spite of the Catalans. "s" 
9 
Given all of the above, there can be little doubt about the political 
sympathies of Bernabeu. The answer to the question of whether he 
actually attempted to emulate Franco, however, is far less clear cut. 
According to Julian Garcia Candau: 
"Bernabeu wanted to emulate Franco in many things ... In postwar Spain, from the stadium of the six European Cups, t, e, gd as much 
power as any minister, and tried to impose Francois'fßI1the world 
of sport. " 51 
Francisco Cercedo likened Bernabeu's style of leadership to that of 
Franco in the following way: 
"Bernabeu has managed to make his leadership unquestionable, and 
that every discomformity with his management be identified as an 
attack on the most profound essences of the club. " 52 
This particular debate has far more to do with style than deeds. It can 
be argued, as have done both Garcia Candau and Cerecedo, that Bernabeu 
was as sensitive to attacks on his leadership as was the dictator, and 
that Bernabeu, in the same way as Franco, identified himself intimately 
with the interest of the club, and attempted to make every attack on his 
leadership appear as a malevolent attack on the club itself. In March 
1974, for example, he reacted angrily to critics of his dismissal of 
long-serving coach Miguel Mu 
oz, 
calling then "badly-intentioned people 
who don't have the best interest of the club at heart". 53 When the 
debate turns its attention to the deeds, however, the arguments of 
50. Murcia Deportiva, (Murcia) No. 416,27 July 1986. 
51. Garcia Candau, op. cit., p. 92. 
52. Cerecedo, op. cits., Posible, No. 3,15 December 1974. 
53. Quoted in Marca, 17 March 1974. 
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Garcia Candau and Cerecedo lose strength. The only concrete measure 
which Bernabeu can be said to have taken in order to safeguard his 
continued rule was the creation, in 1954, of the Real Madrid "Commission 
of Social Discipline". This Commission was established to discipline 
misbehaving members, to suspend from membership, for example, 
vjkQ s 
supporters who threw missiles or who jeered at their own team they were 
losing. Bernabeu himself was not a member of this Commission, and a 
similar sub-committee existed at practically every other club. It is 
discp ', neö 
possible that this Commissio; i some of Bernabeu's opponents within the 
club, but to suggest that the Commission was a represive instrument 
designed to stifle opposition is to make an exaggerated suggestion for 
which there is no evidence. Bernabeu and Franco were compared for three 
main reasons: firstly, because their ages and years of power roughly 
coincided; secondly, because they both had loyal right-hand men in 
Raimundo Saporta and Luis Carrero Blanco, both of whom were expected to 
succeed their masters, but who, for completely different reasons, 
eventually did not do so; thirdly, as already seen, Bernabeu had fought 
for the Nationalists in the civil war, and was clearly a supporter of 
Franco. Bernabeu certainly did not need, however, to resort to the 
methods of Franco in order to maintain power at Real Madrid for so many 
years. 
With regard to the claim that the great majority of Real 
supporters were also Francoists, 54 it is extremely difficult to offer 
54. This claim has been made to the author in interviews with, for 
example, Manuel Väzquez Montalban, Alex J. Botines, Juliian Garcia 
Candau, the former FC Barcelona player Carlos Rexach, the former 
Athletic de Bilbao players and coaches Irraki Säez, Jose Angel Iribar 
and Javier Clemente. 
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any concrete evidence either against or in support. Since before the 
Civil War Real was generally regarded as the right-wing monarchist 
football club in the capital, and Atletico the republican and slightly 
socialist club. 55 During the Franco period, the majority of Real 
followers appear to have been favourable towards Franco, which the 
socialist and republicans who survived the Civil War seemed to lend 
football support towards Atletico. 5' 
This claim, however, cannot be supported by any statistical 
evidence. It could be pointed out that Franco was always received with 
cheers and applause on his visits to the Estadio Bernabeu, but the same 
would perhaps have happened had he chosen to visit any other stadium, 
except those of FC Barcelona, Athletic de Bilbao and Real Sociedad de 
San Sebastian. Another complicating factor is that Real have always had 
a policy of providing very cheap tickets for+he working classes, far 
cheaper than for Atl 
tico 
or Barca a home matches. It would have been 
impossible for a visitor to the Bernabeu during the Franco years not to 
notice the immense lower class support for the club, although this 
support in itself obviously does not signify anything about the 
political sympathies of the Real followers. The official response from 
Real on this matter is predictably non-committal. As pointed out by 
i 
current President Ramon Mendoza: 
"Amongst our supporters, directors and members, there have been 
and are individuals of the most varied political persuasion. 
55. Garcia Candau, op. cit., p. 50. 
56. This view is shared by many Mad id sports journalists, as well as 
Javier Castedo, the former Atl4ico Madrid Vice-President, and the 
former Atletico players Enrique Collar and Luis Aragongs. 
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Supporting Real Madrid does not mean that you have to be 
politically left, right or centre. "57 
The third claim against the club is that it encouraged and was 
proud of the personal support of Franco and most of his ministers. 58 
Neither side in this debate attempts to deny the high level of regime 
support for Real. The club archives revealed that all of the following 
ministers of Franco were fully paid-up Real members: Manuel Fraga, 
Fernando Mariä Castiella, Jose Solis Ruiz, Gregorio Lopez Bravo, Tomas 
Garicano Goni and Juan Jose Roson. 59 All of these regime men regularly 
ve 
attended matches at the Bernabeu, and made of the club's impressive 
Ciudad Deportiva sports facilities. In additiony the military 
Cacrere 
leaders. Luis1Blanco, Camilo Alonso Vega and Jose Millan Astray were 
all committed Real supporters, and were frequently seen alongside the 
above-mentioned ministers in the VIP box at the Bernabeu. Given all of 
the above, it would be easier to list the regime personalities who were 
not Real supporters. 
W4 
With regard to the dictator himself, the popular vie that he was 
also a Real supporter. He only attended important international 
matches and the annual final of his own cup, always held in the Estadio 
Bernabeu. It is popularly held, however, that he always followed the 
57. Quoted in As, 27 November 1985. 
58. This claim has been made to the author, in interviews with, for 
example Julian Garcia Candau, Manuel Vazquez Montaýpän, Alex J. 
. 
Botines, Jose Angel Iribar, Javier Clemente, Agusti Montal, and the 
current FC Barcelona Vice-President Nicolau Casaus. 
59. Revealed by an examination of the archives of Real Madrid. 
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fortunes of Real on television. 60 There can be little doubt, therefore, 
that Franco and his ministers were Real followers. The important 
question, however, is if the club was proud of and encouragejthis regime 
support. 
= -- °- sir The answer to this question appears to be affirmative 
in both aspects. 
The club encouraged this support by sending official invitation 
letters, personally signed by Bernabeu, to the ministers in question, 
and then informally inviting then to return whenever they wanted. 61 It 
is difficult to imagine how much more encouragement the club could have 
offered. With regard to the question of pride, the official Boletin 
of Real Madrid reveals the satisfaction produced at the club by the many 
ministerial visits, offering photographs and quotations from the 
contented visitors about the splendid hospitality received. This pride 
was most clearly reflected in November 1959, when the Boletin included 
the following editorial in response to some fulsome remarks about the 
club from Foreign Minister Fernando Maria Castiella: 
"Now, when the works of a minister of Spain point out quite 
clearly the national importance of the sporting mission of Real 
Madrid, judging it as a great event in the everyday life and hopes 
of the Spanish people, we believe that we are able to feel proud of 
everything that we have achieved up to the present. "62 
Real Madrid also felt very proud when the various regime ministries 
presented the club with all manner of awards and decorations. The full 
list of these honours was always prominently placed in any of the 
60. See, for example, Garcia Candau, op. cit., p. 50. 
61. Revealed by examination of the archives of Real Madrid, Cop. citJ 
62. Boletin del Real Madrid CF, No. 112, November 1959. 
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i 
official club histories, for examples 75 Afios del Real Madrid. 63 
In spite of all this, however, it is still possible to present a 
convincing argument to the effect the there was absolutely nothing that 
the club could do about this regime support. Furthermore, there were 
unpleasant incidents between Bernabeu and the Civil War hero General 
Jose Millan Astray, and afterwards with the Minister for Agriculture 
Rafael Cavestany. - In March 1955, Bernabeu expelled Millar Astray for 
creating a scandal with his kissing of the wife of a prominent diplomat. 
The Civil War hero reacted angrily to the expulsion, challenging 
Bernabeu to a pistol duel. The matter was finally resolved by 
Bernabeu's former commander General Munoz Grandes, who pulled rank on 
Millän Astray and ordered him not to return to the stadium. It was also 
Munoz Grandes, who, four years later, upbraided Rafael Cavestany in the 
Council of Ministers, when the latter complained that Bernabeu had 
refused to offer him the seat of honour in the VIPS box. Munoz Grandes 
reminded the Falangist Minister for Agriculture that the stadium 
belonged to Real Madrid rather than to the Spanish State, and that 
Bernabeu should only give up the seat of honour to Franco himself. 
These two incidents, however, serve only to prove that Bernabeu did 
not have to bow down to less important representatives of the Franco 
regime who visited the, Real Madrid stadium. Indeed, these incidents 
could be interpreted as evidence of Bernabeu's privileged position 
Within the regime. 
63.75 Aßos del Real Madrid, Madrid, 1977, p. 14. 
52 
With regard to the fourth allegation against"Real Madrid, that it 
dominated the RFEF and therefore benefited from partisan preference, it 
should first-be pointed out that, as seen earlier in this Introduction, 
no less than six of, the twelve RFEF Presidents during the Franco years 
were connected with the club to come extent. In addition, the RFEF 
secretary from 1949, to 1979, Andres Ramirez, was a paid-up Real member, 
Real Vice-President Gregorio Paunero served as RFEF Vice President from 
1963 to 1977, and the club always had another representative besides 
Paunero on the executive committee of the RFEF. Given this numerical 
superiority of Real representatives and the lack of democracy within the 
RFEF, it is not surprising that the club was regarded as being highly 
influential. This opinion has been expressed most unequivocally in the 
Barcelona sports newspapers, in the FC Barcelona club magazine Barra and 
in several Basque and other regional newspapers. '4 Indeed, several 
campaigns have been launched by the Catalan newspapers in an attempt to 
uncover hard evidence of Real's domination of the RFEF, the most 
controversial one being that organized by Dicen in the autumn of 1977.65 
Nevertheless, none of these campaigns has turned up any substantial 
proof of unfair practices. 
The biggest source of controversy concerning Real Madrid and the 
REEF during the Franco years was, without doubt, the referees. It has 
64. See, for example Barca No. 760,9 June 1970, El Mundo 
Deportivo, 14 November 1973; Bar a No. 1006,24 February 1975; 
Dicen, 21 February 1977; Sport,, 330 April 1979; El Mundo Deportivo, 
4 October 1979; La-Gaceta del Norte, 10 January 1981; Dicen, 23 
April 1981; El Heraldo de Aragon (Zaragoza), 
2 December 1982. 
65. See Dicen, from 27 September-24 October 1977. 
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always been alleged in Catalonia, the Basque Country and the other 
regions, that Real systematically benefited from partisan refereeing of 
their matches, and that this partisanship substantially contributed 
towards the club winning so many leagues and cups. 66 Real Madrid and 
the sporting press of the capital have consistently ridiculed these 
allegations, claiming that they were based on envy and frustration 
rather than on concrete evidence. 67 
Examination of the archives of the RFEF, the DND, and the major 
football clubs reveals that there is indeed no evidence to support these 
allegations against Real Madrid. 6B Some referees, for example Emilio 
Gureceta and Juan Ortiz de Mendivil, appear to have favoured Real in 
crucial matches, others, howevers, appear to have favoured another of 
the big clubs, occasionally at the expense of Real. In June 1968, for 
example, the partiality of Antonio Rigo towards FC Barcelona in the cup 
final provoked a shower of missiles from the Real supporters and a 
strong protest from Bernabeu. 
It appears that certain ambitious referees decided deliberately to 
favour one of the big clubs in particular, with the objectives of being 
placed on the UEFA and FIFA lists, and thus handling lucrative European 
66. See for example: Dicen 27 September-24 October 1977, El Mundo 
Deportivo, 4 October 1979; La Gaceta del Norte, 10 January 1981. 
This claim has also been made to the author in interviews with, for 
example, Alex J. Botines Nicolau Casaus, Jose Angel Iribar, and 
Javier Clemente. 
67. See, for example; Marca, 15 June 1977,23 October 1978 and 17 May 
1981; As, 11 September 1978 and 24 October 1978. This view is also 
shared by Raimundo Saporta. 
68. Revealed by examination of the archives of the DND, the RFEF, Real 
Madrid, Atletico de Madrid, FC Barcelona, and Athletic de Bilbao. 
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and international matches. A strong recommendation that a certain 
referee be placed on these lists from one of the big clubs was often 
sufficient. It was not in the interests of an ambitious referee, 
however, to upset-another, of the "Big Four" clubs. The RFEF has always 
operated a bizarre and unique recusacion system, whereby every club can 
name one referee per season whom it does not want to have handling its 
matches. To be blacklisted by one of the "Big Four" clubs always meant 
the end of a-referee's international ambitions, and therefore many 
referees appeared to favour one of the big clubs in particular, but 
without offending the others. This was obviously done at the expense of 
the smaller clubs, because to be blacklisted, for example, by Murcia or 
Valladolid was not a serious obstacle in the path of an ambitious 
referee. Thus whilst the "Big Four" vociferously complained whenever 
they-believed themselves to be the victim of partiality, the modest 
clubs were largely forced to suffer in silence. 
The only irrefutable fact about the whole issue is that Spanish 
referees have been generally very poor by European standards, and this 
continues to be the case. This explains why so few of them have risen 
up high on the UEFA and FIFA list. 
Another area in which it is alleged that Real Madrid benefited 
from their influence within the RFEF was the venue of the cup finals. 
From 1947 onwards, these finals were always played at the Estadio 
Bernabeu, even on the six occasions when Real was one of the finalists, 
thus converting the occasion into an effective home match. 
Nevertheless, it can be argued that these cup finals were played 
55 
in the Bernabeu not because Real dominated the RFEF, but because 
the RFEF was dominated by the completely centralist Franco regime, in 
the shape of the DND and the Movimiento. 69 The DND ruled, in March 
1941, that the final of every sporting competition should be held in 
Madrid. 70 The Estadio Bernabeu was chosen as the venue because it was 
the largest stadium in the capital city, the same as Wembley Stadium in 
London or Parc des Princes in Paris. Indeed, it could even be argued 
that this centralism actually worked against Real, because the opposing 
teams in the six finals were spurred on by a sense of injustice and so 
played especially hard, with the result that Real were surprisingly 
defeated in front of their own supporters on no less than four 
occasions. Furthermore, on the two occasions when Real did win the cup 
final in the Bernabeu, the merit of victory was partially stripped by 
the general opinion that their triumph was inevitable and unjust. 71 
It is very difficult to conclude, therefore, that Real Madrid 
benefited greatly from the alleged partiality of the referees and from 
the Bernabeu being the venue of the cup finals. Indeed, the Madrid 
club's domination of the RFEF was more apparent than real. Six of the 
RFEF Presidents during the Franco years were connected with the club, 
but this does not appeared to have been an important factor in Real's 
many domestic successes. Furthermore, it should be taken into account 
that, as already pointed out in this Introduction, the influence of the 
69. This view is shared by Raimundo Saporta, Benito Castejon, Jose Luis 
Perez Pays, and Pablo Porta. 
70. Revealed by examination of the archives of the DND. 
71. This opinion was cautiously expressed, for example, by El Mundo 
Deportivo, 25 June 1962, and by Dicen, 19 June 1975. 
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clubs as a whole within the RFEF was minimal during the Franco years, 
and also that Santiago Bernabeu was twice so exasperated by the actions 
of the RFEF that Real actually boycotted its annual assemblies and 
executive coaittee ieetings. The first such unprecedented boycott 
occurred as a protest against the presidency of the former Real director 
Benito Rico Martinez, and lasted from 1963 to 1966. The second boycott 
was directed against the unpopular Jose Luis Perez Payä, another RFEF 
President with Real Madrid connections, and ran from 1970 to 1974. 
The fifth and final claim against Real Madrid is that it 
deliberately allowed its many international successes to be exploited by 
the Foreign ministry, in order to improve both the poor general overseas 
image and concrete diplomatic position of Francois Spain. 72 The way in 
which the overseas victories of the club helped the Franco regime has 
best been suited up by Alex J. Botines: 
"Real Madrid has been, for years, the club that has best served 
the regime. Real Madrid has paraded across the whole continent 
the importance of a country which has a forced evaluation with 
regard to everything European. Our sub-development found in Real 
Madrid an exception which allowed Spaniards to go abroad "with 
bead held high" 73 
Neither supporters nor critics of the club have attempted to deny the 
validity of this assertion. The questions of how and to what extent 
Real Madrid served as an aabassador for the Franco regime, however, will 
be dealt with in detail in Chapter Seven rather than here. what is in 
debate here, in this brief discussion of the general political 
72. This claim has been made to the author in interviews with, ýpr 
example, Miguel Vidal of As, Juliän Garcia Candau, Manuel Vazquez 
Montalbin, Nicolau Casaus, Jose Angel Iribar, and Javier Clemente. 
73. Botines, op. cit., p. 71. 
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significance of Real Madrid, is whether the club was conscious, even 
proud, of helping the regime in this way. 
The key figure in this debate is Raimundo Saporta, the Real Vice- 
President who, according to Juliän Garcia Candau, used regularly to 
receive detailed instructions from his close friend and Real member 
Fernando Maria Castiella, Franco's Foreign Minister from 1957 to 1969, 
about how the club could help improve the image of the country when 
travelling abroad. '4 Saporta has not attempted to deny the existence of 
these instructions, but does not accept that the club was systematically 
manipulated by the Franco regime. 
"It is true that Castiella used to advise me before certain trips 
abroad, but only about strict matters of protocol, for example how 
to address particular Heads of State. It is ridiculous to suggest 
that Real Madrid was the ambassador of the Franco regime. As 
Castiella himself said, we were the ambassadors for Spain as a 
whole, and obviously proud of being so. But no strict political 
interpretation can be placed on this. Real Madrid improved the 
overseas image of Spain by winning the European Cup six times with 
attractive attacking football, causing queues for tickets wherever 
we played. If Spain at the time had a government of the Centre or 
the Left, then they would have basked in the reflected glory of our 
triumphs in the same way as the Franco government did. This is 
what every government of whatever kind does when its sportsmen are 
successful. Whatever the case, I can certainly assure you that 
Real Madrid would have behaved exactly the same abroad whatever 
government Spain had in the 1950s and 1960s. "74 
Saporta's arguments can be said to raise more questions than they 
resolve. Even if it were true that Real was proud of being an 
aabassador for Spain in general rather than for the Franco regime in 
particular, in itself a debateable claim as shall shortly be seen, for 
74. Author's interview with Raimundo Saporta, 
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( 
the Europe of the 1950s and 1960s, Spain largely signified Franco. In 
the case of a sporting team helping to improve the overseas image of a 
generally ostracized country, the institution which will obviously 
benefit the most from this improvement is the government of that 
particular country. There is enough evidence, however, to suggest that 
Real Madrid was conscious and proud of being an ambassador for both the 
country and the regime. The club Boletin proudly reproduced the many 
letters received from the Foreign Ministry and other institutions of 
the Franco regime, congratulating Real on its splendid ambassadorial 
work.? Furthermore, Santiago Bernabeu often spoke about the subject, 
for example in December 1960, when he responded in the following way to 
a laudatory speech from the Delegado Nacional Elola 01aso, during one of 
his many visits to see Franco at his El Pardo residence: 
" Your Excellency: the pleasing words of our Delegado Nacional de 
Deportes fill us with satisfaction, because, although humble, our 
club has, as indeed we all have, a deep-rooted love and duty for 
our country, and the idea of looking for and findings, with 
whatever pretext, something that is useful for the glory and 
prestige of Spain, is profoundly etched into our awareness. "76 
Bernabeu was for more explicit eight years later, in an interview 
with Pedro Rodriguez of Arriba,, expressing the pride caused in him by 
the praise heaped upon Real Madrid by Franco's Foreign Minister. 
"Do you know, Rodriguez, who is the Foreign Minister?... Yes, 
Castiella. Have you read what he has said about Real Madrid? Here 
is the cutting. Senor Castiella says: "Real Madrid is a complete 
sporting style. Its players are authentic ambassadors of 
sportsmanship. " These are the things that give us strength. "77 
75. See, for example, Bolet n del Real Madrid CF, No. 28, October 1953, 
and No. 132, May 1961. 
76. Boletin del Real Madrid CF, No. 128, January 1961. 
77. Quoted in Arriba, 26 December 1968. 
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It could be argued that this is sufficient proof of the fact that 
Real was proud of serving as an effective ambassador both for Spain and 
the Franco regime. It remains to be seen in detail in Chapter Seven how 
and to what extent the club served as, in the words of Foreign Minister 
Castiella, "the best embassy that we have sent abroad. "" 
It'is appropriate at. this point to draw together the different 
conclusions arrived at in the light of the limited evidence presented in 
this Introduction about the political significance of Real Madrid during 
the Franco years. These conclusions are: that Bernabeu was an obvious 
Francoist, but he had no need to imitate the methods of the dictator in 
order to retain power; that the majority of Real supporters were 
probably also Francoists, although the definitive proof of this 
obviously does not exist; that-Real was the club of Franco and of most 
of his ministers, and was proud of being so; that the club did not 
dominate the RFEF, and consequently did not benefit from the systematic 
partiality of the referees; that Real was a conscious and proud 
ambassador for both Spain and the Franco regime. 
It is possible to terminate this brief introductory debate about 
Real Madrid with two contrasting opinions, a radical critique of the 
club's political significance, following by the official response from 
Real. This is the opinion of Francisco Cerecedo about the club during 
the Franco years: 
"Even at the risk of flattery, it is necessary to do justice by 
affirming that Real Madrid has been the non-official institution 
C 78. Quoted by Julian Garcia Candau, "Cuarenta aflos del national- 
futbolismo, El Pais Semanal, 27 February 1977. 
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which has most identified itself with, and the most brilliant 
services has lent to, the regime. Not even its most convinced 
enemies could dispute this. Everybody can see the innumerable 
official awards, decorations and congratulations which have been 
bestowed upon the club over the years. "79 
The Vice-President of the club, both during the Franco period and 
now, however, not surprisingly holds a different view: 
"Real Madrid is and has been apolitical. It has always been so 
powerful because of being at the service of the vertebral column 
of the State. When it was founded in 1902, it respected Alfonso 
XIII, in 1931 the Republic, in 1939 the Generalisimo, and it now 
respects his majesty Don Juan Carlos. This is because it is a 
disciplined club, which obeys the institutions that leads the 
nation with loyalty. "80 
It is not necessary to offer such an exhaustive study of FC 
Barcelona, the bitter rival of Real Madrid, because the political 
significance of the Catalan club during the Franco years will be 
examined in detail in Chapter Eight. It is only appropriate here to 
offer a brief introductory sketch of the general nature of Bam a, 
considered to be the best supported and most economically powerful 
football club in the world. "ei In spite of all the European cups and 
domestic trophies, Real Madrid has never had either as many supporters 
or much financial power as Bam, because the latter has served as the 
effective Catalan national football team, and as such is able to count 
on, to some extent or other, the support of practically all of that 
region's six million inhabitants. 
79. From Cerecedo, op. cit. 
80. Quoted in El Pals, 3 December 1978. 
81. World Soccer, March 1984. 
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The struggle between Real Madrid and FC Barcelona has always been 
one of the central features of Spanish football. This struggle has been 
fought at three levels: firstly, as a purely sporting struggle between 
the country's two giant football clubs; secondly, as a regionalist 
struggle between the clubs representing Castille and Catalonia; thirdly, 
as political struggle, especially during the Franco years, as shall be 
seen in Chapter Eight, between a club generally considered to be right- 
wing and Francoist, and another with the image of being liberal and 
anti-Francoist. This struggle was astutely summed up by Alex J. 
Botines: 
"What is very clear in Spanish football is that the game is, in 
reality, a weekly political confrontation. Real Madrid represents 
something, and the Barcelona supporter knows it; Barca represents 
something else, and the Real Madrid supporter also knows it. "82 
The enormous support and economic power of FC Barcelona, however, 
has never been translated into consistent success on the field. The 
club claims that this lack of success was due, during the Franco period, 
to the persecution and unfavorable treatment of all things Catalan. 83 
Nevertheless, this is not the only reason that can be put forward. 
Until the 1960s, the Barca team was formed by a majority of Local 
Catalan players, supplemented by three or four stars from outside 
Catalonia or from abroad. In the early 1960s, however, this policy 
changed. 
82. From Botines, op. cit., p. 71. 
83. This claim was made to the author by Agusti Montal, Nicolau Casaus 
and Caries Rexach. 
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In an attempt to emulate the success of Real Madrid with the most 
cosmopolitan team Spain had seen, Barra began to-spend massively on 
importing foreigners and buying any, Spanish player who demonstrated 
potential. These big names often brought with them scandal and 
controversy, but very few performed to better effect than the old 
Catalan stars. In consequence, RAqa won the Spanish league 
championship on only one occasion during the 23-years period from 1961 
to 1984. FC Barcelona gradually became known as the "great under- 
achiever of world football", 84 and this reputation was confirmed by 
their failure to beat modest Steaua Bucharest in the 1986 European Cup 
I final in Seville. 
It is paradoxical that although the Baýrca team has gradually lost 
its Catalan character, the club has gradually, become one of the most 
politically and socially sigificant Catalan institutions. FC Barcelona 
was a dynamic centre of Catalan sentiment before the Civil War, 
especially during the agitation for the Autonomy Statute. "85 After the 
conflict; however, because of the repression of all things Catalan, the 
club acquired an absolutely crucial political and social significance. 
The matches in the Les Corts and afterwards Camp Nou stadia offered a 
regular opportunity for thousands of Catalans to congregate and speak 
in their officially forbidden, Mother tongue, sing outlawed traditional 
songs such as La Santa Espina and Els Sepadors, channel their political 
frustration into a loathing of Real Madrid, and, from the late 1960s on 
wards, wave the illegal Catalan national flag the sen era. This social 
84. World Soccer, March 1984. 
85. Artells, op. cit. 
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and political significance of the club has been best summed up by the 
Bam supporter Manuel Vazquez Montalbän: 
"Barga is the only legalized institution that unites the man in the 
street with the Catalonia that could have been and never was... This 
is as important an institution as the Monasteryof Montserrat , the 
Omnium Cultural, the Institut d' Estudis Catalans or L'Orfeo 
Gracienc . "86 
The directors, players and supporters of FC Barcelona have been 
frequent visitors to Montserrat, the celebrated Catalan religious 
centre. The abbot of the monastery, Dom Cassia Just, was a 
controversial figure because of his support for the famous December 1970 
lock-in by leading Catalan artists and intellectuals at Montserrat. In 
November 1974, Just's welcoming speech to the visiting Bar; a party 
included both the common place about FC Barcelona being "more than just 
a football club", and also a reference to the crucial importance of the 
club in assimilating into Catalan society the thousands of immigrants 
from southern Spain: 
"Barra is much more than a football club, although, naturally, the 
sporting results have a basic importance, and Montserrat represents 
and is much more than a monastery. One of the most positive values 
that I find in FC Barcelona is that it helps the people from afar, 
the immigrants who come from other parts, to integrate themselves 
into Catalonia. Bam is one of the most friendly and efficient 
ways of welcoming with open arms the thousands and thousands of 
immigrants, who, after a short while, are cheering for the same 
colours as the native supporters. "07 
It was indeed a permanent source of frustration to the Espaßol club, 
Bargas local rivals, that the great majority of immigrants from the 
South began to support FC Barcelona instead of themselves. 00 
86. From Vazquez Montalbän, op. cit., p. 120. 
87. Quoted in Barga, No. 922,19 November 1974. 
88. This frustration has been expressed to the author by Antonio Baro, 
the Espafiol President since 1971, and several Espafiol supporters. 
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The conclusion of Emilio Perez de Rosas and Alfredo Relano writing 
in El Pais Semanal was that the character of the club during the Franco 
years should be best understood as the expression of the Catalan's 
phobia towards centralism: 
"There has been a phobia towards centralism, the great phantom to 
the Catalan people, and which makes them look upon Espaßol as a 
spectra in their own house. It is a phobia which identified Real 
Madrid as another arm of the represion, as an instrument to 
reinforce the centralist image of the state. And it is a phobia 
which forgets that from 1939 until the arrival of Di Stefano (the 
Argentine star whose transfer provided a row with political 
undertones between FC Barcelona and Real Madrid) in 1953, that is 
to say during the years of the fiercest doctrinaire Francoism, 
Real Madrid did not win the league, but Barcelona often'did. "89 
It is frequently claimed that Athletic de Billbao, the third of 
Spain's "Big Four" football clubs, was as potent a political symbol in 
the Basque Country during the Franco years as Barga was in Catalonia. 90 
In spite of this claim,; however, it would be difficult to find two more 
different clubs. Whilst FC Barcelona has always been profligate with 
its money, buying expensive players from abroad and from the other 
Spanish regions, since 1919 Bilbao has had a strict policy of only using 
local Basque players, the great majority proceeding from their famous 
youth training schemes. Whilst Barra has wanted to present the image 
of a rich cosmopolitan and internationally ambitious club, Bilbao has 
always been regarded as, a homely and friendly club, not desperate for 
success, but rather sufficiently patient to wait for the youngsters to 
convert themselves into another formidable team. 
89. El Pais Semanal, 12 October 1982. 
Po .0 aki Saez, Jose Angel 90. This claim has been made to the author by: In 
Iribar, Javier Clemente, many Athletic de Bilbao supporters, and 
also by Howell Llwellyn in World Soccer, April 1982. 
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It is remarkable that a club which only uses local talent should 
have won as many trophies as has Athletic de Bilbao. The "Lions of the 
North", as they are popularly known, completely dominated Spanish 
football at the beginning of the century, in the 1930s until the Civil 
War, and again in the 1940s. Between then and the 1980s, when the glory 
days returned again, Bilbao were always placed high in the league and 
were frequent winners of the Copa del Generalisimo. The other Basque 
clubs, Real Sociedad de San Sebastian and Osasuna de Pamplona, have also 
followed a policy of local players only, but with only a tiny fraction 
of the success enjoyed by Bilbao. 
The major reason for this success has been Bilbao's rapid and 
direct style of play, with a profusion of long, high centres, a style 
adopted both because of the huge British influence at the club and 
climatic conditions. As shall shortly be seen in Chapter Two, this 
style allegedly personified the mythical, politically significant 
"Spanish Fury". 
With regard to the political importance of Athletic de Bilbao, the 
pre-Civil War support for the Autonomy Statute and the fund-raising 
Euzkadi team have already been discussed in this Introduction. After 
the conflict, the club served as a centre for Basque dissent against the 
centralist, reprressive Franco regime in much the same way as did FC 
Barcelona in Catalonia. There was, nonetheless, one big difference. 
Beyond their respective regions, Bilbao has always been far more popular 
than Bar a, as evidence by the Basque club having, in 1968,293 local 
supporters clubs outside the Basque provinces, compared to FC 
Barcelona's 43 outside Catalonia. 91 It has been alleged that the 
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existence of so many Bilbao supporters clubs during the Franco years had 
a partially political motive, because the club was seen as anti- 
Francoist symbol by disaffected workers across the whole of Spain. '2 
The fourth of the "Big Four" clubs is Atletico de Madrid, founded 
in 1903'as a nursery club of Athletic de Bilbao. This original link 
between the two clubs explains the similarity in name and colours. The 
Bilbao connection, however, was definitely severed in 1922. In 
comparison to local rivals Real, Atletico has always had the reputation 
of having a large socialist and Republican element among its 
supporters. 93 There is indeed evidence to suggest that the great 
majority of Atletico supporters voted for the Popular Front coalition in 
the elections during the Second Republic. 94 It also seems that the 
socialists and Republicans who survived the Civil War and the subsequent 
purges maintained their footballing allegiance to the club, and 
encouraged their children to do the same, rather than being seduced by 
the glamour and success of Real. 
91. Revealed by examination of the archives of Marca. 
92. This claim was made to the author by Jose Angel Iribar, Javier 
Clemente, and Howell Llewellyn, op. cit. For an interesting account 
of the frenetic celebrations of one particular Athletic de Bilbao 
supporters club, that of the village of Pulpi in Almeria province, 
in Evaristo Acevedo, Carta a los celtiberos esposados, Madrid, 1969, 
pp. 117-118. 
93. See, for example, Garcia Candau, op. cit. This view has been 
expressed to the author by Miguel Vidal, Javier Castedo, Luis 
Aragon'es, Enrique Collar, and by many Atletico de Madrid supporters. 
94. By means of the detailed breakdown of Madrid election results 
offered by Javier Tusell Gömez in La seaunda republica en Madrid; 
elecciones y partidos politicos, Madrid, 1971, pp. 204-220, it 
can clearly be seen that the barrios in which the great majority of 
Atletico supporters lived, namely Latina, Inclusa and Hospital, were 
very fertile ground for the Popular Front coalition. 
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Many Atletico directors, however, were closely linked to the 
Franco regime. The Atletico President from 1956 to 1963 was Javier 
Barroso, former RFEF President and brother of the Minister of War. His 
successor was the self-made millionaire hotel builder Vicente'Calderon, 
decorated many times by Franco himself and a declared regime supporter. 
Amongst the men who have served on the Atletico board of directors have 
been Armando Munoz Calero, the former Falangist Jesus Suevos, the 
Minister for Health and Social Security. 95 This list of regime 
personalities at Atletico is a pale imitation of that of Real Madrid, 
but is sufficient in itself to demonstrate that the leadership of the 
club was clearly Francoist; even if there was an oppositional tendency 
amongst the supporters. 
In addition to these personal links, Atletico was temporarily 
connected to the Franco regime in an institutional way. In October 
1939, the club was taken over by the Spanish Air Force, after Real 
Madrid has preferred to maintain their independence, thus becoming 
Atletico Aviacion. The advantages for the club were generous subsidy 
from the Minister of Air General Juan Yagüe, unlimited petrol and use of 
vehicles, and the right to choose from all of the players serving in the 
Air Force, with first option over those of the Spanish Army. Taking 
these benefits into account, it-is not surprising that Atletico won the 
first two leagues contested after the Civil War. It is perhaps more 
surprising that the club did not win any further trophies before 
returning to its former independent state in April 1946. 
95. Revealed by examination of the archives of Atletico de Madrid. 
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The plans of Vicente Calderon for a new Atletico stadium. in the 
1960s were delayed by the reticence of the Madrid City Council, under 
the chairmanship of future Prime Minister Carlos Arias Navarro, thus 
forcing the club to play their home matches in Real Madrid's Estadio 
Bernabeu during the season 1966-1967. In spite of having been Atletico 
Aviacion and the Francoist club leadership, these stadium problems 
provided the unfounded suggestion that Atletico was being officially 
obstructed for not having been as useful to the Franco regime as Real. 96 
The lack of foundation for this claim was demonstrated by the fact that 
Franco was pleased to accept, in September 1971, Atletico's invitation 
to open the new Estadio Vicente Calderon, and also that Real Madrid 
themselves had trouble, in the early 1970s, with their plans to build a 
new stadium in the northern suburbs of the city. 
With regard to the political significance of-Atletico de Madrid 
during the Franco period, it should be concluded that had the club 
enjoyed more success than its local rivals, then it would have become, 
the "club of the regime" instead of Real, with far more ministers and 
military figures among its directors and supporters. Without doubt, 
this would have annoyed the anti-Francoist element amongst the Atl tico 
followers, but a winning team to put Real in the shade would surely have 
delighted the vast majority of supporters, whatever the political 
consequences of this might have been. 
96. This suggestion was made to the author by several socialist Atletico 
de Madrid supporters, but not by any former player or official of 
the club, neither by any journalist. 
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The objective of this Introduction has been to offer a brief 
illustration of the major institutions of Spanish football during the 
Franco years. It is necessary at this stage to examine the general 
character of the Spanish sporting Press. The most striking feature about 
this sporting Press during the Franco period that it was both very 
extensive and popular, and indeed has lost only a fraction of this 
popularity since 1975. There was at least one weekly sporting paper in 
every single Spanish province, and only a handful of these have since 
disappeared. It was the daily sports papers of the big cities, however, 
which obtained the big sales figures, and this continues to be the case. 
The best-selling sports paper during the'Franco period was the 
Madrid daily Marca, the big money-maker of the extensive Press chain of 
the Movimiento, financing many dogmatic and unpopular provincial 
Falangist papers. Marca was founded in 1938, with the Civil War still 
in progress, by the leading Falangist' Manuel Fernandez Cuesta, the 
brother of the Minister of Agriculture and later Justice, Raimundo. For 
almost thirty years, Marca was the best-selling Spanish newspaper, with 
approximately 400,000 copies purchased daily. 97 As shall be seen in 
detail in Chapter Two, Marca was instrumental in imposing Falangist 
concepts and symbols on Spanish sport in the 1940s, an approach which 
was moderated in subsequent years. 
Marca's excellent sales figure entered a decline from 1967 onwards, 
because of the creation of the rival independent'As in Madrid. It was 
97. Edouard de Blaye, Franco and the Politics of Spain, London, 1976, 
pp. 487-488. 
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only after this decline in sales that ABC and Ya managed to overtake 
Marca in the popularity list. 9e 
In Barcelona, the biggest-seller amongst the sports papers was the 
sensationalist Dicen closely followed by the old-established and staid 
El Mundo Deportivo. Between them, the two accounted for a quarter of 
the total newspaper sales in the Catalan capital with Dicen only being 
outsold by La Vanguardia Espanola. 99 
Two major reasons can be given for the immense popularity of the 
sporting Press in Francoist Spain. The first reason is the massive 
popularity of sport itself, and the second the extremely tedious and 
unimaginative nature of the non-sporting Press, rigidly censored by the 
Ministry of Information and Tourism. This censorship caused most 
newspapers to seek out safe ground in two main areas: foreign rather 
than domestic problems, and as much sporting information as possible 
In spite of this extensive sports coverage, however, the tedium of the 
general newspapers appears to have caused many moderate sports 
enthusiasts to buy one of the specialist sports dailies, bored with the 
persistent political triumphalism and triviality of the likes of ABC, Ya 
and Arriba. 
Approximately half of the sports coverage in both the sporting and 
non-sporting Press centered on football. Except during the summer 
football break, it was only very rarely that another sport managed to 
take the subject matter of the headlines 
wr .I 
98. Edouard de Blaye, ibid. 
99. Edouard de Blaye, ibid. 
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temporarily off football. The normal state of affairs was a daily saga 
of league and cup battles, transfers, injuries, controversies and 
scandals. 
It has been alleged that the sporting journalist was one of the few 
writers whose work was not subjected to the scrutiny of Franco's 
censors. 100 Although, sports journalism was not subjected to the direct 
censorship of the Ministry of Information and Tourism, there was, 
nonetheless, a strict code of practice imposed by the Press and 
Propaganda Commission of the DND. This Commission published its golden 
rule in the Boletin Oficial de la DND in April 1943: 
"It remains absolutely forbidden to publish or print any kind of 
criticism of the Federations, of national or regional character, 
and of the actual behavior of its members. "101 
Thus it was strictly prohibited for the sporting Press to criticize the 
Francoist football authorities, no matter what mistakes they made or 
even what corruption they became involved in. 
This DND ruling was slightly modified in 1958 and again in 1969,102 
but essentially remained the same during the whole of the Franco period. 
The application of the rule was extremely rigid in the immediate post 
Civil War years. In November 1943, for example, Alfonso Bea Martin, the 
sports correspondent of the Teruel Falangist newspaper Lucha, was 
suspended by the DND from his work for six months for having criticized 
the referees of the Aragonese Federation. In March 1952, the RFEF 
100. This opinion was expressed to the author by Jose Maria Lorente, 
Rodolfa Belarmino "Belarmo", and Enrique Gil de la Vega "Gilera". 
101. Boletin Oficial de la DND, No. 1, April 1943. 
102. Revealed by examination of the archives of the DND. 
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President Sancho Davila attempted to exploit to the full the 1943 DND 
ruling. In a note to the sporting Press in general, he asked 
journalists to refrain from printing the declarations of players, 
trainers and directors about referees, as well as complaints about RFEF 
punishments and even rumours of possible corruption. The note 
concluded by requesting the sporting Press to steer clear of: 
"... everything which cannot be considered correct information, 
avoiding unfounded sensationalism and the diffusion of news that 
could serve to upset footballing unity and to slight the supreme 
authority of the RFEF. "103 
The application of the DND ruling became gradually less rigid. 
This relaxation was partly due to the general loosening of the 
censorship undertaken by Manuel Fraga, Minister of Information and 
Tourism from 1962 to 1969, and also to the creation, in 1959, of the 
Spanish Group of Sporting Journalists. This Group, predictably, was 
dominated by the Falangist journalists of Marca, and, also predictably, 
served to maintain conformity and obedience in the world of sporting 
journalism, in a far more subtle and effective way than the DND ruling 
had done. Membership of this Group was obligatory, which created an 
obvious dependency upon the DND and the Marca journalists. This 
dependency has been denounced by many young sporting journalists of the 
1960s, particularly by Alex J. Botines: 
"During the Franco dictatorship, we sporting journalists had 
neither liberty of expression nor professional autonomy. We were 
subjected to the restrictive norms of both the DND and the Group 
of Sporting Journalists, which meant that any article criticle of 
the authorities or any piece of investigative journalism was out 
of the question. I entered sports journalism with lots of hope 
and illusions, but quickly learn that initiative and imagination 
103. Quoted in Viaie al centro de la censura franauista, Cambio 16, 
Madrid, 1985. 
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were actually disadvantages in this profession. All that you were 
supposed to do was to report the goals, take quotations from all 
and sundry, and praise the authorities. "104 
It has also been alleged that many sports journalists during the 
Franco years were paid by the football clubs and the RFEF for writing 
favourable prose. 105 This allegation has been put in print by only two 
writers. The first of these is Botines, who dedicates a whole chapter 
on his book La gran estafa del fütbol espafiol to the issue, recounting 
how, as a novice, he refused a generous monthly supplement to his meagre 
salary from a "great ex-international player" of FC Barcelona. "" The 
other journalist to have put this allegation in writing is Vicente 
Marco, the former head of sport for the extensive radio chain SER. In 
his Historias del deporte he alleged that, whilst in Milan in April 
1966 to cover the European Cup semi-final, he was approached by a Real 
Madrid representative who offered to pay all his hotel bills and 
expenses. 1°7 The same as Botines, he apparently surprised the 
intermediary by refusing the offer. 
Other sports journalists have privately claimed that the RFEF, was 
even more generous than the clubs. 108 It has been alleged that all the 
national team were paid by the RFEF, and, furthermore, that a 
substantial brown envelope was occasionally handed over at the end of 
104. Author's interview with Alex J. Botines. 
105. This allegation was made to the author by Juliän Garcia Candau, 
Alex J. Botines, Juan Jose Castillo, Jose Maria Garcia of radio 
SER, and Antonio Herniez, editor of Sport. 
106. Botines, op. cit., p. 32. 
107. Marco, op. cit., p. 98. 
108. This claim has been made to the author by Julien Garcia Candau, 
Jose Maria Garcia. Antonio Hernäez, and Miguel Vidal. 
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the trip. In order to receive these favours, the sports journalists 
were supposed to use every known superlative to describe the victory, 
or, on the other hand, use every excuse possible to explain away the 
defeat, such as the referee being biased against the Spaniards, the 
opposition violent, or the pitch unfavourable. 
It seems that the existence or the extent of this purchasing of 
sports journalists depended very much upon the club President or 
RFEF 
President involved. It is alleged that the most generous men were the 
Real Madrid President Santiago Bernabeu, the Valencia President Julio de 
Miguel, and the RFEF Presidents Alfonso de la Fuente Chaos, Jose Luis 
Costa and Jose Luis Perez Payä. 109 Other Presidents were apparently 
sufficiently secure inn their positions to not have to resort to these 
methods, or were opposed to the purchasing of sports journalists on 
ethical grounds. 
In conclusion, it must be said that the average sports journalist 
during the Franco years was a dull and unimaginative writer, obedient to 
the demands of his editor and to the restrictive guidelines of the DND 
and the Group, and eager to accept favours from insecure Presidents. 
Nevertheless, a new generation of radical, critical sports writers 
emerged in the 1960 s, headed by Francisco Cerecedo, Julian Garcia 
Candau, Jose Maria Garcia and Alex J. Botines. Not surprisingly, none 
of these was connected to Marca, Spanish national television or radio. 
Furthermore, the Barcelona sports papers as a whole began to adopt a new 
109. This claim has been made to the author by Juliän Garcia Candau, 
Jose` Maria Garcia, Antonio Hernäez, and Miguel Vidal. 
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critical and challenging attitude towards the Francoist sporting 
authorities from the mid-1960s onwards, especially, as shall be seen in 
detail in Chapter Eight, with regard to the allegedly unjust treatment 
of FC Barcelona. 
By way of concluding this brief illustration of the Spanish 
sporting Press, and indeed the Introduction to this thesis, it seems 
appropriate to offer Botines's precise classification of his colleagues 
into four group: 
"There are sports journalists who fulfill their obligations by 
sensationalizing the situations; others who believe themselves to 
be fulfilling it by simply expounding the official version; there 
are those who are considered enemies by this footballing regime 
merely by showing themselves to be difficult on occasions; and 
there are finally those, the worst, who wait for a telephone call 
in order to write not what they think, but rather what those in 
power want to be written. "110 
110. Botines, op. cit., p. 33. 
76 
CHAPTER TWO: FOOTBALL AND FASCISM 
The first of the seven aspects of the politicization of football in 
Francoist Spain to be discussed in this thesis concerns the regime's 
application'of Fascist concepts to the game. Before commencing upon a 
detailed study of the application of these concepts to football, it is 
first necessary to offer a brief history of Spanish Fascism, and an 
outline of its attitude to sport. 
Fascism arrived in Spain in the early 1930s, with the three 
principal founders being the young demagogues Onesimo Redondo, Ramiro 
Ledesma and Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera. Although there were 
considerable ideological and tactical differences between the three, 
there was, ultimately, more that united than divided them. They shared 
an admiration for the movements of Mussolini and Hitler, an obsession 
with defending traditional Hispanic Christian values from the peril of 
godless Marxism, plans for a totalitarian State that would protect the 
workers and eventually create a classless society, and a dream of 
imperialist expansion at the expense of the weaker nations. 
In October 1931, the small, Valladolid-based bands of aggressive 
young militants under the leadership of Redondo and Ledesma combined to 
form the Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional Sindicalista(JONS). Exactly two ` 
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years later, the charismatic Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera, eager to 
defend the former military dictatorship of his father, but anxious to 
lose his aristocratic image, founded the Falange. A marriage of 
convenience between these tiny nascent Fascist groups occurred in 
February 1934, the resultant alliance party being titled Falange 
Espanola de las DONS. 
The Falange was a small and insignificant party until 1936, 
increasingly dominated by the energetic Primo de Rivera. The political 
polarization caused by the coming and the outbreak of the Civil War, 
however, led to a sharp increase in membership, similar to that 
experienced by the Communist Party. The Falangist militias made a 
significant contribution to the Nationalist victory in the conflict. 
The rise of the Falange, however, was to be checked by three body 
blows that were to ensure its eternal political frustration. Firstly, 
in April 1937 Franco adeptly controlled the heady ambitions of the 
Falange by merging it, by means of a Unification Decree, with the 
Carlists, the small Alfonsine monarchist group Renovacion Espafiola and 
the Catholic authoritarian CEDA. The large but ambiguous movement that 
emerged was given the name of Falange Espanola Tradicionalista y de las 
JONS. The second blow to the ambitions of the Falange was the execution 
of Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera in Alicante prison in November 1936 
having been found guilty by the Republican authorities of being a party 
to the military uprising of the previous July. With his death, the 
Falange was deprived of its only popular leader, one of the few men who 
might conceivably have seriously challenged Franco's claim to sole power 
in the event of the Nationalist Civil War victory. The third body blow 
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was the defeat of the Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany in the Second World 
- War, and the consequent impossibility of the realization of Spanish 
imperial ambitions. A large part of the raison d'etre of Spanish 
Fascism was lost with the defeat of the Axis power. 
Franco needed the resources and enthusiasm of the Falange in order 
both to help win the Civil War and to safeguard his personal rule 
afterwards. Under no circumstances was he prepared, however, to allow 
the construction of a one-party Fascist state which would compromise the 
power. and influence of the other groups that had fought equally as hard 
as the Falange to defeat the Republic. Thus, Spain emerged from the 
Civil War with an ostensibly Fascist administration, but without there 
having been a fascist. conquest of the state such as had occurred earlier 
in Italy and Germany. 
Franco skilfully deflected the ambitions of the Falange by giving 
them relatively unimportant areas of power, for example sport. The only 
considerable source of power to which the Falange was allowed access to 
during the Franco years was the extensive "vertical syndicates" 
structure. As a kind of compensation, the dictator continued to pay 
lip service to the Falangist ideology of class cooperation and defence 
of the workers' interests, and insisted upon the use of many Falangist 
symbols, such as the yoke and arrows emblem, the Cara al sol 
battle anthem and the right-arm salute. In the words of Juan J. Linz, 
"the bureaucratized and lifeless structures of the Falange" continued 
to function in Francoist Spain long after the Falangist rhetoric had 
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become rather empty and meaningless for the Franco regime. ' 
Even this rhetoric and these symbols came into question from 1945 
onwards. The post-war anti-Fascist climate in the West, which led to 
the lukewarm United Nations embargo on Francoist Spain, caused the 
dictator to realize the need to improve his overseas image by removing 
the Falangist gestures. In consequence, Franco set in motion a very 
gradual process of "de-fascistification" of his regime. The first 
concession to Western democratic opinion was the September 1945 
withdrawal from Tangier, which Franco had opportunistically occupied in 
1940. In the late 1940s, the formerly obligatory Fascist salute was 
gradually phased out, and a dubious exercise was launched to prove to 
the outside world that the Falange had in fact never been a Fascist 
movement and that the Francoist State had never been a totalitarian 
state. 
In addition to this gradual phasing-out of the Falangist symbols 
and rhetorics, the Alfonsine monarchists and the Opus Dei technocrats 
gradually, but by no means completely smoothly, added to their power and 
influence within the Franco regime at the expense of the Falange. In 
consequence, many veterans of the Falangist Civil War militias and of 
the "Blue Division", the Falangist force sent by Franco to fight 
alongside Hitler's troops on the Russian front, felt cheated and 
manipulated by the dictator. The clearest example of this Falangist 
1. Juan J. Linz, "From Falangeto Movimiento-Organizaci6n, the Spanish 
Single Party and the Franco Regime, 1936-1968", p. 159, in 
Huntingdon and. Moore, Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society. The 
Dynamics of Established One-Party Systems, New York, 1970. 
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frustration was demonstrated by Francisco Herranz, former leader of the 
Falangist militia, who publicly committed suicide in Madrid in November 
1969, in order, as he said in his final words, to protest against "the 
treachery to which the Falange has fallen victim". 2 
The reasons for the Falange being given control of Spanish sport 
were fully discussed in the Introduction to this thesis. The vague 
sporting plan of the Falange, never published in any kind of detail, was 
for a society in which every able-bodied member would be participating 
in some sport or other in giant stadia or sports centres. This popular 
participation would be inspired by the patriotic display offered to the 
outside world by the leading Spanish sportsmen in the international 
competitions, especially the Olympic Games. 3 
In very much the same way as the plans of the Falange for a 
totalitarian fascist-State were never to be realized, the Falangist plan 
for sport did not become reality. As seen in the Introduction, the 
Franco regime was neither able nor disposed to invest in sport vast sums 
of money, unlike Mussolini and Hitler. In addition, in the post-Civil 
War years the Spanish people were generally too under-nourished, 
unhealthy and too busy working long, poorly-paid hours to participate in 
much sport. 4 It is safe to assume that, even if adequate public 
2. Quoted in Edouard de Blaye, op. cit., p. 469. 
3. This vague plan was published in the Boletin Oficial de la DND, No. 
2, May 1943. 
4. This has been alleged in many publications, for example: Vicente 
Marco, op. cit., p. 19; Manuel Vazquez Montalban, p. 32; Luis Maria 
Cazorla Prieto, op. cit., p. 113. This claim has also been made to 
the author by many veteran football supporters, frustrated 
potential sportsmen in the 1940s. 
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sporting facilities had existed in Spain in the 1940s, they would have 
remained largely unused. 5 Although, as shall presently be illustrated 
in detail, the rhetoric of the Falange and its sympathisers painted a 
completely different picture, sport was practically at the bottom of the 
list of priorities of both the Franco regime and the great majority of 
the Spanish people. 
As shall be seen in Chapter Three, by the 1950s Spain had become an 
extremely sports-conscious country, but not according to the Falangist 
model. The Spanish public were filling to capacity the country's 
football stadia, many of them newly-constructed, with'only a tiny amount 
of help from the DND, 6 in order to see spectacular imported players 
like Alfredo Di Stefano, Ferenc Puskas and Ladislao Kubala. In 
addition, it is estimated that more than half of the population followed 
the football commentaries on the radio, partly because of their 
participation in the immensely popular football pools.? This huge 
passive participation in sport was far removed from the Fascist model, 
and the only consolation for the Falangist DND was that the football 
clubs became so prosperous that, led by Real Madrid in 1958, they 
constructed their own all-embracing sports centres, in this way partly 
5. This allegation was made in Vazquez Montalbän, ibid, and Cazorla 
Prieto, ibid. 
6. According to the archives of the Real Madrid club, the total cost 
of the construction of the Estadio Bernabeu during the years 1944- 
1947 was 37,244,000 pesetas, of which one million pesetas, less 
than 4%, was provided by the DND's"Support Fund forthe Construction 
of Private Sporting Facilities". In October 1951, the DND ruled 
that it would contribute just 2.5% to the cost of all future 
football stadia constructions or improvements information revealed 
by the author's investigation of the archives of the DND. 
7. This estimate was made in Marco, op. cit., p. 26, and in Vazquez 
Montalban, op. cit., p. 34. 
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relieving the pressure on the DND to provide public sports facilities. 
It is ironic that the best opportunities for the average Spaniard to 
practise sport were provided not by the DND, but privately, as a result 
of the success of football as a passive spectacle. 
The contrast between the reality described above and the Falangist 
rhetoric of the 1940s could hardly be starker. In the post-Civil War 
years, the examples of Italy and Germany were constantly used to 
demonstrate that sport was to be an essential feature of the new 
classless society that the Falange desired. A good example of this 
rhetoric can be found in the articles of Enrique Gil de la Vega, known 
by the pseudonym of "Gilera", who became the sports correspondent of the 
Francoist Madrid newspaper El Alcäzar, after having fought in the 
Falangist militia during the Civil War: 
"Today, sport is no longer a privilege of the rich. Sport is 
practised by increasingly greater numbers of citizens of both sexes 
and of all social classes, and the State is supporting this. It is 
natural that the State should intervene in its favour, especially 
by contributing to the construction of new facilities necessary to 
face up to the demands of the increased number of participants ... 
The system is still not perfect; the machine will not really 
function effectively whilst the present economic difficulties 
persist; but, for the first time ever, we know that if today we are 
little, then tomorrow we will be a lot, because we have found an 
ideal and the means to arrive at it, just as the youth of Italy 
and Germany arrived at it before. "e 
Similar Fascist rhetoric was offered by Dr. Antonio Fereiras, the 
sports correspondent of the Falangist daily Arriba from 1939 to 1944. 
On the occasion of the football team of Hitler's air force to play an 
8. El Alcäzar, 23 November 1941. 
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exhibition match against Atletico Aviaciön in November 1941, a visit 
that will be presently discussed in detail, Fereiras made the Fascist 
connection between the sporting prowess of a nation and its military 
potential: 
"The most cultured, dynamic, robust and healthy nations strive to 
achieve the recognition of their global-potential in the Olympic 
competitions, with all the accompanying propaganda, respect and 
admiration. It is now a matter of public knowledge that nations 
prepare for war in an atmosphere of work, discipline and sport. 
The gigantic war machinery of the Third Reich has, in its different 
successful campaigns, no doubt, that spirit full of youth, 
dynamism, energy, opportunity and gentlemanliness that we find so 
many times in the Olympic stadium or on the sports grounds. "9 
Whilst "Gilera" and Fereiras led the field with the quality of 
their Fascist sporting rhetoric, it was the daily sports newspaper 
Marca, staffed exclusively by Falangists until the early 1970s which 
carried the largest quantity. As seen in the Introduction to this 
thesis, Marca was the big money-earner of the extensive Cadena de prensa 
del Movimiento ("Press Chain of the Movimiento"), assisting the Spanish 
state in the financing of a whole host of loss-making Falangist local 
newspapers. On the occasion of Marca becoming a daily paper in 
November 1942, its headline read "Arms raised to the Spanish sportsmen! " so 
The articles that followed offered this explanation of the Nationalist 
victory in the Civil War: 
9. Arriba, 20 November 1941. 
10. Marca, 25 November 1942. 
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"The triumph was a tribute to the potential of a race that had 
sketched out for us a path and a style of physical conduct: that of 
the national vigorization by means of the gymnasium and the 
cultivation of sport. "' 
Before entering into a detailed examination of the Fascist 
influence over Spanish football, it is appropriate at this stage to 
offer a brief approximation of the extent of Fascist influence over both 
football in other countries and over other sports in Francoist Spain. 
The regimes led by Hitler and Mussolini were the first system- 
atically to instrumentalize football. Their objectives in doing this 
were threefold: to use the game as a hook to attract young men, 
especially youths, to the activities of the Party; allegedly to "improve 
the race" by increasing popular participation in sport; to demonstrate 
to the world, at the level of international matches and tournaments, the 
alleged superiority of the Italian and German races. 12 
As a consequence of these objectives, many local football leagues 
were established in Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, especially in rural 
areas where the organization of the game had previously been practically 
non-existent. Before all of these league matches commenced, the boys or 
young men were required to give the Fascist salute and frequently sing 
the Party's particular anthem. 13 
11. Ibid. 
12. These Fascist and Nazi plans for sport are outlined and discussed 
in Cazorla Prieto, op. cit., pp. 227-229, and in Carl Diem, Historia 
de los Deportes, Barcelona, 1966, p. 86-89. 
13. For further details, see Diem, op. cit., p. 90. 
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These salutes and anthems were also obligatory in the semi- 
professional and professional leagues of Italy and Germany. Another 
consequence of this Fascist instrumentalization of the game were the 
name changes enforced upon all clubs that had titles with a foreign 
influence, usually due to having been founded by British engineers or 
railwaymen. This policy began in Italy, where Internazionale of Milan, 
for example, was compelled to become Ambrosiana, and Florence Football 
Club Asociazione Fiorentina di Calcio. Afterwards in Germany, the two 
most significant enforced name changes converted Kickers Offenbach into 
Der Offenbacher Fussball Verein and Red White Essen into Rot-Weiss 
Essen. 
It was at international level however, that the Fascist politic- 
ization of football reached its peak. The Italian and German national 
teams always led the capacity crowds in the saluting and singing before 
the matches, which would proceed in an ambience of aggressive 
nationalism. The visiting national team was expected to comply with 
this Fascist gesturing, and there were protests from the British TUC, 
the Labour Party and other socialist groups when the England team gave 
the right-arm salute before a match in Berlin in 1938.14 
The national team of Fascist Italy gave immense satisfaction to 
Mussolini. Upon being granted, in 1932, the hosting of the 1934 World 
Cup finals tournament, the Italian federation charged the leading 
manager Vittorio Pozzo with selecting a 20-man squad, took the players 
14. See, for further details, Sir Stanley Rous, Football Worlds, 
London, 1978, pp. 63-64. 
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away from their clubs and confined them to a military-style training 
camp for two full years. Even this intensive preparation, however, 
coupled with the impassioned home crowds, was not enough in itself to 
lift Italy to the trophy. When they were losing the quarter-final 0-1 
to Spain, and seemingly on their way to a surprise elimination, the 
Italians resorted to violent tactics. The famous Spanish goalkeeper 
Ricardo Zamora was deliberately injured, Italy equalized, and in the 
replay that took place without Zamora, the hosts narrowly won 1-0.15 
Mussolini, present at all Italy's matches in the tournament, excused 
the team's violence in a way which accurately exempted the Fascist 
interpretation of international exporting contests: 
"Football is a physical and psychological struggle in which the 
team from the stronger race will always win. For this reason, 
Italy will, without doubt, soon be champion of the world. "16 
Mussolini's hopes were fulfilled. Italy picked up the World Cup after 
beating Austria in the semi finals and Czechoslovakia in the final. 
Mussolini's team could not claim to be the real world champions, 
however, until they had beaten England, who refused to participate in 
the World Cup until 1950. In a violent match in London in November 
1934, known as the "Battle of Highbury", three England players were 
stretchered off and two Italians sent off, as the hosts beat the World 
Cup holders 3-2. 
After another two-year long training camp, a rejuvenated`Italian 
15. For further details, see Brian Glanville, History of the World Cup, 
London, 1978, p. 68. 
16. Quoted in Diem, op. cit., p. 92 
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team retained the World Cup in the 1938 tournament, staged in France. 
On the day before the final in Paris, there was a vociferous 
demonstration outside theX hotel by French socialists protesting against 
the Italian intervention in the Spanish Civil War, which provoked a 
violent response from the Fascist guards of the Italian team. 17 
The national team of Nazi Germany, in contrast failed to earn much 
domestic or international prestige for the Hitler regime. Coached by 
the Nazi party member Otto Nerz, the team reached the semi finals of the- 
- 1934 World Cup tournament, but then surprisingly crashed out of the 1936 
Olympic footb'all tournament, in front of Hitler and a capacity crowd in 
Berlin, to-; modest Norway. Nerz was immediately dismissed, but his 
successor, Sepp Herberger, fared no better. Despite including players 
from annexed Austria, -Germany were eliminated in the first round of the 
1938 World Cup tournament by unfancied Switzerland. 
Football was also subjected to Fascist influence by the Salazar 
regime in Portugal. This was a regime which like that of Franco, was 
reactionary and authoritarian rather than Fascist, but which also 
indulged in Fascist posturing and rhetoric. Clubs with foreign- 
influenced names were compelled to change their titles, for example 
Benfica Football Club becoming Benfica Club de Futbol, and Sporting 
Club Lisbon Club Desportivo de Lisboa. The same as in Francoist Spain, 
there was also the pre-match saluting and singing, without a fraction of 
the State investment in the sporting infrastracture that occured in 
17. See Glanville, op. cit., p. 81, for details. 
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Fascist Italy or Nazi Germany. 1e 
Fascist influence over football has been effectively limited to 
Italy, Germany, Portugal and Spain. The game has frequently been ' 
utilized as a catalyst for agressive nationalism, the clearest example 
being in the South American military dictatorships of the 1960s and 
1970s. There is a definite qualitative difference, however, between 
Fascist and agressively nationalist influence over football, even though 
the line between the two concepts may appear to be rather thin on 
occasions. In these South American military dictatorships, there was 
practically no rhetoric about how the national team, or club teams 
playing against overseas opposition, should demonstrate their racial 
superiority over the foreign players. On the other hand, there was an 
abundance of rhetoric about how the players should be conscious of' 
defending national pride. 19 
A strong Fascist influence was exercised over all sports in 
Francoist Spain, not just over football. The main instrument of this 
influence was the control of sport by'the Falangist DND. The DND 
imposed this influence in two major ways: firstly, by insisting upon 
Fascist posturing before every sporting contest; secondly; by 
appointing Falangists to many important sporting positions. It was the 
rule of the DND up to 1948 that, prior to every sporting contest at 
every level, the competitors had to line up, give the Fascist salute and 
18. For further details, see Diem, op. cit., p. 174, and World Soccer, 
November 1966. 
19. For further details, see the text and footnotes about the subject 
at the beginning of Chapter Seven of this thesis. 
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chant the Falangist war-cry of, Arriba Espana!, along with, Viva Franco! 20 
Before the final of any tournament, be it of national, regional or- 
provincial character, the players, officials and spectators were 
compelled to sing the Falangist anthem Cara al SQl and, ýthe same before 
any international contest. -Even though it was not compulsory, in 
certain sports Cara al sol was sung before every domestic contest. This 
was the case, for example, before every volleyball match during the 
period 1939-1944, because of the enthusiasm for the song of Juan Antonio 
Fernandez Lozano, the Falangist President of the volleyball federation 
in these years. 21 The Falangist anthem was also sung before every 
roller-skate hockey match during the same period, due to the President 
of that Federation being the prominent Catalan Falangist Juan Ramon 
Escrivä. 22 The DND strictly upheld its rules about Fascist posturing. 
In November 1941, for example, the Catalan regional football federation 
was instructed by the DND to "apply the appropriate rigorous 
disciplinary methods" to the teams of the small mountain towns Tremp and 
Sort, who had omitted to give the necessary salutes and chants before 
their match. They were punished with the deduction of-five league 
points each. 23 In November 1944, Joaquin Martinez Peralta was dismissed 
as President of the handball federation, held responsible by the 
20. This rule, issued by the predecessor of the DND, the Consejo 
Nacional de Deportes, in August 1939, was published in Marca, and 
El Mundo Deportivo, 27 August 1939. 
21. Information revealed by an examination of the archives of El Mundo 
Deportivo, 19 March 1943. 
22. For further details, see El Mundo Deportivo, 19 March 1943. 
23. In the archives of the DND, the author uncovered a letter, dated 21 
November 1941, from Moscardo to Raimundo Rivas, the President of 
the Catalan federation, demanding strict punishment. 
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r 
Delegado Nacional de Deportes General Moscardo for the absence of 'Cara 
al Sol before a friendly match with Portugal in Sevilla. 24 The same 
fate befell Ramiro Villanova, the President of the basketball 
federation, when the Falangist anthem was not sung before a match with 
Portugal in Valencia in March 1945.25 
This Fascist posturing in Spanish sport was abruptly terminated by 
the DND in august 1948, when the Fascist arm salute was abandoned, and 
the chanting and Cara al sol singing made discretionary. It has 
frequently been alleged that these measures were taken by the DND as 
part of the tacit policy_ of "de-Falangization" undertaken by the Franco 
regime in the late 1940s. 26 1Arriba Espana: and, 
'Viva Franco! continued 
to be shouted and Cara al Sol sung up until the 1960s in the sports 
presided over by Falangists, whilst these practices were simply dropped 
in the sports governed by non-Falangists. The singing and chanting 
continued before every roller-skate hockey match, for example, during 
the whole of the presidency of the Falangist Escrivä, which lasted until 
1962. The same occured in handball, until the death of the Falangist 
federation President Jose Maria Aragones in 1964. 
Because of the direct nominations of the DND, approximately half of 
the Presidents and directors of the Spanish sports federations were 
Falangists in the 1940s. This proportion gradually declined to 
24. For further details, see Marca, 7-9 November 1944. 
25. See Marca, 4 March 1945 for details. 
26. This allegation has been made in the following publications: 
Cazorla /rieto, op. cit., p. 130; Marco, op. cit., p. 27; Vazquez 
Montalban, op. cit., p. 38; Francisco Cerecedo in Posible, Madrid, 
No. 2,1 December 1974. 
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approximately a third by the end of the Franco period27. In addition, 
the Consejo Nacional de Deportes, the predecessor of the DND in the 
years 1939-1941, also led by General Moscardö, ruled in August 1939 that 
there must be at least two active Falangists amongst the directors of 
each private sporting club. This rule was maintained until 1959, when 
the presence of these Falangists became recommmended but not 
obligatory. 2e As a consequence of all the above, Falangist personal 
influence at both the sports federations and the various clubs remained 
extremely high throughout the whole of the Franco period. In 1970, for 
example, there were three Falangists on the eight-man executive of the 
volleyball federation, Antonio Soriano, Jose Luis Sanz and Jesus Garcia 
Pereda, and two amongst the ten directors of the champion club 
Estudiantes of Madrid, Juan Antonio Solano and Benito Sanchez Gil. 29 
It is appropriate to conclude this brief examination of the Fascist 
influence over sports apart from football in Francoist Spain with an 
illustration of the kind of Fascist rhetoric that was applied both by 
the Falange itself and by its many sympathisers in the sporting Press. 
Apart from football, the sports more affected were athletics and 
basketball. As early as 1940, Marca pointed out that athletes had to be 
27. This estimate was made by the author, in the light of the 
information revealed by the archives of Marca, El Mundo Deportivo 
and the DND. 
28. Information revealed by an examination of the archives of the DND. 
The choice of these two Falangist directors was left to the club 
Presidents, who frequently needed to consult with the local Party 
organization about the matter. 
29. This information was uncovered by the author in the archives of 
Marca. 
92 
priority of the Falangist sporting plans: 
"The premier sport of our "New Spain" simply has to be athletics. 
Because it is the sport which will do more than any other to 
improve the minds and bodies of our young people, those who will be 
charged with leading the Spanish race into future glory. And 
because it is this sport, in its manifold activities, which will do 
more than any other to demonstrate to the other nations of the 
world the progress made by us Spaniards since our glorious "War of 
Liberation" against the forces of liberalism and decadence. After 
the present conflicts raging in the world are finished, the other 
nations will bear witness, by means of the Olympic Games and other 
international sporting competitions, that we Spaniards are a race 
reborn and rejuvenated, a race that has rediscovered its 
traditional virility and impetousness. "30 
Despite the almost complete lack of improvement of the sporting 
infrastructure since the Civil War, and despite the extremely low level 
of participation in athletics, there was nonetheless an abundance of 
Falangist optimism about the participation in the 1948 Olympic Games in 
London. The Boletin Oficial de la DND carried the following advice to 
the Spanish athletes chosen for the Games: 
"Above all remember, you sporting leaders of "New Spain", that your 
exploits, whether they result in glorious trium¢+or disappointing 
defeat, must constitute- a demonstration to the whole world that 
our Patria has been reborn in the course of bloody struggle and is 
on the point of being great once more. Show to the other nations 
that Spain is potent, virile and powerful again, that Spain is 
ready to resume her rightful place amongst the handful of leading 
free nations of the world. "31 
The Spanish performance in London, however, was abysmal, the only medal 
won being a silver in equestrian. As was pointed out in the 
Introduction to this thesis, Spain won only one Olympic gold medal, two 
silver and two bronze during the whole of the Franco period, and none 
30. Marca, 10 April 1940. 
31. Boletin Official de la DND, No. 68, June 1948. 
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of these were for track and field events. 32 Spanish athletes achieved a 
similar lack of success in the various European Championship and 
Mediterranean Games tournaments. 33 Because of this-almost complete lack 
of success, the Fascist rhetoric surrounding atheletics declined in 
quantity. As late as 1968, however, the following kind of language and 
imagery was employed in the DND's message to the Olympic team preparing 
to make the trip to the Games in Mexico: 
"You are charged with the weighty responsibility of both 
demonstrating to the watching world that we Spaniards are 
consistently becoming a more virile and potent race, and of setting 
an example to the young people of the Patria, by your courageous 
performances, so that the generations to come will vigorously 
strive to emulate your achievements, and in so doing continue 
to exhibit Spanish power and potency. "34 
As can be easily appreciated, the content of this message is not so 
different from that given to the Spanish Olympians by the DND twenty 
years earlier. The conclusion about this Fascist rhetoric with regard 
to athletics must be that it declined in quantity more than in quality 
or content. 
32. The complete Spanish Olympics record during the Franco years reads 
as follows: silver medal for the equestrian team in London, 1948; in 
Helsinki in 1952, Angel Lean Gonzalo won the silver in the 50 metres 
pistol shoot; the Spanish team boycotted the Melbourne games in 1956 
because of the Soviet invasion of Hungary; in Rome in 1960, the 
Spanish team won the bronze medal at hockey; no medals were won in 
Tokyo in 1964, neither in 1968 in Mexico; in the 1972 Winter 
Olympics in Sapporo, the gold medal in the skiing special slalom was 
won by Francisco Fernandez Ochoa, whilst in Munich in the summer 
Enrique Rodriquez Cal won the bronze at flyweight boxing. 
33. As revealed by the archives of the DND, only seven medals were 
won in the nine European Championship and Mediterranean Games 
tournaments in which Spanish teams participated. 
34. Boletin Official de la DND, No. 300, August 1968. 
94 
The other sport, apart from football and athletics, which provoked 
an abundance of Fascist rhetoric was basketball. This was partly 
because basketball was clearly the second most popular sport after 
football, both at spectator and participation level, and partly because, 
as explained in the following way by the Boletin Oficial de la DND 
it was a physical contact sport: 
"The two sports which best embody our rediscovered Spanish 
masculine values are, without doubt, football and basketball. 
These are team sports, in which the values of comradeship and 
sacrifice for others come to the fore. And they are also physical 
contact sports which permit the natural fury, impetousness and 
virility of the Spanish sportsmen to fully manifest itself. "35 
As was the*case with athletics, there would undoubtedly have been more 
Fascist rhetoric concerning basketball if the Spanish national team and 
club teams had been more successful in the international competitions. 
On the few occasions when there was something to celebrate with regard 
to basketball, this rhetoric was employed. In June 1965, for example, 
when the Spanish team reached the semi finals of the European 
Championship, held in Athens, Marca offered the following preview of the 
crucial match against Yugoslavia: 
"It is to be hoped, and indeed expected, that la furia espafiola 
("the Spanish Fury") will once again be on display tonight, both 
for us Spaniards either present here in Athens or watching at home 
on television, and for the watching Continent. Our team will again 
have to employ their considerable physical power, swift 
intelligence and traditional Spanish courage and impetousness. 
Tonight they will have to prove to Europe that they are real men. 
We should all be optimistic and confident, we Spaniards have 
demonstrated on countless occasions throughout history that we are 
at our best, most virile and furious, when we have to react against 
adverse circumstances. "36 
35. Boletin Official de la DND, No. 78, April 1949. 
36. Harca, 11 June 1965. 
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The Spanish team lost this semi final heavily, and achieved extremely 
little international success afterwards. The same as in football, the 
Real Madrid basketball team was far more successful internationally than 
the national team, partly because of the abundance of leading foreign 
players in the Real ranks. This success provoked many flights of 
rhetoric similar to the ones given above, the clearest example occurring 
in May 1969, in the form of the DND's congratulations to Real Madrid for 
having won the European Champions Cup: 
"This has been one of the most heartening, inspiring Spanish 
sporting performances in history. It was marvellous feeling to see 
Spaniards (sic) in command, dominating a sporting event of such 
importance and prestige, passionately displaying the determination, 
virility, impetousness and fury for which we are renowned 
throughout the world. "37 
Similar rhetoric was produced as a result of Real Madrid's other 
international basketball successes. 38 
It can be clearly seen from the examples given above that a common 
theme in all of this rhetoric was the "rebirth" of Spain because of the 
Nationalist victory in the Civil War. This theme was frequently 
employed in the general publications of the Falange, for example in the 
pocket book of Jose Maria Garcia Cernuda, distributed amongst Falangists 
in 1943: 
"Spain has, in effect, been reborn in the fire and passion of the 
"War of Liberation". Out of the ashes of the conflict has risen a 
rejuvenated, transformed, revitalized and magnificent Spain, with 
the Falange at its head. "39 
37. Marca, 14 May 1969. 
38. See, for example: El Alcazar, 22 October 1966, and 2 November 1971; 
Arriba, 10 October 1968; Marca, 29 March 1969. 
39. Jo es Maria Garcia Cernuda, Sobre la Revolucion de la Falange, 
Bilbao, 1943, pp. 29-30. 
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Another theme to be found in practically all of the Fascist 
sporting rhetoric is the "rediscovery" of traditional Spanish masculine 
values, a theme frequently referred to in many Falangist publications, 
for example in their official version of Spanish history, designed for 
use by history teachers: 
"As a result of the heroic struggle in the "War of Liberation", 
many of the traditional racial virtues of the Spaniards were 
recovered, such as courage, passion, sacrifice, determination and 
dedication to the cause. "40 
A third theme common to this rhetoric is the necessity to 
demonstrate this "rebirth" and "rediscovery" to the world in general, as 
pointed out by Sigfredo Hillers de Luque: 
"In the company of foreign visitors to Spain, or whilst ourselves 
overseas, it is our duty, both individually and collectively to 
clearly demonstrate to what extent we Spaniards have improved as a 
race in the thirty years since the historic day when the Patria was 
reborn... "41 
All three of these themes were usually present in the celebration 
of every Spanish international sporting success during the Franco 
period. This was the reaction of the DND in May 1953, for example, when 
the Conde de Teba won the world clay pigeon-shooting title: 
"This is one of the clearest demonstrations offered to Spain and 
the outside world that, since our glorious "War of Liberation", we 
are a nation reborn, having rediscovered and recuperated our 
traditional Hispanic virtues of courage, determination and 
impetuousness. "42 
_40. 
FET y de las JONS, Seccion Femenina, Lecciones de Historia de 
Espafia, Bilbao, 1944, p. 79. / 
41. Sigfredo Hillers de Luque, Etica y estilo falangistas, Madrid, 1974, 
pp. 320-321. 
42. Boletin Official de la DND, No. 123, June 1953. 
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A fourth theme that can be extracted from this Fascist sporting 
rhetoric is the affirmation of Spanish national unity and the negation 
of all hints of regionalism or separatism. A good example of this 
appeared in Marca when, in October 1957, the Spanish team, made up 
almost completely of Catalans, won the world roller-skate hockey 
championship in Lisbon: 
"This inspiring victory has once again demonstrated that we 
Spaniards are at our best when fight together. The team that has 
lifted our beloved national flag so high in Lisbon is a team made 
up of fiercely patriotic and proud Spaniards. Spaniards from 
Catalonia, Spaniards from Castill'e, Spaniards from the Basque 
provinces, but first and foremost Spaniards, fighting together for 
the glory of the race and the Patria. The terrible days when the 
Spaniard fought against Spaniard are now consigned to history, and 
will never return. Now we are all fighting together. "43 
Another example of this theme appearing in a sporting context 
occurred in April 1965, when the Spanish national rugby team, similarly 
composed of a majority of Catalans, beat the West Germany team in a 
friendly match in Barcelona. This was the reaction of the Marca 
correspondent: 
"How heartening it is to see Spanish sportsmen from all different 
regions of the country fighting side by side, united in a common 
cause: the glory of the Patria. Today the city of Barcelona has 
shown that it is more Spanish than ever, through the exemplary 
patriotism of its spectators, through the dedication to the 
national colours of the players that it has provided for the 
Spanish team. .. "'4 
43. Marca, 12 October 1957. 
44. Marca, 4 April 1965. 
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This lteie of national unity was one of the major preoccupations of Jose 
Antonio Primo de Rivera. He dedicated a large proportion of"his 
writings and speeches to condemning the Basque, Catalan and Galician 
autonomy movements, for example in the Norma Programätica de la 
Falange, which he drafted in-November 1934. The second clause of this 
programme stated that: 
"Spain is a unit of destiny in universal terms. Every conspiracy 
against this unity is repulsive. All separatism is a crime which 
we will not pardon. "45 
It is appropriate at this stage to commence a detailed examination 
of the Fascist influence over Spanish football during the France years. 
This examination will mainly consist of a study of the concrete Fascist 
influence overland the Fascist rhetoric surrounding1professional, - 
football. Before this, however, a brief insight into junior and amateur 
football is necessary. 
As seen earlier in this chapter, junior and amateur football 
leagues were established in rural areas in Fascist Italy and Nazi 
Germany, with the objective of drawing young men into activities of the 
Party. These leagues were-completely separate from those organized by 
the Italian and German football federations. The Falange did not copy 
this idea, for two main reasons. Firstly, because, it did not have the 
financial capacity to establish these leagues, which would have 
necessitated greatly subsidizing the construction of football pitches in 
remote villages where there had never been sufficient interest in the 
game for the locals to constructýa pitch themselves. Secondly, because 
45. Reproduced in Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera, Obras completas, Madrid, 
1949, p. 359. 
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the Falange believed that its control over all of the sports 
federations, through the DND, was such that the creation of a parallel, 
and perhaps even rival, sporting organization was necessary. There 
seemed to be little point in establishing separate Falangist leagues 
when the Falange's influence over the traditional leagues meant that, 
until 1948 throughout Spain and in certain regions until much later, as 
shall shortly be seen, every match at every level had to commence with 
the right arm salute and chanting of Viva Franco! and Arriba Espa'a! 46 
Fascist influence over professional football, the same as Fascist 
influence over Spanish sport and society in general, reached a peak in 
the immediate post-Civil War years, and thereafter declined only very 
gradually. This influence was so high during the period 1939-1948 that 
these years have become known as the "Blue Period" of Spanish 
football. 47 During the "Blue Period", Fascist influence over 
professional football was exerted in five main ways: firstly, by the 
nomination of an abundance of Falangists as Presidents and directors of 
the national and regional federations and of the clubs; secondly, by the 
name changes forced upon the clubs with foreign-influenced titles; 
thirdly, by the Fascist gestures that were obligatory before every 
match; fourthly, by the immense amount of Fascist rhetoric that 
surrounded the game; fifthly, by the neo-fascist mystification applied 
to the game by the media. All of these manifestations of Fascist 
46. This point of view was implicitly expressed by General Moscardö's 
assistant, General Jose Villalba, in an interview with El Mundo 
Deportivo, 8 February 1946. Villalba commented that he was 
"extremely satisfied" with the local leagues, and that he saw 
"absolutely no need to change their organizational structure". 
47. This phrase was first coined in Manuel Vazquez Montalbän, op. 
cit., p. 31, and has since been copied in many publications, for 
example Marco, op. cit., p. 19. 
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influence over the professional game were consequences of the 
irresistible control exercised over Spanish sport in general by the 
Falangist DND. 
The large number of Falangists in executive positions in post-Civil 
War football is both a cause and an effect of the strength of the 
Fascist'influence over the game. They were either directly appointed by 
the DND, or chosen by the clubs in order to comply with the DND's ruling 
of August 1939 that there must be at least two active Falangists 
amongst the directors of each sporting club. It can be estimated that 
at least a third of the directors of the national and regional football 
federations and of the professional clubs during this "Blue Period" were 
either active or former Falangists. 48 Three of the five RFEF 
Presidents during these years were Falangists: Luis Saura del Pan, from 
1940 to 1941; Jesus Rivero Meneses, from 1946 to 1947; Dr. Armando Mufioz 
Calero, from 1947 to 1950. Many of the fifteen regional federations 
- were presided over by Falangists at this time, for example Juan Curto 
Sanchez, President of the Castilian federation from 1939 to 1944, Jose 
Luis Valverde at the Murcian federation during the period 1939 to 1950, 
and Joaquin Herrero Cuesta, in power in Navarre from 1943 to 1951. The 
most notable Falangist Presidents at club level during this "Blue 
Period" were Antonio Rodriguez at Zaragoza from 1939 to 1947, succeeded 
by Fellow Falangist Jose Maria Herrera, Juan Carlos Delgado at Cadiz f1 
48. This estimate was made by the author in the light of the information 
revealed in his examination of the following archives: those of the 
RFEF, of Real Madrid, of FC Barcelona, Athletic de Bilbao and Real 
Sociedad de San Sebastian, of Atletico de Madrid, and of El Mundo 
Deportivo. 
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from 1939 to 1942, Raimundo Rodriguez Vilches at Racing de Santander 
from 1940 to 1954, Juan Andres Armendariz at Murcia from 1942 to 1951, 
Eduardo Ramirez at Betis of Seville from 1945 to 1951, and Juan Antonio 
Perez Garc fa, in command at Valladolid from 1946 to 1959. 
The abundance of Falangists in Spanish football during this "Blue 
Period" was not confined, however, to Presidents and directors. It has 
been estimated that approximately a fifth of the professional players in 
these years were either active or former Falangists. 49 The most notable 
of these Falangist players were: Enrique Molina, the Valencia player 
who fought in a Falangist militia in the Civil War, joined the Falangist 
"Blue Division" sent by Franco to fight alongside Hitler's troops on the 
Russian front, where he died in February 1943; Jorge Campanal of 
Sevilla, of whom it is alleged that his surprising selection for the 
national team in'1941 owed a considerable amount to his political 
views; 50 Angel Rovira of Espanol and the national team; Miguel Moleiro 
and Jose Luis Clemente, both of Real Madrid. 
It is surprising both that the enforced name changes of the 
football clubs with foreign titles was not an initiative of the DND. and 
that these changes did not occur until 1941. During the two post-Civil 
War years, these club names were allowed to continue unchanged, despite 
the examples of name changes from Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. It 
49. This estimate was made to the author by the veteran sports 
journalists Juan Jose Castillo of El Mundo Deportivo, 3 September 
1984, and Enrique Gil de la Vega "Gilera" of ABC. 
50. This allegation, which provoked an angry response from the player 
and his friends, was made by Alex J. Botines in La gran estafa del 
fütbol espafiol, Barcelona, 1975, p. 22. 
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Text cut off in original 
Diaz Pastor was that the players wanted to commence the game 
as possible, because of the driving snow. 54 In May 1945, the 
of the La Coruna club Miguel Texeira was actually replaced by 
Moscardö after Cara al Sol had failed to be played through t 
stadium's loudspeaker system before the international match i 
Portugal. 55 
- The Fascist rhetoric surrounding Spanish football durin 
Period" was immense in both quantity and quality, with the f 
already isolated in this chapter constituting the basis of I 
rhetoric. An example of the themes of the "rebirth" of the 
nation and the "rediscovery" of traditional Hispanisc mascu 
appeared in June 1941, in the Marca report of the cup final 
Valencia and Espanol: 
"It was an inspiring sporting struggle of men against 
kind that has been occuring with frequency since the 
Patria in the "War of Liberation"... The Madrid crow 
to a moving demonstration of commitment, passion, fur 
and impetousness, virtues that are returning to Spain 
strength with every day that passes. "56 
The theme of national unity, one of the Falange's pr: 
usually featured prominently in this Fascist rhetoric-pro 
Falangist Marca when one of the Madrid teams played again 
Basque or Catalan opponents. For example, this was apart 
54, Ibid. 
55. See Marca, 7-11 May 1945 for details. 
56. Marca, 10 June 1941. 
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of the paper when Atletico Aviacion played host to Athletic de Bilbao 
in February 1942: 
"This match was a classic confrontation of virile and courageous 
Spaniards, locked in an absorbing and inspiring sporting struggle. 
Regardless of which region of our Patria they may hail from, the 
twenty-two men down on the field were all authentic Spaniards, and 
it certainly showed in the way in which they played. "57 
Marca was not the only sports newspaper, however, which evoked this 
particular theme. This was the preview of the FC Barcelona-Real Madrid 
match in November 1942 which appeared in El Mundo Deportivo where only 
two or three Falangists worked at any one time during the whole Franco 
period: 59 
"Let us fervently hope that tomorrow's match will be an inspiring 
demonstration of typical Spanish passion, fury, virility, and, 
above all, a demonstration of the harmony and togetherness that has 
existed between the different regions of our beloved Spain since 
the "War of Liberation" put an end to the fratricidal conflicts and 
tensions, provoked by a tiny self-interested minority of 
malevolents, which once threatened to tear the country apart. ""9 
The fourth theme of this Fascist sporting rhetoric, the necessity 
of demonstrating the much-vaunted "rebirth" and "rediscovery" to the 
outside world, could only appear in the context of either an 
international match or a friendly game between a Spanish and a foreign 
club, of both of which, for reasons which shall be fully discussed in 
Chapter Seven of this thesis, there were extremely few during this 
"Blue Period". 
57. Marca, 24 February 1942. 
58. This information was revealed to the author by Juan Jose Castillo, 
journalist at El Mundo Deportivo from 1946, appointed editor in 
1968. 
59. El Mundo Deportivo, 8 November 1942. 
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This was the message of the DND to the Spanish national team which, 
in January 1941 was preparing to play its first game since the Civil 
War, having changed its traditional red shirts for more politically 
appropriate blue ones: 
"Remember above all also that you are 
strating, as the football team of the 
former glory we have recovered in the 
since our glorious "War of Liberation 
show to the world your virility, your 
courage, so that they should know all 
responsible for demon- 
Patria,. just how much of our 
two years that have passed 
... Footballers of Spain, fury, your impetuosity, your 
about the "New Spain". eO 
A very similar message was given by the DND to the Atletico Aviaciön 
players before their friendly match in Madrid, in November 1941, against 
the team of the German air force: 
"This a perfect opportunity to demonstrate to a nation that has 
already travelled down the road that we are on how much progress we 
are making, in terms of recuperating the characteristics which 
originally raised us up to be one of the leading nations of the 
world and which must serve to raise us up to that elevated 
position again. "61 
In its report to this match, Marca claimed that the objective expressed 
above by the DND had been fully achieved: 
"There can be absolutely no doubt that our distinguished German 
visitors will leave Madrid convinced that we Spaniards have made 
giants strides since our "War of Liberation". Strides towards a 
greater physical power, towards improved discipline, towards more 
effective impetuosity and fury, virtues which were all fully 
displayed on Wednesday afternoon by both teams... "62 
In April 1942, the Spanish national team left the Iberian Peninsula 
for the first time since the Civil War, to play exhibition matches in 
Berlin against Germany and in Milan against Italy, in the presence of 
60 This message was published in Marca, 11 January 1941. 
61. Published in Marca, 15 November 1941. 
62. Marca, 22 November 1941. 
which the natural courage, passion, commitment, physical power and 
106 
Hitler and Mussolini respectively. The DND message to the Spanish 
players who made this trip constitutes the most virulent piece of 
Fascist rhetoric surrounding the national team during the whole of the 
Franco period: 
"An immense responsibility is resting on your strong shoulders. It 
is your responsibility to demonstrate to these two mighty nations, 
magnificently rejuvenated since their "National Syndicalist 
Revolutions" and brilliant examples which we are attempting to 
follow in so many ways, that Spain is, in effect, a nation 
reborn... This task you must fulfill by playing like real men, like 
real Spaniards, which is to say in an aggressive but sporting way, 
with courage, passion, impetuosity, determination and virility, the 
leading virtues of the "New Spain" which you are charge with 
representing. "63 
The fifth and final way in which Fascist influence over Spanish 
football exerted itself during the "Blue Period" of 1939-1945 concerns 
the mystification of certain teams and players. This mystification was 
closely connected with the Fascist rhetoric discussed above, and mostly 
appeared in the same newspapers, namely Marca, Arriba and El Alcäzar. 
The centre of this mystification tendency was the myth of the furia 
espafiola, created, as seen in the Introduction to this thesis, by the 
Press during the Spanish national team's successful campaign in the 1920 
Olympic Games in Antwerp. In the immediate post-Civil War years, this 
myth was resurrected by Falangist journalists and commentators, and 
those who sympathized with the ideals of the Falange. A good definition 
of the new, neo-Fascist interpretation of the furia was offered in 
Arriba: 
"The furia espafiola is present in all aspects of Spanish life, to a 
greater extent than ever since the "War of Liberation"... In a 
sporting, the furia best manifests itself in football, a game in 
63. Published in Marca, 6 April 1942. 
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N 
virility of the Spanish race can find full expression, usually 
imposing itself, in international contests, over the more 
technical but less aggressive foreign teams. "64 
Throughout the history of Spanish football, two rival tactical 
"schools" have existed. On the one hand, there has been the "Bilbao 
School", always headed by the heavily British-influenced Athletic de 
Bilbao, practising a football of physical aggression, long passes and 
high centres for a tall centre-forward. In opposition, there has been 
the "Sevilla School" of'talented individual, playing with tight 
dribbling and short passes, a style with practically no foreign 
influence. Despite its obvious foreign influence, it was the former 
style which was alleged best to represent the furia espafiola, partly 
because of the claims to this effect by Eduardo Lastaragay, the 
Falangist Athletic de Bilbao director, claims which will be examined in 
Chapter Eight of this thesis. The identification of Athletic with the 
Luria myth reached its peak in the period 1943-1945, when the Basque 
team completely dominated Spanish football. An example of this 
identification appeared in Marca's preview of the 1945 cup final between 
Athletic and Valencia: 
"Our splendid capital city will today once again be the scene for 
an exhibition of the authentic furia espaßola by the remarkable 
Atletico de Bilbao, bravely attempting to take away the prestigious 
Copa del General simo for the third successive year... The Caudillo 
himself and 35,000 other fortunate spectators will surely witness a 
display of typical Spanish passion, courage, determination and 
virility from both teams. It is the vizcainos (natives of Vizcaya 
province), however, who will best represent the furia espafola, 
with their physical power, controlled agression and combative 
approach, virtues which are again making us Spaniards highly 
respected and even feared in the world. "65 
64. Arriba, 30 January 1940. 
65. Marca, 9 June 1945. 
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All Spanish teams playing against foreign opposition in this "Blue 
Period" were expected to copy Athletic be Bilbao's example and offer a 
demonstration of the furia espafiola to the visitors. For example, this 
was the advice given by "Gilera" in El Alcäzar to the Atletico Aviacion 
players before their November 1941 match with the German air force team: 
"It is your responsibility to demonstrate to our highly respected 
foreign visitors the sporting progress that we have made in the 
past two years, and this will obviously be best achieved by 
employing the traditional furia espänola, with courage, aggression, 
power, dynamism, virility and impetousity. "66 
The Spanish Press held up certain footballers to be the embodiment 
or personification of the furia espafiola myth, especially the tall, 
powerful and aggressive Telmo Zarra, the Athletic de Bilbao centre- 
forward. -According to Ariba, Zarra was: 
"... the epitom, ¢ of the furia espanola, impassioned, determined, 
courageous, impetuous, an inspiring example of the kind of virile 
young men who are chargebwith leading the Patria into a new "Golden 
Age" .67 
This mystification of Zarra reached its peak when he lead the 
attack of the national team. For example, after he had scored three of 
the goals in Spain's defeat of Portugal in La Coruna in May 1945, the 
Marca correspondent was moved to comment: 
"Telmo Zarra proved beyond all doubt this afternoon that he is the 
personification of the"furia espafiola. He was magnificent, a real 
man, a real Spaniard, thrilling the crowd and destroying the enemy 
with his dynamism, passion, power and aggression... Zarra is a 
brilliant example of so many of the virtues of our race... "69 
66. El Alcäzar, 18 November 1941. 
67. Arriba, 8 September-: ' 1943. 
68. Marca, 17, May 1945. 
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The only other player who came close to challenging Zarra's 
position as the embodiment of the furia esparlola myth was the powerful 
national team and Espafiol centre-half Angel Rovira. This is part of the 
eulogy of'Rovira that appeared in Marca after he had captained Espanol 
to victory over Real Madrid in the 1940 cup final: 
"The Espafiol captain came close to epitomizing the furia espaßola, 
with his courageous, responsible, aggressive, impassioned and 
manful performance... He is an inspiring example of Spanish 
masculinity. "69 
This tendency towards mystification on the part of the Press, with 
its clear political significance, was not limited to the furia espafiola 
myth. Another trend was to give a military title to the forward lines 
of the leading teams during this "Blue Period". The first example of 
this occured when "Gilera" of El Alcäzar, in his preview of the 1939 
cup final, dubbed the Sevilla forwards Los Stukas: 
"These furious, aggressive, impassioned Andalucian forwards are 
best described as Los Stukas because... they are clearly capable of 
swooping down on the opposing goalmouth and wreaking considerable 
damage and destruction... 1170 
The forwards of the Espaßol team which won the cup in 1940'were named 
Los Cinco Mosaueteros("The Five Musketeers"), 71 and the Athletic de 
Bilbao forward line lead by Telmo Zarra was titled Los Cinco Artilleros 
("The Five Artillerymen"). 72 
One of the principal objectives of this thesis is to demonstrate 
that practically all of the political tendencies in Francoist Spain were 
69. Marca, 3 June 1940. 
70. El Alcäzar, 25 June 1939. 
71. See, for example, Marca 3 June 1940. 
72. See, for example, El Mundo Deportivo, 21 February 1945. 
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reflected in professional football. The process of "de-Falangization" 
that occured in the late 1940s and 1950s was no exception. The words of 
the historian Herbert Southworth unintentionally but nonetheless 
accurately illustrate what happened in football from 1948 onwards: 
"The Fascist salute was no longer obligatory... The blue gradually 
faded from the Blue Shirts. ' The visible Falange was an 
embarrassment. "73 
The "Blue Period" of Spanish football came to an abrupt end in 
August 1948, when the DND made the pre-match saluting and chanting 
discretionary rather than obligatory. This information was passed on to 
the football clubs by means of the RFEF's Circular No. 4 of that month. 74 
These Fascist gestures continued for one further season at only three 
professional clubs: Betis of Seville, Racing de Santander and 
Valladolid, all, as seen earlier in this chapter, under Falangist 
Presidents. From the summer of 1949 onwards, this saluting and chanting 
completely disappeared. 
The national team did not continue to wear blue shirts. ' The 
, traditional red shirts reappeared for the friendly match with Belpüim in 
Barcelona in January 1949, without any DND or RFEF document being 
written about this change. 75 
73. Herbert R. Southworth, "The Falange", in Paul Preston (ed. ), Spain 
in Crisis, Sussex, 1976, p. 21. 
74. Information revealed by the archives of the RFEF. 
75. No written order or commentary about the return to the red shirts 
was discovered by the author in the archives of either the RFEF or 
the DND. 
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Even though the overt Fascist symbolism was swiftly dropped, 
Fascist influence in general over Spanish football declined only very 
gradually over the remaining three decades of the Franco period. The 
principal reason for this lingering Fascist influence concerns the 
abundance of Falangists in positions of power of the game. Approximately 
half of the staff of the RFEF continued to be Falangists. 76 In 
addition, the following Presidents of the RFEF, directly nominated by 
the Falangist DND, were all either active or former Falangists: the 
former "Blue Division" doctor, ArmandaMußoz Calero, in the presidency 
from 1947 to 1950; Manuel Valdes Larrafiaga, from 1950 to 1952; Sancho 
Dävilla, from 1952 to 1954; Alfonso de la Fuente Chaos, from 1956 to 
1960; Jose Luis Perez Pays, from 1970 to 1975; Pablo Porta, from 1975 to 
1984. It has been estimated that approximately a quarter of the 
directors of the RFEF and of the various regional federations during the 
years 1948-1975, all of them appointed by the DND up to 1961, had 
connections with the Falange. 77 There were several Falangists in the 
i 
%.; presidency of these regional federations: Ramiro Valdez Sanchez at the 
Asturian federation from 1953 to 1964; Isidro Valdemoro at the 
Aragonese federation from 1955 to 1958; Juan Jose Ruiz Väzquez at the 
Extremeduran federation from 1966 to 1973; Jorge Martinez Fuentes at the 
Murcian Federation from 1969 to 1977. 
The proportion of Falangists as President of the professional clubs 
76. This approximation was made by the author after an examination of 
the RFEF archives, and after interviewing Jose Luis Perez Paya, the 
Falangist RFEF director from 1968 and President from 1970 to 1975. 
77. This estimation was made using the same sources as in the above 
footnote. 
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was substantially reduced after 1948, mainly because of the clubs being 
able to elect their own Presidents from that year onwards. rather than 
continue to have them appointed by the DND. Until 1959, each club was 
N compelled to include two active Falangists who only very occasionally 
were sufficiently popular and respected to be elected President: Luis 
Martinez Villa at Recreativo de Huelva from 1950 to 1963; Juan Carlos 
Santamariä at Burgos from 1954 to 1959; Roberto Alvarez Sosa at Elche 
from 1955 to 1963; Angel Dominguez at Sevilla from 1957 to 1965; Jose 
Maria Arroyo at Oviedo from 1962 to 1969; Carlos Castaneiras at Espanol 
of Barcelona from 1964 to 1968; Antonio Diaz Camacho at Villadolid from 
1970 to 1978. It has been estimated that the proportion of Falangists 
as Presidents and directors of the professional football clubs during 
the period 1948-1975 was approximately 10%. 78 
In addition to these Falangists at the RFEF, the regional 
federations and the clubs, there existed a small minority of Falangist 
players throughout the Franco years. The most notable of these players 
were: Manuel Sanchis of Real Madrid and the national team; Jose Luis 
Perez Payä of both Atletico and Real Madrid, later to become RFEF 
-1 President; Lorenzo Purchades of Valencia and the national team; Jose 
Antonio Reija of Zaragoza; Mariano Benitez of Sevilla. 
78. This approximation was made using the information revealed in the 
archives of the DND, the RFEF and the major football clubs, and also in in terviews with club officials during that period, for example Agusti Montal, former President of FC Barcelona, Julio de Miguel, former President of Valencia, and the former and current Real Madrid 
Vice-President Raimundo Saporta. 
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Fascist influence over Spanish football continued to be reflected 
through the compulsorily-changed foreign-influenced club names. FC 
Barcelona continued to be Club de Futbol de Barcelona, Athletic de 
Bilbao Atletico de Bilbao and Sporting de Gijon Deportivo de Gijon, 
until the DND allowed Baia to revert to its original title in April 
1974, the other two clubs obtaining the same permission immediately 
afterwards. 79 
The Fascist rhetoric that surrounded Spanish football gradually 
decreased more in quantity than in quality after the end of the "Blue 
Period". Such rhetoric continued to be reproduced by the newspaper 
Marca, Arriba and El Alcäzar, each with a majority of Falangist writers, 
but to a far lesser extent than in the immediate post-Civil War years. 
In addition, only a small minority of the football commentators of the 
many private radio stations that commenced in the late 1940s and early 
1950s and of national television indulged in this rhetoric. For 
example, the virulently nationalist football commentator of both state 
radio and television from 1949 to 1978, Matias Prats, was instrumental 
in the utilization of the occasional victories of the national team as 
the catalyst for aggressive nationalism, rather than as a symbol of the 
superiority of the Spanish race. In July 1950, Prats excitedly claimed 
to approximately fifteen million national radio listeners that Spain's 
World Cup victory over England was revenge for the continued British 
occupation of Gibraltar. He never crossed the thin line, however, 
between this type of aggressively nationalism and Fascist rhetoric 
79. For further details of these name changes, see Barrabäs, (Barcelona) 
No. 84,18 May 1974. 
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based on claims of racial superiority. 80 
The success of the Spanish team in the 1950 World Cup tournament in 
Brazil, however, did provoke some pieces of Fascist rhetoric. This was 
how Marca reacted to the defeat of England: 
"This is the greatest sporting achievement since our "War of 
Liberation", and... a splendid demonstration to the whole world that 
the traditional Hispanic virtues of passion, aggression, fury, 
virility and impetousity have been completely recovered in the "New 
Spain" born out of that bloody conflict. "81 
Arriba also based its preview of the Spanish team's crucial match 
against hosts Brazil on these allegedly "traditional Hispanic virtues": 
"Tomorrow, playing against the host team and 150,000 Brazilian 
supporters in the Maracana Stadium, our team will have again to 
display all the Spanish masculine characteristics that have so far 
destroyed the United States, Chile and England: courage, passion, 
determination, aggression, discipline, virility and fury. "es 
From 1950 onwards, the Fascist rhetoric surrounding the national 
team declined gradually, mainly because of the almost complete lack of 
success enjoyed by this team. Ironically, the defeats of the national 
team served as a'bigger opportunity for this kind of rhetoric than did 
the occasional victories. With every defeat, Marca, Arriba and El 
Alcazar would produce invective about the furia espafiola having been 
diluted by the adoption of foreign tactics and by the inclusion in the 
team of nationalized South American players such as Alfredo Di Stefano 
of Real Madrid. For example, this was the reaction of El Alcäzar to the 
80. This was the defence of Prats himself, supported by the veteran 
sports journalists Juan Jose Castillo and Enrique Gil de la Vega 
"Gilera". 
81. Marca, 3 July 1950. 
82. Arriba, 8 July 1950. 
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/ 
elimination of the national team in the qualifying competition for the 
1954 World Cup finals tournament by unfancied Turkey: 
"This is the consequence of the introduction into our traditionally 
manful, aggressive, impassioned football of alien foreign tactics 
and methods... We Spaniards play best when we play in our own 
style, not one borrowed from overseas... "s3 
This was the judgement of General Jose Villalba, the assistant to both 
General*Moscardo and Jose Antonio Elola Olaso at the DND, after Spain 
had been beaten 3-0 by Portugal in June 1956: 
"Today's match has been an authentic example of lost courage. The 
surfeit of technique has made Spanish football effeminate. We have 
always won on the basis of courage. It's loss has brought today's 
reverse... 1184 
The Spanish team for the 1962 World Cup finals tournament in Chile 
contained four overseas-born players, and was coached by the contro- 
versial Argentine Helenic Herrera. When the team lost to Brazil and, was 
eliminated from the tournament, this high level of foreign influence was 
vehemently criticized. Marca led the way in this criticism: 
"Spain has been eliminated from the World Cup because our team was 
not sufficiently Spanish... For more than ten years now, we have 
quite rightly been applauding the introduction into Spanish 
football of outstanding, spectacular foreign players such as 
Alfredo Di Stefano, Ferenc Puskas and Ladislao Kubala, and talented 
foreign coaches like Fernando Daucick, Helenio Herrera and Ruben 
Fleitas. They have added colour and excitement to our domestic 
football, and helped our clubs to win the European competitions. 
But this foreign influence has now extended too far. Our leading 
club teams are so full with imported players that Spanish 
youngsters are not given the chance to impress. Even worse, the 
national team is now so full of foreigners and so conditioned by 
foreign tactics that it no longer plays like a team of real 
Spaniards, with passion, with aggression, with courage, with 
virility, and above all, with fury... Without intending any 
disrespect towards these distinguished players, we are compelled 
83. El Alcgzar, 18 March 1954. 
84. Quoted in ABC, (Madrid) 6 June 1956. 
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repeatedly to ask ourselves: how can Di Stefano and Puskas feel 
sufficient patriotic pride when they pull on the famous red shirt 
and line up for the national anthems?.. It is time to construct a 
completely new national football team, with eleven wholly Spanish 
players, playing with Spanish tactics and the sadly almost 
forgotten furia espanola . "85 
Arriba, which had warned against excessive foreign presence in the 
national team before the journey to Chile, 86 actually suggested 
afterwards a prohibition on the further importation of foreign players: 
"What happened in Chile did not surprise us at all... Even if the 
team called "Spain" had won the trophy, always an unlikely 
prospect, then it would still not have been occasion for 
unconditional satisfaction, because this team was hardly Spanish at 
all... What is needed is a truly Spanish national team, an 
impassioned, manful and courageous team. It seems to us that the 
best way to achieve this is to stop the flood of imports into our 
domestic game, in order to recover the traditional Spanish style of 
play and build a national team of powerful and aggressive young 
Spaniards. "87 
The DND did impose a ban on the further importation of foreign 
players in August 1962, which pleased Marca, Arriba and El Alcäzar, 85 
and caused the allegation that this ban signified a resurgence of 
Fascist influence in Spanish football. 89 This accusation is only partly 
true. As explained at the time by Jose Antonio Elola Olaso, the 
85. Marca, 17 July 1962. 
86. See, for example, Arriba, 23 June 1965. 
87. Arriba, 20 July 1962. 
88. See, for example, Arriba, 7 August 1962, and El Alcazar and Marca, 
8 August 1962. 
89. This allegation was made in Carzola Prieto, op. cit., p. 239, and in 
Marco, op. cit., p. 88. 
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Delegado Nacional de Deportes, the decision had been affected by the 
criticisms about the allegedly excessive foreign influence in the team 
which failed in Chile. 90 Elola Olaso admitted, however, that the major 
reason for the prohibition was that the world football governing body 
FIFA had, as a result of protests from several countries about Spain and 
Italy playing with foreign-born players in Chile, 91 tightened up its 
regulations about imported players being incorporated into the national 
team of their new country. 92 The Delecado Nacional pointed out that, 
in consequence, it would be extremely difficult to form a decent team 
for the 1966 World Cup finals without an import ban, and that such a ban 
had been adopted two weeks earlier in Italy, for this reason. 93 
It is logical to assume that if the import prohibition had been 
based on essentially Fascist principles, then the DND would have upheld 
it in the strictest possible manner. From the late 1960s until the 
termination of the ban in 1973, however, the DND turned a blind eye to 
the entry into domestic football of an abundance of South American 
players with dubious documents claiming Spanish parentage, as shall be 
fully discussed in Chapter Eight of this thesis. 
Before this import ban, the international successes of Real Madrid 
were accompanied by extremely little Fascist rhetoric, because of these 
successes being obviously the result of the expensive purchases of the 
90. This was implicitly revealed by Elola Olaso in an interview with El 
Mundo Deportivo, 18 August 1962. 
91. For details of these protests, see World Soccer, August and 
September 1962. 
92. See El Mundo Deportivo, 18 August 1962. 
93. Ibid. 
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Argentine Alfredo Di Stefano, the Uruguayan Jod Santamaria, the 
Hungarian Ferenc Puskas and the Frenchman Raymond Kopa. The Delegado 
Nacional Elola Olaso raised many eyebrows when he attempted to apply 
such rhetoric after seeing, in December 1958, an Atletico de Madrid team 
containing four foreigners beat the Bulgarians CDNA of Sofia in the 
European Cup: 
"Apart from the result, which fully satisfies me, what impressed me 
the most was appreciating that the racial virtues of the Spaniards 
continue, when placed under examination in... undertakings of major 
historical transcendency. "94 
Short of their foreign stars, the Spanish clubs, especially Real 
Madrid, were far less successful in the European competitions, and 
therefore provided little opportunity for Fascist rhetoric. A rare 
opportunity presented itself in May 1966, when a rejuvenated and wholly 
Spanish Real Madrid won the European Cup for the sixth time. The 
Spanish Ambassador in Bonn, Jose Sebastian de Erice O'Shea, watched the 
final against Partizan Belgrade in Brussels, along with several other of 
Franco's ministers and diplomats, and was moved to comment: 
"I wear the badge that I received from the club (Real Madrid) with 
pride and joy, because, as a representative of my country, I 
realize that the presence of Real Madrid across the world is an 
authentic expression of our virile, young enthusiastic reborn 
Spain. "98 
The only occasion that the new, young, wholly Spanish national team 
provided for this kind of rhetoric was the victory in the 1964 European 
Nations Cup, staged in Spain. Before the final against the Soviet 
Union, the man who had constructed this new team, Colonel Jose 
94. Quoted in Marca, 19 December 1958. 
95. Quoted in the Boletin del Real Madrid CF, No. 193, June 1966. 
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Villalonga, a young officer in Franco's army in the Civil War and 
afterwards head of the "Military School of Physical Education" in 
Toledo, commented to the Press: 
"Tommorow's match will be the culmination of two years' hard work, 
building a young, impassioned, aggressive, virile team based on 
typical Hispanic racial virtues... Two years ago, in Chile, we had 
a team of foreigners and Spaniards playing to foreign tactics. 
That situation could not last. Today, we have a team of real 
Spaniards once more, a team we can all be proud of. "96 
Like the Fascist rhetoric in general, the myth of the furia 
espafiola enjoyed a brief resurgence in the period following the 
prohibition of foreign players in 1962. This myth had hardly been 
applied to the five European Cup triumphs of Real Madrid from 1956 to 
1960, because of both the immense foreign presence in the team and the 
sophisticated, short-passing tactics that it employed, in contrast to 
the direct and aggressive style of Athletic de Bilbao. The announcement 
of the ban on further players was enthusiastically greeted in this way 
by Marca: 
"Let us fervently hope that this reduction in the foreign influence 
in our national game quickly leads to a complete recuperation of 
the furia espanola, out of fashion for far too many years... "97 
Practically every newspaper report of the 1964 European Nations Cup 
final contained several references to the furia, Arriba leading the way: 
"The furia espanola has returned at last, and... triumphed in 
adversity yesterday, against the most difficult of opponents... 
Yesterday's victory demonstrated to the world that the furia 
espanola is invincible, when employed with passion, aggression, 
courage and virility. "98 
96. Quoted in Marca, 21 JUne 1964. 
97. Marca, 8 August 1962. 
98. Arriba, 23 June 1962. 
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The resurgence of the furia, myth was completed by Real Madrid's sixth 
European Cup win in 1966. Marca regarded this event as the dawning of a 
new are for the furia: 
"Just four years ago, our football was dominated by foreigners, and 
our beloved furia espafiola was in serious danger of extinction... 
Two years ago, the furia returned in the form of a virile, 
impassioned young Spanish team which defeated the Soviet Union. 
Now, after a rejuvenated and wholly Spanish Real Madrid has 
recaptured the European Cup, the return of the furia is evident. 
But this process should not be regarded as completed. Instead, we 
should look with optimism to the future, because the furia espaßola 
is on the verge of a new Golden Age, when young, impassioned 
Spanish players will once again demonstrate to the world the 
Hispanic racial virtues. "99 
Apart from the national team's triumph in the 1964 European Nations 
Cup and Real Madrid's victory in 1966 European Cup, there were to be-no 
other international successes for these rejuvenated, all-Spanish teams, 
and therefore very little opportunity for the Fascist rhetoric and the 
furia espanola myth. One of the last examples of this kind of rhetoric 
occurred in June 1971, when the Spanish national team travelled to 
Moscow for a-European Nations Cup match. Although this was not 
mentioned in any other-newspaper, both Marca and Arriba carried 
grandiose, fulsome articles claiming that the whole Spanish party, upon 
departure after defeat by the Soviets, chanted Arriba Espanal and sang 
Cara al Sol. b00 It has been alleged by several of the players, however, 
that the chanting and singing was initiated by the Marca and Arriba 
correspondents, and carried out by the RFEF and DND officials without 
99. Marca, 13 May 1966. 
100. See Marca, and Arriba, 2 June 1971. 
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any substantial contribution coming from the players. '°' 
It is appropriate at this stage to attempt to arrive at a 
conclusion about the extent of Fascist influence over Spanish 
professional football during the Franco years. A clear distinction has 
to be made between the "Blue Period" from 1939 to 1948, and the three 
decades that followed. During the "Blue Period", this Fascist influence 
over football was immense, indeed, every bit as strong over Spanish 
sport and society in general. The Falangist DND appointed an abundance 
of Falangists as Presidents and directors of the RFEF, of the regional 
federations and of the clubs, three of whom were compelled to change 
their foreign-influenced names, whilst every match began with Fascist 
saluting and chanting, and was largely reported in the Press in a 
language riddled with Fascist rhetoric. The "de-Falangization" of Spain 
from the late, 1940s onwards was clearly reflected in football by the 
abandonment of the pre-match Fascist gestures and the blue shirts of the 
national team. Thereafter, the Fascist influence over football declined 
very gradually. The proportion of Falangists in positions of power was 
restricted firstly by the return, in 1948, of a limited degree of 
democracy to the football clubs, and secondly by the clubs taking part 
in the election, from 1961 onwards, of the majority of the directors of 
the RFEF and the regional federations. The Fascist rhetoric and 
mystification of the game was made difficult in the 1950s by the 
extremely high level of foreign influence in the internationally 
101. This was alleged to the author by the following former players, 
present in Moscow: Caries Rexach of FC Barcelona Jose Angel Ir (bar 
of Athletic de Bilabao, 1 July 1986; Manuel Velizquez of Real 
Madrid. 
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successful teams, especially Real Madrid. 
This rhetoric and mystification enjoyed a temporary resurgence in 
the period 1962-1966, because of the prohibition on further foreign 
players and the brief successes of the national team and Real Madrid. 
By the end of the Franco period, the Fascist influence over professional 
football was limited to Falangist Presidents of the RFEF, for example 
Jose Luis Perez Paya and Pablo Porta, and the occasional reappearance 
of the Fascist gesturing and rhetoric, such as occurred when the 
national team travelled to Moscow, in June 1971. 
The major obstacle to the application of Fascist concepts to 
Spanish professional football, and indeed to Italian and German 
professional football earlier, was the lack of a precise model for the 
professional game. The Fascist model for sport in general required mass 
participation in order, firstly, to "revitalize" the race, and, 
secondly, to impress the watching world. This model, however, was 
strictly confined to amateur sport. The world of professional football, 
with its immense passive support, millionaire players and imported 
foreign stars, was always going to have severe difficulties in 
harmoniously coexisting with this Fascist sporting model. 
A veritable gulf existed between these two sporting worlds. This 
was illustrated by the events of every 1 May during the 1940s and 1950s, 
when the DND organized the annual "Sindicalist Sporting Games", in which 
members of the "Vertical Syndicates" would attempt to offer a multi- 
sports spectacular. This would take place in Real Madrid's Estadio 
Bernabeu, only half filled with non-participating members of the 
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"Vertical Syndicates" who had been coerced into attending, or members of 
the public who entered free of charge. 102 The lack of interest in this 
annual event can be contrasted with the same stadium packed to 125,000 
capacity to see the expensive foreign stars lead Real Madrid to another 
triumph in the European Cup. 
To bridge the gap between these two distinct sporting worlds was to 
square a circle. There wqs absolutely no official attempt to do this 
by the leadership of the DND or the Falange. 103 The ambiguity was 
allowed to remain completely unresolved. The only serious attempt to 
close this gap was undertaken by the Falangist broadcaster Mariano 
Daranas of Radio Nacional when, in June 1954, Real Madrid staged a free 
exhibition match against a side of veteran national team players to 
celebrate the opening of the final section of the Estadio Bernabeu. 
This is a part of Daranas's appraisal of the event: 
"Perhaps we talk too loudly and too well against Communism. But are 
we certain that we really comport ourselves like anti-Communists? 
Are we sure that we apply all all the necessary, or, at least, 
possible means so that the horse-breakers of working-class meat do 
not manage to play the role of anxious sheperds? In order to 
respond with a categorical affirmative, it is necessary to place 
with the reach of the lower classes, the more frequently the 
better, not only certain essential biological demands, such as 
work, food, sleep, house and leisure, but also those-other social 
imperatives that are the almost exclusive monopoly of certain 
economic classes. Bear in mind that, thanks to Real Madrid, 
thousands and thousands of poor children saw for the first time on 
Saturday a real football match; that Zarra and Di Stefano changed 
in front of their eyes from legendary figures into men of flesh and 
bone; that the parents enjoyed seeing their children delighted. 
102. For further details of these "Si dicalist Sporting Games", see 
Cazorla Prieto, op. cit., pp. 218-221. 
103. No such attempt was discovered by the author in his examination of 
the archives of the DND, op. cit., rnor was referred to by any of 
his interviewees. 
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Bear in mind that throughout the evening the gigantic and 
harmonious stadium was not, strictly speaking the property of Real 
Madrid, but that of thousands of humble families who cannot afford 
to buy tickets for every Sunday league match, to such an extent 
that the actual season ticket holders, powerless, and persuaded by 
the immense wave of new spectators, gave up their seats in the 
covered stand to the masses from the poor districts. "104 
Apart from this rhetoric, there was no other attempt by the DND of the 
Falange to diminish the gulf which separated the Fascist sporting model 
and Spanish professional football. 
104. This radio script was reproduced in the Boletin del Real Madrid CF, 
No. 48, July 1954. 
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CHAPTER THREE: FOOTBALL AND POLITICAL PASSIVITY 
"For years, Spanish sport was effectively reduced to football, 
always employed as a drug to make the man in the street forget his 
everyday problems, and used systematically on the eve'of the most 
conflictive public holidays. Manuel Fraga, specifically, combined 
the fiestas of football and bulls for all of the May Day public 
holidays, culminating a few years ago, one 30 April, in a 
television transmission of all of the goals ever scored by the 
Spanish national team, narrated by the epic voice of Francoism, 
that of the commentator Matias Prats. "1 
This is the opinion of Javier Solana, the present Spanish Minister of 
Culture with responsibility for sport, 2 about the second aspect of the 
politicization of football in Francoist Spain: the alleged manipulation 
of the game by the Franco regime to serve as a political soporific, 
"social drug" or "escape valve" that contributed towards the maintenance 
of a high level of political passivity. Together with the diplomatic 
and regional significance of football, which will be examined in 
Chapters Sevenand Eight of this thesis respectively, this has been the 
most discussed aspect of politicization. 
1. Quoted in Antonio Alcoba, op. cit., pp. 254-255. 
2. In August 1977, the DND became the Consejo Superior de Deportes, 
under the auspices of the Ministry of Culture. This arrangement for 
the political control of Spanish sport remains intact at the time of 
writing. 
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The general allegation against the Franco regime with regard to 
this particular aspect, made largely by an abundance of both Spanish and 
foreign sports writers, is that it systematically manipulated football 
in order to help maintain a high degree of political passivity that was 
originally established by force of arms. These many critics of the 
Franco regime do not attempt to deny that there existed an immense 
genuine demand for professional football from a repressed and 
entertainment-starved-Spanish public. They simply allege that this 
demand was cynically exploited. Their arguments centre on the 
contribution towards the popularity of the game made by the sections of 
the media most closely connected to the State: the daily sports 
newspaper Marca, a member of the Movimiento's extensive Press chain, and 
national radio and television. In particular, the latter institution is 
alleged to have been utilized during the May Day public holidays of the 
late 1960s and early 1970s in an attempt by the regime to reduce the 
attendance at the illegal demonstrations of the opposition parties and 
the independent trade unions. 3 
In defence of the Franco regime, it is argued, largely by a group 
of veteran, conservative Spanish sports journalists, that the enormous 
popularity of football during the Franco years had nothing to do with 
the regime. They point out that an explosion of interest in the game 
similar to the one that occurred in Franco Spain also took place in 
3. This allegation has been made in the following publications: Alcoba, 
op. cit., pp. 253-255; Luis*Maria Cazorla Preito, op. cit., p. 163; 
Vicente Marco, ßistorias del deporte, Madrid, 1982, p. 144; Julian 
Garcia Candau, op. cit., pp. 51-52; Alex J. Botines, op. cit., pp. 
17-18. 
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every European and South American country after the Second World War, 
and that this explosion produced allegations of football acting as a 
political soporific in most of these countries. In a specific Spanish 
context, this group of writers claims that the high level of coverage of 
the game by both the State-controlled and independent sections of the 
media was the effect rather than the immense public demand for the 
product rather than to any manipulation by the Franco regime, and that, 
in consequence, this media coverage should not be subjected to suspicion 
or investigation. 4 
This chapter has five objectives. The first is to demonstrate that 
football has been utilized as a political soporific not only in 
Francoist Spain, but also in many countries and at many times, 
especially in the South American military dictatorships of the 1960s and 
1970s. The second objective is to demonstrate that football was simply 
one part of the all-pervasive "culture of evasion", the concept employed 
with regard to the popular culture that prevailed in Francoist Spain. 5 
The third objective is to demonstrate that the critic's perception of 
football as a political soporific increased in intensity at 
approximately the same rate as the game itself increased in popularity. 
To examine the evidence that supports the view that football was 
systematically utilized by the Franco regime as a political diversion is 
4. The only publication in which these views have been expounded in 
any kind of systematic manner has been Marca, 17 February 1970. 
These views have been expressed to the author in interviews with the 
Marca journalists Jose Maria Lorente and Rodolfo Belarmino "Belarmo, 
3 May 1986, and by the former RFEF Presidents Jose Luis Perez Pay', 
and Pablo Porta. 
5. This concept was created by Sir Raymond Carr and Juan Pablo Fusi, 
op. cit. ý 
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the fourth and most important objective of this chapter. The fifth and 
final objective is to evaluate to what extent football contributed to 
the high level of political passivity that existed in Francoist Spain. 
There have been several newspaper and magazine articles about the 
alleged utilization of football as a political soporific, the most 
notable written by the celebrated Uruguayan novelist Mario Benedetti. 6 
No systematic monographic study of this phenomenon in the whole of South 
America, however, has been published. In these articles, it has been 
alleged that this manipulation of the game normally occurs when a 
military 'uff nta realizes that repression, or the fear of repression, is 
not sufficient in itself to maintain for an extended period the hiiti 
level of political demobilization originally established by force of 
arms and also that it is incapable of attaining the economic and social 
progress which usually brings political passivity in its wake. In order 
to obtain this level of passivity, the junta is compelled to search for 
popular entertainments which could be promoted to be political 
soporifics, the Roman idea of "bread and circuses" appealing to the 
military mind. There is practically no viable alternative to football 
as the principal "circus" in the view of the 'uff nta, being a daily saga 
of dramatic and impassioned events, and indeed traditionally the major 
source of entertainment for the majority of middle and working class 
males in south America.? 
6. See, for example, El Pais, 6 January 1981 and 29 June 1986. 
7. See, for example, the articles of Benedetti mentioned in the above 
footnote, Cazorla Prieto, op. cit., pp. 274-275, and Janet Lever, 
Soccer Madness, New York, 1983. 
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In the course of these newspaper and magazine articles, it is 
alleged that the South American military dictators adopted several 
measures in order to ensure that football had the potential to distract' 
popular attention away from the political situation. Extremely little 
definitive proof, however, is offered in support of these allegations. 
The principal allegation is that substantial sums of money from 
mysterious sources frequently permitted the almost permanently near- 
bankrupt clubs to be able to resist the lucrative offers from Europe for 
the most attractive and popular players. It is claimed that in this way 
the modest Santos club of Sao Paulo was able to maintain the world- 
famous player Pele in their team for the whole of his career. The first 
headline-making offer for Pele came from Real Madrid in June 1959, when 
he was still only nineteen years old. e In June 1960, a mysterious 
"businessman" with a low public profile called Eduardo Antonio Coehlo 
gave financially-troubled Santos an interest-free loan of half a million 
United States dollars, on the condition that the lucrative offers for 
Pere from the West German clubs Bayern Munich and SV Hamburg were 
rejected. 9 It is alleged that Coehlo continued to give similar loans to 
Santos whenever it appeared possible that the player would be sold to a 
West German or Italian club, up until he retired from top-flight 
football in 1975.10 Much the same thing is alleged to have occured with 
the immensely popular Uruguayan striker Fernando Morena of the Peßarol 
club of Montevideo, and also with Diego Maradona, who surprisingly 
remained in financially-troubled Argentine football, first with the 
8. For further details, see Marca, 22-28 June 1959. 
9. See, for further details, Lever, op. cit., pp. 113-114, or 
World Soccer, August 1968. 
10. See Lever, ibid. "P. c'. ", ý. 
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Argentinos Juniors club and then with Boca Juniors, both of Buenos Aires 
until 1982.11 It is claimed that mysterious sums of money have allowed 
many lesser-known Argentine, Brazilian, Uruguayan, Chilean and 
Paraguayan footballers to remain at home. 12 It is significant that 
after the fall of the military dictatorships in Argentina, Uruguay and 
Brazil in the period 1983-1985, even the most popular clubs of these 
countries have been unable to resist the Italian, Spanish and French 
offers for their leading players. 13 
In a similar way, it is also alleged that the military dictators of 
South America materially contributed to football being able to serve as 
a political soporific by saving bankrupt clubs from disappearance with 
other mysterious sums of money. It is claimed that this occured with 
special frequency in the Chile of General Pinochet, where the military 
regime has apparently realized that the collapse of professional clubs 
causes whole towns or suburbs to lose their principgl source of 
entertainment, with matches cancelled throughout the country because of 
the withdrawal of these teams from the national league. 14 It has been 
11. See, for further details, the two articles of Benedetti mentioned 
above, and World Soccer, September 1980. 
12. In addition to the two sources mentioned in the above footnote, see 
World Soccer, April 1977 and March 1982, and Don Balön, No. 282,10 
January 1981. 
13. It was stated in World Soccer, March 1987, that there are 95 
footballers from these three South American countries playing in the 
professional leagues of Western Europe. Indeed, the South American 
championship tournament for national teams, which took place in 
Argentina in July 1987, was severely weakened by the great majority 
of these 95 players having to remain with their European clubs. 
14. For further details of these allegations, see either Don Balön, No. 
282,10 January 1981 and No. 494,7 April 1985, and World Soccer, 
March 1982 and September 1984 
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specifically alleged that the Pinochet regime stepped in to save the 
Everton club of Vina del Mar from extinction in 1979, and the Rangers 
club of Talca three years later-15 Of greater significance, however, 
appears to be the regime's constant preoccupation with the financial 
problems of Colo Colo Santiago, the most popular Chilean club. The 
regime realized that the disappearance of this famous club could have 
actualily brought in its wake the collapse of the whole Chilean 
professional league. On two occasions, in 1981 and 1984, the Pinochet 
regime was so concerned about the Colo Colo situation that, echoing the 
governmental interference in Spanish football in the 1940s, it actually 
appointed its own nominee as club President, completely disregarding the 
wishes of the approximately 35,000 club members. 16 
It is claimed that the Stroessner regime in Paraguay was 
responsible for saving the Ascunciön clubs Sol de America and Cerro 
Porteno from extinction, in 1983 and 1985 respectively, '7 whilst the 
military junta then in power in Uruguay is alleged to have done the same 
with the highly popular Peflarol club of Montevideo in both 1978 and 
1981.18 
The various military regimes of South America have spent 
considerable amounts of money in preparing a successful national team, 
not only in order to have an obvious catalyst for aggressive 
nationalism, but, in addition, a political soporific that could assist 
15. See Don Balön, No. 494,7 April 1985. 
16. Ibid. 
17. See, for further details, World Soccer, April 1986 
18. For details, see the two articles of Benedetti mentioned above. 
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in keeping the populace in front of their television sets instead of on 
the streets causing problems for the regime. The various Brazilian 
military juntas invested thousands of dollars in the preparation of 
their World Cup teams, with spectacular success in 1970, but 
considerably less in subsequent tournaments. 19 The Uruguayan military 
dictators spent heavily on their national team in the period 1980-1982, 
were rewarded with the Mundialito victory in 1981, but in the same year 
failed to qualify for the 1982 World Cup finals tournament. 20 The 
Stroessner regime invested more than a million US dollars preparing the 
Paraguayan national team for the 1986 World Cup finals, in which they 
performed creditably. 21 
All of the money allegedly spent by the Brazilian, Uruguayan and 
Paraguayan regimes, however, pales in comparison with the two and a half 
million US dollars that the Argentine junta headed by General Jorge 
Videla invested in preparing a team for the 1978'World Cup finals, 
played on home soil. 22 The young Argentine national manager Cesar Luis 
Menotti reflected the general feeling that a good performance by the 
home team would contribute towards the maintenance of political 
passivity: 
"If Argentina, apart from organizing the championship, manages a 
good classification, then many of the problems of the Argentine 
people will be resolved. "23 
19. See, for further details, Lever, op. Cit., pp. 32-55 and pp. 93-112. 
20. See the two Benedetti El Pais articles for details. 
21. This allegation was made in World Soccer, April 1986. 
22. For further details, see World Soccer, October 1978, Don Balön, No. 
282,10 January 1981, and The Sunday Times, 21 June 1986. 
23. Quoted in Interviu, 16 November 1877. 
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Menotti's team did win the tournament, playing open and attacking 
football, allowing the Videla junta to bask in the reflected glory. 24 
The most obvious way, however, in which the South American military 
dictators attempted to promote football to be a political soporific was 
n 
the same method as in Francoist Spain: an extremely high number of 
matches broadcast on State television, especially during the potentially 
dangerous May Day public holiday. This was the case in all of the 
dictatorships mentioned above, and especially in Argentina under the 
'uff nta of General Ongania from 1966 to 1969, when as many as six matches 
a week were transmitted, the clubs being generously recompensated by the 
regime for the lack of paying spectators in the stadia. 25 
Football has been manipulated as a political soporific not only in 
the South American military dictatorships. It is claimed that this has 
occurred in most of the dictatorships of the World, in Central America, 
in the one-party states of Black Africa, in South East Asia, and even in 
Eastern Europe. 26 Unlike South America, however, the areas mentioned 
above are not wildly enthusiastic about the game, being largely under- 
developed rural societies. Furthermore, there is no pluralist 
24. For details of how the Videla regime took advantage of the 1978 
World Cup triumph, see: Cazorla Prieto, op. cit., pp. 308-310; 
Benedetti, op. cit.; World Soccer, October 1978; Don Balön, No. 282, 
10 January 1981; The Sunday Times, (London) 21 June 1986. 
25. See Cazorla Prieto, op. cit., pp. 297-298, and Vicente Verdi, 
El Futbol: mitos, ritos y simbolos, Madrid, 1980, p. 205, and 
La Naciön, (Buenos Aires), 6, May 1969 for details of this television 
coverage. 
26. For brief details of all of these allegations, see the special 
report in Don Balon, No. 131,8 April 1978, and Cazorla Prieto, op. 
cit., pp. 161-187. 
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democratic tradition in these areas, and the regimes in power have 
usually possessed neither the economic means nor the inclination to 
promote professional football as a political soporific; mainly because 
their problems have been more immediate. 
It has even been asserted that football has served as an instrument 
of political diversion in Western Europe. In particular, it has been 
claimed by several Italian journalists and sociologists that Giovanni 
Agnelli, the largest shareholder of the Fiat car empire, is financer and 
President of the powerful Juventus club of Turin partially in order to 
distract the attention of his workers away from labour problems. 27 It 
is alleged that the same objectives are held by Fritz Scherer, the 
President of the leading West German club Bayern Munich and employer of 
approximately 40,000 Bavarians in various furniture factories. 28 
Another example of a local capitalist allegedly directing the local 
football club with the intention of contributing towards passivity is 
the shipping magnate Claude Bez, President of the champion French club 
Girondins de Bordeaux. 29 One of the theoreticians of professional 
football as a political soporific in the Western pluralist democracies 
is Professor EW Hunt, who wound up his controversial article "Karl Marx 
versus the Stretford End, " published by The Guardian in February 1981, 
in the following way: 
"Professional football is also a powerful drug. Karl Marx called 
religion "the opium of the masses"; words to be inscribed later on 
Lenin's tomb. He was referring to Christianity which, so he 
believed, drugged the proletariat so effectively that they were not 
27. For details, see Cazorla Prieto, op. cit., pp. 164-165. 
28. Ibid. 
29. See World Soccer, October 1981 for details. 
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conscious of their miseries. Were he alive today, he would still 
say the same. But he would hardly leave it there; he would no 
doubt add the names of the other narcotics that are corrupting 
Western society, among which he would not fail to include 
professional football. 
It reminds you of the most pungent words of one of the most 
celebrated satirists of the ancient world: 
"The Roman people crave only two things: bread and the circus 
games". 
Is it any different today? "30 
A strong counter-argument can nevertheless be presented against 
applying this neo-Marxist theory of "false consciousness" to football, 
in consequence regarding the game as a political soporific in both 
military dictatorships and pluralist democracies alike. It can be 
argued that football fanaticism in all societies is more likely to be 
the effect rather than the cause of political passivity. In military 
dictatorships, political demobilization is established and subsequently 
maintained by repression, or the fear of repression, rather than by 
enthusiasm for football. This game frequently increases in popularity 
after the establishment of a dictatorship, but partially because of the 
general drabness of life and the lack of liberty to participate in many 
other activities. 31 With regard to the pluralist democracies, there is 
absolutely no conclusive evidence whatsoever to suggest that football 
fanaticism can lead to political and industrial passivity. For example, 
there were far more strikes and conflicts at the Turin Fiat factory in 
the 1970s, when the Juventus team of Agnelli completely dominated 
Italian football, than in the relatively peaceful 1980s, when the 
domination of Juventus has been successfully challenged by 
30. The Guardian, (London), 13 February 1981. 
31. For further details of how football increased in popularity in 
Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay after the military takeovers of the 
late 1960s and early 1970s, see Cazorla Prieto, op. cit., pp. 161- 
163, or Lever, op. cit. 
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Internazionale of Milan, Roma, Verona and Napoli. The American 
sociologist Janet Lever, who researched into the social and political 
significance of Brazilian football in the early 1970s, arrived at the 
conclusion that, when put to the test, football was incapable of serving 
as an agent of political passivity: 
"We can condemn a regime's cruel tactics of social control and 
restrictions on civil liberties without condemning soccer. Few are 
fooled by the government's manipulation of sport for its nation- 
alist goals; it is not "false consciousness" that makes people 
support their teams... Nor is soccer an opiate that would stop the 
revolution; a contest that dramatizes real social conflict could 
not continue in a time of extreme unrest and might even prompt 
civil disorder. "32 
The second objective of this chapter is to demonstrate that 
football should be regarded as simply one part, albeit a large and 
important part, of the immense "culture of evasion" that existed in 
Francoist Spain. This was the concept created by Sir Raymond Carr and 
Juan Pablo Fusi in Spain: From Dictatorship to Democracy in order to 
describe Spanish popular culture in the Franco years, and was defined as 
"an escape from immediate reality". 33 
This "culture of evasion" was mainly the product of the general 
desire in post-Civil War Spain to attempt to forget both the traumas of 
that conflict and the subsequent hunger, misery and repression. This 
desire to forget was largely responsible for the failure of the "heroic 
cinema" of the 1940s, heavily subsidised by the State, which offered 
epic films about the Nationalist struggle in the Civil War and 
32. Lever, op. cit., p. 159. 
33. Sir Raymond Carr and Juan Pablo Fusi, op. cit., p. 118. 
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exaggerated exploits of-the Falangist "Blue Division" on the Russian 
front. The other major casualty was the "social literature" of the 
1950s, a largely failed attempt by young writers such as Miguel Delibes, 
Juan Goytisolo and Rafael S 
(nchez Ferlosio to bridge the extremely wide 
gap between the limited number of intellectuals who chose to remain in 
Francoist Spain and the largely indifferent masses. As sadly concluded 
by the Falangist poet Dionisio Ridruejo, who joined the anti-Francoist 
opposition in 1955, "intellectuals have never known a time when their 
influence has been so restricted"34 
Apart from football, the major manifestations of this "culture of 
evasion" were: the cinema, dominated by trivial Andalusian musicals 
starring the immensely popular Conchita Piquer, 35 Lola Flores and Carmen 
Sevilla, and American and Italian importations; tear-jerking "photo- 
novels" bought at the newspaper kiosks, of which the best-selling 
Simplemente Maria series was the undisputed market leader; 36 from the 
early 1960s onwards, the hugely popular trivial serials and game shows 
34. Dionisio Ridruejo, Escrito en Espafia, Madrid, 1962, p. 176. 
35. It was a song of Conchita Piquer which perhaps best epitomised the 
general desire to ignore the immediate past and contemporary reality 
which was fundamental to this "culture of evasion": 
"I don't want to find out 
Don't tell me, neighbour 
I prefer to live dreaming 
Than to know the truth. " 
This song was quoted in Manuel Vazquez Montalbän, Cronica 
sentimental de Espana, Barcelona, 1971, p. 28. In this stimulating 
work, all of the manifestations of the "culture evasion", including 
football, are discussed in depth. 
36. For further details of the Simplemente Maria phenomenon, see Manuel 
Campo Vidal, Simplemente Maria y su repercusiön en las clases 
trabajadoras, Madrid, 1979. 
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broadcast by State television. 37 During the last years of the Franco 
period, television almost completely dominated this "culture of " 
evasion", a situation that caused Josep P1ä to observe, in 1972, that 
"everybody is watching television serials with open mouths, such is 
today's culture", 38 and his fellow Catalan writer Manuel Vazquez 
Montalbän to'claim, a year later, that "to talk about a mass culture in 
Spain practically reduces the subject to'television and songs". 39 None 
of these manifestations of the "culture of evasion" made any serious 
attempt to reflect the social and political reality of Francoist Spain, 
instead offering the public the opportunity temporarily to escape from 
the reality of long working hours, low pay, -poor nutrition and the fear 
of repression. 
Football was not the only sport which formed a part of this 
"culture of evasion". It has been alleged that basketball, by far the 
second most popular sport in Francoist Spain. 4° was also exploited by 
the Franco regime as a distraction that could contribute towards the 
maintenance of a high level of political passivity. 41 The estimated 
television viewing figures for basketball matches in the early 1960s 
37. For complete details of television's role in this "culture of 
evasion", see Manuel VIzquez Montalban, El libro aris de Television 
Espanola, Madrid, 1973. 
38. Quoted in Trio, 23 December 1972. 
39. Vazquez Montalban, El libro aris de Television Espadola, op. cit., 
p. 161. 
40. For details of basketball's popularity in Francoist Spain in terms 
of paying spectators and television audiences, see Marco, op. cit., 
pp. 167-169. 
41. This allegation has been made in the following publications: Cazorla 
Prieto, op. cit., p. 341; Marco, op. cit., p. 167; Garcia Candau, 
op. cit., p. 108. 
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were extremely high, on occasions reaching ten million, 42 which 
obviously encouraged State television (RTVE) to combine this sport with 
football in its special transmissions allegedly designed to reduce 
attendance at the illegal May Day demonstrations. The first May Day 
basketball broadcast consisted of the Real Madrid-Caja de Zaragoza match 
in 1964. The following year, there was no room for basketball because, 
as shall shortly be seen, RTVE transmitted no less than four football 
matches during the May Day public holiday period. For the May 1966 
holiday, the FC Barcelona-Real Madrid basketball clash, which would 
decide the league championship, was brought forward by three days and 
seen by an estimated 14 million viewers, the record for a Spanish 
basketball match until 1980.43 From 1966 onwards, there was at least 
one basketball match broadcast by TVE during the May Day holiday, top 
domestic matches supplemented by the occasional foreign clash, for 
example the Soviet Union-Yugoslavia international in 1972. 
The only other sport which possibly served the Franco regime as a 
political diversion is bullfighting, which is in fact not, strictly 
speaking, a sport. There was a large number of bullfights broadcast by 
RTVE in the summer months, when there-was neither football nor 
basketball. Furthermore, as commented by Javier Solana at the beginning 
of this chapter, bullfights were also transmitted by RTVE during the 
42. It was claimed in the estimated viewing figures offered in Holal, 
(Madrid) for example, that the Real Madrid-FC Barcelona basketball 
match of February 1964 attracted a television audience of almost 
twelve millions. It was claimed by Manuel Vazquez Montalbän, 
however, in El libro cris de Televisiön Espafiola, op. cit., that all 
estimated viewing figures in the 1960s tended to be exaggerated 
because of the imprecise methods employed to gather the data. 
43. Information taken from, IHola!. 
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May Day public holiday. 
The third objective of this chapter is to explain the process by 
which the view that football was being manipulated by the Franco regime 
was born and gradually gained widespread acceptance. 
After the conclusion of the Civil War, there was an immense 
popular demand, reflected in the Press, for the league and cup 
competitions immediately to recommence. 44 The demand for cheap 
entertainment and distraction from the miserable reality of the 
immediate postwar years was enormous, and consequently the football 
stadia were practically always filled to capacity. 45 In addition, there 
were practically no other forms-of mass entertainment, apart from 
bullfighting during the summer months. 
These capacity crowds were certainly not attracted by the prospect 
44. This demand` was reflected in interviews with the Presidents of the 
RFEF, Julian Troncoso Sagredo, in Marca, 2 May 1939, with the 
Falangist Zaragoza President Antonio Rodriguez in El Mundo 
Deportivo, 10 June 1939, and in the editorials published in Marca, 
April 1939 and 22 May 1939, and in El Mundo Deportivo, 28 May and 4 
September 1939. 
45. A special report published in Marca, 19 June 1942 estimated that for 
approximately 80% of the first and gecond division, ie. 
professional, and Copa del Generalfsimo matches played in the three 
seasons since the Civil War there had been a capacity crowd, and 
that at the retaining 20% of matches only on very rare occasions had 
the shortfall of spectators been more than 20%. In consequence, 
Marca called upon the DND to initiate a policy of stadia 
construction, beginning with a 100,000-capacity national stadium in 
Madrid. This call was taken up by both El Alcazar and Arriba, 
because of lack of State investment, however, the DND was only able 
to offer a tiny amount of financial assistance to the private 
football clubs to construct their own stadia. By 1944, the Press 
campaign for public stadia had terminated. 
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of seeing spectacular football. Several leading players had died in the 
conflict, for example Luis Montanes of Valencia and Enrique Urquizu of 
Athletic de Bilbao. Many others preferred to remain in exile in South 
America rather than return to Francoist Spain, for example practically 
the whole of the El Euzkadi combined Basque team and of the FC Barcelona 
team that toured Mexico. It was not until the mid-1940s that a new 
generation of attractive Spanish players came to the fore, featuring 
Telmo Zarra and Piru Gainza of Athletic de Bilbao, Estanislao Basora and 
Cesar of FC Barcelona and Luis Molowny of Real Madrid. This lack of 
attractive players in the early 1940s, however, did not matter overmuch 
to the entertainment-starved and war-weary Spanish public. 
The popularity of Spanish football increased considerably in the 
1940s. 46 This increase was largely due to the attractive young players 
mentioned above, and the fact that no single team dominated the game, 
the honours being distributed between the leading clubs. This state of 
equality continued until Real Madrid, inspired by the Argentine forward 
46. Using information gathered from the archives of El Mundo Deportivo, 
of Marca, and of the major football clubs, it can be estimated that 
- football crowds for professional matches increased by approximately 
50% from 1940 to 1950. More accurate figures cannot be given 
because, due to the membership system operated at all Spanish clubs, 
no exact records of the numbers of spectators at any match are kept. 
In addition, this increase would surely have been far higher if any 
other clubs, apart from Real Madrid in 1947, had constructed 
completely new stadia, instead of merely increasing the capacity of 
their old grounds. The only definitive statistics available are 
those of the the increase of members at the leading clubs, obtained 
by the author examining their separate archives: in July 1940, Real 
Madrid had 11,766 members, a figure which had risen to 35,642 by 
July 1950; the increase at FC Barcelona during the same period was 
from 4,307 to 33,860; at Atletico de Madrid, from 7,539 to 14,024; 
at Athletic de Bilbao, from 7,875 to 16,127; at Real Sociedad de 
San Sebastian, from 5,548 to 11,831. 
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Alfredo Di Stefano, began to dominate in the mid-1950s. 
This increase in popularity was also reflected in the sharp 
increase in the football pools revenue, 47 and in the number of listeners 
to the match commentaries broadcast on the radio. In the immediate 
post-Civil War years, a radio receiver was something of a luxury, and 
practically the only stations broadcasting belonged either to the State 
or to the media chain of the Movimiento. By 1950, however, the majority 
of Spanish homes possessed a receiver, and usually spent Sunday evenings 
listening to the exciting football commentaries broadcast by the new 
private radio stations, with their pools coupons in front of them4e 
The popularity of football in Francoist Spain received another 
considerable increase because of the creditable fourth place achieved by 
the national team in the 1950 World Cup finals tournament in Brazil. 
The media coverage of the tournament was immense, whilst the city 
councils of Madrid, Barcelona, Bilbao, Valencia and Sevilla erected 
large screens and showed to the enthusiastic public 8mm films of the 
Spanish victories two days afterwards. The media coverage and the film 
shows caused several people connected with the game to suspect that the 
Franco regime might be exploiting football in order to maintain a high 
47. During the season 1939/1940, the three private football pools 
companies which recommenced after the Civil War had joint revenues 
of 2,868,750 pesetas, which was inferior to the 1935/1936 total of 
3,011,427 pesetas. By season 1949/1950, his total had spectacularly 
risen to 26,478,348 pesetas. This information was revealed by an 
examination of the archives of the DND. 
48. This was claimed to the author by Vicente Marco, the founder-and 
former director of the Cadena SER' highly popular Sunday sports 
programme Carrusel deportivo, which attracted an estimated fifteen 
million listeners by 1950. 
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level of political passivity, although this suspicion, for obvious 
reasons, was not put into print. 49 
Eight more years were to pass before this suspicion was printed 
inside Spain. The subject was originally broached by Spanish Republican 
exiles in Mexican and South American newspapers. 5° In November 1958, 
the Francoist writer Rafael Garcia Serrano hinted in Arriba that the 
popularity of football could be a factor in the political demobilization 
of the country, without going so far as to suggest that this was the 
product of deliberate regime policy, nor even that such depoliticization 
was one of the objectives of the regime. 5' 
By the time of Serrano's article, the popularity of football in 
Francoist Spain had ascended to new heights, largely because of the 
arrival of world-class foreign players such as Alfredo Di Stefano, 
Raymond Kopa and Ferenc Puskas at Real Madrid, Ladislas Kubala, Eugenio 
Martinez and Sandor Kocsis at FC Barcelona, and Vavä at Atletico de 
Madrid. In order to accommodate the mass of spectators that were 
attracted by these foreign players, practically all of the professional 
clubs either increased the capacity of their stadia by major 
49. This suspicion was felt at the the time by for example, the present 
FC Barcelona Vice-President Nicolau Casaus, and by Juan Jose 
Castillo, the veteran editor of El Mundo Deportivo, in 1950 a 
journalist on the paper. 
50. See, for example, the special feature on the popularity of football 
in Francoist Spain which appeared in La Naciön, 9 October 1956, and 
the column of Jose Maria Muguerza, one of the components of the 
El Euzkadi Basque team of 1938 who had remained in exile, in the 
Mexico City sports review Domingo Deportivo from June 1955 to 
November 1957. 
51. See "Dafensa del fütbol" by Rafael Garcia Serrano in Arriba, 29 
November 1958. 
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renovations, or constructed completely new stadia. 
It was not until the advent of television, however that the 
suspicion that the Franco regime was attempting to use football as a 
political soporific began really to grow in strength. Because of the 
technological backwardness of Francoist Spain, largely due to its 
isolation from the other countries of Western Europe, Spanish national 
television (RTVE) was not established until October 19S8. Furthermore, 
the outside broadcast facilities of RTVE were not sufficiently advanced 
to permit regular broadcasts of football matches until 1961. 
The view of football as a "social drug' in Francoist Spain was 
publicly expressed for the first time in L968, by Manuel Vazquez 
Montalbän, who largely based his argument on the football coverage of 
RTVE: 
"The fact that there are more football matches transmitted by 
television in Spain than in any other European country, says a lot 
in itself about the kind of popular culture that exists in this 
society, and even about our political system... One of the major 
effects of such an immensity of televised football, apart from 
reducing attendances at the stadia, is undoubtebly to contribute 
towards the creation of a general public that is passive in all 
respects. "52 
Vazquez Montalbän's broaching of the subject in this way made an 
important contribution to encouraging a debate, albeit somewhat limited, 
about a possible connection between the "football fever" and the 
political passivity that existed in Francoist Spain. 53 Two months 
52. Quoted in Barca, No., 664,20 March 1968. 
53. Alex J. Botines, for example, pointed out that Vazquez Montalbän's 
frank interview in Barca encouraged him to be so forthright in Dicen 
two months later. 
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later, in May 1968, Alex J. Botines went a step further than Vazquez 
Montalbän by referring to the football broadcasts during the May Day 
public holiday, and mischievously speculating about possible motives for 
these broadcasts: 
"Once again, the armchair football supporter has been treated to a 
feast, seeing some of the most exciting domestic and international 
action. But one question repeatedly occurs to me: why so much 
televized football during this particular holiday? Do the 
authorities wish to keep us all in the living-room, away from the 
beach or the mountains? ""4 
1969 was the year in which this debate increased in both quantity 
and quality. There were further contributions from both Vazquez 
Montalbän and Botines. In February 1969, the humorous writer Evaristo 
Acevedo published Carta a los celtiberos esposados, his amusing 
interpretation of contemporary Spanish history. Writing with an obvious 
touch of irony, Acevedo offered the first historical explanation of the 
increase in the popularity of football in Francoist Spain, linking it 
with the process of "de-Falangization" that was discussed in Chapter Two 
of this thesis: 
"Politics began to be relegated to a discreet penumbra, leaving the 
biggest preoccupations for the economy. How was the gap filled 
between 1947, the year in which Spain began to despoliticize 
itself, and 1967, in which first by means of democracia oraanica 
and afterwards by means of other liberalizations, Spain began to 
reintegrate herself into the international coexistence, into "the 
world of our days"? Simple: by "footballizing" public opinion. 
By means of a controlled Press, which dedicated pages and 
pages to the league matches, to the cup matches, to the 
declarations of coaches and footballers, to the financially 
fabulous transfers of the great figures of football, the country 
began to become impassioned about football. "55 
54. Dicen, 2 May 1968. 
55. Evaristo Acevedo, Carta a los celtiberos esposados, 1969, 
pp. 190-191. 
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The first important figure inside the football world to express his 
opinion on the matter was the Real Madrid President Santiago Bernabeu, 
probably because he was annoyed by the earlier comments of Vazquez 
Montalbän, Botines and Acevedo. In contrast to these commentators, 
Bernabeu found nothing either dangerous or suspicious about football 
serving as political soporific, without entering into the question of 
whether this situation was the result of a deliberate policy of the 
Franco regime. This is how he was quoted in the semi-official Real 
Madrid book 5,000 voles blancos, published in September 1969: 
"We are in a moment of such great incomprehension and such a 
horrible bustle that what the people really want is tranquility. 
The people want to find refuge in their house with their wife, with 
their children, with their family, with their friends. Nothing 
else matters to them. It's pure tragedy. Football is the means by 
which the great mass of people forget their problems from time to 
time . "16 
Bernabeu was by no means alone in his opinions. His counterpart at 
Atletico de Madrid, Vicente Calderon, was far more explicit when 
questioned about the subject on television in November 1969, the 
question itself reflecting how widespread this debate had become in such 
a short period: 
Do you not think that football is making the country stupid? 
-I wish that football would make the country stupid, and I wish 
that the people would think about football for three days 
before and three days after the match. In this way, they would 
not think about other, more dangerous things. "57 
56. Quoted in Juan Mattas and Jose Luis Muniain, 5,000 soles blancos, 
Bilbao, 1969, p. 326. 
57. Reproduced in all of the Spanish sports newspapers, 17 November 
1969. 
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This debate continued apace in the Press, with the great majority 
of contributions coming from the new generation of critical sports 
journalists, led by Alex J. Botines, Juriän Garcia Candau and Jose Maria 
Garcia, in addition to non-specialist sports writers such as Manuel 
Vazquez Montalban and Francisco Cerecedo. 68 The next significant 
contribution to the debate came from Bernabeu, in February 1971. 
Instead of limiting himself, as before, to claiming that football helped 
the general public to escape from a sometimes unpleasant reality, he 
actually boasted that Real Madrid was doing a favour to the "nation" by 
keeping the people in a state of contentment: 
"We are doing a service for the nation. What we want is to keep 
the people happy. I say to you that we are doing a service for the 
nation because people like football a lot, and with football the 
Spaniards make their daily problems more bearable. "59 
The next distinguished person in the game to declare his opinion 
about the subject was the Athletic de Bilbao President Jose Maria Oraa, 
who objected to the RFEF requesting him to bring forward Athletic's home 
match against Valencia by three days in order to be broadcast by RTVE on 
May Day 1973. Despite the normal compensation offered to the clubs by 
RTVE for the reduction in paying spectators, Oraa insisted on protesting 
in the following way: 
"There is altogether far too much televized football in this 
country. Furthermore, I am simply at a loss to understand why RTVE 
always has to broadcast a number of matches during the May Day 
holiday, as if it was really preoccupied with keeping about half of 
the country in their homes... "60 
58. See, for example: Dicen, 9 April 1970 and 12 September 1971; Barca, 
No. 765,13 July 1970; As, 27 September and 3 January 1971; 
"Deporte, sociedad y politica", Cuadernos para el diäloco, 
(Madrid), No. XXV, May 1971. 
59. Quoted in Informaciones, (Madrid), 26 February 1971. 
60. Quoted in As, 26 April 1973. 
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This debate was not completely confined to the Spanish media. In 
March 1974, the prestigious Paris newspaper Le Monde undertook a 
detailed study of the Spanish political situation, and one of the 
conclusions that it arrived at was that: 
"Football has converted itself in Spain into the derivative of 
political passion. "61 
During the transition from dictatorship to democracy in Spain, this 
debate obviously acquired a historical approach, because, as shall be 
illustrated in the Epilogue to this thesis, all allegations about 
football continuing to serve as a political soporific stopped around 
1977 due to the profound changes that were then occurring in the 
organizational structures of the game. Many historical overviews 
claiming that football had served the Franco regime as an agent of 
political passivity were published, including the one from Javier Solana 
offered at the begining of this chapter. 62 The most original of these 
overviews was perhaps the one given by Francisco Gonzalez Ledesma in his 
biography of the world-famous Spanish goalkeeper Ricardo Zamora: 
"When the Civil War finished, the national football panorama was as 
gloomy as the general horizon of the country... The people longed 
to return to normal, to return to the life that the war seemed to 
have destroyed for ever, and they especially wanted to forget. In 
this context, football has always been a kind of opium which has 
helped the bad times to pass, and has caused to be forgotten many 
situations which would have otherwise appeared unbearable. 
Concious of this, the leaders of the "New State" dedicated a large 
part of their efforts to the reorganization of football, and there 
is no doubt that they were successful. For almost forty years, we 
Spaniards - in a general, mass sense - have preoccupied ourselves 
less with the realities of our country than with knowing how our 
favourite team would end up in the league classification. Without 
61. Reproduced in Don Ba17on, No. 66,10 January 1977. 
62. See, for example, Cazorla Prieto, op. cit., p. 164-165, Marco, op. 
cit., p. 144, or Dicen, 20 March 1977. 
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the stadia filled, it would not have been possible to substitute, 
as in the phrase attributed to Fernandez de la Mora, "the things of 
politics" for "the politics of things". 63 
This above quotation introduces two points which are crucial for the 
fourth objective of this chapter, which is to examine whether there 
really existed a deliberate policy of the Franco regime to manipulate 
football to be a political soporific. The first point raised in the 
overview of Gonzalez Ledesma is the debatable claim that "the leaders of 
the "New State" dedicated a large part of their efforts to the 
reorganization of football", with the objective of mitigating the misery 
and hunger of the immediate post-Civil War years. The second point 
concerns the-well-known phrase of Gonzalo Fernandez de la Mora, the 
Opus Dei diplomat who served as Minister of Public Works from 1970 to 
1974, with its implication that the Franco regime possibly had a 
theoretical basis for attempting to use football as a political 
soporific. 
It is appropriate to point out at this stage that there exists very 
little evidence to support the claim that the regime materially helped 
football to be in a position to serve as a political soporific 
immediately after the Civil War, as Gonzalez Ledesma claims above. It 
is true that pressure was put on General Jose Moscardö the head of 
first the Consejo_Nacional_de_Deportes, and then, from 1941 onwards, the 
Delegacion Nacional de Deportes, to have the national sporting 
competitions functioning again as soon as possible. This is evidenced 
63. Francisco Gonzalez Ledesma, Zamora: mito y realidad del mejor 
guardameta del mundo, Barcelona, 1978, pp. 211-212. 
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by Moscardö declaring, in October 1939: 
"The leaders of the "New Spain" have placed upon me the weighty 
responsibility of ensuring that the sporting competitions of Spain 
return to full operation immediately... "64 
Moscardo, in turn applied pressure to his own appointed directors of the 
RFEF to reorganize the league and cup competitions with haste, 65 and 
this they managed to achieve the first post-Civil War Copa del 
Generalisimo, as it was renamed, commencing in June 1939, and the first 
league in October 1939. This pressure, however, certainly does not 
prove that the Franco regime was immediately aware of the potential of 
football to serve as a political diversion. It could be argued that 
practically every government, of whatever political character, is 
anxious, after a war, to help everyday life to return to the way it had 
been before the conflict. This return to normality is usually regarded 
by the populace as a demonstration of the competence of the government. 
This was one of the immediate post-Civil War objectives of the Franco 
regime, despite the transformation of the political system of the 
country and the massive repression unleashed against those connected 
with the Republic, the political parties that had supported it during 
the conflict and the trade unions. Furthermore, it has been alleged 
that had the Civil War concluded in a different way, then the Republican 
victors would have been equally zealous to have the league and cup 
competitions functioning again as soon as possible, both as a 
64. Quoted in Marca, 24 October 1939. 
65. In the archives of the DND, the author uncovered a letter from 
Moscardö, dated 5 June 1939, urging the RFEF President Julian 
Troncoso Sagredo, appointed by Moscardo only three weeks earlier, to 
"use all possible resources and efforts" in order to have the Copa 
del Generalisimo played in June and July, and the league in 
operation again from October. 
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demonstration of their competence and because there was practically no 
other cheap form of entertainment for the war-weary general public" 
Gonzälez Ledesma's claim that the Franco regime "dedicated a large 
part of its efforts to the reorganization of football" , however, does 
not confine itself to referring to the pressure applied to both Moscirdo 
and the RFEF in order to have the league and cup competitions 
functioning again., The phrase implies that the Franco regime materially 
helped the football clubs to reorganize themselves, in order for them to 
be prepared for the relaunching of the league in October 1939. The 
evidence to support-this claim simply does not exist. The only 
concession made to the clubs in the immediate post-Civil War years was a 
priviledged"position with regard to the acquisition of petrol, an 
extremely scarce commodity at the time, for travel to away matches. 67 
In February 1939, the Oviedo club received a negative response when they 
requested military assistance in the reconstruction of their stadium, 
damaged during the Nationalist conquest of the city in October 1936.69 
The same response was received by the Real Sociedad, Sporting de Gijon, 
Valencia and Cadiz clubs in the period April-September 1939, when they 
all individually, without any coordination of their efforts, requested a 
loan from the Consejo_Superiorde Deportes to finance their stadia 
repairs and other expenses until they received the gate money from their 
66. This 1llegation has been made in the following publications: 
Gonzalez Ledesma, op. cit., p. 212; Cazorla Prieto, op. cit., 145;, 
Garcia Candau, op. cit., p. 52. 
67. As revealed to the author by an examination of the archives of the 
major football clubs, they were not subjected to any rationing 
whatsoever. 
68. For further details, see Marca, 9 September 1939. 
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first home league match in October 1939.69 In consequence, the clubs 
were compelled to prepare themselves for the recommencement of the 
national competitions with practically no assistance from the Francoist 
authorities. 
In later years, the Franco regime was unwilling to offer the only 
form of material help requested of them by the football clubs: loans to 
construct new stadia. In April 1944, the Real'Madrid President 
requested from the DND a ten-year loan of 25 million pesetas in order to 
'N implement his visionary plans for the construction ofa125,000 capacity 
stadium, but was immediately refused. 7° The DND instead gave Real 
Madrid one million pesetas out of its "Support Fund for the Construction 
of Private Sporting Facilities", but this amounted to less than 4% of 
the total cost of construction, the remainder of the money being raised 
by Bernabeu by offering the supporters a five years advanced membership 
scheme. 71 As seen in Chapter Two of this thesis the DND ruled, in 
October 1951, that its "Support Fund" would contribute just 2.5% to the 
cost of all football stadia constructions and improvements. When the 
Sevilla club requested a loan of 40 million pesetas from the DND for 
69. Information revealed by the archives of the DND: no information 
about these requests, or the subsequent refusals of the DND, was 
given by Marca or any newspaper. 
70. This information was revealed by the archives of the DND, and of 
Real Madrid; again, no information about this matter was given by 
the extensive sporting Press, which, as seen in the Introduction to 
this thesis, was closely controlled by the DND's "Commission of 
Press and Propaganda". 
71. Revealed by examination of the archives of Real Madrid. For further 
details about the financing of the construction of the Estadio 
Bernabeu, see El libro de oro del Real Madrid, Madrid, 1952, pp. 
338-345. 
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their stadium plans, in October 1955, they were also promptly refused. 72 
All of the above tends towards the conclusion that the Franco 
regime did-practically nothing in material term to ensure that football 
was in a position to serve as a political soporific. The obvious reason 
for this lack of assistance was the poor financial position of the 
regime. Another possible reason was that the regime did not immediately 
recognize the potential of the game to serve in this way. The question 
of whether the Franco regime was aware of this potential,. however, is 
somewhat hypothetical, because even if it had been aware right from the 
conclusion of the Civil War, then the difficult economic circumstances 
would still have prevented it from helping the clubs in any meaningful 
material way. 
In fact, there is no evidence whatsoever to suggest that the Franco 
regime was aware of this potential of football until the 1960s, by which 
time the game was allegedly already to be a political soporific, with 
average attendances at the immense new stadia the highest in the world 
after Brazil, 73 with an estimated 50% of the population listening to the 
footballcommentaries broadcast on the radio, with their pools coupons'in 
front of them, 74 with approximately 40% of the inhabitants of the large 
cities preferring to read one of the specialist sports newspapers rather 
72. Once again, information revealed by the archives of DND, which was 
not given by*the sporting Press. 
73. According to World Soccer, August 1965, the average estimated 
attendance for a Spanish first division match was 42,300, and that 
for a Brazilian 39,800. 
74. This estimate was made to the author by the radio broadcaster 
Vicente Marco. 
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than a general newspaper, 75 and with approximately 60% of the'space in 
these sports newspapers dedicated to football. 76 It is logical to 
assume that this state of affairs, which the Franco regime had done 
practically nothing to promote, pleased the regime. This contentment, 
however, was not expressed in any documentary way, or even by a comment 
of satisfaction to the Press from General Moscardb or one of Franco's 
football-enthusiastic ministers, such as General Agustin Munoz Grandes 
. or General Camilo Alonso Vega. 
The Franco regime first demonstrated its awareness of the potential 
of football to serve as a political soporific when RTVE began its policy 
of broadcasting an extremely high number of matches, in 1960. It could 
be argued that this-was the first opportunity that had presented itself 
to the regime to attempt to increase, or at least maintain at the same 
level, the immense popularity of football. 
- The first football match transmitted by RTVE was the June 1960 cup 
final between Real and Atletico de Madrid, with very poor quality 
pictures. In the following sixteen years, up to the summer of 1976, a 
total of 714 football matches were broadcast in their entirety by RTVE, 
at an average of 4.46 matches per month on the basis of the football 
season lasting for ten months of the year. 77 This total was far higher 
75. This estimate, which corresponded to Madrid, Barcelona, Bilbao, 
Valencia, Sevilla and Zaragoza in 1960, was made by Luis Maria 
Cazorla Prieto, op. cit., p. 165. 
76. This estimate was made by the author, on the basis of having 
examined an abundance of sports newspapers published in Francoist 
Spain. 
77. This total was gathered by the author from the daily newspapers, 
because of the lack of such statistics in the archives of RTVE. 
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than the corresponding figure for any other country in the world during 
this period, apart from Argentina from 1967 to 1969. After Spain, the 
country with the third highest television coverage of football was 
Italy, where an average of almost three matches a month were screened. 78 
In both Argentina and Italy, however, a proportion of the matches were 
broadcast by private television stations, whereas in Spain the RTVE had 
a complete monopoly. The breakdown of these 714 matches transmitted in 
Francoist Spain is as follows: 285 league matches, with usually one a 
fortnight being screened during the period 1961-1968, and thereafter one 
practically every Saturday evening during the league season, from 
September to April; 67 domestic cup games, usually the semi finals and 
final, played. in May and June; every single international match, both 
competitive and friendly, played by the Spanish national team during 
this period, which amounted to 92; 109 games featuring Spanish teams in 
the three European club competitions, 37 of which were Real Madrid 
matches in the European Cup;, 161 other assorted matches in which there 
was no Spanish participation, mostly foreign international matches from 
the World Cup and European Nations Cup final tournaments, along with the 
finals of the European club competitions. 79 
Francisco Cerecedo described the amount of football coverage 
offered by RTVE as "saturation level", 80 whilst Manuel Vazquez Montalbän 
claimed that there existed a policy of "transmitting the kicking of 
practically every football, everywhere in the world". 81 The editors of 
78. Information gathered from the archives of World Soccer. 
79. Information gathered by the author from Spanish daily newspapers. 
80. Francisco Cercedo, op. cit. 
81. Quoted in Bar a, No. 765,13 July 1970. 
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the world's two most prestigious football publications, Keir Radnedge of 
World Soccer, London, and Jaques Ferran of L'Equipe, Paris, both 
recalled that it was well known on the international fotball scene 
during the 1960s and early 1970s that RIVE would buy up the right to 
broadcast international games that were usually transmitted only in the 
countries of the two competing national or club teams. 82 Domestic 
league matches were broadcast simultaneously in very few countries, and 
practically no European country, during the period 1960-1975, the main 
obstacle being the collective opposition of the clubs because of the 
consequent fall in paying spectators at the stadia. This problem was 
overcome in Francoist Spain by means of an agreement between the RFEF 
and RTVE, originally formulated in August 1961 and renewed in July 1966 
and August 1972, by which RTVE would compensate the difference in gate 
receipts between the televized match and the same fixture the previous 
season, or on the previous occasion when that particular fixture had not 
been broadcast. The policy of transmitting a league match practically 
every Saturday night proved to be extremely expensive for RTVE. It can 
be estimated that RTVE spent approximately 600 million pesetas, 
approximately three million pounds sterling, on compensating the 
professional clubs for their fall in paying spectators because of the 
presence of the television cameras. 83 Exactly 183 million pesetas of 
this money, slightly less than a third, went to the Real Madrid club for 
the broadcasting of between four and seven of the league matches in the 
Estadio Bernabeu every season, whilst FC Barcelona received 103 millions 
82. Author's interview with Keir Radnedge, and With Jacques Ferran. 
83. Because of the lack of information offered by RTVE, this 
approximation was made by the author. 
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during this six teen-year period for permitting the transmission of 
between two and four matches per season. 84 It has been claimed that 
this expenditure of approximately 600 million on compensating the 
football clubs constituted more than half'of RTVE's total spending on 
sport. " 
In addition to the 714 domestic league, cup, international, World 
Cup, European Cup and European Nations Cup matches broadcast in their 
entirety by RTVE from 1960 to 1976, a two-hour programme called 
Estudio Estadio and consisting of highlights of all of the first 
division matches played earlier that day was transmitted on Sunday 
nights from September 1968 onwards. 
Despite, or possibly because of, this saturation coverage, the 
estimated audiences for football in Francoist Spain were consistently 
high. Only on very rare occasions did the estimated viewing figure for 
a televized game fall below the ten million mark. Approximately 80% of 
matches were watched by a television audience of between ten and fifteen 
million. The most important league matches, especially between Real 
Madrid and FC Barcelona, Real Madrid's games in the European Cup and the 
matches of the Spanish national team almost always achieved an audience 
in excess of 15 milion, approximately half of the Spanish population 
during the later Franco years. The television audience for a football 
84. Information revealed by the archives of the two clubs. 
85. This claim was made by Manuel Väzquez Montalbän in Barca, No. 765, 
13 July 1970, although he did not attempt to make any approximation 
of the expenditures of RTVE on sport in general and compensation for 
the football clubs in particular, because of RTVE's refusal to offer 
him information. 
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match in Francoist Spain exceeded 20 million of five occasions: the 
European Cup final between Real Madrid and Partisan Belgrade in May 
1966; the decisive World Cup match between Spain and West Germany in 
July 1966; the July 1968 cup final between Real Madrid and FC Barcelona; 
the World Cup final of June 1970 between Brazil and Italy; the league 
match between Real Madrid and FC Barcelona in February 1974.86 It is 
logical to assume that these viewing figures for football would have 
been even higher if every Spaniard had had access to a television set. 
The conclusion to be drawn from all of the above material about 
televized football in Francoist Spain is that there was more of it, it 
was extremely expensive for RTVE, and that it achieved very high 
estimated viewing figures. These facts have generally been accepted as 
evidence that the Franco regime did have a policy of systematically 
promoting football to be a political soporific. 87 The responsibility 
86. All of this information about estimated television audiences was 
taken from the magazine'1Holal. It should be borne in mind, however, 
as pointed in Footnote 42 of this chapter, that the accuracy of 
these figures has been called into question. 
87. These facts have been accepted as evidence of the existence of this 
policy in the overwhelming majority of books and articles mentioned 
in the footnotes throughout this thesis, and by the overwhelming 
majority of the author's interviewees, even by, for example, the 
former RFEF_President Pablo Porta. It is more convenient to list 
the interviewees who were not in agreement with this interpretations 
of the facts: Jose Luis Perez Paya, the former RFEF President, the 
former Delecado Nacional de Deportes Benito Castejon, the Marca 
journalists Jose Maria Lorente and Rodolfo Belarmo "Belarmino". It 
is significant that all of these dissenters were either high-ranking 
officials in the Francoist sporting system, or formerly Falangist 
employees of the sports newspaper of the Movimiento. 
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for this policy has usually been attributed to Manuel Fraga, the 
Minister of Information and Tourism from 1962 to 1969.88 Fraga 
demonstrated his awareness of the social importance of football by 
commenting after seeing Real Madrid, the club of which he was a paid-up 
member, defeat Internazionale of Milan in the 1966 European Cup semi 
finals: 
"The immense social significance of football in' this country has 
again been amply shown up by tonight's exciting match... In how 
many other countries in the world would the stadium be packed by 
120,000 supporters, with thousands more outside desperate to enter 
but unable to do so, and with more than half of the nation 
following the game on the television? "e9 
This awareness of Fraga was demonstrated by his actions as well as by 
his words. As shall be seen in detail in Chapter Seven of this thesis, 
he successfully integrated the staging in Spain of the final stages of 
the 1964 European Nations Cup into his vast propaganda campaign entitled 
"Twenty-Five Years of Peace", the Franco regime's celebration of a 
quarter of a century of power. In addition, as shall be illustrated in 
Chapter Six, he persuaded several famous footballers and other sportsmen 
to take part in his campaign in favour of an affirmative vote in the 
December 1966 referendum on the "Organic Law of State". With regard to 
using television to promote football to be apolitical soporific, it has 
frequently been alleged that Fraga achieved this by means of giving his 
personal nominees and men of confidence Eduardo Elorriaga and Luis 
Ezcurra, appointed as Director General and Director of Programming at 
RTVE respectively within two months of Fraga becoming Minister, 
88.. This attributation has been made in the following studies, as well 
as in an abundance of newspaper and magazine articles too numerous 
to list: Cazorla Prieto, op. cit., p. 1)5; Alcoba, op. cit., pp. 
254-255; Marco, op. cit., p. 146; Garcia Candau, op. cit., pp. 52- 
53; Botines, op. cit., p. 18. 
89. Quoted in Marca, 14 April 1966. 
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instructions to broadcast as much football as possible. 90 
More specifically, it is alleged that Fraga instructed his two 
nominees to transmit a large amount of football, combined with 
basketball and bullfighting if neccessary, during the May Day public 
holiday. 91 Although there is no documentary evidence to prove that 
these intructions were given, it is difficult to believe that it is 
merely a coincidence that such an abundance of football matches were 
broadcast by RTVE during the public holiday which posed the biggest 
potential problems for the Franco regime. 
It is appropriate at this stage to offer the fullest details of 
RTVE's football coverage during the May Day holiday from 1960 to 1976. 
In May 1960, RTVE's broadcasting of matches had still not commenced. On 
the May Days of both 1961 and 1962, the "Syndicalist Sporting Games" of 
the "Vertical Syndicates", held annually on this date in Real Madrid's 
Estadio Bernabeu, were screened by RTVE. After the arrival of Elorriaga 
and Ezcurra at the head of RTVE in September 1962, these "Syndicalist 
Sporting Games" ceased to be broadcast by RTVE, presumably because of 
the low number of viewers, even though figures of estimated audiences 
were not published until 1964. In place of these games on May Day 1963, 
Real Madrid's cup victory away to Granada was transmitted. The 
following year, Real's European Cup semi final match away to Zurich 
90. This allegation was made in all of the studies listed in Footnote 
88, with the same page references, except the Alcoba book, op. cit., 
which made no reference to Elorriaga and Ezcurra. 
91. All of the studies listed in Footnote 88, including the Alcoba 
book, made this allegation about basketball and bullfighting. 
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was broadcast on the night of 30 April, whilst on May Day itself the cup 
match between Atletico de Madrid and Murcia was brought forward two days 
and screened. Establishing a practice that would be normal for the 
following thirteen years, with the only club President to complain 
being, as seen already Jose Maria Oraa of Athletic de Bilbao in 1973, 
Atletico de Madrid were requested to bring the match forward by RTVE 
through the RFEF, and duly complied. 92 In this year, the first May Day 
basketball match was broadcast by RTVE, between Real Madrid and Caja de 
Zaragoza, in addition to the two football games. 
Before and during the May Day holiday of 1965, the remarkable 
number of four matches in four days were transmitted by RTVE, two of 
which had no Spanish participants. On the night of Wednesday 28 April, 
the European Cup-Winners Cup match between Zaragoza and West Ham United 
was transmitted. The following night, the testimonial match of the 
English player Stanley Matthews in London was broadcast by RIVE, even 
though there was no Spanish player taking part in the match. The 
following evening, Friday 30 April 1965, the European Cup semi final 
between Benfica of Lisbon, who had previously eliminated Real Madrid, 
and Vasas of Budapest was screened. A series of four live matches in 
four days was completed when, on May Day itself, RTVE transmitted FC 
Barcelona's home game against Valencia. 
On 30 April 1966, the Spanish national team's friendly match with 
Belgium, part of the preparations for the 1966 World cup finals 
92. Information obtained from the archives of Atletico de Madrid. 
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tournament, was broadcast by RTVE. The following day was dominated by 
Real Madrid, their cup match away to Malaga being transmitted, followed 
immediately by the FC Barcelona-Real Madrid basketball game. From 1966 
onwards, there would always be a televized basketball match to 
complement the football on May Day. In 1967, the basketball match was 
between FC Barcelona and Joventut de Badalona, whilst the football 
broadcast by RTVE was the cup tie between Murcia and Valencia. 
On 30 April 1968, the cup match between Sevilla and Espanol de 
Barcelona was broadcast by RTVE, and on May Day itself the tie between 
Atletico de Madrid and Hercules de Alicante, specially brought forward 
two days. On 30 April and 1 May 1969, two other domestic cup matches 
were screened by RTVE: Real Sociedad de San Sebastian versus Sporting de 
Gijon, and then the most attractive game of the competition, the Madrid 
"derby" match between Real and Atletico. 
On the night of 30 April 1970, for the first time RTVE broadcast 
one of the compilation programmes that it made specially for the May Day 
public holiday: a two hour-long collection of every goal scored by the 
Spanish national team, narrated, as recalled by Javier Solana at the 
beginning of this chapter, by the ultra-nationalist commentator Matias 
Prats. The following day, May Day, the cup match between Real Madrid 
and Castellon was transmitted. 
From 1971 onwards, RTVE's football coverage during this public 
hoiday became even more intense. On the night of 30 April 1971, the cup 
match between FC Barcelona and Betis of Seville was screened. On May 
Day itself, a two-and-a-half hour special history of Real Madrid's 
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performances in the European Cup was followed by the transmission of 
Real's cup match with La Coruna. 
On 30 April 1972, another match between Real Madrid and La Coruna, 
on this occasion a league match played in the Galician seaport, was 
broadcast by RTVE. The following day, the league match between Valencia 
and FC Barcelona, of crucial significance with regard to the league 
title, was transmitted, followed by the Soviet Union-Yugoslavia 
basketball game. 
On the night of 30 April 1973, RTVE broadcast another of its 
special programmes with the narration of Matias Prats: On May Day of 
that year, the normal basketball and bullfighting transmissions were 
complemented by the Athletic de Bilbao-Valencia league match, despite 
the protests, observed earlier in this chapter, of the Athletic 
President. 
The friendly match between the West German and Yugoslav national 
teams, both in preparation for the 1974 World Cup finals tournament, was 
broadcast by RTVE on the night of 30 April of that year. The following 
day, a special two-hour German programme about the history of the World 
Cup competition was transmitted, followed immediately by the 
broughtforward league match between Atletico de Madrid and Oviedo. 
On 30 April 1975, the league match between Zaragoza and Real Madrid 
was conveniently brought forward and broadcast by RTVE. On the last May 
Day during the life of Franco, however, there was no domestic or 
international match available to be transmitted, and therefore RTVE 
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complemented the usual basketball and bullfighting broadcasts by 
screening the two-hour Brazilian film "The Thousand Goals of Pele", the 
world-famous player who had just retired from first-class football. 
As shall be illustrated in greater detail in the Epilogue to this 
thesis, the manipulation of football as a political soporific during the 
May Day public holiday did not end in 1975. For the May Day of 1976, 
the government of Carlos Arias Navarro insisted on the Real Madrid-Ba_rVa 
match being brought forward by two days and televized, in order to 
ýý 
reduce attendance at the Com! isiones Obreras rally in Madrid's 
Casa de Campo and other demonstrations of the forces and parties in 
favour of transition to plurarist democracy. 93 
In the light of the above evidence, there has been no attempt 
whatsoever to deny that the Franco regime attempted to use football as 
an agent of political passivity during the May Day public holidays. 94 
It is a completely separate question, however, whether the same 
conclusion can be reached with regard to the extremely high level of 
football transmitted by RTVE throughout the year. The policy of RTVE 
can be defended by claiming that the remarkably high level of interest 
in the game in Francoist Spain demanded a remarkably high level of 
0 
93. For further details, see the whole of the Spanish sporting Press, 
especially the Barcelona newspapers, from 24 April to 2 May 1976, 
and also the comprehensive account offered in Garcia Candau, op. 
cit., pp. 51-52. 
94. This was not even attempted by the four defenders of RTVE's general 
policy of football coverage discussed in Footnote 95, all of whom 
remained silent about the question of the annual May Day 
transmissions. 
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television coverage. This was the predictable response of Luis Ezcurra 
when questioned about the matter: 
"Our aim is to satisfy all the appetites, to satisfy the millions 
of supporters which football has in Spain, always taking into, 
account the big teams... We televize football it is a necessity in 
our coverage, given the importance of this sport in Spain. "95 
This is the argument normally employed to explain the existence of a 
"culture of evasion" by the very persons responsible for promoting this 
culture: that their only objective is the satisfaction of a genuine 
public demand, rather than the promotion or stimulation of this demand. 
As remarked by an abundance of Spanish sports journalists and writers, 
however, this is by no means a satisfactory answer to the question of 
why there was such a high level of televized football in Francoist 
Spain. 96 There can be a little doubt that there was almost as much 
public demand to see a large amount of televized football in, for 
example, Britain, Italy and West Germany during the period 1960-1976, 
and that if the same amount of televized football had been broadcast in 
these countries as in Francoist Spain, then approximately the same high 
viewing figures would have been achieved. Moreover, it is impossible to 
imagine that there was any Spanish public demand beforehand to see, or 
even awareness of the existence of, matches such as the Stanley Matthews 
testimonial or the West Germany versus Yugoslavia friendly match, both 
mentioned above in connection with the May Day RTVE coverage, or other 
games shown at other times of the year without any Spanish participation 
or major international significance, for example the English FA Cup 
95. Quoted in Barca, No. 434,19 March 1964. 
96. This type of remark was made, for example, in Cazorla Prieto, op. 
cit., p. 165, Marco, op. cit., p. 146 and by Manuel Vazquez 
Montalbän in Bar a, No. 765,13 July 1970. 
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Final in May of practically every year, or the semi finals and final of 
the South American club championship every October. As a consequence of 
this major flaw in the defence of RTVE's policy during the Franco years, 
it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the public demand for 
televized football in Francoist Spain was partly artificially stimulated 
and promoted by RTVE, acting on instructions from the Franco regime, in 
the person of Manuel Fraga. 
What the fourth objective of this chapter, which is to examine the 
evidence that the Franco regime had a policy of systematically promoting 
football to be a political soporific, demands above all else is an 
illustration of the official attitude of the regime to the popularity of 
the game. Unfortunately, such an illustration simply does not exist in 
documentary form. 97 The best evidence regarding official attitudes 
about the connection between football and political passivity is 
contained in the three quotations which follow. 
The first of these quotations is the much-cited desire of Franco's 
Minister of Public Works Gonzalo Fernandez de la Mora to substitute "the 
things of politics for the politics of things". This desire, expressed 
in his revealingly-titled book E1 crepüsculo de las ideolog(as C" The 
Twilight of the Ideologies"), 98 constituted one of the clearest calls by 
the group of Opus Dei "technocrats" brought into the cabinet in the 
97. The author expected to find such an illustration of official 
attitudes in his examination of the archives of the DND, or of the 
RFEF. 
98. Gonzalo Fernandez de la Mora, El crepüsculo de las ideolocias, 
Madrid, 1965. 
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1960s for a politically demobilized and passive consumer society within 
the institutional framework of the existing dictatorship. Fernindez de 
la Mora's call has been interpreted as a suggestion that the Franco 
regime should attempt to promote football and other popular sources of 
entertainment as agents of political passivity not only by Gonzalez 
Ledesma, the biographer of the goalkeeper Zamora, as seen above. For 
example, Vicente Marco alleged that this phrase of the Opus Dei Minister 
was the inspiration for the regime's attempts to use football as a 
political soporific: 
"The desire of the Franco government to change "the things of 
politics for the politics of things" naturally had its effects in 
Spanish sports, where football in particular began to be employed, 
by means of an unprecedented level of television coverage, as a 
means of alienating and insulating the Spanish man-in-the-street 
from the not completely favourable political and social reality. "99 
The second quotation comes from the Delegado Nacional de Deportes, 
Jose Antonio Elola Olaso, on the occasion of the Spanish national team's 
defeat of the Soviet Union in the final of the 1964 European Nations 
Cup, played in Madrid. As commented already in this chapter, the 
staging in Spain of the semi finals and final of this competition 
conveniently coincided with the "Twenty-Five Years of Peace" propaganda 
campaign organized by Manuel Fraga. Elola Olaso linked the football 
triumph with the propaganda campaign in the following way: 
"This is the great sporting triumph of peace. It is our offering 
to the Caudillo for the "Twenty-Five Years of Peace". "loo 
99. Marco, op. cit., p. 145. This phrase of Fernandez de la Mora was 
used as an illustration of the Franco regime's in three other 
publications: Cazorla Prieto, op. cit., p. 166; by Alex J. Botines 
in Dicen, 2 May 1968; by Manuel Vazquez Montalbän in Barca, No. 765, 
13 July 1970. 
100. Quoted in ABC, 23 June 1964. 
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It can be argued that this comment from the Delegado Nacional implied 
that the Franco regime's interpretation of "peace" was a social and 
political passivity, built partly on the foundations of intense football 
enthusiasm, which would facilitate the continued dictatorship of the 
regime. This interpretation of Elola Olaso's comment was expressed by, 
among others, Manuel Vazquez Montalban: 
"What our former honourable [sic] Delegado_Nacional intended to say 
was that he longed for a country where a certain type of peace is 
maintained by everyone being passively stuck in front of their 
television sets marvelling at the breathtaking exploits of Real 
Madrid. "101 
The third quotation which illustrates the attitude of the Franco 
regime to the connection between the popularity of football and 
political passivity is somewhat clearer and less ambiguous than the two 
offered above, which have been interpreted in different ways. In 
December 1970, during the tension of the Burgos military trials, a 
curious motion was presented to the Cortes by the little-known Martin 
Fernandez Palacios, requesting that all football matches be played on 
Saturday in order to leave Sunday free for religious and family 
activities. The response of the Franco regime's spokesman to this 
motion is extremely revealing: 
"The issue which Senor Fernandez Palacios brinas uD is very 
interesting, but difficult to establish in the present organization 
of our sport, which alreaady authorizes matches to be celebrated on 
Saturday when both participants are in agreement, and in any case 
the organization of matches on Sunday has two objectives. One is 
economic, due to Sunday being holiday, whilst playing the games on 
Saturday would mean the major part of the productive and working 
population being unable to go and watch their favourite sport. In 
addition, the second motive is that football constitutes an obvious 
101. Quoted in Ba , No. 664,20 March 1968. 
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solace and relaxation for thousands and thousands of Spaniards, 
that support in the country is immense and that we are obliged to 
sustain and increase it, granting access to such spectacles to the 
largest possible number of citizens. "ioz 
This statement from the Franco regime, revitalized the debate, already 
outlined in this chapter, about whether football was acting as a 
political soporific. This debate about the Cortes motion was sparked 
off by this radical critique from Nestor Lujän: 
"Football is a ludicrous sport from all points of view, 'although 
important with regard to panemet_circenses... We would like the 
Spaniards to become passionate about other problems, but as we 
don't have the slightest possibility of influencing them, we accept 
the facts with a painful and very long, too long, silence. "103 
The usual critics of the alleged manipulation of football by the Franco 
regime took their cue from Lujan and interpreted the regime's response 
to Fernandez Palacios' motion as the clearest piece of evidence yet of 
the existence of a regime policy of systematically promoting football to 
be an agent of political passivity. Manuel Vazquez Montalbän was 
particularly incisive: 
"And so now, at long last, we have the truth: the government of 
this country feels "obliged to sustain and increase" enthusiasm for 
football. Surely the government realizes that the cultural level, 
the level of political awareness of the Spanish man-in-the-street 
are still sufficiently low, and rising sufficiently slowly, for 
there to be little necessity to continue with the policy of 
employing our so badly-treated national sport as a means of 
alienation, as a means of social and political passivity. "04 
There were several other critical interpretations of the Franco 
regime's statement. 105 Not every interpretation, however, was negative. 
102. Reproduced in the Boletin Of icial de las Cortes Esvafiolas, Madrid, 
No. 1129,23 December 1970. - 
103. Säbado Grafico, (Madrid), 6 February 1971. 
104. Bam, No. 796,16 February 1971. 
105. See, for example: Alcoba, op. cit., p. 256; Botines, op. cit., p. 
19; Dicen, 17 February 1971; El Mundo Deportivo, 21 February 1971. 
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Marca, perhaps not surprisingly given its status as the sports newspaper 
of the Movimiento, was eager once again to defend the regime, in so 
doing launching a counter-attack against the critical group of writers 
who believed that it was a systematic regime policy to utilize the 
game as a political soporific: 
"We see nothing peculiar or suspicious in the official response to 
the motion presented in the Cortes in December by Senor Fernandez 
Palacios, and therefore we are slightly perplexed by all the fuss 
that has surrounded it. This appears to us to be no more than the 
thoughtful, considerate statement of a government that obviously 
wants to avoid the situation whereby a large proportion of its 
subjects would be unable to enjoy their favourite sport and source 
of entertainment... In a more general context, all of this stuff 
about football acting as a "social drug" and an "escape valve" is a 
cliche as old as a cathedral. Football has been impassioning the 
people both in Spain and elsewhere for almost all of this century, 
because it is something like an island of refuge in a sea of 
everyday concerns and worries, not because any government has 
promoted it for their own specific purposes. "106 
Marca's point of view was supported by the former El Alcäzar 
correspondent "Gilera", who claimed in ABC that it was "ridiculous to 
suggest that there was any possible political significance" in the 
response of the Franco regime to the Cortes motion. 107 
It is appropriate at this stage to arrive at a conclusion about the 
question of whether there existed a regime policy of promoting football 
to be a political soporific. Given the very limited evidence available, 
this conclusion must be as follows. The Franco regime was not 
sufficiently perceptive to realize the potential of the game as a 
possible agent of political passivity until the 1960s, by which time 
Spain had become the European country with the highest level of football 
106. Marca editorial, 20 February 1971. 
107. ABC, 22 February 1971. 
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enthusiasm. Because of this lack of perception, allied to a lack of 
economic means, the regime did pratically nothing to assist the clubs in 
preparing for the relaunching of the league in October 1939, and in 
constructing new high-capacity stadia. In the early 1960s, the regime, 
led by the astute Real Madrid member Manuel Fraga, became aware that 
television was the perfect way to ensure that the enthusiasm for 
football remained at the same high level or even increased. It is not 
satisfactory to claim that the transmission of such an abundance of 
matches, more than in any other country except Argentina from 1967 to 
1969, was justified by immense public demand. This demand was partly 
artificially stimulated and promoted, especially with regard to the many 
matches screened without any Spanish participation or special inter- 
national significance. In the light of the immediate popularity of 
televized football, the regime realized that such transmissions could 
contribute towards reducing attendances at the illegal May Day 
demonstrations of the anti-Francoist opposition. This utilization of 
the game as a political soporific was very much a manipulation on the 
cheap. In the same way as the regime had been unwilling to emulate 
Hitler and Mussolini in the investment of huge sums of money in the 
Spanish sporting infrastructure, it wanted the game to serve as an agent 
of political passivity without giving financial assistance to the clubs, 
as the military regimes of South America felt obliged to do. 
The fifth and final objective of this chapter is to evaluate to 
what extent the Franco regime's utilization of football as a political 
soporific actually contributed towards the maintenance of the high 
level of political passivity that existed in Francoist Spain. This 
particular question has been treated with far less debate and discussion 
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than the question of whether there existed a regime policy to employ 
football as a political soporific. Both the critics and defenders of 
the Franco regime with regard to the latter question are basically in 
agreement that the immense popularity of football in Francoist Spain was 
partly the effect rather the cause of this political passivity. These 
critics and defenders simply differ with regard to details, for example 
whether the televized football on May Day actually reduced attendance at 
the illegal demonstrations. 108 
In the light of the limited evidence available, it is impossible to 
resist the conclusion that the political significance of the high level 
of football enthusiasm in Francoist Spain consists in this enthusiasm 
being a consequence rather than a cause of political passivity. After 
the end of the Civil War, the Spanish population was politically passive 
because the anti-Francoist leaders and militants, of whatever political 
grouping, had either died in the conflict, had left the country or had 
been eliminated in the subsequent purges. Those that survived were 
obliged to accept the new regime, and to struggle to avoid political 
suspicion and repression, and to maintain employment in order to support 
themselves and their dependents. Given the harsh social 
108. It was claimed to the author by Alex J. Botines, for example, and 
by Julian Garcia Candau, that the May Day football transmissions by 
RTVE probably fulfilled the regime's desired effect of reducing 
attendances at the demonstrations. Other critics of this regime, 
however, for example, Manuel Vazquez Montalbän and leading 
historian Juan Pablo Fusi, respectively, in this case agree with 
habitual defenders of the regimes's sporting policy, -such as 
Enrique Gil de la Vega "Gilera", and the great majority of the 
author's interviewees in doubting that these broadcasts had a 
substantial effect on the attendances. This question has never 
been discussed in print. 
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conditions that existed and the lack of other forms of cheap popular 
entertainment, it should be no surprise that football became a hugely 
popular form of refuge or escape from the grim reality of the post-Civil 
War years. 
The abundance of televized football during the later Franco years 
delighted the average Spaniard, although there is absolutely no evidence 
to suggest that the policy initiated by the nominees of Manuel Fraga 
caused persons who would otherwise have demonstrated their opposition to 
the Franco regime to refrain from doing so. In particular, there exists 
no proof that the feast of televized football served up during the May 
Day holidays restrained any opponents or potential opponent of the 
regime from attending the illegal demonstrations. If any Spaniard were 
Eb Ceffe s; or, 4nd 6wýdSG.: 
prepared to subject himself and his family by attending these 
demonstrations, then it should be presumed that his political 
consciousness and commitment were sufficiently developed to'both see 
vQ r ec w. ts b cti t 
through1and miss a football match broadcast on television on the same 
day, 
even 
assuming that he was a football enthusiast. 109 
109. Several former opponents of the Franco regime, mostly members of 
the Comisiones Obreras, have testified to the author that these May 
Day transmissions did not cause them even to consider staying at 
home, even if a match of the club which they supported, mostly 
either Atretico de Madrid, FC Barcelona or Athletic de Bilbao was 
screened. 
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CHAPTER FOUR : FOOTBALL AND DICTATORSHIP 
The third aspect of the political manipulation of Spanish football 
during the Franco years concerns the almost complete lack of democracy 
within the structures of the game both at national administrative level, 
in the DND and the RFEF, and at local club level. 
This chapter has two objectives. Firstly, it aims to demonstrate 
to what extent the lack of democracy in football reflected a lack in all 
other aspects of Spanish society during the Franco period. Secondly, it 
discusses the frequently-made allegation that the Franco regime 
attempted to maintain this lack of democracy in the game in order to 
avoid an uncomfortable comparison with the lack in all other areas. ' 
As illustrated-in the Introduction to this thesis, Spanish football 
1. This allegation has been made in the following publications: Alex J. 
Botines, op. cit., p. 73; Vicente Marco, op. cit., p. 25; Jose Maria 
Garcia, op. cit., pp. 11 and 92f" Dicen, 14 October 1975,2 February 
1976 and 4 March 1981; Don Baltin, No. 14,6 January 1976; Sport, 10 
April 1980. The following interviewees have also made this 
allegation to the author: the Catalan sociologist Joan Josep 
Artells, the celebrated writer Manuel Vazquez Montalbän, the sports 
journalist Alex J. Botines, the former Barca players Carles Rexach, 
the current FC Barcelona Vice-President Nicolau Gasaus, the sports 
writers Julian Garcia Candau and Jose Maria Garcia, and the former 
Athletic de Bilbao players and coaches Jose Angel Iribar and Javier 
Clemente. 
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ft 
before the Civil War had been governed completely democratically. The 
RFEF was founded in 1902 by the first clubs, and its Presidents and 
directors were chosen in annual elections by the club representatives at 
the assemblies held in Madrid every July. In the same way, the 
directors of each club were voted for by the members on an annual basis. 
k 
This democratic situation immediately changed after the Civil War. 
The Consejo Nacional de Deportes (CND), formed in November 1938, whilst 
the Civil War was still raging, under the direction of General Jose 
Moscardo, was granted wide emergency powers to govern Spanish sport by 
its organizational overlord the Movimiento. 2 For more than two years, 
until the creation of a permanent DND in February 1941, alsounder the 
forceful leadership of General Moscardb, the CND exercised to the full 
its power of nominating the Presidents and all the directors of every 
national and regional sports federation, and of the many private clubs. 
With regard specifically to football, the CND appointed Julian Troncoso 
Sagredo to the RFEF presidency in January 1939 and, upon his death in 
April 1940, replaced him with Luis Saura del Pan, whilst at club level 
two examples of the CND's domination are nomination as President of the 
Zaragoza club of the Falangist Antonio Rodr quez in May 1939, and of the 
I army colonel Juan Carlos Delgado as President of Cädiz in June 1939.3 
The two-year domination of Spanish sport by the CND almost exactly 
reflected the Spanish political situation of the time by being a clear 
0 
2. For details of these powers of the DND, see Luis Maria Cazorla 
Prieto, op. cit., pp. 212-213. 
3. For further details, see Marca, 9 May and 18 June 1939. 
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example of caudilla]e, the concept originally used by the Franco regime 
in order to legitimize its dictatorial rule. Caudillaje is the Spanish 
equivalent of Führerprinzip, the almost mystical Nazi concept of the 
totalitarian rule by the dictator accountable only to history, derived 
from the Spanish word Caudillo, meaning all-powerful leader. This 
concept was adapted to the post-Civil War Spanish context by three of 
the leading Francoist intellectuals, the Falangist Javier Conde, Julian 
Pemartin and Juan Beyento. 4 
As shall presently be illustrated in detail, the administration of 
Spanish football clearly reflected the concept of Caudillaie in the 
1940s and 1950s. In the 1960s, however, the clubs managed to recuperate 
a small amount of their former power and influence within the RFEF, 
and, in addition, a limited degree of internal democracy was allowed to 
return to the administration of the clubs. These minor reforms to the 
organizational structure of football reflected, in return, the growing 
significance of Francoist Spain of democracia organica ("organic 
democracy"), the second concept used by the Franco regime in an attempt 
to legitimize its anti-democratic rule. Democracia oroanica was based 
firmly upon the rejection of universal suffrage as a formula for 
popular participation, instead proposing as an alternative the "organic" 
or corporative participation in the decision-making process of the 
various professional associations, the official "vertical" trade unions 
4. See Javier Conde, Lucha de pasiones, Barcelona, 1950, Julian 
Permartin, Jose Antonio, Madrid, 1953, and the following three works 
by Juan Beneyto: Genio y ficura del Movimiento, Madrid, 1940; 
Historia de las doctrinas politicas, Madrid, 1948; El nuevo Estado 
espafiol, Madrid, 1939. 
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and the local town and city councils. The culmination of this process 
of democracia orgänica was the December 1966 Organic Law of the State, 
approved by 96% of the 88% of Spaniards who voted in a referendum about 
the Law, the result of which was guaranteed by an immense propaganda 
campaign organized by Manuel Fraga, the Minister of Information and 
Tourism, which included the collaboration of several famous foot- 
ballers, as shall be seen in Chapter Six, in addition to preventive 
detentions, glass urns, transparent ballot paper and even the "stuffing" 
of the urns with "yes" votes in some areas. 5 The Organic Law approved 
in this way stipulated the rules for the succession to Franco and the 
election of one fifth of the deputies to the Cortes by the heads of 
families and married women, making a total electorate of approximately 
17 million. 
The domination of Spanish sport by the DND from 1941 onwards 
continued-to reflect the concept of caudillaie, with General Moscardö 
still the all-powerful Caudillo, in the same way as the domination of 
the CND had done previously. Vith regard to football, the hero of the 
Toledo Alcäzar seige maintained a rigid control over the RFEF by 
regularly changing its leadership, as seen in the Introduction to this 
thesis with regard to the Presidents. In March 1947, for example, 
Moscardo was so dismayed by the humiliating defeat suffered by the 
national team against Portugal and Eire that he sacked the RFEF 
President, Jesus Rivero Meneses, the Vice-President and four of the 
- directors. 6 In addition, Moscardo was also empowered to veto any of the 
5. For further details, see Edouard de Blaye, op. Cit., pp. 237-238. 
6. See Marca, Madrid, March 3-10,1047. 
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measures taken, by his chosen men that were not completely to his liking, 
and this he did, for example in May 1950 with regard to the national 
team's preparations for the 1950 World Cup finals tournament in Brazil, 
considering the RFEF's planned one week training camp for the national 
team not sufficient.? This use of the veto was very rarely resorted to 
by the Delegado Nacional, however, because the RFEF leaders were either 
usually sufficiently aware of Moscadö's wishes that they carried them 
out before he intervened, for example the introduction of the Fascist 
salute before every match and the blue shirts for the national team, 
discussed in Chapter Two of this thesis, or they were eager to implement 
his every suggestion, about, for example, an exhibition match against 
the touring team of East European refugee players, again in May 1950, a 
suggestion that will be fully discussed in Chapter Six. 
Moscardo maintained the same rigid control over the various 
regional football federations, responsible for the game at junior, youth 
and amateur level, as'he did over the RFEF, regularly changing his own 
personally nominated Presidents and directors. In March 1943, for 
example, he axed the whole of the executives committee of the Murcian 
federation because of their failure to have discovered that a referee in 
7. Whilst examining the archives of the RFEF, the author discovered a 
letter from General Moscardö to the RFEF President Dr. Armando Munoz 
Calero, dated 17 May , 950, expressing the former's "profound 
disappointment" at Munoz for Calero having planned only a week-long 
training camp for theme national team at El Escorial before leaving 
for Brazil. Moscardo suggested a camp "of at least two weeks 
duration and of a tough, demanding physical nature, in order for the 
players selected to represent the Motherland to be in optimum 
condition for the World Cup finals tournament". Mu? 
(oz Calero 
obliged by arranging a two-week camp, 
beginning on 7 June 1950. 
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a local junior league had fought, in the Republican army in the Civil 
War. 8 In December 1948, the same fate befell the directors of the 
Cantabrian federation after a team composed of the best amateur players 
of the region had been thrashed 13-1 by a French amateur touring team. 9 
Moscardo's complete domination of the actual football clubs, 
however, only lasted until 1948. Up to that date, the annual club 
assemblies and presidential elections had been strictly forbidden, 10 and 
the Delegado Nacional had continued frequently to nominate his own men 
as club Presidents, usually in an attempt to resolve an internal crisis 
at that particular club. In March 1940, for example, Moscardö appointed 
his good friend and former Civil War comrade Enrique Piieiro, the 
Marques de la Mesa de Asta to the presidency of FC Barcelona, and 
subsequently replaced him with Colonel Jose Vendrell in June 1944, an 
appointment which will be discussed in detail in Chapter Eight. Barýa 
was not the only club to have its President nominated by the DeleQado 
Nacional. In February 1945, for example, Moscardö attempted to resolve 
5 the crisis at the Betis club of Sevil]t by appointing the Falangist 
Eduardo Ramirez to the presidency, " and the same at Valladolid in 
October 1946 by the nomination of Juan Antonio Perez Garcia. 12 The 
8. See Murcia Deportiva, No. 7,21 March 1943, Marca, 19-20 
March 1943, for further details. 
9. For further details, see Marca, 5 December 1948. 
10., A brief note signed by Moscardö and published in the Boletin Oficial 
de la DND, No. 1, April 1943, explained this prohibition: 
"It is hereby stated that all official gatherings, assemblies 
and elections of officials at the sporting clubs of Spain shall 
remain under prohibition until such time as this Deleaaciön 
Nacional de Deportes considers their celebration opportune. " 
11. See Marca, 8-11 February 1945, for details. 
12. See, for further details, Marca, 27-28 October 1946. 
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Delegado Nacional was sufficiently satisfied with the character and 
performance of the other club Presidents to allow them to work without 
undue intervention, andito arrange for their successors to be chosen 
from amongst the-incumbent club directors. t3 
The many commentators who have alleged that the Franco's regime was 
eager to maintain a lack of democracy in football and other sports in 
order to avoid an uncomfortable comparison with lack of democracy in all 
other aspects of Spanish society, claim that the rigid control which 
Moscardo exercised over the RFEF and the football clubs in the 1940s, 
closely reflecting the concept of Caudillaje in vogue in Spain at the 
time, was demanded of the Delegado Nacional by the regime itself. '4 
There is no documentary evidence to prove that any of Franco's ministers 
were concerned about preventing the return of democracy to football. 
The DND itself, nevertheless, was a part of the Franco regime, albeit a 
comparatively insignificant part, and Moscardo was fully aware of the 
way in which the higher echelons of the regime wanted him to govern 
sport. This awareness is illustrated in a letter that he wrote to the 
RFEF in February 1945, a formality to explain the appointment as Betis 
President of Eduardo Ramirez: 
"As you well know, one of the primary objectives of this regime, 
and of this Delegacien Nonal de Deportes, is to maintain firm 
13. In this way, Santiago Bernabeu, for example, became President of 
Real Madrid in September 1943 and Javier Borroso assumed power at 
Athl'etico de Madrid in March 1948, without the need either for 
elections or for Moscard4r to intervene. 
14. This specific allegation has been made in the following 
publications: Botines, op. cit., p. 73; Marco, op. cit., p. 25; and 
to the author in the following interviews: Alex J. Botines: Manuel 
Vazquez Montalbän; Nicolau Casaus; Julian Garcia Candau. 
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order and authority in all institutions, and for this reason I feel 
obliged to effect these necessary changes at the Real Club Betis de 
Balonpie. "15 
This letter constitutes sufficient evidence to permit the claim that 
C. Moscardö s refusal to allow democracy to return to football was largely 
motivated by an awareness of the Franco regime's preference for a 
dictatorial style, even if`there exists no proof that any significant 
regime personality was concerned about the possible negative effects of 
allowing the game to revert to its former democratic ways. 
Moscardo's policy of rigidly controlling the clubs' leadership, 
however, began to cause hirº problems in 1947, because of ignoring the 
wishes of the club directors and members and appointing incompetent 
Presidents. These problems commenced in March 1947, when his nominee 
for the presidency of the Elche club, the Falangist Ricardo Galvin, who 
insisted on retaining the unsuccessful Juan Reverte as team coach, 
resigned after a vociferous demonstration by the supporters and a 
unanimous vote of no confidence against him by the directors. '6 In 
June 1947, the Falangist President of the Castellon club, Miguel 
Rodriguez Blanco, appointed by Moscardo eighteen months earlier, was 
forced to resign when serious irregularities were discovered in the 
club's accounts. " A third problem for the Delegado Nacional occurred 
in January . 1948, when the 
supporters of the Cultural y Deportivo club of 
Leon demonstrated against, and three directors resigned in protest at, 
15. -This letter from Moscardo to the RFEF President, dated 9 February 
1945 was discovered by the author in the archives of the RFEF. 
16. For further details, see Murcia Deportiva, Murcia, Nos. 217-219,18 
March -1 April 1947, and Marca, 29-29 March 1947. 
17. See Marca, 3-4 June 1947, for details. 
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the presidency of the retired army colonel Juan Sanchez Cabello, who 
persisted with the same manager despite a series of humiliating defeats 
for the team. He did not resign, but was compelled to appoint a new 
coach. 
The Delegado Nacional realized that more competent club Presidents 
would emerge if he allowed a very limited amount of democracy to return 
to the game. In March 1948, therefore, he allowed the annual club 
assemblies to recommence, but with the bizarre and unprecedented 
stipulation that only 200 members drawn out of a hat be allowed to 
attend. 19 These 200 would be able to vote for the President only, who 
would then choose his own directors, every four years. Moscardo, 
retained the right, however, to veto as presidential candidate any club 
member with a dubious political record, 20 and, in addition, the right to 
cancel the elections and again appoint his own man, "if the 
circumstances demand such action". 21 
As a consequence of this limited reform, more competent and popular 
18. For details, see Marca, 4-16 January 1948. 
19. The precise rules and regulations for these assemblies and elections 
were published in the Boletin Oficial de la DND, No. 61, April 1948. 
20. The current FC Barcelona Vice-President and former militant of the 
Catalanist party Esquerra Republicana, Nicolau Casaus for example, 
was frequently vetoed by the DND as a potential presidential 
candidate or director, as shall be fully illustrated in Chapter 
Eight of this thesis. 
21. Quoted in Boletin Oficial de la DND, No. 61, April 1948. It should 
be pointed out at this stage that this reform was humorously 
identified by Francisco Cerecedo, writing in Posible, No. 2,1 
December 1974: 
"And after twelve years without being allowed to hold general 
assemblies at the clubs, the Federation (sic, should read DND) 
conceded the benefits of democracia ora nica to the football 
institutions, by means of limited elections, in this way 
avoiding the resurrection of the dreaded universal vote. " 
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club Presidents came to power from 1948 onwards, and Moscardo did not 
feel compelled to intervene in this process at any professional club. 
His problems with the choice of club leaders, however, had not been 
completely resolved. Because of the kind of bureaucratic mistake that 
frequently occurred in Francoist Spain, the officials of both DND and 
the RFEF omitted to make this new system obligatory by requiring every 
club to change their own regulations accordingly. The 1948 reforms 
were, in effect, simply recommendations for the clubs to follow rather 
than the binding rules that Moscardö had intended. 
The general impression, however, was that this system was 
compulsory, and was consequently automatically adopted at practically 
every club. 22 When presidential elections were necessary at FC 
Barcelona in October 1953, nonetheless, following the resignation of 
Marti Carreto over the controversial selling to Real Madrid of all 
rights over the Argentina player Alfredo Di Stefano, an issue that will 
be fully discussed in Chapter Eight of this thesis, club secretary 
Albert Malaquer discovered that the 1948 system had not been 
incorporated into the Bar2a statutes, meaning that the club was within 
its rights in holding an election with every adult member voting. The 
interim committee of former Barca Presidents decided to arrange such a 
mass election, although knowing, as will be illustrated in detail in 
22. This was the impression received by Julio Lamana, general secretary 
of Athletic de Bilbao from 1949 to 1983. Lamana alleged that, had he 
been aware of the loophole in the 1948 regulations, he would have 
advised the club directors, when presidential elections were 
necessary in July 1951, to hold a mass vote of all the 13,000 adult 
members, instead of the election by just 200 that appeared 
obligatory. 
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Chapter Eight that this decision would infuriate General Moscardo. ' The 
Delegado Nacional, surprisingly to many, did not attempt to prevent the 
election. 23 After a month-long campaign, more than 17,000 Barca socios 
exercised their right to vote, a right that they would not enjoy again 
for 25 years. 
Moscardö was predictably annoyed at these events in Barcelona, and 
vehement in his criticism of the officials whose errors had caused 
them. 24 In order to prevent any further such exhibition of local 
democracy, he demanded that the RFEF make the 1948 system compulsory for 
every club. 25 
The lack of real democracy at the football clubs, however, was only 
a half of the total lack of democracy in the game during the caudillaje- 
like dictatorship of General Moscardo, the other half being the clubs' 
complete lack of influence within the RFEF. Whilst Moscardo was 
Delecado General, the DND irresistibly dominated the RFEF. In the 
years following his death in 1956; however; the clubs began to express 
23. The following interviewees confessed to the author their surprise at 
the time at General Moscardo not intervening to prevent the Bam 
election: the former FC Barcelona President Agusti Montal; Nicolau 
Casaus; the veteran editor of El Mundo Deportivo, Juan Jose 
Castillo; Enrique Gil de la Vega "Gilera", the veteran football 
correspondent of ABC. Perhaps the explanation for the Delegado 
Nacional's surprising lack of intervention is the influenza that 
confined him to bed for three weeks from 17 October to 8 November, 
revealed by Marca, 21,26 and 29 October, and 2 and 10 November. 
24. The annoyance of the Delegado Nacional was disclosed to the author 
by various veteran officials of the DND, interviewed during 
examination of the archives of that institution, March and April 
1986. 
25. The RFEF obediently did this, by means of their Circular No. 9 of 
January 1954, published in the Boletin Oficial de la DND, No. 129, 
February 1954. 
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their frustration at their lack of influence. This frustration was felt 
most acutely by Real Madrid, spectacular European champion and, as shall 
be seen in detail, in Chapter Seven, praised to the skies by many of 
Franco's ministers for their diplomatic significance, but nonetheless 
unable to influence the RFEF's decisions about, for example, the 
calendar of league and cup matches or the number of players that could 
be substituted in the course of these games. 26 In consequence, a rare 
example of unity between the two giant sporting clubs of Spain occurred 
at the RFEF assembly of July 1958, when the Real President Santiago 
Bernabeu seconded a motion proposed by his BarYa counterpart FranSesc 
Mir *0 Sans, requesting that the clubs elect the Vice-Presidents and 
directors of'the RFEF, leaving the post of President still to be filled 
by the nominee of the Delegado Nacional. The motion was overwhelmingly 
passed at the assembly, but vetoed without any explanation when sent on 
to Jose Antonio Elola Olaso, Moscardö's successor, for the DND seal of 
approval. 27 
Three years later of the RFEF assembly, a similar motion, this time 
proposed by the Valencia President Julio de Miguel and with the 
difference that three directors in addition to the President should 
continue to be nominated by the DND, was again passed overwhelmingly and 
then approved by Elola Olaso, who realized that this minor reform was 
26. This frustration is clearly reflected in the editorials of the 
Boletin del Real Madrid CF, for example Nos. 43,52,79,92 and 95, 
of February 1954, November 1954, February 1957, March 1959 and June 
1959. 
27. For further details, see either Marca or El Mundo Deportivo, 8-14 
July 1958. 
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necessary in order to pacify the frustrated clubs. 28 As had been the 
case with the 1948 reform of the clubs' presidential election system, 
this reform of 1961 has also been interpreted as a step towards the 
introduction of democracia organica into Spanish football. 29 
The football clubs quickly discovered, however, that their 
influence over the direction of the game had not been substantially 
increased by the alteration in the method of electing the majority of 
RFEF directors. In May 1962, these newly-elected directors clashed with 
the RFEF President Benito Pico Martinez, the nominee of Elola Olaso, 
about the arrangements for the national team's participation in the 
forthcoming World Cup finals tournament Chile. 30 In the wake of the 
Spanish failure in Chile, the general sentiment among the clubs was that 
28. See either Marca or El Mundo Deportivo, 11 July 1961 for further 
details. The motives of Elola Olaso were revealed to the author by 
Benito Castejon, secretary the the Delegado Nacional from 1959 
onwards. 
29. This interpretation was offered by Francisco Cerecedo in Posible, 
No. 3,15 December 1974, in Botines, op. cit., p. 72, and Marco, op. 
cit., p. 25. 
30. Pico Marine-z, presumably following the instructions of the Delegado 
Nacional wanted a two-week preparatory training camp at El Escorial, 
whilst the club representatives on the executive complained that 
this would interfere with the final rounds of the Copa del 
Generalisimo. The former President of Valencia and RFEF director 
Julio de Miguel recalled to the author that he led the complaints of 
the club to Pico Martinez' plan, on the grounds that the clubs who 
provided most players for the national team would be disadvantaged 
by having to play their cup matches without these players. After a 
lengthy debate, a compromise was reached whereby the training camp 
would last for only ten days, and all of the cup games would be 
brought forward so that the national team players could participate. 
De Miguel also expressed the opposition of the majority of the clubs 
to the controversial former FC Barcelona coach Helenio Herrera being 
placed in charge of the national team only a month before the start 
of the tournament, and of his plans to base the team on the injury- 
prone veterans of Real Madrid Alfredo Di St6fano, Jose Santamaria 
and Ferenc Puskas, aged 35,34 and 34 respectively, and all foreign- 
born. 
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the blame lay with the DND for having ignored their suggestions before 
the tournament. 31 The FC Barcelona representative on the RFEF 
executive, the former club President FranSesc Miro Sans, expressed his 
annoyance most clearly, but nonetheless still pulled short of risking 
punishment by explicitly criticising the DND: 
"I believe that the responsibility for what happened in Chile lies 
with those who refused to listen to us before the event, those who 
never seem to listen. Let's hope that, henceforth, our voice, 
which is the voice of the clubs, the real experts in Spanish 
influence, will count for more at the RFEF. Otherwise, it's 
possible that the same will happen again. "32 
Mire Sans' hopes, however, were to remain unfulfilled. The next 
clash between the clubs and the DND for the control of the RFEF occurred 
in June 1963. Following a series of further poor results for the 
national team, the RFEF directors persuaded both Pico Martinez and 
national manager Jose Villalonga to resign. Elola Olaso, however, 
resenting the clubs attempting to establish their influence in this way, 
refused to accept the resignations and persuaded the two men to 
continue. The clubs reacted indignantly to what they regarded as 
unwarranted interference by the DND in the internal affairs of 
football. The most indignant club was Real Madrid, whose club magazine, 
in an angry editorial, effectively demanded a return to the pre-Civil 
War situation of the clubs controlled by an RFEF that was completely 
free from State control: 
"... we want all of the responsibility for the direction of Spanish 
football, but also a total independence and complete autonomy, 
within the obvious limits of subordination to the sporting 
authorities. "33 
31. This sentiment is reflected, for example, in the editorials which 
appeared in the Boletin del Real Madrid CF, No. 147, August 1962, 
and in Bar ca, No. 348,25 July 1963. 
32. Quoted in bicen, 26 July 1962. 
33. See Boletin del Real Madrid CF, No. 159, August 1963. 
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The conclusion that Real Madrid, along with several other clubs, drew, 
from the unaccepted resignations affair was that, as long as the rigid 
control of the DND was maintained, then the participation of the clubs 
in the affairs of the RFEF was practically useless: 
"Simply to arrange the fixtures and impose fines on the players, 
this much-vaunted participation of the clubs in the RFEF is hardly 
worth the trouble. "34, 
The Real Madrid President Bernabeu decided to put this conclusion 
into practice, and attempted to organize a complete club boycott of the 
July 1963 RFEF assembly and executive committee meetings. He sent a 
letter to the President of every professional club, calling for action 
against "this unneccessary and dishonourable interference (of Elola -. 
Olaso) in the organization of football, a matter which should be left to 
ourselves". 35 There was not enough time to arrange the boycott before 
the assembly, indeed some Presidents claimed that the Bernabeu letter 
did not arrive until after they had made the trip to Madrid. 36 In the 
event, only Valladolid and Racing de Santander, clubs with very close 
relations with Real, supported Bernabeu's boycott. At the beginning of 
the assembly, Elola Olaso made an emotive speech in which he accepted 
that he acted in a "heavy-handed manner" over the resignations affair, 
34. See Boletin del Real Madrid CF, No. 159, August 1963. 
35. Copies of this letter were discovered by the author in the archives 
of the FC Barcelona, of Athletic de Bilbao and Real Sociedad de San 
Sebastian, and of Atletico de Madrid. 
36. This claim was made to the. , author 
by Julio de Miguel and by the 
President of Salamanca Jose Maria Dominguez in Marca, 19 July 1963. 
The copies of Bernabeu's letter discussed in the above footnote, 
however, all arrived approximately a week before the assembly, and 
therefore it could be argued that De Miguel and Dominguez simply 
wanted to avoid taking sides in the confrontation and thus earn the 
enmity of either Bernabeu or Elola Olaso. 
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promised "less direct interference" in the internal affairs of the game, 
and concluded with a plea to "maintain the unity and discipline that is 
the cornerstone of Spanish sport, ignoring those who seek to undermine 
this unity in order to further their own selfish interests". 37 The 
Delecado Nacional was given a warm ovation, and Bernabeu' boycott had 
been struck a powerful blow. Despite the complete lack of support from 
the other clubs, who largely believed in Elola Olaso's promise, 38 the 
Real President, a proud, arrogant man, continued with the unprecedented 
boycott of the RFEF annual assemblies and executive committee until 
Elola Olaso's fall from power in December 1966. 
The next source of friction between the clubs and the DND concerned 
Elola Olaso's unilateral decision to renew his ban on foreign players 
for a further four years in August 1966. Bernabeu attempted to revive 
support for his boycott with the following kind of attack on the 
Delegado Nacional: 
"Thisdemonstrates'one again the complete lack of importance of the 
clubs. It seems to me ridiculous to suggest that the presence of 
leading foreign players at Real Madrid or FC Barcelona is capable 
of preventing the emergence of exciting young Spanish players in, 
for example, Leon, Bilbao or Sevilla, players who will form the 
future the national team. If anything, these youngsters will learn 
from the example set by foreign players in Spain. "39 
The indignation of Bernabeu was shared by the other leading clubs, 
37. Quoted in Marca, 17 July 1963. 
38. For examples of this belief, see either the many favourable comments 
from leading club Presidents in Marca or El Mundo Deportivo, 
17-18 
-July 1963, or the editorials 
in Bar? a, No. 399,25 July 1963 and 
ýAupa Atletico!, No. 24, August 1963. 
39. Quoted in Boletin del Real Madrid CF, No. 196, September 1966. 
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especially FC Barcelona. 40 The modest clubs, however, benefited from 
this ban because it took away the advantage that the likes of Real and 
Barga had with their foreign stars, whilst the Basque clubs were content 
because they have not used foreign players for almost fifty years, and 
therefore support for the RFEF boycott of Bernabeu again did not 
materialize. 
At this juncture, it is necessary temporarily to leave the question 
of the struggle between the clubs and the DND for the control of the 
RFEF in order to return to the lack of democracy at the football clubs. 
FC Barcelona launched a vociferous campaign against the 1948 system of 
just 200 members drawn out of a hat electing the club President, but, 
almost to the same extent as Bernabeu's anti-Elola Olaso campaign, 
support from the other clubs was weak. The main reason for this lack of 
40. The Barca magazine, No. 560,10 August 1966, carried an editorial 
which effectively used the foreign player prohibition issue as an 
excuse for a vitriolic attack on the style of government of both the 
DND and the RFEF: 
"In the first place, the lack of representation that the clubs 
have in the RFEF is lamented. It could be argued that various 
clubs and regional Federations are present. But as long as the 
DND has the right to appoint directly the President and a 
-certain number of directors, then the Federation (RFEF) will 
not have the same representative nature as it would with 
officials voted for by the clubs. The statutes of the 
Federation were improved a few years ago (1961). But reality 
has demonstrated that this is useless, that something more 
effective has to be achieved, with people who live for 
football, who live it, and are prepared to dialogue with the 
clubs. The RFEF doesn't carry out a dialogue. On the 
contrary, it is a master of monologue. And the same occurs 
with the DND ... The RFEF has wasted magnificent opportunities 
to talk with the clubs. The only contact that it maintains 
with the latter are the assemblies, which turn out to be the 
saddest and most pathetic spectacle that one can see. Four 
hours a year listening to impressive speeches and then home 
again. That is all the dialogue that the RFEF offers to the 
clubs. Such a state of affairs simply cannot continue. " 
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support was that the majority of incumbent club Presidents were content 
to see the 1948 system continue because it granted them the power to 
choose the directors, guaranteed them at least four years in office, 
and made it more difficult for them to be voted out of power than would 
have been the case if all members were enfranchised. 
The Bam-campaign began when the Catalan club was forced to 
conform to the 1948 system for their December 1957 elections, provoking 
this scornful comment in the club magazine: 
"This method of election seems as absurd to us as if the name of 
the President was actually drawn out of a hat. 41 
Many similarly bitter attacks on the 1948 system appeared in the club 
magazine during the 1960s, culminating in this powerful editorial during 
the stunted Barra presidential election campaign of November 1969: 
"It is a pity that an election of this type should be decided by a 
vote in which 283 people take part, in the event that everyone 
turns up. This system simply has to be scrapped and a profound 
revision of the whole matter undertaken. "42 
Another method used by the FC Barcelona directors to demonstrate 
their contempt for the 1948 system and their preference for inner-club 
democracy was to make significant democratic gestures whenever possible. 
In January 1962 for example, every adult Barte member was invited to 
attend and vote at a special assembly organized by President Enric 
Llaudet to decide the fate of the old Les Corts stadium. In August 
1965, on the initiative of the same President, the members were 
asked to vote for a name for Bar a's new stadium. At every other 
club, such decisions were strictly confined to the boardroom. The 
41. See Bar a, No. 104,12 December 1957. 
42. See Barca, No. 730,11 November 1969. 
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directors of FC Barcelona, however, had an important point to prove. 
The efforts of the Ba as leadership were largely responsible for 
the modification of the 1948 system. Before a special gathering of the 
sixteen first division club Presidents in April 1967, arranged by the 
new RFEF president Jose Luis Costa, Llaudet made the following 
connection between the introduction of democracia org pica by the Franco 
regime and the need to allow democracy to return to the football clubs: 
"All the talk at the moment is about permitting a greater degree of 
public participation in the organization of the country. There was 
even a referendum held about this issue recently. Our request for 
football club democracy is consistent with the necessary changes 
taking place in Spain as a whole. "43 
At this special April 1967 meeting, support for Llaudet's proposal 
for every club to be allowed to choose their own electoral system only 
received the support of the Presidents of the two Basque clubs, Athletic 
de Bilbao and Real Sociedad. 44 The Presidents of the other thirteen 
first division clubs were unwilling to see the 1948 system change, 
mainly for reasons already outlined in this chapter. The opposition to 
Llaudet's motion was led by Real Madrid President Bernabeu, by then 
having finished his boycott of the RFEF after the replacement of Elola 
Olaso as Delegado Nacional, who declared that: 
"There are always people who want to change things just for the 
sake of changing. The system that we have for the election of club 
Presidents has worked very well for about thirty years, and 
therefore I see absolutely no reason at all to change it. ""y 
43. Quoted in Dicen, 3 April 1967. 
44. For further details of this special meeting, see either Marca or 
El Mundo Deportivo, 5 April 1967. 
45. Quoted in Marca, 5 April 1967. 
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Because of this heavy defeat in April 1967, Llaudet decided not to 
table a motion about the subject at the RFEF assembly of three months 
later. Llaudet's successor, Narcis de Carreras, was, as shall be seen 
in detail in Chapter Eight, too preoccupied with the consequences of the 
stormy 1968 cup final to bring up the issue of club democracy at the 
RFEF assembly of that year. During the football season 1968/1969, 
however, two incidents increased both the momentum of and the support 
for Bar a's campaign for change. In December 1968, it was widely 
expected that, because of the team being bottom of the first division 
and the club being heavily in debt, the Cordoba President Jose Luis 
Romero would be convincingly beaten in the club elections. Romero, 
however, surprisingly won the elections, amidst accusations of 
"treating" the 200 members allowed to vote and even of "ballot-rigging", 
a result that provoked angry demonstrations by the supporters. "6 Three 
months later, similar accusations and demonstrations followed the re- 
election of the incumbent Celta de Vigo President Antonio Correira. 47 
The Barca delegate at the July 1969 RFEF assembly Agusti Montal, 
present in place of the indisposed Carreras, referred to these two 
incidents when proposing a motion in favour of the dissolution of the 
1948 system. Montal concluded his speech thus: 
"For more than thirty years now, the football clubs of Spain have 
been unable to function as they should do, with the full 
participations of all of the members. We are convinced that this 
full participation must return, in order for our clubs to be a 
credit to the communities from which they spring and a credit to 
Spanish sport in general. "48 
46. For further details, see either Marca or As, 7-16 December 1968. 
47. See either Marca or As, 18-22 March 1969, for details. 
48. Quoted in all of the above sports newspapers, 14 July 1969. 
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The FC Barcelona motion split the assembly into three groups: the small 
section in support of Montal, led by the other Catalan clubs, with the 
exception of Espanol of Barcelona, the Basque clubs and the Catalan 
regional federations; the majority of the assembly, in favour of a 
compromise solution extending the franchise at the clubs, but not to 
every adult member; the group led by Real Madrid that was opposed to 
all reform of the 1948 system. A compromise motion established a 
special committee to draft reform proposals, proposed by the Valencia 
President Julio de Miguel, was accepted. Both Bernabeu and Montal 
presented themselves for membership of this committee, but neither 
gained the neccessary votes, the assembly's choice being the Presidents 
of Valencia, Real Sociedad, Sporting de Gijon, Hercules de Alicante, 
Huelva and the President of the Galician regional federation. 49 
In May 1970, this committee simply recommended that the number of 
club members to be drawn by lot, and allowed to vote, be increased to 5% 
of the total, a suggestion that, predictably, disappointed the 
campaigners for complete club democracy. Montal, by then Ba_ rsa 
President, complained that: 
"This recommendation seems to us to be neither one thing nor 
another, an extremely unsatisfactory compromise by men who could 
possibly be considered to be reluctant to contest a popular 
election at their clubs. "50 
The President of Athletic de Bilbao, Jose Maria Oraa, a man, as shall 
be seen in Chapter Eightiat the time increasingly influenced by the 
49. For further details, see As, 14 July 1969. 
50. Quoted in Baarrca, No. 759,2 June 1970. 
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clandestine Basque National Party, declared himself to be: 
"... somewhat disappointed. I really can't understand why so many 
people in football are opposed to every member being allowed to 
vote at his club. "81 
It has been alleged that this ad hoc committee was advised by the 
Delegado Nacional de Deportes Juan Antonio Samaranch against 
recommending a one-member-one-vote system, although the evidence to 
support this claim is rather circumstantial. Between May 1970 and the 
RFEF assembly of the year, the issue lost much of its topicality because 
of the Guruceta affair, another subject that will fully discussed in 
Chapter Eight of this thesis. At the assembly, the committee's proposal 
was almost unanimously accepted, with Real Madrid and the other 
opponents of reform in favour and the only dissenters being FC 
Barcelona, most of the other Catalan clubs, the Catalan regional 
federation, most of the other Basque clubs, including Athletic de 
Bilbao, and the Basque regional federation. 53 The proposal was approved 
by the DND, and came into effect in August 1970.54 
It has frequently been claimed that this reform reflected the 
various democracia orgänica reforms instituted by the Franco regime in 
the late 1960s. 55 The new system allowed, for example, 1,228 Atletico 
de Madrid members to vote in the club's presidential elections of June 
51. Quoted in El Mundo Deportivo, 29 May 1970. 
52. This allegation has never been made in print, but rather to the 
author in interviews with Alex J. Botines and Julian Garcia Candau. 
53. For further details, see As, 11 July 1970. 
54. This reform was implemented by means of RFEF Circular No. 10 of 
August 1970, and published in the Boletin Oficial de la DND, No. 
325, September 1970. 
55. This allegation has been made in the following publications: 
Francisco Cerecedo in Posible, No. 5,15 January 1975; Botines, op. 
cit., p. 72 and Cazoria Prieto, op. cit., p. 35. 
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1971,2,034 in the Real Madrid elections of June 1972, in which Santiago 
Bernabeu was once again the only candidate, 1,127 in the Athletic de 
Bilbao elections of July 1973 and, at FC Barcelona in December 1973, 
1,585.06 The campaigners for the return of complete democracy to the 
football clubs frequently complained publicly that the system had not 
qualitatively changed since 1948, whilst privately noting that the 
process of democratization of the Spanish political system had 
commenced. 57 
At this point, it is appropriate to return to the other half of the 
issue of the lack of democracy in Spanish football during the Franco 
years; 'the struggle between the DND and the clubs for controls of the 
RFEF. As seen earlier, Delegado Nacional Elola Olaso had consented, in 
1961, to the clubs' request for all but three of the RFEF directors to 
be elected at the annual assembly, but had subsequently disappointed 
many clubs, and earned the enmity of Bernabeu, by refusing to accept the 
resignations of Pico Martinez and Villalonga, and then by continuing 
with his unilaterally-imposed prohibition of foreign players. The FC 
Barcelona magazine had insisted, ' in August, 1966, that "such a state of 
affairs simply cannot continue". 5e The influence of the clubs within 
the RFEF, however, continued to be severely restricted by the DND for 
56. Information revealed by the author's examination of the archives of 
these clubs, op. cit. 
57. See, for example, interview with Jose Maria Oraa, in Dicen, 20 July 
1973, and with Agusti Montal in El Mundo Deportivo, 28 November 1973 
and in Bar a, No. 942,4 December 1973. Montal recalled to the 
author, that after the disappointing 1970 reforms, he realized that 
it would be impossible to achieve a one-member-one-vote system 
whilst the Franco regime remained in power. 
58. See Bam, No. 560,10 August 1966. 
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the remainder of the Franco years. 
The replacement as Delegado Nacional of Elola Olaso by Juan Antonio 
Samaranch in December 1966, the reasons for which were discussed in the 
Introduction to this thesis, was largely received with satisfaction by 
the football clubs, especially by Real Madrid, who immediately ended 
their boycott of the RFEF. Upon hearing the news of his personal 
enemy's fall from power, Real President Bernabeu declared: 
"I am not surprised at all, I have been expecting this news for 
some time now. Let's hope that Mr. Samaranch, in whom we have 
every confidence, will permit us the control of the game that is 
necessary if Spanish football is to remain one of the leading 
powers in the world. "59 
The hopes that the clubs had of Samaranch allowing them to control 
the RFEF without excessive intervention from the DND, however, were to 
be quickly confounded. At the RFEF assembly of July 1967, Bernabeu 
proposed a motion to have all the RFEF directors elected at the 
assembly, with the influence of the DND reduced to choosing the RFEF 
President and "intervening in the internal affairs of football only when 
absolutely neccessary". 60 This motion was unanimously approved by the 
assembly, despite the warning of Jose Luis Costa, the RFEF President 
appointed by Samaranch only seven months earlier, that is could "upset 
the harmony that has existed in the organization of football for the 
part thirty years". 61 Samaranch, allegedly angry about the clubs 
59. Quoted in Marca, 29 December 1966. 
60. For further details, see any of the sports newspapers, 11 July 1967. 
61. Quoted in all of the sports newspapers, 11 July 1067. 
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Bernabeu decided to protest against the appointment of Gich with 
another boycott of the assemblies and executive committee meetings of 
the RFEF, after apologizing to the new RFEF President Jose Luis Perez 
Pays, former Real Madrid centre-forward, for the trouble that this 
boycott would cause him. 65 Perez Payä, however, then provoked the 
indignation of Bernabeu and many other club Presidents by immediately 
clarifying who would exercise the greatest influence over his 
presidency: 
"It is beyond doubt that I will always be taking the line of the 
Minister-Secretary of the Movimiento and of the Delecado Nacional 
because they are the leading rectors of Spanish sport. "66 
The last attempt of the football clubs to increase their influence 
within the RFEF during the Franco years occurred at the RFEF assembly of 
July 1972. One motion, proposed by the FC Barcelona President Agusti 
Montal and supported in the Press by Bernabeu, 67 demanded the return of 
the foreign players, with the argument that the prohibition had actually 
been counter-productive because the national team had performed worse 
since the prohibition had been introduced ten years earlier. The second 
major motion of the assembly of 1972, again publicly supported by 
Bernabeu, 68 called once more for all of the RFEF directors to be elected 
at the assembly, rather than three by the DND. Both of the motions were 
almost unanimously passed, but then immediately vetoed by Juan Gich, 
with the minimum of explanation to the Press. The reaction of the clubs 
65. This brief apology was made to Perez Paya in a letter, dated 27 
September 1970, uncovered by the author in the archives of the RFEF. 
66. Quoted in Bar a, No. 778,13 October 1970. 
67. See interview with Bernabeu in As, 17 July 1972. 
68. See same interview. 
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to Gich's intransigence was predictably indignant. 69 Valladolid, Räcing 
de Santander, Sevilla and Granada promised to join Bernabeu's boycott 
and stay away from the 1973 assembly. 
In the event, however, all four of the clubs mentioned above sent 
delegates to the assembly, as a consequence of the Delegado Nacional 
surprisingly lifting', in May 1973, the ban on foreign players. The 
majority of clubs were pleased at this development because it seemed 
that Gich had been compelled to do their wishes. It has been alleged, 
however, both at the time and afterwards, that Gich's real motive in 
lifting the ban was to distract attention away from the national team's 
second successive failure to qualify for the World Cup finals 
tournament. 70 
By the end of the Franco period, the football clubs had largely 
accepted defeat in their struggle with the DND for control of the RFEF. 
Representatives of the clubs were in the majority on the RFEF executive, 
and frequently caused problems for the President. 71 The victories won 
by the clubs on the RFEF executive, however, were small and relatively 
69. For examples of this reaction, see Mestalla, (Valencia) No. 126, 
September 1972,1{Aupa Atletico!, No. 133, September 1972, Boletin del 
Real Madrid CF, No. 268, September 1972, and Bam, No. 881,4 
September 1972. 
70. This allegation was made in am, No. 916,19 May 1973, Dicen, 17 
May 1973, Botines, op. cit., p. 96 and Jose Maria Garcia, op. cit., 
p. 67. 
71. In Janäüry 1974, for example, both Gich and Perez"Paya were prepared 
to extend the contract of national team manager Ladislas Kabala, 
despite the failure to qualify for the 1974 World Cup finals 
tournament, for four further years. The club representatives on the 
RFEF executive, however, wanted to engage a different coach. As 
revealed to the author by Perez Paya, after a lively debate, a 
compromise of two more years for Kubala was reached. 
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insignificant ones. The DND continued to dominate the RFEF through the 
nomination of the President and three directors, and the right to vetoe 
any motion passed at the annual assembly. 
The Presidents of the leading clubs demonstrated their 
disillusionment and frustration at the DND's continued domination by 
voting with their feet. At the July 1974 RFEF assembly, only eight of 
the eighteen first division club Presidents were present, the others, 
apart from Santiago Bernabeu, 'sending either a Vice-President or 
director as their representative. 72 The following July, only six first 
division Presidents attended. 73 The motives for their absence were 
aptly summed up by the Valencia President Julio de Miguel: 
"I see little point in attending an assembly that has practically 
no power. We either discuss trivia such as the fixture list and 
get bored to tears, or vote on some issue of importance, only to 
have our decision vetoed without any explanation. "74 
Certain Presidents, for example Jose Antonio Eguidazu of Athletic de 
Bilbao and Agusti Montal of FC Barcelona, 75 privately concluded that 
democracy could only be fully restored at the RFEF, and the domination 
of the DND be broken, after the death of Franco and when the political 
system had begun to be democratized. 
This chapter has attempted to demonstrate how the various stages of 
the Franco dictatorship were reflected in the governance of Spanish 
72. Information revealed by the author's examination of the archives of 
the RFEF. 
73. Information from the RFEF archives. 
74. Quoted in Dicen, 10 July 1974. 
75. Revealed by author's interviews with Agusti Montal and Julio Lamana, 
the former Athletic de Bilbao secretary and confidant of Equidazu. 
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football. At first, the complete domination of this and every other 
sport closely reflected the concept of caudillaje that was being put 
into practice by Franco in the 1940s and 1950s. In the 1960s, the 
democracia orgänica reforms introduced by the Franco regime were 
reflected by the introduction of a very limited degree of democracy both 
to the adminstration of the RFEF and the football clubs. In the 1970s, 
the general frustration felt by the country as a whole at the 
ineffectiveness of these reforms and the Franco regime's refusal to 
introduce other more meaningful ones was reflected by the specific 
frustration felt by the majority of football clubs upon realizing that 
they would not be able to introduce a one-member-one-vote electoral 
system until the Franco dictatorship itself had begun to be dismantled. 
This chapter has attempted to demonstrate that the general lack of 
democracy in Spanish football during the Franco period was a direct 
consequence of the regime's style of government. There is little 
explicit documentary evidence to support the allegation that the regime 
was eager to maintain a lack of democracy in football and other sports 
in order not to'establish an uncomfortable comparison with the lack of 
democracy in general in Francoist Spain. It must be concluded, 
nonetheless, that the DND itself was part of the Francoist state 
machinery and that the various Delegados Nacionales de Deportes were 
fully aware of the way in which the regime wanted them to govern sport 
and the limited scope of football democracy which the regime would 
permit. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: FOOTBALL AND EXPLOITATION 
The fourth aspect of the politicization of football in Francoist Spain 
concerns the poor treatment received by the professional players from 
both the football clubs and the Francoist sporting authorities. This is 
the aspect which has been discussed the least by the select group of 
writers and journalists who have concerned themselves with the political 
significance of Spanish sports. The only two writers to have examined 
the poor working conditions of the footballers have been Tomas Martin 
Arnoriaga, in Los esclavos de oro del balön, l and Daniel Gomez Jimenez, 
who dedicated to the subject several of his weekly columns in the 
"vertical syndicates" newspaper Pueblo, signed simply "Daniel". 2 
Two explanations for the lack of treatment of this aspect of 
politicization can be put forward. Firstly, the poverty of the 
footballers' working conditions have generally not been recognized as 
such because the stereotyped image of the Spanish footballer has usually 
been that of a luxuriously-treated and extravagantly-paid young man, in 
1. Tomas Martin Arnoriaga, op. cit. - 
2. See, for example, Pueblo lo, (Madrid) 17 September 1968. 
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sharp contrast to the poorly-treated and ill-paid majority, of Spanish 
workers. 3 Secondly, even when this shabby treatment of the footballers 
has been occasionally recognized, by "Daniel", for example, 4 it has 
usually been thought this was the normal treatment received by 
footballers throughout the world rather than the result of a deliberate 
policy of the Franco regime. 5 In consequence, the political 
significancd of the shabby working conditions of the footballers has 
simply not been recognized, not even in the standard works on the 
politicizations of Spanish football, written by Manuel Vazquez 
Montalban, 6 Julian Garcia Candau, T Francisco Cerecedoe and Alex J. 
Botines. 9 
Despite all of the above, however, the treatment received by the 
players should be considered as another aspect of the politicization of 
football in Francoist Spain, because the Franco regime was undoubtedly 
in favour of the footballers' working conditions reflecting those of the 
great majority of Spanish workers. 
3. This image of the footballers is best illustrated in: Martin 
Arnoriaga, op. cit., p. 159-162; in Marca, 18 November 1957 or 4 
March 1969. The majority of veteran supporters interviewed by the 
author share this view, and consequently have little respect for the 
struggles of the players' union, the Asociaciön de Futbolistas 
Espanoles. On the other hand, the majority of younger supporters 
interviewed have a sympathetic attitude towards the problems of the 
players, and appreciate the need for the Asociacion, even though 
very few expressed support for the four strikes undertaken during 
the period 1979-1984. 
4. See, for example, Pueblo, 17 September 1968. 
5. See, for example, As, 1 December 1973, and El Mundo Deportivo, 20 
February 1974. 
6. Manuel V(zquez Montalban, op. cit. , 
7., Julian Garcia Candau, op. cit. 
8. Francisco Cerecedo, op. cit. 
9. Alex J. Botines, op. cit. 
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The concrete evidence to support the above claim, however, 
unfortunately does not exist. In order to support this claim, 
therefore, it is necessary to fall back on the rational assumption that 
if the footballers' treatment in Francoist Spain had been qualitatively 
better, then, from the point of view of the Franco regime, an un- 
comfortable comparison would have been created with the generally poor 
working conditions of the large majority. '0 
The situation would undoubtedly have been even more uncomfortable 
for the Franco regime if the professional footballers had actually taken 
action to improve their working conditions, as occurred in every other 
Western European country in the same period. These Spanish footballers 
were consistently held up by the media as shining examples of 
discipline. courage, the much-vaunted "Spanish fury", commitment and 
self-sacrifice, qualities valued very highly in Francoist Spain. i1 The 
consequences for the Franco regime, in terms of political mobilization 
and industrial strife, could possibly have been serious if the example 
set by the footballers had changed to one of indignation at their poor 
working conditions, followed by solidarity, militancy and even strike 
action. Therefore, it is logical to assume that it was in the interests 
of the Franco regime to maintain the players in approximately the 
same situation as the majority of Spanish workers: docile, divided 
among themselves, loyal to their employer, and politically passive. 
10. This assumption is shared by, for example, Juan Pablo fusi, Julian 
Garcia Candua, Manuel Velazquez, Luis Aragones, the Former FC 
Barcelona player Caries Rexach, Juan Jose Castillo, and Jose Angel 
Iribar. 
11. See, for example, El Mundo Deportivo, 14 October 1942 and 30 March 
1949, and Marca, 15 November 1957. 
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Before entering into a detailed study of the footballers' 
grievances, it is necessary at this juncture to point out both the 
differences and similarities between the working conditions of the 
players and those of the Spanish workers. 
The most striking difference between the working conditions of the 
two groups was financial. Although it is a myth, a myth often sustained 
by the clubs themselves in order to turn public opinion against a 
rebellious player, as shall shortly be seen in detail, that every single 
player was paid a fantastic salary, it is nonetheless true that even a 
modest second division footballer earned more than the average Spanish 
worker during the Franco years. For example, Jose Luis Marin, the 
former player of Madrid second division club Rayo Vallecano, estimates 
that in 1960 he was earning approximately 1700 pesetas per month with 
bonuses included. 12 In this year, the Spanish average monthly income 
was approximately 1,500 pesetas, while the minimum pay established by 
the Ministry of Labour was fifty pesetas a day, approximately 1,200 
pesetas monthly. 13 
It should be taken into account, however, that the salary of 
professional sportsmen has traditionally been relatively high because of 
the brevity of their active careers, and the consequent need for them to 
save money in order to commence upon a new career or set themselves up 
12. Author's interview with Jose Luis Marin, 23 February 1987. 
13. Information revealed by Miguel Martinez Cuadrado, Anuario Politico 
Espanol 1969. Cambio social y modernizacion politics, Madrid, 1970, 
p. 60, and Max Gallo, Historia de la Espana franguista, 1973, p. 
436. 
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in business in their mid-thirties, or even earlier in the case of 
serious injury. Furthermore, the Spanish footballers were compelled to 
tolerate very difficult working conditions in return for these 
relatively high salaries, as shall shortly be seen in detail. 
There were far more similarities than differences between the 
working conditions of the footballers and the majority of workers in 
Francoist Spain. To begin with, both groups-were denied the right, 
enshrined in Article 23 of the Declaration of Human Rights, to form free 
and independent trade unions. Practically every Spanish worker was 
compelled to join one of the unpopular State-controlled "vertical 
syndicates". All attempts to form independent trade unions were met by 
the full weight of the Francoist machinery of repression, as Marcelino 
Camacho, Nicolas Redondo and the other leaders of the underground unions 
Comisiones Obreras, UGT and CNT painfully discovered. The footballers 
were officially regarded as "amateur sportsmen" rather than "genuine 
workers", and were consequently excluded from the "vertical 
syndicates"system. '4 Nonetheless, the players were still prohibited from 
forming themselves into any other type of grouping or association. '5 
The second major similarity between the working conditions of the. 
footballers and the majority of workers in Francoist Spain concerns the 
immense power held by the employers. In many large companies, workers 
11 
14. Revealed by examination of the archives of the DND, in particular 
Boletin Oficial de la DND, No. 37, April 1946 and No. 233, January 
1963. 
15. Revealed by examination of the archives of the DND, and of the RFEF, 
in particular Boletin Oficial de la DND, No. 161, October 1955. 
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were systematically fined for lateness and other minor infringements of 
the company rules. 16 In a similar way, the professional footballers 
were subjected to, in the words of the former Real Madrid and Spanish 
international player Manuel Velazquez, " all manner of petty regulations 
and restrictions, stipulating what we should eat and drink, 
at what time we should be in bed, and even, on which nights we should 
remain celibate. 17 Large multinational firms such as Seat, Pegaso and 
Perkins Motors regularly used to expel workers who dared to complain 
about the poor working conditions, 18 while the Spanish football clubs 
used to cancel unilaterally the contracts of players considered to 
be insufficiently obedient, or who had been injured too badly to 
continue playing. 19 In both cases, the employers demanded a high degree 
of loyalty, and were normally very ruthless when their employees had 
ceased to be economically useful. 
The Spanish footballers had no less than seven major grievances 
during the Franco period. Firstly, as seen above, they were forbidden 
by both the DND and the RFEF to form a trade union or association, and, 
moreover were excluded from the official "vertical syndicates" system. 
These "syndicates" were generally considered to be inefficient and 
ineffective due to being controlled by the Franco regime, but, as 
realized at the time by Manuel Velazquez and other footballers, to be 
16. See, for example, Edgard de Blaye, op. cit., pp. 499-501, and Max 
Gallo, Spain under Franco: A History, London, 1973. 
17. Author's interview with Manuel Velazquez. 
18. See, for example, de Blaye, op. cit, pp. 499-501, and Gallo, op. 
cit., p. 344. 
19. Revealed by examination of the archi ves of Atletico de Madrid, Real 
Madrid, FC Barcelona, Atidtic de Bilbao and Real Sociedad de San 
Sebastiän. 
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excluded from the "vertical syndicates" was far worse than being 
compelled to join. 20 As seen briefly above, there existed no sindicato 
for professional sportsmen because they were deceitfully considered by 
the clubs, the RFEF, and the DND to be merely amateurs. Consequently, 
the compromising words salario and sueldo were always avoided by the 
clubs when drawing up the contracts of the players, in favour of the 
more innocent recompensacion. 21 
The second major grievance of the players arose as a consequence of 
their not being considered professional sportsmen: their exclusion from 
the social security system, in clear contravention of Article 22 of the 
Declaration of Human Rights. This meant that when a player retired, he 
received no state pension, and had to live on money saved up during his 
playing days. Manuel Velezquez had few problems in establishing himself 
as a retailer of electrical goods upon retirement, because his earnings 
as a Real Madrid and national team star had been considerable22. 
There are many cases, however, of less fortunate players. Jose Luis 
Marin, for example, was unemployed and unable to support his wife and 
three children without help from his extended family when he retired in 
1968. He eventually found employment as a waiter in a bar owned by a 
Rayo supporter. 23 Pedro Gil and Javier Garcia, two former colleagues of 
Marin at Rayo who retired at approximately the same time, were both 
20. Author's interview with Manuel Velazquez, and with several other 
footballers of the Franco period, for example Caries Rexach and Jose 
Angel Iribar. 
21. Revealed by examination of the archives of Atietico de Madrid, and 
Real Sociedad de San Sebastian. 
22. Author's interview with Manuel Velasquez. 
23. Author's interview with Jose Luis Marin, Madrid. 
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unable to find work in Madrid, and consequently returned to their native 
towns to work with their families. 24 
The plight of a badly injured player was even, worse, even if he had 
sustained his injury. as a result of a piece of courageous action on the 
field. His club would arrange a testimonial match or him, from which 
the proceeds would be considerable only in the case of a leading star, 
and then unilaterally cancel the player's contract and consider he 
matter closed. In certain cases, for example that of Miguel Mart(nez, 
the Atl tico de Madrid midfielder who was in a coma for five years 
before dying in 1971, the clubs were generous with the injured player 
and his family. Such cases, however, were really exceptions to the 
rule of shabby treatment, because the clubs were simply not legally 
obliged to help in any way at all. Jose Maria Zubiarrain, for example, 
the former Atl (tico de Madrid goalkeeper, had his career terminated by 
injury in March 1970, and received so little compensation from his club 
that, as shall shortly be seen, he decided to take his case to the law 
courts. 
The third source of indignation for the footballers of Francoist 
Spain was the clubs' right of retention, which meant that even when a 
player's contract had expired he could only move elsewhere if his 
present club gave its approval. According to the controversial Articles 
99 and 100 of the RFEF's Regulations, 25 all that a club had to do 
in order to retain a player was to increase his salary by 10%. This 
24. Author's interview with Jose Luis Marin. 
25. Revealed by examination of the archives of the RFEF. 
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apparently unjust rule was designd to protect the smaller clubs from 
losing the players that they had developed and trained for years at 
great expense. This rule was invoked with particular frequency by the 
Basque clubs to prevent their international stars from moving to wealthy 
Real Madrid and FC Barcelona. In this way in July 1966, and again two 
years later, Athletic de Bilbao prevented their international 
goalkeeper Jose Angel Irrbar from joining Barra. Irrbar understood the 
need for such a rule, but nonetheless concluded that it was one more 
restriction on the liberty of the Spanish footballer: 
"At the time, when my ambitions to join FC Barcelona were blocked 
twice, I was unable to understand the need for this retention of 
contract by the club. It seemed to me completely unjust. Over the 
years, however, and especially now that I am the coach of Athletic 
de Bilbao, I can appreciate that this rule was necessary in order 
to defend the modest clubs, who would otherwise have lost all their 
best young players on whom they had spent vast amounts of money in 
training. On the other hand, however, it must be said that this 
retention rule was one more example of the unjust treatment 
received by the footballers, denying us the right to freedom of 
movement. The smaller clubs should certainly be protected against 
losing their best young players, but not at the expense of the 
players' freedom of contract. The major consequence of this ruling 
was that the clubs had absolute control over the destiny of the 
players, especially so because they could sell or cancel a 
player's contract whenever they wanted to. All of the legal rights 
in the player-club relationship were zealously held by the 
clubs. "26 
The fourth bone of contention for the footballers of Francoist 
Spain was the apparently endless list of petty rules and regulations 
which had to be obediently accepted at every club. The players were 
almost always treated like, in the words of the former Atletico de 
Madrid star Luis Aragones, "irresponsible children who needed a stern 
father to keep them in order". 27 Indeed, the Real Madrid President 
26. Author's interview with Jose Angel Iribar. 
27. Author's interview with Luis Aragon's. 
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Santiago Bernabeu actually said on a number of occasions: 
"The footballer, for both good and bad, is very much like a child, 
and really needs to be treated as such. "28 
Practically every aspect of the players' lives was controlled and 
regulated, in clear contravention of Article 12 of the Declaration of 
Human Rights, concerning the right of the individual to his family and 
private life. This patronizing treatment occurred almost to the same 
extent in Italy and South America. 29 It was only in Francoist 
Spain, however, that the clubs expressly prohibited their players from 
making statements or gestures with a political significance. 30 The 
clearest example of this prohibition occurred in November 1974, when 
Bernabeu discovered that the politically conscious West German player 
Paul Breitner, newly arrived at Real Madrid, was considering giving 
financial help to the striking workers of the giant Pegaso Company. As 
Breitner explained. 
"Bernabeu called me into his office and told me, in no uncertain 
terms, that what I planned to do could have serious consequences. 
He pointed out the importance of Real Madrid maintaining its 
supposedly "non-political" image, and said I would make myself very 
unpopular by interfering in Spanish domestic affairs. I was forced 
to climb down on the issue and swallow my pride, as so many 
other players apparently had to do when confronted by Bernabeu. "31 
28. Quoted in Pueblo, 17 September 1968. 
29. Revealed by examination of the archives of World Soccer, January and 
February 1984, in particular the editions of June 1963, October 
1969, June 1972 and February 1980. 
30. Revealed by examination of the archives of World Soccer, of Atletico 
de Madrid, and Real Madrid, in particular Boletin del Real Madrid 
CE, No. 295, December 1974, with regard to the case of Paul 
Breitner. 
31. Author's interview with Paul Breitner. 
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It would have been possible for the Spanish footballers to have 
opposed and even eliminated these five grievances listed above, if it 
had not been for the existence of the sixth and seventh grievances: the 
players' lack of representation within the RFEF, and the prohibition on 
them taking their grievances to the law courts. In consequence, the 
footballers were completely powerless to seek justice and fair treatment 
from the clubs. 
Before 1968, there was not a single players' representative on the 
executive committee of the RFEF. In July 1968, a motion at the annual 
RFEF assembly was passed requesting such a representative, and was 
surprisingly approved by the Delegado Nat*onal Samaranch. 32 This 
representative, however, was to be chosen only by the current and former 
international players, and usually turned out to be a man who had no 
intention of disturbing the status quo by taking up the grievances of 
the footballers. This was especially the case with regard to Jose Luis 
Perez Pays, the first player's representive, before being appointed RFEF 
President in 1970. 
This lack of influence within the RFEF, however, pales into 
insignificance alongside the seventh and final grievance of the 
footballers of Francoist Spain: the prohibition on the players seeking 
to redress any of their other grievances in the law courts. No other 
similar prohibition has apparently ever existed in any other footballing 
country. 33 This prohibition was on Article 5 of the statutes, 
32. Revealed by examination of the archives of the RFEF, and the DND, in 
particular Boletin Oficial de la DND,, No. 300, August 1968. 
33.. Revealed by examination of the archives of World Soccer. 
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read: 
"The RFF has full and exclusive jurisdication over all matters 
within its concern. 1134 
In addition, the clubs would always include in a player's contract a 
clause which stipulated that he "expressly renounces the jurisdiction of 
all authority, court, right or procedure that is not established in the 
RFEF Regulations. "35 
The RFEF usually ruled in favour of the club, on the few occasions 
when a player actually dared to complain about not having been paid, or 
about having been fined for infringing some petty club regulation. One 
player who who complained to the RFEF about the treatment received from 
his club was Juan Jose Tatono, the former Valencia defender who, in 
November 1969, denounced his employers for suspending him without pay 
for having argued with the manager. As recounted by Tatono himself: 
"Perhaps I deserved to be suspended, but certainly not without pay, 
that was completely unfair. I had to borrow money from friends in 
order to keep my family. I complained to the RFEF, but they came 
down in favour of the club, agreeing with the suspension. It seems 
that this is what usually used to happen with players' complaints 
to the RFEF. My complaining to Madrid made matters worse with 
Valencia, who sold me, after a season on the sidelines, to second 
division club Elche. Looking back now, I regret having complained 
to the RFEF, because it only did me harm. 1036 
In addition, therefore, to the treatment of the footballers contravening 
Articles 12,22 and 23 of the Declaration of Human Rights, this lack of 
a fair trial by an independent and impartial court was also in contra- 
vention of Articles 8 and 10 of that Declaration, as well as of the 
34. Revealed by examination of the archives of the RFEF, and quoted in 
Martin Arnoriaga, op. cit. p. 125. 
35. Revealed by examination of the archives of Atletico de Madrid, and 
Real Sociedad de San Sebastian. 
36. Author's interview with Juan Jose Tatono. 
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Franco regime's own Fuero de los espanoles which formally granted all 
workers the right to take their labour grievances to the special labour 
courts. 
The first footballer to complain about these unique working 
conditions was the highly intelligent Jose Cabrera Bazän, who on several 
occasions threatened a personal srike while playing for Jaen in the 
1950s. Upon retiring, he completed his legal studies, and then wrote El 
contrato de trabajo deportivo, which proved, among other things, that 
the contract of a professional was clearly a labour contract. 37 In the 
late 1970s, as shall be seen in the Epilogue to this thesis, Cabrera 
Bazän assisted in the foundation of the footballers' trade union, the 
Asociaciön de Futbolistas Espanoles. 
Cabrera Bazän, however, was a rare exception. For approximately 
thirty years, all of the other footballers remained silent, grateful to 
be doing the job they had dreamed of since childhood, and being 
relatively well-paid for doing it. The docility of the players in the 
1940s and 1950s reflected the docility of the Spanish workers in 
general. This situation gradually began to change in the 1960s, when 
certain sections of the workforce began to take up the struggle for 
better pay and working conditions, and for the right to form independent 
trade unions. This change in climate eventually reached the foot- 
ballers, despite, in the words of Jose Angel Iribar, "all the efforts of 
37. Jose Cabrera Bazan, El Contrato de trabajo deportivo, Madrid, 1961. 
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the clubs, the RFEF and the DND to isolate us players from the outside 
world". 39 
The first serious attempt to form a players'union was made in April 
1969, but was promptly abandoned in the face of the fierce hostility of 
the-clubs and the sporting authorities. As recounted by Manuel 
Velazquez: 
"The captains of all the first division teams planned to come 
together to discuss forming an association that would struggle to 
improve our-working conditions. The problems began when the Press 
found out. The RFEF President Jose Luis Costa denounced the idea, 
along with practically all of the club Presidents. Our President, 
Bernabeu, was particularly angry because our captain, "Pirri", and 
other player, Bernardo Grosso, had made statements in the Press 
in favour of this association. Bernabeu forced the the two of them 
to make humiliating public retractions of their earlier statements. 
That was very much the end of the matter. It was to take another 
ten years for the footballers finally to form their own trade 
union. "39 
This setback about forming a union, however, did not serve to 
silence all of the players. In June 1970, the Zaragoza centre-forward 
Marcelino Perez famous for his winning goal for Spain in the 1964 
Nations Cup final against the Soviet Union, demanded a transfer when his 
contract with the club ended, and complained more vociferously than any 
player had done before when this was refused him. The Zaragoza 
directors turned public opinion against the player by pointing out how 
high his salary was, and how it would be further increased by 10% in 
38. Author's interview with Jose Angel Iribar. 
39. Author's interview with Manuel Veläzquez. 
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order to retain him. 4° As pointed out by both Jose Angel Iribar 
and Manuel Velazquez, however, Marcelino's stance served as an 
encouragement for other players indignant about their treatment. 4' 
The Angolan-born forward Jose Mendon5a went one step further than 
Marcelino in March 1971. Mendonca was so upset by the treatment 
received from the club Mallorca, in terms of lack of payment and refusal 
of transfer, that he engaged the lawyer Eduardo Ajuria to fight his 
case. As a veteran, Mendonca had no fear of a possible RFEF ban 
resulting from his taking legal action aganist Mallorca and thus 
infringing the controversial Article 5 of the RFEF's statutes. Ajuria 
skilfully managed to bring the case to the Supreme Court in Madrid, 
where, in accordance with the thesis of Cabrera Bazän, 42 it was ruled 
that a labour contract existed between Mendonca and Mallorca, therefore 
compelling the club to make certain financial reparations. 
Ajuria was to enjoy similar success two years later with the case 
of Jose Maria Zubiarrain, the Atletico Madrid goalkeeper whose career, 
as seen above. was cut short by injuries sustained in action. He was 
infuriated by the club paying him a small amount of compensation and 
then cancelling his contract. Ajuria fought the case in the grounds 
40. The opinions of the Zaragoza directors about the Marcelino case are 
fully reproduced in Heraldo de Arao6n, El Mundo Deportivo, Marca, 
and As, from 17 June to 8 July 1970. The opinions of the player, 
himself, in contrast, were paid very little attention by the Press, 
being confined to a few lines in Heraldo de Aragon, 17,22,24 June 
and 6 July, and a similarly brief treatment in El Mundo Deportivo, 
17 and 24 June, and in As 17,22, June and 7 July 1970. 
41. Authý9 r 's interviews with Manuel Velazquez and Jose Anger Irtbar. 
42. Jose Cabrera Bazan, op. cit. 
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that the player's injury was obviously the result of a labour accident. 
The following statement of defence from the lawyer of Atletico, backed 
up by both the RFEF and the DND, perfectly illustrates the patronizing 
attitude of the Spanish clubs towards the footballers in Francoist' 
Spain: 
"It is absolutely inadmissible that a player who, as we all know, 
enjoys substantial payment, many paternalistic benefits, 
conscientious doctors of the first order, comfortably short working 
hours, and so many privileges, should try to seek the protection of 
the influence and benefits of a social security law created 
exclusively and logically for the genuine worker. "43 
This defence, however, proved to be ineffective. In December 1973, the 
Supreme Court passed a verdict in favour of Zubiarrain, condemning 
Atletico de Madrid for not having registered the player in the social 
security system. For the second time, the argument that a footballer 
was not a "genuine worker" had been dismissed in the Supreme Court. 
The two men most upset by the Zubiarrain verdict were Enrique de la 
Mata Gorostizaga and Jose Luis Perez Payä. The former was both Director 
General of Social Security and Vice-President of Atl'etico de Madrid, but 
nontheless still unable to prevent this personally humiliating verdict. 
Perez Paya was equally humiliated, because besides being the RFEF 
President implicated in the case he was also the Subdirector General of 
Social Security. 
Perez Payä skilfully prevented other indignant players from taking 
their grievances to court by promising to resolve completely the whole 
43. Revealed by examination of the archives of Atletico de Madrid, and 
quoted in Martin Arnoriaga, op. cit., p. 32. 
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issue of the nature of the footballers' contract and their possible 
affiliation to the social security system. In the same way as he had 
proved to be a docile players' representative on the executive 
committee of the RFEF, however, Perez Pays had done practically nothing 
about these issues by the time of his fall from power in July 1975. 
The obstructionism of Perez Paya was supported by the majority of 
the football clubs, despite, as seen in the Introduction to this thesis, 
their opposition to the continued prohibition of foreign players and the 
further ailings of the national team. In consequence, the many 
grievances of the Spanish footballers remained to be resolved after the 
death of Franco. As shall be seen in the Epilogue, the players were not 
to be immune from the general desire for change in Spanish society after 
1975. In the same way as the docility, obedience and political 
passivity of the players throughout the Franco period had reflected 
the situation of the workers in general, apart from the occasional wave 
of strikes, the spirit of solidarity and militancy among the footballers 
from 1975 onward reflected the increase in the general political 
consciousness of the majority of Spanish workers. This desire for 
change on the part of the players was described in the following way by 
Manuel Velazquez. 
"By the time of the death of Franco, we players were desperate f or 
a change in our working conditions. For far too many years we'd 
been treated like little children, especially here at Real Madrid. 
We were not allowed to form our own trade union, there was no 
social security protection for when you fell injured or retired, 
the club could hold on to you for as long as they wanted to, and 
you couldn't even resort to the law courts for justice. Such an 
unfair situation simply couldn't continue, and it was only to be 
expected that we footballers, like so many other groups and 
sections of Spanish society, would become militant during the 
transition from dictatorship to democracy. "44 
44. Author's interview with Manuel Velazquez. 
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CHAPTER SIX: FOOTBALL AND THE REFUGEES 
The fifth aspect of the politicization of football in Francoist Spain 
concerns the presence in Spain of various outstanding refugee players 
and coaches from Eastern Europe. 
The majority of these refugees had fled from Hungary as a , result of 
the failure of the October 1956 anti-Communist uprising, and were 
enthusiastically signed up by the leading Spanish clubs because of their 
immense playing and coaching reputations. As a result of the pre- 
dictable oppositions, -- these Spanish clubs encountered a whole range of 
obstacles when they attempted to ratify the registration of these 
refugee players with the Federation of International Football 
Associations (FIFA). Permission for them to play in Spain, however, was 
eventually conceded by FIFA. In addition, the East Europeans were all 
rapidly granted Spanish nationality under the special classification of 
"political exiles", which lead to the two most famous refugees, Ladislas 
Kubala and Ferenc Puskas, playing for the Spanish national team until 
1962. 
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These "golden refugees', as they were called by the Spanish Press, ' 
can be divided into the following three categories: Kubala and Ferdinand 
Daucik, the player and coach partnership that arrived in Spain in 1950 
at the head of a team of anti-Communist exiles from right across Eastern 
Europe; the world-famous Hungarian army team Honverd, which left 
Budapest after the defeat of the 1956 uprising; the Yugoslavia players 
and coaches who were prominent in Spanish football in the 1960s and 
1970s. 
It has been alleged that these footballing refugees were given 
every possible assistance to settle in Francoist Spain, in order for the 
Franco regime to convert them into "anti-Communist symbols" by using 
them to demonstrate both the harsh reality of Communism and the 
relatively liberal nature of Spain. 2 The objective of this chapter is 
to dicuss this allegation, and in-so doing evaluate the political 
significance of the presence of these reugees in Francoist Spain. 
Before commencing upon an examination of the political significance 
of the entry into Francoist Spain of Kubala and Daucik, it is necessary 
to establish the context of this chapter with a brief-discussion about 
East European exiles in other sports in Francoist Spain, and East 
European footballers in exile in other countries. There is extremely, 
little to discuss in both cases. 
1. This expression was first used to describe Kubala and Daucik in El 
Mundo Deportivo, 27 August 1950. 
2. This allegation has been made to the author in interviews with Juan 
Pablo Fusi, and Manuel Väzquez Montalbän, and in print by Vazquez 
Montalbän op. cit., p. 157. 
222 
Apart from the footballing refugees, the- only other East Europeans 
in Spanish sport during the Franco period were a handful of Yugoslavian 
basketball players in the early 1970s. Only one of this group, Milan 
Adamovic, who played for the Caja de Ronda club from January 1975 
onwards, after serving a worldwide two-year ban left without the 
permission of the Yugöslavian authourities. 3 The other players who 
signed for Spanish clubs, thus earning vital foreign exchange for their 
country, had this offical permission. 
There are extremely few examples of East European footballers 
seeking asylum in the West, apart from the Hungarians in Francoist 
Spain. A small number of East German players have stayed in West 
Germany over the years while on tour there. Apart from the present 
Bayern Munich defender Norbert Nachtweih, however, they have been 
mediocre players without an international reputation. As will be 
illustrated in the course of this chapter, the sporting authorities of 
every West European country apart from Francoist Spain were extremely 
cautious about taking in dissident East Europeans, because of fear of 
damaging sporting relations with the whole of the Eastern Block. 4 The 
Francoist authorities had no such fear because Spanish sporting 
relations with the East European countries were negligible, a reflection 
of the non-existence of diplomatic relations until after the death of 
Franco. 
3. For further details of the Adamovic affair, see Marca, 10 
February 1974 and As, 2 January 1975. 
4. In March 1967, for example, the French authorities were reluctant to 
offer asylum to four members of the Romanian Under-21 football team 
who attempted to defect in Lyon. For further details, see World 
Soccer, April 1967. 
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The passage of the player Kubala and the coach Daucik from East 
European to Spanish football should be regarded as a kind of prologue to 
the more famous and controversial case of the Honved team. Nevertheless, 
the story of the flight of Kubala in particular is remarkable and 
romantic, all of which assisted in his later conversion into an "anti- 
Communist symbol" in Francoist Spain. Born in Budapest in 1927, his 
prodigious talent earned him a Hungarian international debut at the age 
of only 17. After the death of his father in 1945, he followed his 
Czech mother to Prague, played for the Czech national team and married 
the daughter of Ferdinand Daucik, the coach of his club Spartak Prague. 
He returned to Budapest in July 1948, only to flee across the Austrian 
border in January'1948, accompanied by several friends, all disguised as 
Soviet soldiers. 
Kubala has always alluded to political events when explaining his 
decision to leave Hungary: 
"I decided to leave Hungary because of the Communist takeover, 
which was on the point of culmination just then. I couldn't bear 
the thought of living in a Hungary dominated by the Soviets. My 
father-in-law was organizing a team of anti-Communist East 
Europeans players, mostly Hungarians, and we all came together in 
Milan in March 1948. "5 
It must be taken into account, nonetheless, that professional 
football, which afforded Kubala a relatively lavish lifestyle at the age 
of 20, was about to be dissolved in Hungary in favour of a rigid amateur 
structure. The players would have to find other work and leave football 
5. Author's interview with Ladislas Kubala. 
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for evenings and weekends, a prospect which did not appeal to Kubala. 
The team of East Europeans, united in their anti-Communism and 
their desire to seek fame and fortune, was called "Hungaria" because of 
the preponderance of Hungarians. They toured Italy, Switzerland, the 
Low Countries and France during 1948 and 1949, playing exhibition 
matches twice a week and hoping to be signed up by a leading club. 
Juventus of Turin, Milan, Anderlecht of Brussels and Stade de Reims were 
all enthusiastic to sign up Kubala, the inspiration of the touring team, 
but were apparently dissuaded by the sporting authorities of their 
respective countries, who did not want to damage relations with the 
Eastern Bloc for the sake of one footballer. ' It was coach Daucik who 
took the decision, in the spring of 1950, -to move on to Spain, for the 
following motives: 
"Spain seemed a good country to tour at the time, even though it 
was still substantially poorer than the rest of Western Europe. 
There was clearly a huge passion for the game there, and I expected 
there to be a lot of interest in a team made up of various 
nationalities because Spain had been starved of international 
football contacts since the Civil War... As to the political side 
it did cross my mind beforehand that our being a team of anti- 
Communists would help us to fill the Spanish stadia, even more so 
than in Italy and France at the height of the Cold War. In 
addition, it seemed that the Spanish authorities would be more 
disposed to help their clubs sign on any of our players that caught 
the eye, and the purpose of our tour, after all, was to find us all 
clubs in Western Europe. "' 
It is difficult to assess to what extent the political significance 
of "Hungaria" contributed to their success in Francoist Spain. The 
6. This explanation for the breakdown of the negotiations was offered 
to the author by both Kubala and Daucik. 
7. Author's interview with Ferdinand Daucik. 
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media offered them an extremely warm welcome. For example, upon their 
entry into Spain through Hendayä in May 1950, Marca greeted them with 
the headline "Welcome, Brave Footballers of Freedom". 8 The stated 
radio station Radio Nacional de Espada immediately dubbed the visiting 
team "refugees from Communist terror", a label that was adopted by 
practically all other sections of the Spanish media. 9 In this way, an 
institution under the direct control of the Franco regime established 
the manner in which the team of exiles would be treated. 
With regard to actual offical assistance to "Hungaria", the 
Delegado Nacional de Deportes, General Jose Moscardö advised the RFEF 
to arrange a match between the visitors and the Spanish national team, 
preparing for the World Cup finals tournament in Brazil. 1° The RFEF 
actually organized two such matches, in which the media's flattery of 
the East Europeans reached its height. " Daucik had previously 
attempted to play against the national teams of Italy, Switzerland and 
France, but without success. 
"Hungaria" was wound up in July 1950, when the series of friendly 
matches had become a tedious, non-competitive grind. Most of the 
8. See Marca, 8 May 1950. 
9. Information revealed to the author by Matias Prats, the ultra- 
nationalist former football commenatator of State radio, television 
and NODO news reel. 
10. During examaniation of the archives of the RFEF, the author., 
discovered a letter from the DND, signed by General Moscardo May 13 
1950, to the RFEF President Armando Muäoz Calero, in which the 
latter was requested to organize a game between "our glorious 
national football team and anti-Communist footballers from East 
Europe, currently on tour in our country". 
11. For further details, see Marca, 21-26 May 1950. 
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players gave up their ambitions to be professional footballers, and left 
for France or Belgium, where they found other employment. Kubala, 
however, became the subject of another episode in the bitter "transfer 
war" between Real Madrid and FC Barcelona, and signed for the Catalan 
club in August 1950. The Barra general maneral Josep Samitier promised 
Kubala that the newly-elected Spanish representative on the FIFA 
executive committee, the Falangist doctor Armando Munoz Calero, would 
secure approval for the player's registration in Spain. 12 FC Barcelona 
also signed on the coach Daucik, who expressed his gratitude by 
declaring to the delighted Press that: 
"Spain is the land of freedom, for it has given us refugees from 
repression a new home and new hope. "13 
Daucik took charge of the Bam first team in January 1951, but 
Kubala had to wait for FIFA clearance to play in competitive matches. 
The matter was first debated at the FIFA executive meeting in December 
1950, held as usual in Zurich, As expected by the player himself, 14 the 
Hungarian demand that Kubala should be suspended worldwide until 
allowed to register with another club by his former club Vasas of 
Budapest, actually proposed by the Soviet representative, was accepted. 
If the Hungarian authorities had not opposed Kubala's registration 
with Barra, then the matter would certainly not have assumed the 
political significance that it did. In the event, however, the 
12. Revealed by author's interview with Ladislas Kubala 
13. Quoted in El Mundo Deportivo, 22 August 1950. 
14. Revealed by author's interview with Ladislas Kubala. 
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seemingly unjust suspension of Kubala, coupled with the frustration of 
Spanish football supporters at being denied the chance to see his 
supposedly phenomenal talents on display, caused the media to become 
indignant and aggressive. The player was presented to the Spanish 
-public, 
in the words of the ultra-nationalistic Radio Nacional 
commentator Matias Prats, as a "victim of Communist spite, a man 
unjustly prevented from freely carrying out his profession". t8 
Mainly because of this politically-motivated campaign by the 
Francoist media, the Spanish public followed the course of the next FIFA 
executive meeting, in March 1951, with substantial interest. 16 Munoz 
Calero skilfully used the rule that a federation must give good reason 
for persistently refusing the re-registration of a player in another 
country, and swung practically all of the non-Communists onto his side 
by evoking the picture of poor Kubala having played only trivial 
friendly matches for three years. In the vote that followed the 
impassioned debate, only the Soviet and Czechoslovakian representatives 
opposed Kubala's ratification as a Bar$a player. 17 
The Hungarian made his debut six weeks later in a cup match in 
Seville,. where he was offered a warm reception. He immediately 
transformed. Ba__r a into an unstoppable team, leading them to triumph in 
the cup with sixýgoals. 
15. Recalled to the author by Matias Prats, interview op. cit. 
16. The newspapers El Mundo Deportivo and Mar ca both sent a 
correspondent to Zurich, along with Matins Prats of Radio Nacional. 
17. For further details, see either Marca, or El Mundo Deportivo, 29 
March 1951. 
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By the time of the June 1951 cup final, both Kubala and Daucik were 
Spanish citizens. Their applications were processed in only three 
months because the Interior Minister Blas Perez Gonzalez placed them in 
the scarcely-used category "political refugees", the clearest 
demonstration possible ? hat the Franco regime was actively in -favour of 
these "golden refugees"-remaining in-Spain. 1e 
This granting of Spanish nationality, however, did not auto- 
matically qualify Kubala to play for the Spanish national team. The 
Hungarians, possibly conscious of the political significance that Kubala 
had acquired in Francoist Spain, were as resolutely opposed to him 
playing for the Spanish as they had been about his registering for 
Bam. It took Mufioz Calero until May 1953 to win over the majority of 
the FIFA executive committee on this issue, a delay which caused further 
media attacks against the East European attitude and, in consequence, an 
increase in the player's political significance. 19 It has actually been 
alleged that the RFEF was ordered by the Franco regime to request 
permission for Kubala's inclusion in the national team in order 
deliberately to augment this political significance. 20 The truth is, 
however, that Kubala had quickly proved to be more richly talented than 
18. The category of "political refugee" had previously been used to 
shelter, according to Edouard de Blaye, op. cit., pp. 203-204, "the 
entire world's stock of Fascist ex-dictators, right-wing extremists 
and collaborators on the run', such as the former Argentine dictator 
Juan Perrin, the Belgian Nazi leader Leon Degrelle and the in famous 
SS Colonel Otto Skorzeny. 
19. See, for example, Marca, 21 October 1952 and 5 March 1953. 
20. This was alleged to the author by both Juan Pablo Fusi and Manuel 
Vazquez Montalbän, even though no evidence has been uncovered to 
support this, for example, no letter from the Delegado Nacional 
General Moscardo to the RFEF President requesting Kubala's inclusion 
in the national team. 
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any native Spanish player, and for this reason it was generally hoped 
that he would transform the mediocre national team, 21 in which he made 
his debut in July 1953. 
The political significance of Kubala reached its peak with the 
release, in March 1954, of a highly romanticized film based on his 
eventful life, entitled Los ases buscan la paz ("The stars search for 
peace"). The climax of the film is Kubala's reunion in Barcelona with 
his Czech wife, after five years of separation (an event which actually 
took place in Milan in July 1952). The film itself should be regarded 
as the climax of the process of presenting Kubala to the Spanish public 
as an anti-Communist symbol. It has been alleged by various comment- 
ators that Los ases buscan la paz succeeded in demonstrating the-. 
21. This hope was expressed El Mundo Deportativo, 26 May 1953,1 July 
1953,4 July 1953, and in Marca, 3-4 July 1953. 
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harshness of Communism and the relatively liberal nature of Francoist 
Spain. 22 
1ý 
Kubala's political significance gradually diminished, partially 
because of being overshadowed from 1956 onwards by the Honved groups, 
and partially because of his own wild and irreponsible lifestyle, in 
contrast to the responsible family man portrayed in the film. 
This significance did occasionally reappear, however. In March 
1958, for example, Kubala was the subject of a tribute in Paris by his 
fellow anti-Communist Hungarian exiles, on the occasion of a France v. 
22. This has been alleged to the author in interviews with'the 
following: Juan Pablo Fusi; Manuel Vizquez Montalbän, the veteran 
El Mundo Deportivo editor Juan Jose Castillo, Alex J. Botines, the 
late Dicen columnist, and Miguel Vidal, the As journalist. In 
addition, the political significance of this film has twice been 
discussed in print, the first time. In Vazquez Montalban, op. cit., 
p. 157: 
"The young visible leader of a team of fugitive Hungarian 
(sic) footballers from the "Red Terror", Kubala had the 
features of a political symbol, which if not cultivated too 
much at the beginning, later exploded with generosity in that 
ineffable film titled Los ases buscan la paz. " 
The second occasion occured when Barrabas, (Barcelona), No. 237,19 
April 1977, attempted to explain why the true Kubala story had been 
altered in the film: 
"The cinematographic plot, however, has, as usually happens in 
these cases, a large dose of fantasy. A logical political and 
social moment in which Spain was living, thus there was 
interest in showing a popular hero, with the characteristics 
of an idol, so that he could colaborate in the fierce anti- 
Communist Propaganda. 
The figure of a beloved and admired footballer, for 
example, would influence the spirit of not a few spectators and 
supporters. " 
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Spain friendly international match. 23 In August 1961, at Kubala's 
testimonial game in the Camp Nou the Hungarian became the 
first footballer to receive the Medalla de Oro al Merito Deportivo, from 
the DND, an award which caused suspicion that the Franco regime was 
showing its gratitude to Kubala for having served as such a potent anti- 
Communist symbol. 24 In December 1961, the Spanish media 
enthusiastically covered Kubala's reunion with his mother, described for 
the NODO news reel, compulsorily shown before every cinema programme in 
Francoist Spain, by commentator Mat(as Prats as "the end of fourteen 
years of cruel separation caused by Communist tyranny. 2 
In the years 1956-1958, the Kubala-Daucik story effectively 
repeated itself. In the same way as the aforementioned pair had done 
six years earlier, the Honved group arrived in Spain to popular acclaim, 
played a series of friendlies, were signed up by the top clubs, were 
portrayed as anti-Communist symbols by the media, were rapidly granted 
Spanish nationality, and received all the official help possible to 
obtain FIFA clearance to play for their new clubs and the Spanish 
national team. 
The Hungarian Uprising of October 1956 was, by its very nature of 
being a nationalistic, anti-Communist and largely Catholic insurrection, 
23. This homage was decribed, in Marca 11 March 1958, as "the tribute of 
patriots liberated from Communist oppression to Ladislas 
Kubala, a brilliant example of a courage and thirst for liberty 
for Hungarians on both sides of the Iron Curtain". 
24. This suspension has been expressed in Vazquez Montalbän, op. cit., 
p. 158, and in Barrabäs, op. cit. 
25. Revealed by Mattas Prats to the author. 
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hugely popular in Francoist Spain. 26 The insurgents were 
enthusiastically praised in the Press, while the attitude of the Franco 
regime is revealed by the anti-Soviet rhetoric of the Spanish delegate 
at the United Nations. 
This official attitude is further demonstrated by the Spanish 
boycott of the Olympic Games held in Melbourne in November and December 
1956. The Franco regime desperately wanted to show to the world its 
rejection of the Soviet invasion of Hungary, and was forced to do so by 
means of international sport because of the non-existence of its 
diplomatic relations with the Eastern Bloc. It has been alleged that 
the Franco regime hoped to impress the United States with this boycott 
and the strong anti-Communist rhetoric that acoompanied it. 27 The 
decision to withdraw was taken by Franco's cabinet on 6 November. It 
was the task of the new Delegado Nacional de Deportes Jose Antonio 
Elola Olaso, only six months in the post, simply to offer the following 
verbose explanation: - 
"By taking this decision, we believe that we are interpreting the 
feelings of the Spanish people, who could not agree to participate 
in the Olympics in circumstances like the present ones, in which 
26. Every Spanish newspaper of 29 October 1956 carried the following 
comments of Franco about the Hungarian situation: 
"The countries that have known freedom and a better life cannot 
conform with living miserably beneath the tyranny and terror of 
Soviet Communism. There comes a moment when there is nothing 
to lose and in which death itself constitutes a liberation. 
They will be able to chain the bodies, but they will be able to 
subjugate the conscience. What has happened in one country and 
another was, for me, expected for a long time. I always 
considered the biggest weakness of Russia to be the impossible 
digestion of the occupied countries. " 
27. This allegation was made to the author by Juan Pablo Fusi, Manuel 
Vazquez Montalbän, and the Catalan sociologist Joan Josep Artells. 
233 
the dignity and independence of sovereign countries are being 
trampled on, and which culminates in the sanguinary invasion of 
Hungary, decreed by the Communist Internationale, which reminds us 
so much of that which they attempted twenty years ago in our 
homeland... "28 
It should come as no surprise, in the light of this boycott, that 
the Francoist authorities were soon giving all possible assistance for 
the Honved group to settle in Spain. The chain of events which 
culminated in the Honved players and coaches remaining in Spain began in 
September 1956, when the Hungarian army team was drawn to play against 
Athletic de Bilbao in the European Cup. It is safe to assume, however, 
that even without this draw the Honved group would have ended up in 
I Francoist Spain because, as admitted by the famous forward Sgndor 
Kocsis, 29 they were well aware of the success story of compatriot 
Kubala, of how only Spain had been willing to give him citizenship and 
pursue his case with FIFA. 
The Honved team had a clearer political significance than Kubala 
because they were the team of the Hungarian army, certain regiments of 
which fought against Soviet troops. Seven of the team joined in the 
fighting, and indeed it was erroneously reported by the world Press on 
30 October that the famous Honved captain Ferenc Puskas had 
actually been killed in the conflict. 30 
28. This explanation was reproduced in practically every Spanish 
newspaper of 7 November 1956. 
29. Revealed by author's interview with Sandor Kocsis. 
30. See, for example, any of the London newspapers of 30 October 1956. 
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Although the match with Athletic de Bilbao was not scheduled until 
22 November, the Honved party left Budapaest twenty days earlier, when 
it was obvious that the rising had failed, and just before the Soviets 
closed the frontier with Austria. The plans of the club secretary Emil 
Ostereicher were to play friendly matches across Western Europe, 
capitalizing on both the team's immense overseas reputation and 
political significance, then travel on to Bilbao, and afterwards, 
hopefully, join Spanish clubs. 
As soon as news of Honved's arrived in Vienna reached Spain, FC 
Barcelona secretary Samitier left for the Austrian capital with the 
intention of signing up Puskas, Rocsis and Zoltan Czibor, the three 
stars of the team, before Real Madrid had acted. On arriving in Vienna, 
however, Samitier discovered that Puskas, along with Ostereicher, had 
already agreed to join Real after a telephone conversation with Santiago 
Bernabeu. The Catalan had to content himself with precontracts signed 
by Kocsis, Czibor and the centre-forward Andras Kazsas. 31 In 
addition, the Espahol club of Barcelona agreed by telephone to engage 
the coach Jenoe Kalmar. Thus by the time that Honved left Vienna for 
friendlies in West Germany, six out the party of 19 were effectively 
resigned to exiling themselves from Hungary and settling down in 
Francoist Spain. 
The political alignment of Honved was made even more clear by a 
31. According to Sandor Kocsis, this pre-contract, accompanied by 200 
US dollars, stipulatd that the three players would sign for no other 
non-Hungarian club but Barca. 
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moving speech by Ostereicher, invited to intervene in the French- 
National assembly's debate on t'e Hungarian situation on 7 November. 
Ostereicher finished in this way: 
"We wanted to leave behind a free Hungary. Unfortunately, this . 
could not be, but we believe that Hungarian blood has not been shed 
in vain, and that our country will one day become a free country 
again, like France. "32 
Partially because of the advance Press coverage, featuring this 
speech by Ostereicher, Honved were granted an emotional reception when 
they ran out to play Athletic de Bilbao. On the field before the match, 
the Bilbao club's chaplain offered a homage to the fallen Hungarian 
insurgents. 33 Upon arriving in the capital two day's later for an 
exhibition match against a Combined Madrid XI, the media coverage 
became intense. As had been the case earlier with Kubala, the Honved 
party were depicted as victims of Soviet repression who only wanted to 
exercise their profession in a free country. 34 The importance of money 
in the decision of the Hungarians to remain did not enter into the media 
treatment. 
It has frequently been alleged that the size of the crowd for the 
game with the Combined Madrid XI, a capacity 110,000 in the Estadio 
Bernabeu, unprecedented for a friendly match, was influenced by this 
N 
32. Quoted in Arriba, 17 November 1956. 
33. For further details, see any of the Madrid newspapers of 23 November 
1956. 
34. See, for e; ample, Arriba and ABC, 25-30 November 1956, 
especially Arriba, 29 November 1956. 
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I 
politically-moti-vated media coverage. 35 Four of Franco's ministers 
were present at the game, which also began with a religious homage: 
Captain Luis Carrero Blanco, General Agustin Mufioz, Grandes, General 
Camilo Alonso Vega and Rafael Cavestany. 
After being received by most of the Catalan Press and Kubala in 
- Barcelona, the Honved party, six of whom planned to return and remain in 
Spain, left to tour Italy and South America in December 1956. In their 
absence, Doctor Munoz Calero, encouraged by the DND, 36 attempted to 
ratify their registrations with the Spanish clubs at the FIFA executive 
committee. ' As had been the case with Kubala, the Spanish media followed 
these attempts passionately, indignant about the united East European 
intransigence. 37 Even the compromise solution of a year's worldwide ban 
35. This was alleged to the author by Miguel Vidal, interview op. cit., 
and the veteran ABC football correspondent Enrique Gil de la Vega 
"Gilera". 
36. A letter was discovered by the author in the archives of the RFEF, 
from the Delegado Nacional Elola Olaso to the RFEF President Alfonso 
de la Fuente Chaos, dated 4 January 1957, requesting the latter to 
direct Munoz Calero to arrange with FIFA the registration in Spain 
of the four Honved players, "with the same enthusiam and diligence 
as was displayed with regard to the player Ladislao (sic) Kubala of 
Club de Fütbol Barcelona". 
37. The Spanish sports newspapers and Radio Nacional sent correspondents 
to the FIFA executive meetings in Zurich in both March and July 
1957. A good'example of this indignation at the-East European 
intransigence can be found by Enrique Fernandez in Barca, No. 64,7 
March 1957: 
"The world sporting outcry is unanimous that the rights and 
sentiments of humanity triumph over the cold legality of some 
clauses, invoked by those who are accustomed to forget them 
when it suits them. The causes which motivated this "absence" 
from their homeland and their reluctance to return should not 
be undervalued. " 
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-on-the four players, accepted in July 1957, did not satisfy the Press. 3° 
Accordingly, Puskas and colleagues had to confine themselves to 
further friendly matches for a year, during which time the Spanish 
media's attention on them continued. Kalmar and Ostereicher, in 
contrast, had begun work at Espafiol and Real'Madrid respectively in 
March 1957. It was in this month that all six of the Hungarians applied 
for Spanish nationality, which was granted by the Ministry of the 
Interior, with the same swiftness as with the Kuba]q application, in 
August 1957. 
It was originally thought that there was no need to obtain FIFA 
clearance for the four former Honved players to be included in the 
Spanish nationl team because they were all in the veteran stage of their 
careers. Puskas's performances for Real Madrid, however, inspiring them 
to two further European Cups, were outstanding, and Munoz Calero 
therefore made the request to the FIFA executive in March 1960. The 
East Europeans were once again adamant in their opposition to the 
Spanish proposal, because Puskas, unlike Kubala before him, was the 
world-famous former captain of the strongest ever Hungarian national 
team. Permission for him to line up for Spain, however, was granted at 
0 
38. The Spanish Press generally regarded the one-year ban as a 
malevolent attempt to prove that the Honved group had committed some 
wrong and so needed to be punished. The strongest rhetoric again 
come from Barca, in edition No. 85,1 August 1957: 
"The measure of FIFA, taken because of the pressuring of the 
Hungarian federation, does not constitute a simple footballing 
sanction, but rather an inhuman ruling, at odds with the most 
elemental norms of human rights, and with the respect owing to 
the people who fled from the "Red Terror" in the tragic events 
of last winter in Budapest. " 
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Munoz Calero's third time of asking, in November 1960.39 Puskas 
consequently was able to play for the Spanish national team in the 1962 
World Cup finals tournament in Chile. 
The third group of East Europeans to play in Francoist Spain was a 
collection of 1goslavs. Their political significance, however, in 
contrast to that of the Hungarians, was generally minimal. The majority 
of these Yugoslavs left their homeland with the approval of the 
authorities, for having both played in twenty international matches and 
having reached the age of 28. In 1975, there were seven such veteran 
Yugoslavs playing in the Spanish first division, in addition to the 
outstanding coach Milan Miljanic being in command at Real Madrid. 
The only one of these Yugoslavs who settled in Francoist Spain with 
any clear political signigicance was Ljubisa Brocic, the coach of FC 
Barcelona during season 1960/1961, a man who had illegaly left his own 
country. He arrived in Spain in February 1960, and by May of that year 
was a Spanish citizen, the Spanish Ministry of the Interior 
having followed the precedents established with the Hungarians and 
considered him a "political refugee". In October 1960, he was unable to 
accompany his Bar a team to Zagreb for a European Fairs Cup match, an 
event the political significance of which was fully capitalized upon 
by the Spanish media. 4° 
39. For further details of this FIFA executive meeting, see Marca, 2 
November 1960. 
40. Marca, 14 October 1960, for example described Brocic's enforced 
absence from the Zagreb match as "a disgrace, another Communist 
assault against a man who has already suffered far to many". 
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It is now appropriate to draw conclusions about the political 
significance of the presence in Francoist Spain of these "golden 
refugees" from Eastern Europe. To begin with, it must be affirmed that 
these dissident players and coaches were given all possible official 
assistance to settle in Francoist Spain, assistance that would certainly 
not have been offered by any other Western European country. 41 
This assistance falls into two categories: firstly, a successful 
campaign but painstakingly organized by the DND to obtain FIFA clearance 
for these footballing refugees to. register with the leading Spanish 
clubs and to play for the Spanish national team, in the face of 
determined East European opposition: secondly, the swift granting of. 
Spanish nationality for all of these refugees, who did not have to 
fulfill the usual strict requirements of either ten years' residence or 
Spanish parentage because of being classified as "political exiles". 
In addition to these two pieces of concrete assistance from the 
Franco regime to the "golden refugees", the extremely sympathetic media 
treatment of the East Europeans, which contributed towards their 
decision to settle in Spain, 42 was largely due to the regime 's latent 
anti-Communism. A considerable section of this media, for example 
national radio, television and the NODO news reels, was under the 
direct control of the Ministry of Information and tourism, while the 
41. Reknowned international football writers such as Keir Radnedge, 
editor of World Soccer, Brian Glanville, sports editor of The Sunday 
' Times, and Jaques Ferran, editor of L'Eauipe, have all alleged to 
the author that no other Western European country would have risked 
severely damaging its sporting relations with the Eastern bloc 
countries by taking in these Hungarian refugee players. 
42. Both Ladislas Kubala and Sandor Kocsis, made this claim to the 
author. % 
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independent section largely shared the Franco regime's interpretation of 
events. 
The benefits obtained by the Franco regime through offering every 
possible assistance to these footballing refugees to settle in Spain 
were many. In the first place, they offered the regime the opportunity 
to demonstrate, in a domestic context, the liberal nature of Francoist 
Spain in comparison with the Communist countries. It is extremely 
difficult, however, to support this statement with concrete evidence. 
It is evidence of a kind, nonetheless, that this statement has widely 
been held as true, both inside and outside Spain, and it has practically 
never been alleged that the portrayal by the Spanish media of these 
refugees as "anti-Communist symbols", particularly in the hugely popular 
film Los ases buscan la paz, affirmed for many football supporters the 
Franco regime's perpetual message that the quality of life in their 
Spain was far superior to that behind the Iron curtain. 43 
In addition to this domestic advantage for the Franco regime, it 
has also been alleged that the presence of these East European players 
in the Spanish club sides and national team had the international effect 
of making Francoist Spain appear, perhaps surprisingly, a tolerant and 
sympathetic country to many foreigners who had previously regarded it as 
the last bastion of Fascism. 44 Spain had been the only Western European 
43. This allegation was made to the author by Juan Pablo Fusi and Manuel 
Vazquez Montalbän. the latter comparing the political message of the 
film with that offered on his nightly national radio programme by 
the virulently anti-Communist priest Venancio Marcos. 
44. This was alleged to the author by the international football 
journalist Keir Ra: daedge, Brian Glanville and Jaques Ferran. 
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country, after all, prepared to take in these poor refugees, give them a 
new home, an identity, and then allow them to practise their profession 
in full personal liberty. 
It is further alleged that the Franco regime benefited in a third 
way from the presence of these "anti-Communist symbols". as seen in 
Chapter Three of this thesis, players such as Kubala and Puskas to the 
Spanish league contributed towards football being in a position to serve 
the regime as a political soporific. 45 It is certainly true that 
football crowds substantially increased in the 1950s. 4' 
This rise, however, can be attributed-to a variety of factors, for 
example the increase in real wages or the presence in Spanish football 
of leading South American players like Alfredo Di Stefano and Jose 
Santamaria of Real Madrid, making it practically impossible to evaluate 
how important a factor in this increase the entry onto the scene of the 
East Europens really was. The claim has frequently been made that the 
crowd-pulling potential of Kubala obliged FC Barcelona to construct the 
45. Juan Pablo Fusi, Manuel Vazquez Montalban, Juan Josep Artells and 
Alex J. Botines, this allegation to the author, claiming that Kubala 
and Puskas in particular had a greater crowd-pulling capacity than 
any individual Spanish player. 
46. Exact football attendance figures such as are recorded in. Britain. 
and elsewhere have simply never existed in Spain, due to the 
membership system emplyed by all Spanish clubs. Members are 
entitled to see every home match, and so no exact count of how many 
members take their seats is maintained, only of how many non-members 
buy tickets on the day. Consequently, crowd figures are all 
estimated, and differ from newspaper to newpaper. Juan Jose 
Castillo, interview op. cit., estimated to the author that first 
division football crows increased by approximately 40% during the 
1950s, while Enrique Gil de la Vega "Gilera" offered a more 
conservative estimate of 30-35%. 
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gigantic Camp Nou stadium in 1957,47 ignoring the fact that Barca had 
been considering such a development long before Kubala's arrival, since 
Real Madrid gained worldwide prominence in 1948 with the unveiling'of 
the impressive Estadio Bernabeu. 48 Indeed, it could even be argued that 
Spaniards Luis Suarez and Cesar Rodriguez, along with South Americans 
Eugenio Martinez and Ramön Villaverde, were just as potent attractions 
for the Catalan public in the 1950s as Kubala. 
No matter to what extent Kubala and his compatriots contributed to 
. 'football being able to serve as a political soporific, there is 
absolutely no evidence to prove that this was one of the objectives in 
the Franco regime's policy of offering them. every possible assistance to 
remain in Spain. There is, however, practically no concrete evidence 
whatsoever that sheds light on the objectives of the regime in this 
respect. Given the extremely limited evidence of official attitudes to 
the East Europeans that is available, the most incisive conclusion that 
can be reached is that the Franco regime did everything in its power to 
facilitate the settlement of the East European players and coaches in 
Spain, without, perhaps for obvious reasons with regard to the political 
soporific factor, explicitly expressing its objectives. There is no 
doubt that the Franco regime was pleased with the overall impact in 
47. This claim has been made in El Mundo Deportivo, 11 April 1955,28 
February 1957,10 November 1966,23 November 1969, in Dice n, 9 
October 1967 and 14 June 1975, as well as in several unofficial 
histories of the club, for example CF Barcelona by Antonio Hernäez 
and Jose Luis Marco, Barcelona, 1974, p. 78. 
48. This is evidenced by an interview in El Mundo Deportivo, 22 February 
1948 in which the then Bar ca President Agusti Montal was quoted as 
saying that "our club has begun seriously to consider the 
possibility of constructing a larger stadium, in the light of the 
highly successful and imaginative project of Real Madrid". 
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Spain of the footballing refugees. This contentment was demonstrated by 
General Agustin Munoz Grandes after having witnessed, in December 1960 
at FC Barcelona's Camp Nou a thrilling match won 5-3 by Real Madrid, for 
whom Puskas scored four goals, while two of the Ba rs a scorers were 
Kubala and Kocsis: 
"Today's game illustrated for me once again the correctness of our 
decision to offer refuge to these victims of Communist repression. 
I'm convinced that only in a free country like ours can they fully 
express all of their remarkable talents. "49 
This contentment was certainly not unilateral.. All of the East European 
regularly'expressed their gratitude towards Francoist Spain for having 
offered them a new life. 50 In addition, Puskas demonstrated his own 
personal gratitude by enthusiastically collaborating, along with other 
famous sportsmen such as tennis star Manuel Santana and boxer Jose 
Legrä, in the Ministry of Information and Tourism's campaign for a "yes" 
vote in the December 1966 referendum on the Organic Law of the State. 61 
49. Quoted in Marca, 5 December 1960. 
50. See, for example, the interview with Ladislas Kubala in El Mundo 
Deportivo, 7 February 1951,4 March 1953,12 November 1957,8 
February 1961 and 29 September 1961, with Ferdinand Daucik in 
El Mundo Deportivo, 26 January 1951 and in Marca, 20 December 
1965, with Zoltan Czibor in El Mundo Deportivo, 2 February 1957 and 
in Barca, No. 118, March 21 1958, with Ferenc Puskas in Marca, 10 
October 1957 and 27 September 1963, and with Sandor Kocsis in 
El Mundo Deportivo, 19 October 1958. 
51. Brief interview in which famous sportsmen, including Real Madrid 
stars Francisco Gento and Amancio Amaro, recommended a "yes" vote in 
the referendum appeared in Marca, every day during the ten days 
prior to the actual voting. The advice of Puskas appeared on two 
occasions, on 6 December and 12 December 1966. In addition, the 
former Honved captain appeared on a specially arranged television 
programme, on 11 December 1966, in which various personalities, 
including the Francoist writer Fernando Vizcaino Casas, requested 
the Spanish people to demonstrate their support for the dictator in 
the referendum. For further details about the collaboration of 
Puskas and other sportsmen in the campaign of the Ministry of 
Information and Tourism, see "Deporte, sociedad y poll ica", 
Cuadernos para el diälogo, No. XXV extraordinary, May 1971. 
243A 
CHAPTER SEVEN: FOOTBALL AND DIPLOMACY 
The diplomatic importance of Spanish football constitutes the sixth 
aspect of the politicization of the game during the Franco years. 
Together with the political diversion aspect and football's regionalist 
importance, this is one of the three aspects of politicization that has 
enjoyed a certain amount of critical treatment, albeit in a journalistic 
and anecdotal rather than systematic manner. ' The generally accepted 
theory that has emerged from this critical treatment is that football 
considerably helped the Franco regime to improve both its poor general 
overseas image and diplomatic position. 
The specific diplomatic significance of the Real Madrid club during 
the Franco period was discussed in the Introduction to this thesis, with 
the conclusion that Real had been both willing and proud to serve as one 
of the most effective ambassadors for Francoist Spain. That brief 
1. Juliaä Garcia Candau has been the writer most concerned about the 
diplomatic significance of Spanish football. His allegations about 
the manipulation of Real Madrid by Foreign Minister Fernando Maria 
Castiella, made mainly in his El Pais Semanal article, op. cit., and 
his book, op. cit., caused a great deal of controversy at the time 
of publication, partly because of the lack of evidence that he 
offers to support the claims. The subject had earlier been treated 
briefly and humourously by Manuel Vazquez Montalba"n, in Politica y 
deporte, op. cit., and by Francisco Cerecedo, op. cit. 
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discussion in the Introduction was concerned with the Real's diplomatic 
importance with the specific objective of contributing towards an 
outline of that club's general political significance during the Franco 
years. The objective of this chapter, on the other hand, is to examine 
in detail how, and to what effect, football helped to improve the 
overseas image and diplomatic position of Francoist Spain. 
It should be pointed out at this stage that two quite different 
concepts will be under examination in. this chapter. These concepts have 
invariably been discussed together by the small group of writers who 
have dealt with the subject, either for the sake of convenience, or 
because of an inability to recognize any distinction between the two. 2 
It is one thing to suggest that the style and success of a football team 
like Real Madrid of the 1950s and 1960s helped to improve the 
international image of Francoist Spain to an unquantifiable extent. 3 
It is quite another thing, however, to progress to the claim that such a 
team actually contributed to the establishment or strengthening of concrete 
2. These two concepts have failed to be differentiated in all four of 
the studies mentioned above. 
3. This has been suggested in all four of the studies mentioned above, 
and also in the author's interviews with, for example, the former 
Real Madrid footballer Manuel Velazquez, with the veteran Marca 
journalist Rodolfo Belarmino "Belarmo" and Jose Maria Lorente, and 
with Juan Jose Castillo, the veteran editor of El Mundo Deportivo. 
Furthermore, it was alleged by the former and present Real Madrid 
Vice-President Raimundo Saporta that the club considerably 
contributed towards improving the overseas image of Francoist Spain, 
"but in the service of Spain in general rather than that of the 
Franco regime in particular. Real Madrid would have behaved in 
the same way, and indeed still does, in order to have increased 
the prestige of our country abroad whatever government had been 
in power. That is the style of our club, and hopefully always 
will be. " 
245 
diplomatic relations with any particular country. 4 As shall presently 
be seen, there exists a veritable wealth of evidence to support the 
first of these allegations, but practically none for the second. 
It is appropriate at this stage to place the diplomatic 
significance of football in Francoist Spain in its worldwide historical 
context. The potential of sport generally to improve the image of a 
country in the eyes of the outside world has been recognized since, 
approximately, the Second World War. There have traditionally been two 
major ways for a country to improve its international image through 
sport; the Olympic Games and the football World Cup, both in the form of 
month-long tournaments held every four years. 
There can be little doubt that, because of the immense worldwide 
media coverage of the Olympic Games, the feats of the Soviet gymnasts, 
of the East German Swimmers and of the Black African runners have served 
to improve, to an unquantifiable extent, the overseas image of these 
countries. The World Cup has served a similar function. The spectacular 
Brazilian triumph of 1958 and 1962, for example, consider=ably helped to 
enhance the international image of that enigmatic country, perhaps even 
increasing foreign tourism. 
There is a qualitative difference, however, between the diplomatic 
significance of Brazil's World Cup victories of 1958 and 1962 and that 
4. This claim has only been made to the author, tentatively by Julian 
Garcia Candau, with regard to relations between Spain and the 
Eastern Bloc countries. 
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of 1970. The latter triumph was systematically exploited by the 
military 'uff nta led by General Medici, with the objectives of improving 
the overseas image of the military dictatorship, of strengthening 
diplomatic links with certain countries, of assisting the campaign to 
attract foreign tourists, and even of boosting Brazilian exports. 5 
The advantage derived from the 1978 World Cup triumph for the 
Argentine regime of General Videla appear to have been even more 
substantial than those for the Medici junta in Brazil. In the wake of 
the 1976 military takeover, it seemed unlikely that the country would be 
able to stage the prestigious tournament awarded to Argentina back in 
1972, because the preparations were so far behind schedule. The 
military 'uff nta led by Videla, however, realized both the international 
and domestic advantage that could be obtained from successfully staging 
the tournament, and consequently dedicated practically unlimited 
resources to the preparations, which were speeded up by cutting corners 
that would have been impossible for a democratic government to cut. 6 
Just before the tournament, there was a debate in Western Europe about 
how the staging of the World Cup could serve the Videla regime by 
distracting attention away from the "Dirty War" then being fought 
5. The exploitation of the 1970 Brazil World Cup triumph by the Medici 
regime is fully discussed: by the American sociologist Janet Lever 
op. cit., in World Soccer, April 1973; in Barrabas No. 176,4 
February 1976; and in Don Balön, No. 106,20 October 1977. 
6. For details of the Vidal regime's preparations and hopes for the 
1978 World Cup, see articles in: L'Eauipe, 15 November 1977: World 
Soccer; April 1978; Don Balön, No. 134,19 May 1978; As, 26 May 
1978; El Mundo Deportivo, 28 May 1978; La Naciön, 25 November 1983; 
the book uF tbol sin trampa, Buenos Aires, 1985, by the former 
Argentine manager Cesar Luis Menotti. 
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against all opponent of the dictatorship.? In April 1978, just two 
months before the actual tournament, it even appeared that the Dutch and 
Swedish teams might refuse to compete, because of the human rights 
issue. In the event, all of the countries attended, and practically all 
of the foreign visitors were surprised to discover hardly any trace of 
the military repression. e Furthermore, jhe hospitality of the Argentine 
people was exemplary, and the young Argentine team won the tournament 
playing attractive, attacking football, instead of using violent and 
negative play as on so many occasions in the past. As a consequence of 
all of the above, the international image of Videla's Argentina improved 
immeasurably. Since 1978, it has been alleged on various occasions that 
the Argentine military 'uff nta'bribed the Peruvian team to allow Argentina 
to defeat them by a remarkable 6-0 scorline, and so progress to the 
World Cup Final instead of Brazil. 9 At the time, however, these 
allegations were confined to the Brazilian media, whilst the watching 
world applauded the spectacular Argentine success. 
It has been alleged that the Uruguay military dictates invented and 
staged the Mundialito or "Little World Cup" tournament of December 1980 
and January 1981 between former World Cup winners in order to extract 
7. For details of this debate, see all the newspaper and magazine 
articles mentioned above. 
8. This surprise was shared by Ladislas Kubala, the manager of the 
Spanish national team in 1978, and by the following journalists who 
attended the tournaments: Keir Radnedge of World Soccer, Brian 
Glanville of The Sunday Times, David Lacey of The Guardian Jaques 
Ferran of L'Eguipe, Juan Jose Castillo of El Mundo Deportivo and 
Miguel Vidal of As. 
9. Outside Brazil, this allegation has been debated in many newspaper 
and magazine articles, the most comprehensive appearing in: World 
Soccer, November 1983, El Mercurio, (Santiago de Chile) 13 June 
1985; The Sunday Times, 22 June 1986; El Pais, 31 July 1987. 
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the same kind of domestic and international advantages as their 
Brazilian and Argentine counterparts had done previously. '0 Like the 
Argentine three years earlier, the Uruguay team dropped their tradition- 
al defensive pattern, won the tournament,, -and thus presented the 
military regime with a considerable amount of much needed international 
prestige. 
As shall presently be seen, the Spanish national football team did 
not regularly provide the Franco regime with the opportunity to enhance 
its international image in the style of the South American military 
dictatorships, for the simple reason that it achieved very few successes 
during the Franco years. Partly because of this lack of consistent 
success on the part of the national team, the Franco regime was keen to 
extract the maximum diplomatic advantages possible from the inter- 
national triumphs of the country's leading club team, Real Madrid. 
There are many other examples of military dictatorships systematically 
using the international successes of their leading club team in order to 
improve their overseas image. Indeed, it has been alleged that the , 
actual methods of the Franco regime in this respect have been copied by 
certain South American dictatorships. " 
One of the clearest examples of this kind of utilization is that of 
10. 
_For 
details of these allegations, see the following: World Soccer, 
January 1981; Sport, 4 January 1981; As, 6 January 1981; La Naci6n, 
9- 25 November 1983. 
11. This allegation has been most fully discussed in: Jan et Lever, 
op. cit., As, 6 January 1981; La Nacion, 9-25 November 1983. This 
claim has also been made to the author by the following 
interviewees: Juliän Garcia Gandau, Miguel Vidal, Juan Jose 
Castillo, Manuel Vazquez Montalban. 
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the Olympia club of Asuncion, which has apparently served since the 
1960s as the international flagship of the Stroessner regime in 
Paraguay. In the same way as Franco and the majority of his ministers 
were Real Madrid supporters, Stroessner and the other members of his 
'uff nta have always been partisans of Olympia, whose players comported 
themselves in an exemplary manner when playing abroad, always running 
out, for example, carrying both the Paraguayan national flag together 
with that of the host country. Olympia's ambassadorial services to the 
Stroessner regime reached the peak of their effectiveness in the wake of 
their surprising and spectacular October 1979 triumph in the Copa de los 
Libertadores, the South American annual club championship. 12 
The most important Brazilian club in this respect was Santos, the 
club of Pelt, the world's most famous player in the 1960s and 1970s. 
During these two decades, Santos travelled to all parts of the world, 
making friends for a military-governed Brazil with their attractive and 
spectacular play. However, Pele did not confine his controversial 
comment about Brazil not being ready for a return to democracy to the 
domestic stage. On three occasions, in Rome in 1969, in. Mexico in 1970 
and in Buenos Aires in 1972, he delighted the Brazilian military 
dictatorships by claiming that democracy had caused many problems for 
his country, and that an extended period of military rule was a possible 
solution to these problems. 13 
12. See, for example: World Soccer, April 1980; Sport; 7 November 1980; 
La Naciön, 9-25 November 1983. 
13. For details of Pele's declarations, see the following: Janet Lever, 
op. cit., World Soccer, November 1969 and May 1972; Goal, 7 May 
1972. 
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It has been alleged that the Argentine military authorities gave 
specific instructions about how to behave when playing abroad to the 
powerful River Plate club, the favourite of the Buenos Aires middle 
classes, in opposition to the more popular Boca Juniors, generally 
considered to be the club of the city's lower classes, especially the 
Italian immigrants. '' Despite the huge spending by River Plate on 
leading Argentine and-foreign players, however, the club never managed 
to please the military juntas by winning the Copa de los Libertadores. 
Boca Juniors, in contrast, managed to pick up that prestigious trophy in 
1977 and 1978, and on both occasions the victory celebrations were the 
catalyst for furtive anti-regime demostrations. Furthermore, these Boca 
triumphs gave extremely little international prestige to the Videla 
'uff nta because the team played with a pragmatic defensive style and was 
often accused of systematically employing violent tactics in order to 
control the opposing star players. '5 
This utilization of a successful football team by a military 
dictatorship for ambassadorial objectives, however, has not been 
confined to Francoist Spain and South America. In the Egypt of Colonel 
Nasser, the international triumphs of the Zamalek club of Cairo were 
exploited in a quite blatant manner. 16 The same happened with the 
Leopards club of Kampala during the dictatorship of Idi Amin, especially 
14. This allegation has been most fully discussed in World 
Soccer, July 1983, and in La Nacion, 9-25 November 1983. 
15. See, for example: As, 27 November 1978; El Mundo Deportivo; 28 
November 1978; World Soccer, January 1979 and July 1983; La Nacion 9- 
25 November 1983. 
16. See World Soccer, March 1975. 
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after their 1974 triumph in the African Champion Club. 17 
In the same way as the context-for this chapter on the ambassadoral 
significance of football in Francoist Spain concerns the manipulation of 
the game in this respect in other countries, it must also concern the 
role played in this regard by other Spanish sports during the Franco 
period., It can be argued that basketball in Francoist Spain had at 
least as much of an ambassadorial function as f6otball. 10 The chief 
motive for making this claim is that Raimundo Saporta, the Real Madrid 
Vice-president who closely collaborated with his good friend Fernando 
Maria Castiella so that the Franco regime could extract the maximum 
benefits from the club's international football triumphs, was 
essentially a basketball man. He was originally recruited to the club's 
administration by President Santiago Bernabeu after splendidly 
organizing a national basketball tournament at the Liceo Frances in 
Madrid at Christmas 1952. It has been alleged that Saporta even 
convinced Castiella that basketball could make a greater diplomatic 
contribution than football if managed correctly. 19 Castiella then 
proceeded to give Saporta detailed instructions regarding the journeys 
abroad of the Real Madrid basketball team, the large majority of which 
seemed to have been dutifully carried out. One of the priorities of the 
17. See World Soccer, March 1975. 
18. This has been the argument of several of the author's interviewees: 
Raimundo Saporta, Julian Garcia Ganau and Miguel Vidal. 
19. This can alleged by Julian Garcia Gandau, both in interview with the 
author, and in his El Pais Semanal article, op. cit., Raimundo 
Saporta himself, however, denied the allegation, yet nonetheless 
stated that he would have been pleased to have convinced Castiella 
on this point, but at the time did not completely realize the 
ambassadorial potential of basketball himself. 
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Franco regime's foreign policy in the early 1960s was the improvement of 
relations with the United States, and it is in this light that the 
signing of leading American basketball players by the top Spanish clubs, 
led by Real Madrid, should be seen. 2° Relations between Spain in the 
United States were obviously based upon common strategic and economic 
interests, but the fact that many top American players chose to go to 
Spain perhaps helped to improve the general image of Francoist Spain in 
the United States. 21 In addition, it possibly also helped that Saporta 
arranged annual Real Madrid basketball tours of the United States, in 
which the players behaved almost like professional ambassadors, for 
example running out with both the Spanish and American flags, handing 
out Spanish oranges to the crowd, and then playing in an open and 
attractive manner. 22 
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, basketball helped to improve the 
image of Francoist Spain in the Eastern Bloc and China. This was partly 
a consequence of Saporta finally accepting, in November 1966, the 
presidency of the Real Federacion Espanola de Baloncesto, after earlier 
having refused it on several occasions on the grounds of excessive work 
20. This first Americans arrived in Spanish basketball even before the 
national professional league began in 1965. The first big name 
player to arrive was Don Lawrence, who signed for Real Madrid in 
April 1964, followed by his friend Ben Davis two months later. FC 
Barcelona entered the American market in January 1965, signing up 
Robin Mortensen. 
21. This possibility was tentatively supported by Raimundo Saporta, 
Juliän Garcia Gandau and Miguel Vidal, and also by Robin Mortensen, 
the former FC Barcelona basketball player, now coach at the Joventut 
club of Badalona. 
22. For details of the ambassadorial behavior of the Real Madrid 
basketball players in the United States, see, any July or August 
edition of the Boletin del Real Madrid, or of Marca, from 1963 to 
1972. 
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at Real Madrid. Saporta then proceeded to convert the Spanish national 
basketball team into an efffective ambassador for the Franco regime, as 
he had earlier done with the Real team. In April 1968, he led the 
first Spanish basketball tour of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, 
with all of the goodwill gestures that Saporta had used at Real. 
Furthermore, he organized several tours of the Middle East, by-passing 
Israel, partly because good relations with the Arab States was another 
priority of Castiella. 
The ageing Castiella was replaced as Foreign Minister in October 
1969 by Gregorio Löpez Bravo, another paid-up Real Madrid member and 
keen supporter-. After a brief pause, the instructions to Saporta about 
the behaviour of all the Real Madrid Sports teams and the Spanish 
national basketball team when travelling abroad recommenced. In 
October 1972, Löpez Bravo requested Saporta to undertake a national 
basketball tour of China. The tour duly went ahead, being hailed by 
the Press as an example of "basket diplomacy", similar to the more 
famous "ping-pong diplomacy" that was going on at exactly the same time 
between China and the United States. 23 
The only other sport besides football and basketball which played a 
significant diplomatic role for the Franco regime was tennis. It has 
been claimed on various occasions that the leading Spanish player Manuel 
Santana was almost as effective an ambassador for Francoist Spain as 
23. See, for example, Marca from 1963 to 1972. 
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were the various Real Madrid teams. 24 In the same way as Real Madrid, 
the ambassadorial significance of Santana was not simply due to his 
triumphs in tournaments all around the world, but also to the style in 
which he won. Off the court, Santana was always polite and well-spoken, 
whilst on the court he played stylish and attractive tennis. It has 
consistently been alleged that he was an admirer of Franco, particularly 
in the light of his participation in the Ministry of Tourism and 
Information's immense publicity campaign for a positive vote in the 
regime's referendum of December 1966.25 Furthermore, Santana always 
seemed extremely pleased to receive the many medals and awards bestowed 
upon him with-great ceremony, especially when Foreign Minister Castiella 
gave him the highest decorations for ambassadorial services, the Gran 
Cruz de Caballero de la Orden de Isabella Catolica, after his famous 
triumph in the men's single tournament at Wimbledon in July 1966. 
In the late 1960's, Manuel Orantes emerged as a possible successors 
to Santana as the tennis ambassador of Francoist Spain. Orantes, 
however, unlike Santana, failed to win any major international 
tournament, and so his capacity to serve as an ambassador was strictly 
limited. 
No other Spanish sportsmen or teams exercised a significant 
ambassadorial role during the Franco years, largely because, as seen in 
24. This claim has been made in print by the 
No. 235,4 April 1977, and to the author 
Manuel Vazquez Montalbän. 
25. For details of Santana's intervention in 
campaign, see Barrabäs, No. 235,4 April 
satirical Weekly Barrabäs, 
by Julian Garcia Gandau and 
the 1966 referendum 
1977; S port, 19 July 1977. 
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the Introduction to this thesis, Spain was a second-rate sporting nation 
in international terms. 
In order to place the ambassadorial and diplomatic significance of 
football in Francoist Spain in its proper historical context, the 
previous six pages of this thesis have given examples of football teams 
having been used as effective ambassadors by other dictatorships eager 
to improve their international image, and examples of other sports in 
Francoist Spain having an ambassadorial significance. It should be 
borne in mind, however, as pointed out at the beginning of this chapter, 
that two distinct concepts are under examination here: the potential of 
sport to improve the general overseas image of a country, and the 
potential of sport actually to improve the concrete diplomatic position 
of a country. The latter is a far more doubtful concept than the 
former. The strength or weakness of diplomatic relations between two 
countries is the consequence of many political, economic and 
geographical factors. The ability of sport to assist in the improvement 
of actual diplomatic relations is almost always limited to acting as a 
kind of side-plate to the main course, which must necessarily consist of 
mutual political and economic interests. 
An example more relevant to this study concerns relations between 
Francoist Spain and Tito's Yugoslavia. Sporting relations between the 
two countries were excellent, commencing with the European Cup matches 
between Real Madrid and Partisan Belgrade in December 1955. Yugoslavia, 
however, along with Mexico, Uruguay and the Warsaw Pact countries, was 
one of the fiercest diplomatic opponents of the Franco regime, as 
evidenced by her opposition to Spanish entry into the United Nations at 
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exactly the same time as the Real-Partisan games mentioned above. It 
was not until 1978 that the first steps were taken by Yugoslavia to 
establish formal relations with Spain. 
These two examples given above demonstrate that sport alone cannot 
normally be sufficient motive for the establishment or improvement of 
diplomatic relations between two countries. 
It is now necessary to examine in detail how football helped the 
Franco regime generally to improve its poor international image, but 
failed to materially assist in the establishment or improvement of 
concrete diplomatic relations with any other country, despite the 
efforts of Foreign Minister Castiella to this end. 
In the period from the conclusion of the Civil War until the mid- 
1950s the ambassadorial significance of Spanish football was almost 
completely concentrated in the national team, chiefly because the 
European Cup tournament for the champion club of each country did not 
commence until 1955. Until that year, the Spanish club teams only 
played against foreign opposition on an irregular, non-competitive 
basis. 
During the Second World War, the Franco regime blatantly used the 
Spanish national football team as an ambassador to assist in the 
maintenance of good relations with the Axis powers, Salazar's Portugal 
and Vichy France. The behaviour of the players, RFEF officials and 
journalists during these exhibition matches was subjected to the orders 
and advice of the Foreign Ministry, and passed on to the RFEF via the 
257 
DND. The existence of this chain of command is revealed by several 
documents discovered in the archives of the DND. Before every one of 
the Spanish national team's fourteen overseas journey to play 
international matches during the period 1939 to 1951, a message 
personally signed by the Delegado Nacional General Jose Moscardö was 
written for the attention of the teams's coaches and players. Although 
the actual wording of the message changed on every occasion, it 
basically demanded that all of the travelling party "be conscious of 
serving as sporting ambassadors for our glorious county", and as such 
"should behave in foreign lands in the way that will most benefit the 
prestige and respect of our beloved national flag". That this advice to 
the components of the national team originated in the Foreign Ministry 
is strongly hinted at by the affirmation that "several high organs of 
our States, especially that one concerned with our foreign relations, 
share the sentiments of this advice to you, and will be dependent on 
your behaviour once you pass beyond the frontiers of Spain. " 26 
As a consequence of this political control by the Franco regime, 
the national team, as seen in Chapter Two of this thesis, changed their 
traditional red shirts to Falangist-inspired blue ones, ran out on to 
the field carrying both the Spanish flag and that of the opposing 
country, lined up alongside their opponents to give the Fascist salute 
26. These messages, were reproduced in the monthly Boletin Of'icial de 
la DND from 1941 to 1947. Thereafter, the note was simply passed on 
to the offices of the RFEF, and read out to the players before the 
match by the national manager, with the exception of the especially 
long message from Koscardo before the departure, in May 1950, of the 
national team to compete in the World Cup finals tournament in 
Brazil. 
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to the largely uniformed crowd before the match, and then proceeded to 
play, according to the instructions from the DND, which probably 
originated in the Foreign Ministry, "in as sporting and ambassadorial 
way as possible". 27 The RFEF and DND officials, for their part, 
dutifully gave out typical Spanish presents to the officials of the 
opposing country, and offered diplomatic opinions to the foreign sports 
journalists. 
The first international match played by the Spanish national team 
after the Civil war was against Portugal in Lisbon in January 1941. The 
Foreign Ministry had as one of its leading priorities the maintenance of 
close relations with the neighbouring regime of Antonio de Oliveira 
Salazar, and the RFEF consequently obliged by arranging no less than 
ten friendly matches with Portugal in the 1940s. The prominent Galician 
Falangist Jesus Suevos, acted as an effective master of ceremonies 
during these games. 
In March 1942, the Spanish national team played host in Sevilla, to 
a team composed of the best players of Vichy France, a match that was 
later invalidated by the official French football federation. This 
policy of playing against the teams of the Axis Powers was continued. 
In the following month, the blue-spirted Spanish team carried out the 
suggestions of the Foreign Ministry by taking part in exhibition 
matches in Berlin and Milan, which served as rare opportunities for the 
27. These words, or ones to the same effect, were always included in 
the message from the DND to the national football team before each 
of its matchers overseas during the period 1939 to 1951, discussed 
more fully in the previous footnote. 
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mass expression of international Fascist sporting solidarity. 28. Again 
acting on the suggestions of the Foreign Ministry, the RFEF invited the 
German and Italian national teams to play return matches in Madrid in 
1943,29, but this proved to be impossible because the deteriorating 
military position of the Axis powers required their leading footballers 
to dedicate themselves to military duties. 
During the period 1945-1950, the Western ostracization of Francoist 
Spain, -which culminated in the rather ineffective United Nations 
diplomatic and economic embargo, caused Spain to be almost completely 
isolated from the international sporting community. Again acting upon 
the suggestions of the Foreign Minister, the RFEF regularly attempted 
to help the Franco regime ease its way out of the diplomatic strait 
jacket in which it found itself by trying to arrange friendly matches 
with the English, French and Italian national teams. 30 The football 
federations of these three countries also apparently acted upon the 
advice of their own Foreign Ministries, and consequently ignored the 
28. The suggestion that the visit of the Spanish national team to Berlin 
and Milan in April 1942 to play against the national teams of Hitler 
and Mussolini were promoted by the foreign Ministry for diplomatic 
reasons was made by Fernando Vizcaino Casas in Contando los 
cuarenta, Madrid, 1978, p. 156-147/ and to the author by the 
following interviewees; Manuel Vazquez Montalban, Julian Garcia 
Candau and Miguel Vidal. 
29. It has been claimed that the Foreign Ministry encouraged the RFEF to 
invite the German and Italian national teams to play exhibition 
matches in Spain in the book and the three interviews mentioned in 
the previous footnote. 
30. Revealed by the discovery of invitation letters of the football 
federations of these three countries in the archives of the RFEF, 
Madrid. 
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Spanish invitations, 31 thus proving the point already made in this 
chapter that sport can usually only assist in the improvement of 
diplomatic relations between two countries when mutual political and 
economic interests already exist. 
Because of the diplomatic boycott of Francoist Spain, the 
international football governing organization FIFA was forced to be 
extremely careful in arranging the qualifying groups for the 1950 World 
Cup finals tournament. FIFA were forced to place Spain With Portugal 
and the Irish Republic, the only two countries that had consistently 
accepted the RFEF's many invitations for the friendly matches in the 
1940s. 
The 1950 World Cup finals tournament, held in Brazil, was the first 
occasion of a Spanish sporting team coming under the scrutiny of the 
outside world since the Civil War, and therefore, as pointed out in the 
message to the chosen players from the Delegado Nacional General 
31. The suggestion that the English football federation consulted the 
British Foreign Office before rejecting the four Spanish invitations 
of September 1946, February 1947, November 1947 and March 1949 was 
confirmed to the author by the late Sir Stanley Rous, the former 
secretary of the Football Association, Rous affirmed the receipt of 
the four letters from Madrid, and recalled that he then, aware of 
the Diplomatic embargo on Francoist Spain, telephone the Foreign 
Office, where an official advised the Association politely to turn 
down the first Spanish offer of September 1946 and any subsequent 
ones that might arrive. With regards to the Spanish invitations to 
the French football federation, the veteran editor of the Paris 
sports newspaper Jacques Ferran, alleged that the French Foreign 
Ministry was probably consulted and like its British counterparts, 
gave a negative response because of the United Nations boycott. It 
is logical to assume that the same process occurred in connection 
with the Spanish invitations to the Italian federation. 
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Moscard6,32 the impression created by the Spanish team had to be a 
favourable one. The ambassadorial responsibility placed upon the 
players was huge, 33 as confirmed by one of the members of the teams, 
Luis Molowny. 
"During the training camp at El Escorial before flying to Brazil, 
we were told countless times that we should think of ourselves as 
ambassadors for Spain, shunned by the rest of the world for daring 
to be different. We were instructed about how to behave ourselves 
in Brazil, for example, always to wear official suit, to say the 
right thing to foreign Pressman, and even to pick your opponent up 
off the floor with a smile if you had fouled him. 34 
The national team dutifully carried out these instructions which 
originated from the Foreign Ministry. Off the field, the players were 
smart and diplomatic, whilst on the field they played in an open, 
attractive style and achieved a creditable fourth place, having 
surprisingly beaten the highly respected England of Stanley Matthews. 
These players certainly did more than any future national team generally 
to improve the overseas image of the Francoist Spain. " 
32. The content of this message from General Moscardo which was 
published in the Boletin Oficial de la DND No. 87, July 1950, and in 
the Marca and El Mundo Deportivo newspapers, was fully discussed in 
Footnote 27 of this chapter. 
33. This ambasadorial responsibility on the Spanish national team in 
Brazil was commented upon in the following humourous, ironic way by 
Cesar Alonso de los Rios, writing in Cuadernos Para el diälogo, XXV 
Extraordinario, May 1971: 
"The Spanish players were charged with the responsibility of 
raising high the national flag in the face of those countries 
that necessarily had to recognize Spain, and integrate her into 
the international organizations and into the economic aid 
plans. " 
34. Authors' interview with Luis Molowny, the former Real Madrid and 
Spanish international footballer. 
35. This opinion had been expressed in print by Cesar Alfonso del los 
Rios, op. cit., and in interviews with the author by the historian 
Juan Pablo Fusi, Manuel Vezquez Montalban, Julian Garcia Candau, 
Juan Jose Castillo, Miguel Vidal and Luis Molowny. 
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Evidence of the good impression created in Brazil by the Spanish 
national team is the election of the then RFEF President and former 
"Blue Division" doctor, Armando Munoz Calero to the executive committee 
of FIFA, due to the combined votes of the South American countries, 
including those of Mexico and Uruguay, resolute diplomatic opponents of 
Francoist Spain. 36 This election, which was held in Rio de Janeiro 
during the tournament, undoubtedly delighted the Foreign Ministry, 
because it clearly demonstrated the fact that Spain had managed to 
transform itself from being an outcast into a full member of the 
international sporting community practically overnight, despite the 
opposition of the socialist countries. This transformation was 
boastfully recognized by Munoz Calero himself in 1953. 
"When I joined the FIFA executive in 1950, Spain only maintained 
sporting relations with Portugal and Ireland. Now, however, we 
have normal relations with all the countries of the world, except 
those that live without freedom behind the Iron Curtain. Now, the 
voice of Spain is heard and respected the same as that of the most 
powerful nation ... 37 
The Spanish national team, however, failed to continue the good 
ambassadorial work that it began in 1950 because of a surprising lack of 
success on the field. The team failed to qualify for both the 1954 and 
the 1958 World Cup finals tournaments, being humiliatingly eliminated by 
first Turkey and then Switzerland. It did manage to qualify for the 
1962 and 1966 tournament, but on both occasions performed extremely 
poorly when the crucial moment arrived. Even worse was to follow, 
36. Information revealed by an examination by the author of the archives 
of World Soccer, January and February 1984, and of Mundo Deportivo, 
September and October 1984. 
37. Quoted in Boletin del Real Madrid CF, No. 40, November 1953. 
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because the national team then failed to qualify for the 1970 and 1974 
tournaments. This disappointing'World Cup record during the Franco 
years obviously severely limited the ability of'the Spanish national 
football team to play an important diplomatic role on behalf of the 
Franco regime. 
Furthermore, the national team was also unable to fulfil an 
ambassadorial function in the inaugural European Nations Cup Tournament 
of 1960. On this occasion, however, the reason was a politically- 
motivated boycott by the Franco regime rather than another Spanish 
failure on the field. Spain was drawn to play against the Soviet Union 
in the quarter finals of the new competition, arranged on a home-and- 
away basis, a draw which shocked the regime. The DND, acting on 
instructions from the Ministry of Information and Tourism, prohibited 
any Press discussion of either the diplomatic or sporting consequences 
of the pairing until the matter has been discussed by Franco's 
cabinet. 38 At this cabinet meeting, the Interior Minister Camilo 
Alonso Vega put forward the proposal to boycott the matches with the 
Soviets, on the grounds that there were still some ex-commandants of the 
38. Information revealed by the discovery in the archives of the DND of 
a letter from the President of the DND's Comisiön de Prensa v 
Propaganda, dated 17 May 1960, to the editors of the country's 
sporting newspapers and the sports editors of the large general 
newspaper, requesting them "kindly to refrain from discussing the 
possible consequence of our national football team having been drawn 
to play the Soviet one in the European National Cup, until such time 
as the matter has been fully discussed by the highest organs of 
State. " 
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Falangist "Blue Division" being held prisoner in Soviet labour camps. 39 
The Foreign Minister, Fernando Maria Castiella and the Minister 
Secretary of the Movimiento, Jose Solis, more aware than any of their 
collegues about the diplomatic and ambassadorial significance of sport, 
realized that such a withdrawal could only worsen the international 
image of the Franco regime, but their arguments against the boycott were 
defeated40. 
The worst fears of Castiella and Solis became reality. The RFEF, 
which had been ordered to withdraw from the competition by the DND, 41 
was largely regarded by the international footballing community as 
simply a tool of the Franco regime, whose rabid anti-socialism even 
extended as far as prohibiting a sporting contest. 42 The incisive 
39. There were no reports of this cabinet debate in the Spanish Press, 
simply the news that the match was cancelled. This information was 
given to the author by Benito Castejön, in 1960 secretary to 
Delegado Nacional Elola Olaso and later to become Delepado himself, 
who was informed in detail about the debate by his close friend 
Jose Solis. 
40. Revealed by author's interview with Benito Castejon. 
41. Information revealed by the discovery in the archives of the DND, 
of a letter from the Delegado Nacional de Deportes, Jose Antonio 
Elola Olaso, to the President of the RFEF, Alfonso dela Fuente 
Chaos, dated 21 May 1960. The letter informed the RFEF President 
that "the highest organ of the State have, after long and deep 
contemplation, decided that, in the present circumstances, the 
European Nations Cup match between the Spanish national football 
team and that of the Soviet Union cannot proceed". Elola Olaso then 
proceeded to instruct de la Fuente Chaos to "inform the media about 
this cancellation, and make the necessary arrangements within your 
own federation. " 
42. This view of the RFEF in the light of the cancellation of the 
matches with the Soviets is reflected in articles in, for example, 
The Times, May 1960, and L'EQuipe of the same date. This view has 
also been expressed to the author in interviews with the following: 
Sir Stanley Rous, Brian Glanville Keir Radnedge, David Lacey, and 
Jaques Ferran. 
265 
response of the Soviet football federation was: 
"This act of arbitrariness and coercion in respect of the Spanish 
footballers who wanted to play the Soviet Union shows that the 
Fascist dictator of Spain tramples-over the principles of the 
international sports federations. Obeying the will of his bosses, 
the United States imperialists, he tries to bring into sport the 
elements of the Cold War. "43 
Along with Castiella and Solis, another Spaniard who was disappointed 
about this withdrawal was Raimundo'Saporta, the man largely responsible 
for the important ambassadorial services being rendered to the Franco 
regime by the Real Madrid club at exactly the same time: 
"As soon as I learnt about Spain being drawn with the Soviet Union, 
I knew that there would be problems with the regime. If we had 
been drawn with any of the other Eastern Bloc countries, the game 
would have gone ahead. Indeed, Real Madrid has already played 
against Hungarian and Yugoslavian teams in the European Cup. The 
Soviet Union, however, was a qualitatively different case. 
Personally, I share 'the arguments of Castielläº-,; and Solis, thinking 
that the games should have been played. It was an opportunity for 
Spain to appear moderate and forgiving in the eyes of the 
international sporting community, rather than as the backward- 
looking isolated bastion of reactionarism that we seemed in the 
light of the mistaken withdrawal. This boycott probably undid a 
lot of ambassadorial good that Real Madrid was doing for Spain in 
that period. The most ironic thing about the whole sorry issue is 
that, at that time, we would almost certainly have beaten the 
Soviets and perhaps even won the competition, because we had an 
excellent team containing the likes of Di Stefano, Kubala, Suarez 
'and Gento". 44 
The negative ambassadorial effects of this withdrawal for the 
Franco regime, however, were mitigated by the events of four years 
later, Because of the influence of Agusti Pujol, the Spanish 
representative on the executive committee of the European football 
governing body UEFA, and because of the excellence of the stadia of Real 
Madrid and FC Barcelona, Spain was designated as the host for the semi 
r 
43. Quoted in The Times, 26 May 1960. 
44. Author's interview with Raimundo Saporta. 
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finals and final of the 1964 Nations cup tournament. 4 The fact that the 
Soviet Union, as defending European champions, was to be one of the 
visiting semi-finalists predictably caused unrest within Franco's 
cabinet, especially when most of the experts predicted a Spain-Soviet 
final. Another withdrawal was demanded by Alonso Vega, but on this 
occasion Castiella, aided by Solis, convinced the other ministers that 
the previous boycott had been a diplomatic failure, and that the matches 
were an excellent opportunity to offer to the watching world the image 
of a Spain gradually becoming more hospitable and tolerant. " It has 
even been alleged that Castiella claimed to his colleagues that the 
hosting of the matches could be of assistance to Spain's bid to enter 
the European Economic Community. 47 
In addition to all of the arguments of Castiella, the staging of 
the 1964 Nations Cup matches was made to seem even more attractive to 
Franco and his cabinet by the new young Minister of Information and 
Tourism Manuel Fraga, who pointed out, at the same cabinet meeting in 
April 1964, that the games could be included in his plans for the 
"Twenty-Five Years of Peace" celebration, the supposedly spontaneous 
festivities to commemorate the twenty-fifth anniversary of the 
dictatorship. 48 
45. Information revealed by an examination of the archives of World 
Soccer, El Mundo Deportivo, Marca and the RFEF. 
46. The course of this cabinet debate was revealed to Benito Castejön by 
Jose Solis. Accurate reports of the debate have also been offered, 
in Alex J. Botines, op. cit, p. 131, and in Manuel Vazquez 
Montalban, op. cit., p. 73. 
47. This was alleged in Botines, ibid., but neither by Castejon nor 
Vazquez Montalban. 
48. All three of the sources mentioned in the above footnote made this 
allegation about the reservations of Franco, Alonso Vega and Munoz 
Grandes. 
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In consequence, the matches went ahead in Spain despite the 
reservations of Alonso Vega, the Deputy Head of State General Agustin 
Munoz Grandes, and even of Franco himself. The Spanish national team 
predictably beat Hungary in the semi finals, and then, in front of 
Frando, most of his ministers and 125,000 fans in an impassioned Estadio 
Bernabeu, triumphed 2-1 over the Soviet Union in a dramatic final. 
The international prestige of the Franco regime received a much 
needed boost from this football match with a Soviet team, coming as it 
did just over a year after the controversial execution of the Communist 
Party agent Julian Grimau. This boost was not only due to the match 
being played rather than being cancelled again, but also because it was 
played in an excellent sporting spirit. As revealed by two of the 
Spanish players, Jose Angel Iribar49 and Jesus Pereda, 80 this 
sportsmanship was partially due to both Castiella and Solis having 
called at the training camp of the host team on the morning of the final 
to give a brief lecture about its ambassadorial and diplomatic 
importance. In addition, the immense crowd, partly inspired by appeals 
49. Author's interview with Jose Angel Iribar. 
50. Author's interview with Jesus Pereda. 
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for good behaviour in the newspapers, 51 treated the Soviet anthem with 
respect, and then applauded each of the impressive moves made by the 
visiting team. The Soviet team left without the European crown they had 
won four years earlier, but nonetheless with plenty of good memories of 
their visit to Spain, which surprised them because they had been led to 
expect a hostile reception. 52 Franco himself alluded to both the 
sporting attitude of the capacity crowd and the consequent surprise of 
the Soviet visitors in his glowing report of the final: 
"I am content with the victory and with the behaviour of the crowd, 
which constantly encouraged the Spanish team, demonstrating its 
enthusiam without failing to treat the foreign team correctly, and 
the same when listening to the Soviet Anthem. The enormous 
gathering which filled the Estadio Bernabeu could not have been 
more affectionate towards me, with its repeated ovations. Our 
unity and patriotism were evidenced in front of millions and 
millions of people who saw the big match on television in many 
countries of the world. I am sure that the team of the USSR, its 
directors and assistants took away from Spain an excellent 
impression, and will remember the sportsmanship of our team and of 
the numerous spectators who packed the stadium. "53 
The great majority of the 6,000 international Pressmen who gathered 
51. This appeal was, as revealed to the author by an examination of the 
archives of the DND, issued for publication in the newspaper by the 
Comisibn de Prensa y Propaganda of the DND. The complete text of 
the appeal is as follows: 
"It is to be hoped that the behavior of the crowd at the 
European Nations Cup Final, to be contested on Sunday in the 
Estadio Bernabeu, Madrid, between teams representing Spain and 
the Soviet Union, will be of exemplary nature. The football 
, supporters should bear in mind that the attention of the whole 
sporting world will be focused on this match, and therefore 
they should demonstrate their good education, fair mindedness 
and sportsmanship. " 
52. The views of the Soviet team are reflected in interviews with 
several players, which appeared in all of the Spanish general and 
sporting newspaper on 23 and 24 June 1964, and in World Soccer July 
and August 1964. 
53. Quoted in Francisco Franco Salgado-Araujo, Mis conversaciones 
privadas con Franco, Barcelona, 1976, p. 426 
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in Madrid for the final were as pleasantly surprised as the Soviets not 
to encounter a tense and hostile ambience surrounding the match. 54 
Their reports of the final and friendly atmosphere undoubtedly 
,, contributed towards the improvement of the overseas image of Francoist 
Spain. 55 Furthermore, television coverage of the game was taken by 
fifteen European countries, offering to half of the continent, in the 
actual words of the RTVE commentary given by the ultra-nationalistic 
MatiGPrats, "the image of a happy and hospitable Spain, basking in the 
social peace established by our good protector and Caudillo, Francisco 
Franco. 56 Indeed, most of the foreign television and radio 
commentators alluded to the impressive applause received by the dictator 
when he very astutely left the stadium just two minutes before the final 
whistle, with a historic victory assured. 51 
It should be borne in mind, however, that the ambassadorial 
significance of the Spanish national team was confined to the successes 
achieved in Brazil in 1950 and in Madrid in 1964, and therefore almost 
pales into insignificance alongside that of Real Madrid. 
Before examining exactly when and how Real Madrid improved the 
54. This surprise was expressed to the author by the following sports 
journalists present: David Miller of the The Times Brian Glanville, 
David Lacey, and Jaques Ferran. 
55. This is the view of the four journalists mentioned in the previous 
footnote, although they all pointed out that they were neither 
conscious of or keen to improve the image of Francoist Spain with 
their reports. This view is shared by Raimundo Saporta, Manuel 
Väzquez Montalbän, and Juan Pablo Fusi, besides the majority of 
Spanish football journalists. 
56. Author's interview with MatiaaPrats. 
57. Author's interview with Sir Kenneth Volstenholme, the BBC television 
commentator for the Madrid final. 
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international image of Francoist Spain, it is appropriate first to offer 
two examples of ministerial recognition of the club's ambassadorial 
importance, Foreign Minister Castiella was moved to declare, upon 
awarding the prestigious Gran Cruz de Caballero de la Orden de Isabel "' 
la Catolica to Real's Argentinian star Alfredo Di Stefano in December 
1960, that the club "has constituted the best embassy that we have sent 
abroad". 6e In an'interview with the, newspaper ABC eight years later, 
Castiella was in a more expansive mood: 
"Real Madrid, is furthermore, a complete style of sportsmanship, 
and they know how to dignify the name of Spain whilst travelling 
around the world. The club's players comport themselves like 
genuine ambassadors, contributing with their performance to the 
prestige of our country. 59 
The other minister to pay tribute to the ambassadorial work of the club 
was Jose` Solis, who, in October 1959 was the representative of the 
Franco regime at ReaV s banquet after the 5-0 destruction of the 
Luxembourg club Jeunesse d'Esch in the European Cup, and he was soon on 
his feet addressing the players in this fulsome way: 
"You have-done much more than many scattered embassies for this 
people of God. Foreigners who used to hate us now understand us, 
thanks to you, because you have broken down many walls.. Your 
victories constitute a legitimate pride for all Spaniards, both 
inside and outside our country. When you retire to the dressing 
, rooms at the end of every` match, to staunch your sporting wounds, you should know that all the Spaniards are with you accompany you, 
proud of your triumphs, which have lifted the Spanish flag so 
high. "6o 
It must be pointed out that Castiella and Solis have not been the 
only ministers to praise the. ambassadorial importance of their country's 
58. Quoted in the Boletin del Real Madrid, No. 128, January 1961. 
59. Quoted in ABC 1 
60. Quoted in the Boletfn del Real Madrid CF No. 112, November 1959. 
.1 
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successful sportsmen. Such praise has been handed out, usually by 
Foreign Ministers, by governments of all political persuasion since 
regular international sporting competitions began. What makes the case 
of Real Madrid in Francoist Spain qualitatively different is that 
Castiella, as shall shortly be seen, did not content himself with the 
club simply improving the general international image of the country. 
The Spanish Foreign Minister went one step further, actually attempting 
to use Real for the fulfilment of specific diplomatic objectives. 
Castiella would obviously have not been able to use Real in this 
way if the club had been unwilling to allow this to happen. As seen in 
the Introduction of this thesis, however, the club was both pleased and 
proud to be of assistance, as revealed by eternal Vice President 
Raimundo Saporta. 
"Real Madrid... has always been so powerful because of being at the 
service of the vertebral column of the State. "61 
Castiella found in Saporta the perfect man to work with at the 
club. By both his own admission and the allegations of others, '2 
Saporta would have been almost as comfortable actually serving as a 
Spanish diplomat overseas, because his character was extremely pleasant 
and diplomatic, and, in addition, he spoke perfect French and competent 
English. 
61. Quoted in El Pais, 3 December 1978. 
62. This suggestion originates from authors interviews with: Raimundo 
Saporta, the form V Real Madrid; layer Manuel Veläzquez, Luis 
Molowny, Manuel Vazquez Montalban and Juliän Garcia Candau. 
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The allegation that is central to the second half of this chapter 
is that Saporta used to receive specific instructions from Castiella 
before every journey abroad of either the Real football or basketball 
team. 63 Saporta himself was reluctant either to confirm or deny this 
allegation. 64 The majority of sporting journalists interviewed have 
expressed doubts that Saporta went to the Foreign Ministry before every 
single Real excursion overseas, to France or Belgium, for example, but 
admitted that it was highly probable that the Vice President was given 
advice by the Foreign Ministry before embarking upon a journey fraught 
with possible diplomatic problems, for instance to Eastern Europe or the 
Middle East. 65 
It is now necessary to offer concrete historical examples of how 
Real Madrid both improved the general overseas image of Francoist Spain, 
and was used by Castiella in an attempt to attain specific diplomatic 
objectives. 
63. This controversial allegation was originally made by Julian Garc : ra 
Candau in his El Pais Semanal article, op. cit., and then at greater 
length and with greater conviction in his book, op. cit., pp. 54-55, 
and in interview with the author, op. cit.. Garcia Candau's 
allegations have been supported practically unequivocally in 
interview by Manuel Vazquez Montalbän and by the late Catalan sports 
writer Alex J. Botines. On the other hand, however, this allegation 
has been refuted by Luis Molowny, Manuel Velazquez, Jose Maria 
Lorente, Rodolfo Belarmino "Belarmo", and Enrique Gil de la Vega 
"Gilera", the veteran sports correspondents of ABC. 
64. Author's interview with Raimundo Saporta who lost a good part of his 
characteristic affability and serenity upon being asked this 
particular question. 
65. This view, a kind of middle position between Garca Candau and his 
Real Madrid connected detractors, has been expressed to the author 
by Miguel Vidal, Juan Jose Castillo, Joan Josep:. Artells, the author 
of Barga, Barsa, Barca, op. cit. 1 Antonio Hernaez, the veteran 
editor of Sport. 
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The potential of Real to serve as a far more effective ambassador 
than any other Spanish club was demonstrated long before its spectacular 
domination of the world football. It was Real that led the way in 
persuading the leading Western European club to visit diplomatically- 
isolated Spain in the 1940s to play exhibition matches. When the club 
began to venture abroad in the early 1950s, the praise from the Franco 
regime for their behaviour was soon resounding, a prelude of things to 
come. - 
In July 1952, Real spectacularly won the prestigious Peguena CoDa 
del Mundo in Bogota, Colombia. A glowing report of the club's visit 
from the Spanish ambassador-in Bogota led to a letter to Real from 
Castiella's predecessor as Foreign Minister, Alberto Martin Artajo. 
This was letter was proudly reproduced in the next issue of the Boletin 
del Real Madrid CF: 
"The behaviour of the components of the Real Madrid party, from the 
first director to the last player, has been irreproachable in every 
aspect, and the impression that they have left behind, thanks to 
their impeccable correctness, sporting gentlemanliness and 
patriotism, has been practically perfect. "`s 
It was not only the club's exemplary overseas behaviour, however, 
that, in the early 1950s, was setting the scene for its future 
ambassadorial work on behalf of the Franco regime. Real's magnificient 
new Estadio Bernabeu, then the biggest in Europe, was impressing many 
of the few foreign visitors who passed through Madrid in that period, 
and was actually placed on the list of recommended attractions compiled 
66. Quoted in the Boletin del Real Madrid CF, No. 28, September 1952. 
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by the Ministry of Information and Tourism. 67 It is safe to assume that 
the majority of the small group of tourists who visited Franco's capital 
expected to encounter massive poverty and repression, and were therefore 
probably pleasantly surprised to be shown around such an impressive 
construction. Very few foreign heads of state came to Madrid in the 
1950s, but those that did were all encouraged to visit the stadium, for 
example King Hussein I of Jordan in June 1955 and the Brazilian 
President Doctor Kubitschek seven months later. 68 
The Franco regime's gratitude towards Real Madrid for ambassador- 
ial services rendered was clearly demonstrated for the first time in 
June 1955, when the club won the Latin Cup, the forerunner of the 
European Cup in Paris. for this exploit, every player was awarded the 
Falangist Medalla de la Orden Imperial del Yugo y de las Flechas, even 
though none of the FC Barcelona or Athletic de Bilbao players who had 
previously won the same trophy had been granted this decoration by the 
regime. 
The diplomatic potential of Real was completely realized in the 
late 1950s, with victory in the first five editions of the European Cup. 
It was not just the fact of the five consecutive triumphs which made 
Real a legendary club throughout the world, but also the style. It was 
a style built firmly on flamboyant and attractive attacking play, led 
67. For further details of the use of the Estadio Bernabeu as a tourist 
attraction by the Ministry of Information and Tourism, see the Libro 
del Oro del Real Madrid, Madrid, op. cit., p. 337. 
68. For details of the visits of Hussein and Kubitschek, see the Boletin 
del Real Madrid CF, No. 60, July 1955, and No. 67, February 1956 
repectively. 
275 
by the remarkable Argentine Alfredo Di Stefano. 
This spectacular style of play contributed enormously to the 
ambassadorial significance of Real for the Franco regime. Another 
considerable contribution was made by the perfectly diplomatic behavior 
of the players and directors, always immaculately dressed and saying the 
correct things-for the foreign press. As pointed out by the former Real 
star Manuel Velazquez: 
"We were instructed by the club to dress smartly and behave 
ourselves at all times, but especially for trips abroad. Saporta 
even gave us instructions about what we should say to the foreign 
journalists, platitudes such as: "the hospitality that we have 
received in your country has been unforgettable; and we hope to be 
able to match this hospitality when it is your turn to, visit our 
beautiful city. "69 
The correctness was the result of the discipline instilled at the club 
by President Bernabeu, and of the diplomatic awareness of Vice-President 
Saporta. It was the latter who arranged, with the encouragement of 
Foreign Minister Castiella, 1° clever public relations exercises that 
possibly contributed towards an improvement in the general overseas 
image of Francoist Spain. In August 1958, for example, during a Real 
tour of South America, Saporta handed over a cheque for one thousand 
United States dollarrto the Argentine President Arturo Frondizi for the 
.y 
69. Author's interview with Manuel Velazquez. 
70. In his interview with the author, Raimundo Saporta admitted that 
these public relations exercises were of his own'invention. He then 
suggested to them to Castiella in their regular meetings, who 
normally reacted to them with enthusiasm. Saporta unequivocally 
pointed out, nonetheless, that these exercises had no political 
motive: 
"The objective of these gestures was to improve the inter- 
national image of our club, and afterwards to improve that of 
Spain in general. As I've said before, Real Madrid would have 
behaved the same way whatever kind of government had been in 
power at that time. " 
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assistance of recent flood victims. 71 In December 1961, the Real 
players were photographed smilingly distributing Spanish oranges at a 
Manchester children's hospital before playing a friendly match with 
Manchester United. In addition to these specific examples, the Real 
team also pleased football supporters and politicians all around the 
world by running out before exhibition matches carrying both the Spanish 
flag and that of the country of the host club. Indeed, as admitted by 
Saporta, T2 Real would have carried out the'same exercise before European 
Cup matches, if the UEFA regulations had not prohibited this. 
I 
It has been widely recognized, both inside and outside Spain, that 
the Real Madrid club contributed immensely towards improving the general 
international image of Francoist Spain. 73 As stated at the beginning of 
this, chapter, nonetheless, it is relatively simple to allege that an 
excellent sportsman or team has acted as an effective 
ambassador 
and 
this improved the overseas image of his or their-country. It is far 
more difficult to prove. that this individual or team has actually helped 
to. improve diplomatic relations with another country. For example, the 
Finnish long-distance runner Lassi Virren and the Roumanian gymnast 
Nadia Comaneci have undoubtedly served as effective ambassadors for 
their respective countries, but to suggest that they have been 
influential in a concrete diplomatic sense would be to make a grossly 
71. For further details of the meeting between Saporta and Frondizi, see 
Boletin del Real Madrid CF, No. 98, September 1958, Marca, 
10 August 1958. 
72. Author's interview with Raimundo Saporta. 
73. This view has been supported by all of the officials, writers and 
journalists, and in all of the publications, mentioned in this 
chapter. Nobody, of whatever political persuasion, has attempted to 
contest this view. 
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7 
exaggerated claim. It would be just as exaggerated and unsubstantial to 
claim that Real Madrid has played a decisive role in the establishment 
or strengthening of diplomatic links between Spain and some other 
country. In the light of the limited evidence available, the most that 
can be said is that Castiella clearly attempted to use the club for 
specific diplomatic purposes, but with only partial success. 
The most blatant example of Real Madrid being used for specific 
diplomatic purposes occurred in May 1961, only nine months before 
Castiella made his first attempt at entry into the European Economic 
Community. As admitted by Saporta, 74 Castiella requested the club to 
play a friendly match in Strasbourg, and afterwards pay a seemingly 
impromptu visit to the headquarters of the Council of Europe. Saporta 
presented the Council- with an expensive silver salver, and then made a 
speech which could well have been written by Castiella himself or one of 
his assistants. The general character of this speech is best summed up 
by the following extract: 
"It is an honour to have been called to play (sic) in the "European 
Capital", because this demonstrates that even this Council, where 
Spain is not at the moment represented, consider us as Europeans. 75 
This, visit by Real Madrid to Strasbourg, however, did not yield the 
fruit hoped for by the Foreign Minister, because everyone of his' 
subsequent approaches to the community was turned down, due to the anti- 
74. Author's interview with Raimundo Saporta, in which he admitted that 
the Strasbourg visit was the idea of Castiella, but denied that his 
speech was written by the Foreign Minister or any of his assistants. 
Despite being requested to make the journey by Castiella, Saporta 
still denied that Real Madrid was willingly being politically 
manipulated by the Franco regime. 
75. Quoted in Boletin del Real Madrid CF, No. 133, June 1961, and in 
Marca, 17 May 1961. 
278 
democrgtic nature of the Franco regime. It is even possible that 
Saporta's. speech of May 1961 was counter-productive, having been 
recognized by members of the Council as a blatant, possibly even cynical 
stunt by Castiella. T6 
A slightly less blatant example of the Castiella. attempt to use 
Real for specific diplomatic objectives can be found in the form of the 
club's visit to New York in July 1959. During that summer, President 
Eisenhower of the United States was planning his mammoth world tour of 
November and December of that year. Both Castiella and Franco himself 
were desperately keen for "Ike" to stop off in Madrid for a few hours, 
J 
which would, they hoped, -confirm to the watching world a degree of 
United States approval of the Franco regime. 77 It appears to be more 
that a mere coincidence that the by then world-famous Real Madrid 
football team made their one and only journey to the United States that' 
particular summer, especially when it is taken into account that there 
was no remotely decent team for Real to play against, because 
professional football did not reach the United States until the early 
1970s. Furthermore, the suspicion that the visit has a specific 
diplomatic objective is strengthened by the fact that the Real party was 
met at Kennedy Airport, New York, by the Spanish Ambassador Jose Maria 
76. This possibility was suggested to the author by Julian Garcia 
Landau, and Keir Radnedge. 
77. The importance that Franco and his Foreign Minister gave to 
Eisenhower passing through Madrid for a few hours is clearly 
r demonstrated in the following three studies: FMncisco Franco Salgado- 
Araujo, op. cit., p. 273; Fernando Maria Casti'ella, Politfca " 
exterior de Espa1'a (1898-1960) Madrid, 1960, p. 28; Ricardo de.: 4q 
Cierva, Historia del franguismo. Aislamiento, transformacion, 
agonia, Barcelona, 1978, p. 184. 
279 
de Areilza and the also visiting Minister of Commerce Alberto Ullastres, 
and photographed extensively with them throughout their visit. 7° The 
Real team played three exhibition matches on this American tour, in New 
York, Philadelphia and Washington DC, on each occasion running out ox/to 
the field with both the Spanish and United States flags, and then 
achieving convincing victories against their amateur opponents with some 
spectacular, attractive football. Three members of Eisenhower's cabinet 
were present at Real's final match in Washington DC, and afterwards paid 
fulsome tribute to the exciting display offered by the likes of Di 
Stefano, Puskas, Santamaria and Gento. 79 Unlike the Strasbourg visit, 
this American tour must be considered a success for Castiella, because 
Eisenhower, whether influenced by the tour of Real Madrid or not, did in 
fact decide to spend a few hours in Madrid. 
Furthermore, it has been alleged that Castiella requested Saporta 
to arrange Real tours of the Middle East, because good relations with 
the Arab states was one of the central features of Francoist foreign 
policy. 80 Castiella attempted to cultivate close links with the 
nascent United Arab Republic of Egypt and Syria, and thus it could be 
argued that the visits of Real Madrid to play friendly matches against 
the Zamalek club of Cairo had a specific diplomatic purpose. 91 
Relations between Spain and the United Arab Republic were possibly 
78. For further details of Real Madrid's 
Real Madrid CF, No. 109, August 1959, 
79. See the publication mentioned in the 
80. This allegation has been made in the 
op. cit., p. 54. 
81. This is the argument of Julian Garci 
author in interview. 
American tour, see Boletin del 
or Marca, 24-30 July 1959. 
previous footnote. 
book of Julian Garcia Candau, 
ä Candau, expressed to the 
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strengthened by the famous Real team, as usual, the first Spanish 
sporting team to visit the country, running out on to the pitch, in 
March 1961 and then again nine months latter, carrying the flag of the 
new republic, to the delight of the 90,000 crowd. In the summer of 
1964, Real visited Morocco and Algeria, and, the same as with their 
earlier tours of the United States and Egypt, there were more diplomatic 
advantages for the Franco regime than good professional teams for Di 
Stefano and his celebrated colleagues to play against. 82 On this summer 
tour of 1964, Bernabeu and Saporta between them gave out a record eight 
of the club's famous golden lapel badges in three weeks, to various 
royals and politicians. 83 
The suspicion that Castiella was using Real for specific diplomatic 
purposes is further fuelled by the large number of awards that he 
bestowed upon the personalities of the club, awards that were completely 
separate from those handed out by the Movimiento or the DND. The 
highest awards that the Foreign Minister had to give out was the Gran 
Cruz de Caballero de la Orden de Isabel la Catölica, and this he 
bestowed upon Di Stefano in a specific homage to the club with Franco 
present, at-the dictator's El Pardo residence in December 1960, and 
then upon Saporta with similar pomp and ceremony only five months later. 
It undoubtedly gave Castiella enormous satisfaction to see how 
82. Professional football did not arrive in North Africa until the mid- 
1970s. The four opponents of Real Madrid on their 1964 tour were 
all amateur teams, and consequently real scored a total of 26 goals, 
and conceded just one 
83. Revealed by the Boletin del Real Madrid CF, No. 172, September 1964. 
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popular Real Madrid was with football fans across the world, and also to 
see foreign governments bestowing their own award upon the club. 
President Bernabeu was actually awarded the highly prestigious Legion 
d'Honneur by the French government in June 1959 and this was confirmed 
upon him, in a ceremony in Paris attended by the Spanish Ambassador by 
MQurice Herzog, the French Minister for Youth and Sports and famous 
former mountaineer. 
The extent of the international esteem for-Real Madrid was 
illustrated in Rome in April 1965, when Saporta; to the delight of 
Castiella, 84 was elected to the executive committee 
Council of Physical Education, an agency of UNESCO. 
Saporta was also chosen to be the President of that 
"Commission for Sporting Legislation", on which he 
for four years. 
of the International 
In addition, 
Council's 
had already served 
The ageing Castiella was replaced as Foreign Secretary in October 
1969 by Gregorio Lopez Bravo, another Real member and keen supporter. 
It was logically expected, therefore, that the club would continue to be 
used for the attempted attainment of specific diplomatic objectives. 
The instructions to Saporta, however, surprisingly stopped, and did not 
recommence until Lopez Bravo had been annoyed by a Real Madrid 
basketball trip to Tel Aviv in November 1972. Because of the lack of 
advice from the Foreign Minister, Saporta arranged this visit to Israel 
without realizing that Real would upset Lopez Bravo's Arab friends, and 
84. Raimundo Saporta, interviewed by the author, admitted that Castiella 
had been very pleased to learn about the events in Rome. 
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this was exactly what happened when General Mosche Dayan was awarded the 
coveted Real lapel badge. In order to mitigate the negative diplomatic 
effects of this visit to Tel Aviv, the young Foreign Minister requested 
Saporta to organize a basketball trip to Libya, in which Colonel 
Gadaafi, the Arab leader most irritated by the Dayan decoration, would 
also be awarded the lapel badge a journey that was dutifully undertaken 
in June 1973.85 
In March 1973, Lopez Bravo requested Saporta that Real perform yet 
another specific diplomatic service to the Franco regime. The gradual 
initiation of relations with the Eastern Bloc countries had been one of 
the central priorities of Lopez Bravo, beginning with his surprise 
visit to Moscow in December 1969, when he had been Foreign Minister for 
only two months. He astutely realized that, although full diplomatic 
relations with the Soviets and their satellites were impossible whilst 
Franco remained in power, highly beneficial commercial relations could 
nonetheless be established. 86 Therefore, Lopez Bravo requested the 
club on the occasion of their visit to Odessa to play Dynamo Kiev in the 
quarter finals of the European Cup, to create as pleasant an impression 
as possible on their first journey to the Soviet Union. This they duly 
did, being even more complimentary about the host country than 
85. Raimundo Saporta admitted that the visit to Tripoli and the awarded 
to Gadaafi were suggested by Lopez Bravo. For further details of 
Real's journey to Libya, see: Boletin del Real Madrid CF, No. 279, 
August 1973; Marca, 19-27 July, 1964; the El Pas Semanal article of 
Julian Garcia Candau, op. cit, and his book, op. cit., p. 54. 
86. Lopez Bravo demonstrated the priority that he gave to the 
improvement of commercial relations with the Eastern Bloc in the 
prologue that he wrote for the Spanish edition of Samuel Pisar, 
Transacciones entre el Este y el Oeste, Barcelona, 1972. 
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usual when questioned by Soviet journalists. In addition, President 
Bernabeu suppressed his latent anti-Communism sufficiently to bestow the 
club lapel badge upon the Ukranian Minister for Sport and Culture, and 
in the match that followed the Real Madrid team diplomatically wore an 
all-red uniform. 
This visit to Odessa constitues the last clear example of Real 
Madrid being used in an attempt by the Franco regime to attain specific 
diplomatic objectives. It is appropriate at this stage to arrive at a 
conclusion about the diplomatic importance of football in Francoist 
Spain. As in other chapters of this study, it must be pointed out that 
a general lack of explicit documentary evidence, especially with regard 
to the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 87 partly impedes the forming 
of such a conclusion. Given the limited documentation available, it 
must be confirmed that both the Spanish national football team and Real 
Madrid helped to improve the international image of Francoist Spain to 
an unquantifiable extent, and that the latter club consciously allowed 
itself to be used by the Foreign Ministry in the attempted attainment of 
specific diplomatic' objectives, possibly with partial success for 
Franco's regime. 
87. As disclosed to the author by several high"officials of the Spanish 
Foreign Ministry, all of them connected the present ruling Spanish 
Socialist Workers Party, where there is absolutely no material in 
the archives of the Ministry that concerns the Franco regime's 
manipulation of football for ambassadorial and diplomatic purposes. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: FOOTBALL AND REGIONALISM 
There can be little doubt that the relationship between football and 
regionalism in Francoist Spain constitutes one of the most important of 
the seven aspects of the political manipulation of Spanish football. 
The reason for this chapter on the regionalist aspect appearing at the 
end of this thesis is that this is the only aspect of politicization 
that worked against the Franco regime. All of the other six aspects 
already discussed in this thesis served the interests of the regime to 
some extent or other. 
The importance of this regionalist aspect is clearly demonstrated 
by the relatively large amount of published work on the subject, in 
comparison to the scarcity of material discussing the other six aspects 
of politicization. The majority of these publications about the 
connection between between football and regionalism have specifically 
concentrated on the social and political significance of FC Barcelona. 
Two books have been written on this theme, Barca_Barca, Barca, by Joan 
Josep Artells, ' and Barca: cara i creu by Jaume S. Sabartes, 2 along with 
a whole host of newspaper and magazine articles and book chapters. The 
1. Joan Josep Artells, op. cit. 
2. Jaume S. Sabartes, op. cit. 
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political significance of the two leading Basque clubs, Athletic de 
Bilbao and Real Sociedad de San Sebastian, has received far less 
treatment, partly because of the absence amongst their supporters of a 
pe. -ic . q&Wcihß -d; yine of 
intellectuals similar to the one at Barca that 
Was so eager to write about their club. 
This imbalance in the treatment of the question of the question of 
football and regionalism obvious offers the impression that FC Barcelona 
was the club with the biggest anti-Francoist reputation. This 
impression, however, is somewhat deceptive. The evidence available 
suggests that Athletic de Bilbao and, to a lesser extent, Real Sociedad, 
carried out as many significant political gestures against the Franco 
regime as did the Catalan club, and in this way managed to reflect the 
general Basque opposition to the centralist dictatorship as effectively 
as Bam reflected Catalan opposition. Moreover, it could be argued 
that the Basque players were far more politically conscious and did far 
more to demonstrate their opposition to the Franco regime than did 
their counterparts at FC Barcelona, only a minority of whom were 
actually Catalans. 3 
There is no doubt that the opposition of the Basque clubs was very 
different in style and objectives from that of FC Barcelona. It has 
3. The number of native Catalan players in the FC Barcelona first-team 
squad gradually declined during the Franco years. As revealed by an 
investigation of the archives of the club, carried out by the author 
during April and May 1986, there were 14 players born in Catalonia 
in the Barca squad for season 1939/1940,15 for season 1949/1950, 
due to the increase of the squad from 18 to 22 players, 12 in 
season 1959/1960, and just seven in season 1960/1970. 
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been alleged on several occasions that this difference was partly a 
reflection of the difference between the two regions' style of political 
opposition to the Franco regime. ' 
The objective of this chapter is first to explain why football came 
to be an important catalyst for Basque and Catalan opposition to the 
Franco regime, and then to illustrate in detail how this occurred. 
It is not difficult to understand why the game became a vehicle for 
popular opposition. Because of the Basque and Catalan support for the 
Republic in the Civil War, Franco systematically attempted to destroy, 
or at least render innocuous, every institution that offered the 
slightest hint of regionalism or separatism. The Basque and Catalan 
languages were outlawed in public and in official institutions, often 
brutally, while thousands of books written in the two tongues, many of 
in M2 " 1939 
them ancient and priceless, were systematically burnt(. The leaders and 
the great majority of militant regionalists had either died in the 
conflict, been forced into exile, imprisoned or executed by the 
victorious Nationalists. The militants that managed to survive the war 
and the subsequent purge mostly attempted to return into society 
unnoticed in order to support themselves and their families, avoiding 
any form of political activity. 
Immediately after his victory in the Civil War, Franco made it 
unequivocally clear that his State was going to be completely unitarian 
4. This is the view of Juan Pablo Fusi, and Manuel Vazquez Montalban, 
expressed to the author. 
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and centralist. Speaking in conquered Barcelona in 1939, he declared 
that: 
"Spain is being reorganized within a broad totalitarian. concept... 
The character of each region will be respected, but without 
prejudice to national unity, which we desire to be complete, with a 
single language, Castilian, and a single personality, the Spanish 
one. "5 
It is possible to speak of a "postwar vendetta" against both the 
Basques and Catalans, their culture and their language. 6 The post-Civil 
War repression by the victorious NationalisýS,. in the Basque Country and 
Catalonia was different from that in the rest of Spain, because of being 
directed not exclusively against the rojos, -the imprecise expression 
used by the victors to describe the Left and the working class in 
general, but rather against practically all sectors of Basque and 
Catalan society, which had to pay for their collective offence against 
the Nationalist concept of "national unity". 
The repression in the Basque C untry'and Catalonia, or, more 
accurately, the repression of these two defeated regions, was often 
brutal, with the armed police frequently behaving like an army of 
occupation. Because of their powerful industrial capacity and 
agricultural wealth however, the Basque country and Catalonia did 
not, in general, suffer hunger and misery quite to the same extent as 
the other Spanish regions in the 1940s and 1950s, which was a small 
consolation for the repression imposed by the centralist Madrid regime. 
5. -Quoted in Palabras del Caudillo, Barcelona, 1939, p. 226., 
6. This was the phrase used by Norman L. Jones in his article "The 
Catalan Question Since the Civil War", included in the collection 
Spain In Crisis, op. cit. 
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Because of this relative prosperity, more than a million hungry 
labourers flooded into the two regions from, principally but not 
exclusively, Andalucia, Estremadura and Murcia. They found themselves 
in regions with plenty of employment opportunities and economic 
ambition, but politically and culturally repressed. and frustrated. In 
the 1960s and 1970s, Basque and Catalan nationalist opposition 
movements, of a: cultural and intellectual, as well as political, nature, 
evolved clandestinely in Francoist Spain, largely independent of the 
oppositional efforts of the exiled Basque and Catalan political forces. 
Considering all of the above, it is hardly surprising that sport 
should have served as a catalyst or vehicle for Basque and Catalan 
opposition to the Franco regime. Extremely few other modes of 
expression remained open to these people whose language, literature, 
tfisdcot, ot ccs}vPes 
flags, songs, dances and even / -_- were systematically repressed. 
Football was undoubtedly the most important sporting catalyst for 
regionalist opposition in Francoist Spain, but by no means the only one. 
Basketball also served as such a catalyst, mainly because the major 
basketball teams were merely one of the many sporting sections of the 
giant football clubs. Therefore, the politically-motivated antagonism 
between the Basque and Catalan football clubs and Real Madrid, largely 
regarded, in these two regions as the official club of the Franco 
regime, T carried over into basketball. The basketball sections of 
7. This view of Real Madrid during the Franco years has been expressed 
by practically every Barýa supporter, ex-official and ex-player 
interviewed by the author] and in print by for example: Manuel 
Vazquez Montalban in Politica y deporte, op. cit.; Alex J. 
Botines, op. cit.; Julian Garcia Candau, op. cit. 
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Athletic de Bilbao and FC Barcelona played the role of catalyst for 
regionalist anti-Francoist sentiment, and their home matches became 
regular gatherings of Basque or Catalan sentiment, where the regional 
language would be spoken without fear of arrest, where forbidden songs 
would be sung, and where, from the late 1960s onwards, the outlawed 
regional flags would be waved with relative impunity. It is true that, 
the same as occurred at football matches in Bilbao and Barcelona, there 
were several arrests by the Polic(a Armada over the years at basketball 
matches for flag-flying offences. 8 Generally, however, the sports 
centre, like the football stadium, was a tolerated centre of regionalist 
expression. 
On the occasion of the visits of the Real Madrid basketball team to 
these two repressed regions, Basque and Catalan contempt for the 
centralist regime found a largely tolerated outlet. The hostile 
reception for Real in the two regions was more ferocious and dramatic at 
basketball than at football matches, because of the compact nature of a 
basketball arena. Missiles were regularly thrown at the Real players, 
fighting between the two teams frequently broke out, and there was even 
a violent pitch invasion at FC Barcelona in October 1974, which the 
basketball federation, presided over by the Real Madrid Vice-President 
Raimundo Saporta, punished with a three-month closure of the Barca T 
arena. 9 The Real Madrid basketball supporters retaliated in kind when 
8. As revealed by an examination of the archives of FC Barcelona, there 
was one arrest made in February 1967, at the basketball match 
against Real Madrid, for the flying of the sen era, and two in May 
1972 during the game with Caja Madrid. 
9. For further details, see El Mundo Deportivo, 17-27 October 1974. 
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the Basque or Catalan clubs visited the capital city. In December 1974, 
for example, Real fans stoned the FC Barelona basketball team coach as a 
revenge strike for the pitch invasion two months earlier, thus 
necessitating the postponement of the match. 1° This incident caused 
Leon Thompson, one of Bar a's American imports, to declare: 
"The local derby matches back home in New York used to get pretty 
tense. But that's as nothing compared with these Barcelona-Madrid 
clashes. If things continue like this, there could well be deaths 
one day, who knows? "" 
Athletic de Bilbao and FC Barcelona, however, were not the only 
basketball teams to serve as vehicles for repressed regionalist 
sentiment in Francoist Spain. Mention should also be made, in a Basque 
context, of the clubs Elorriaga Bidasoa, where a pitch invasion during a 
Real Madrid visit occurred in March 1975,12 and the hugely popular 
Sestao. It can be argued that the Joventut club of Barcelona and Sant 
Andreu of Barcelona have played the role as catalysts for Catalan 
sentiment, in the same way but to a lesser extent than Baia. Indeed, 
the first pitch invasion in Spanish basketball history occured at Sant 
Andreu in November 1968, during an explosive match with Real Madrid. 13 
The politically-charged struggle for Spanish sporting supremacy 
between Real Madrid and FC Barcelona continued in volleyball and 
handball, both amateur sports. As was the case with both football and 
basketball, volleyball and handball matches between the two giant clubs 
10. For further details, see As, 2-3 December 1974. 
11. Quoted in Dicen, 3 December 1974. 
12. See, for example, As, 9 December 1975. 
13. For further details, see El Mundo Deportivo, 16 November 1968. 
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were followed by invasions of angry Barsa supporters. 14 
There were also other sports, particular to the Basques and 
Catalans, which served as vehicles for regional sentiment. In the 
Basque country, the sports of pelota and rowing, both of which were 
energetically promoted by Athletic de Bilbao and Real Sociedad de San 
Sebastian, fulfilled this function. 15 In a Catalan context, mention 
should be made of roller-skate hockey and rugby. 16 All four of these 
sports accentuated Basque and Catalan cultural distinctiveness, and 
provided regular opportunities for speaking in the regional languages. 
These sports, however, were practically unique to the two regions, and 
therefore there were no potentially explosive clashes with Real Madrid 
teams in which the Basques and Catalans could vent their anger and 
frustration about centralism, volleyball and handball. 
The context for this chapter should be established not only by 
isolating the other sports which served as catalysts for Basque and 
14. See, for example, El Mundo Deportivo, 7 October 1972. 
15. These two sports were almost exclusively practised in the Basque 
Country. Players from the two major Basque clubs always constituted 
a majority in the Spanish national pelota team, while the rowers 
from these two clubs on two occasions, in 1972 and 1976, constituted 
a majority in the Spanish Olympic rowing team. 
16. Roller-skate hockey had only been played in Catalonia, Portugal and 
in the parts of South America where there was a sizeable Catalan 
immigrant community. The Spanish national team, frequently "world" 
champions, has been composed almost exclusively of Catalans, with 
Barra players usually in the majority. Rugby, however, has not been 
confined to Catalonia, having spread across the whole of Spain. Its 
popularity in Catalonia, though, far exceeds that in any other 
region. The Spanish team has traditionally been practically all- 
Catalan. The team for the friendly match against Argentina in 
Barcelona in October 1973, for example, was composed entirely of 
Catalans, while the team for the match with West Germany in Madrid 
the following April included only one: non-Catalan. 
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Catalan sentiment in opposition to the Franco regime, but also by 
discussing the role of football as a vehicle for regionalist opposition 
to centralist dictatorship in other parts of the world. Because of 
being by far the most popular spectator sport, football has, frequently 
served as a vehicle for the sentiment and pride of a particular region, 
and this is especially the case when that region is being repressed by 
centralism. Political parties, flags and languages are immediately 
suppressed, and implicit forms of expression which are roughly tolerated 
by the centralist regime become of immense importance to the repressed 
region. Football is not, of course, the only example of these tolerated 
implicit forms of rational expression. Art, music, literature, theatre 
and other sports can also serve as-catalyst for regionalist sentiment` 
and opposition. 
In the specific context of international football, several clubs 
outside Spain have clearly acted as vehicles of opposition for repressed 
regions. In the Soviet Union, for example, the Dynamo Tiblisi club has 
traditionally served as a catalyst for repressed Georgian nationalism, 
with the supporters speaking the Georgian language rather than Russian, 
and with the club usually staging pre-match Georgian dancing 
exhibitions. The home matches of Dynamo Tiblisi against the powerful 
Moscow teams have become just a highly-charged and potentially violent 
as Barra or Athletic de Bilbao versus Real Madrid during the Franco 
years. 17 
17. See, for example, World Soccer, November 1979 and May 1981. 
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In very much the same way as Dynamo Tiblisi in Georgia, the Ararat 
Yereven club has served as a vehicle of expression and protest for the 
repressed Armenian. Over the years, there have been many violent 
incidents during the visits of the Moscow teams. 18 Furthermore, several 
Yereven players have refused to appear in the Soviet national team in 
protest against continued repression, 19 a tactic that was adopted, as 
shall shortly be seen in detail, by the celebrated Athletic de Bilbao 
goalkeeper Jose Angel Iribar. 
A brief mention should also be made of Dynamo Zagreb representing 
the repressed region of Croatia in Yugoslavia, 20 and of Slogan 
Bratislava fulfilling the same role in Czechoslovakia for the dis- 
affected Moravians. 2' The struggles of all of these regionalist clubs 
against those of the capital city have always been tense and frequently 
violent, while their participation in the European competitions has 
given these repressed regions an opportunity to internationally project 
themselves. 
It is now necessary to offer a detailed illustration of the 
18. In July 1969, the stadium of Ararat Yereven was closed for three 
months following a violent pitch invasion in a match with Dynamo 
Moscow. Games against Torpedo Moscow in Yereven were twice 
suspended, in April 1976 and September 1978, because of missile- 
throwing at the visiting players. In April 1983, the team coach of 
Dynamo Moscow was stoned while leaving the vicinity of the Yereven 
stadium, which provoked a further two month closure, and the threat 
of enforced relegation if further violent incidents occurred. For 
further details of Ararat Yereven, see World Soccer, August 1969, 
and May 1984. 
19. See World Soccer, May 1984. 
20. For further details, see World Soccer, October 1981. 
21. See, for further details, World Soccer, March 1968, October 1973 and June 1975. 
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relationship between football and regionalism in Francoist Spain, 
beginning with the Basque clubs because of their numerical superiority. 
It could be argued that the Osasuna club of Pamplona should be included 
in this study of the political significance of Basque football. As 
shall be seen in the Epilogue to this thesis, Osasuna undoubtedly 
played a significant role in the transition from dictatorship to 
democracy, by adopting an all-Basque player policy and clearly siding 
with the Basque nationalist movement rather than with the devotees of a 
non-Basque Navarre. During the Franco period, however, the opposite was 
very much the case. Osasuna was a club led by Francoists, who 
immediately changed the club's traditional all-Basque player policy, 22 
and well supported by staff and students of the famous Rightist Opus Dei 
university in Pamplona. 23 In addition, Osasuna was a club of secondary 
sporting importance during the Franco years, playing in the first 
division for only four seasons. 
As seen in the Introduction to this thesis, both Athletic de 
Bilbao and Real Sociedad clearly came out in favour of a degree of 
Basque autonomy before the outbreak of the Civil War. In April 1937, 
the players`of the two clubs, many of whom had previously served in the 
22. As revealed by an examination of the archives of El Mundo Deportivo, 
the all-Basque player policy of Osasuna, adopted in 1921, was 
abandoned by the completely Sew board of directors headed by the 
appointee of General Moscardo, the army Colonel Juan Antonio Solana 
in March 1939. Thenceforth, the Osasuna team was composed by a 
combination of local Navarrans and players from other Spanish 
regions, with very few Basque from the provinces of Guipuzcoa, 
Vizcaya and Alava. 
23. It is estimated by Juan Jose Castillo, the veteran editor of E1 
Mundo Deportivo, that approximately a quarter of the Osasuna 
supporters during the Franco years were either staff or students of 
the Opus Dei university. 
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Basque militias defending' their homeland, came together to form the 
backbone of the El Euzkadi team which toured Europe and Mexico and 
refused to return to Francoist Spain. 
Given the clear political identity of the Athletic de Bilbao club, 
it is not surprising that it was viewed with suspicion by the 
Nationalist conquerers under General Fidel Davila in June 1937. In 
addition to the support for Basque autonomy and the El Euzkadi team, two 
of the clubs' directors, Aitor Azcargorta and Patxi Gorrotxategi, had 
died in the conflict, and many members had either similarly perished, 
were in Francoist prisons, or were continuing the struggle against the 
Nationalist forces in another part of Spain. 24 
The club was only saved from post-war extinction by a public call 
from the Civil 4overnor of Vizcaya province for prospective new 
directors to gather at an extraordinary meeting in August 1937.25 As 
seen in Chapter Three of the thesis, it has been alleged that the major 
motive of the new Francoist authorities in helping to save Athletic and 
other clearly pro-Republican football clubs, for example FC Barcelona 
and Valencia, from disappearance was to ensure that the game could serve 
as a kind of political soporific or "social drug", and so mitigate part 
of the austerity and repression of the posr-Civil War years. Whatever 
the motives of the Civil Governor of Vizcaya, there were enough Athletic 
supporters amongst the Basque bourgeoisie who had supported Franco to 
24. Information revealed by an examination of the archives of Athletic 
de Bilbao. 
25. This call was published in all of the Bilbao newspapers of 11 August 
1937. 
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form a new board of directors and put the club back in business. 2' The 
new directors were mostly local businessmen, bankers, shipbuilders and 
export agents, who had largely maintained a low profile during the Civil 
War. There were also two Basque Falangists, Antonio Echevarr(a and Juan 
Carlos Crespo, 27 on the reconstituted Athletic board of 1937. 
In this way, the political character of Athletic de Bilbao was 
completely transformed in the space of three months. The objectives of 
the new directors, led by the banker Luis Casajuana, were to build a new 
young team, while ensuring that the club "would never again identify 
itself with the anti-patriotic forces that criminally seek to destroy 
national unity". 28 
An example of the obedience of the new Athletic board to the 
Francoist authorities can be-found with regard to the enforced change of 
club name. In January 1941, the local Jefatura Provincial de. 
Propaganda, ordered the club to change its title to the Castilianized 
Atletico. Casajuana and his directors meekly assented to the change. 
According to the official club history Historia del Athletic Club, it 
was undoubtedly a change for the worse: 
"Effectively, 1 February 1941 is a sad date for the great Athletic 
pride and sensitivity with regard to the club name, invariably 
maintained since foundation". 29 
26. According to the archives of Athletic de Bilbao, 23 persons 
presented themselves at this meeting, only one of whom, Alfredo 
Bengoechea, had previously served as an Athletic director, during 
the years 1929-1934. 
27. Revealed by the Athletic de Bilbao archives. 
28. According to the archives of Athletic de Bilbao, these were the 
words of President Casajuana at the first regular meeting of the 
newly-constituted board, in September 1937. 
29. Historia del Athletic Club, Bilbao, 1974, p. 86. 
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Although: Real Sociedad de San Sebastian obviously did not have to change 
its name, a complete change in the nature of the club leadership was 
necessary because the majority of the pre-Civil War directors had been 
pro-Republican. For example, one Real director, Andoni Nußez, had died 
fighting against the Francoist conquest of Guipuzcoa province, whilst 
two colleagues, Juan Antonio Betelu and Miguel Onaindia, preferred to 
cross the French border and enter into exile rather than remain in 
Francoist Spain. 30 Like its Bilbao rival, the club needed a new board 
of local pro-Franco businessman, led by the industrialist authorities. 
The two major Basque clubs had serious problems in forming decent 
teams in the immediate post-Civil War years. Some Basque players had 
died in the conflict, Jose Dunabeita of Real Sociedad for example, 
whilst all but-two of the famous El Euzkadi team remained in Mexico. 
The two clubs were forced completely to rebuild with young players who 
had survived the Civil War, and who saw in football an opportunity to 
escape the hunger and misery from which the great majority were 
suffering. These new young teams developed in an atmosphere of militant 
Falangism and systematic repression in the Basque Country. 
Athletic de Bilbao managed to rebuild far more effectively than 
Real Sociedad, and dramatically carried off the newly-named Copa del 
Generalisimo on three successive occasions, from 1943 to 1945. Given 
the political climate of the early 1940s, it is not surprising that 
these Athletic triumphs were subjected to the application of Falangist- 
inspired mystification. This mystification was largely encouraged by 
30. Information revealed by the archives of Real Sociedad de Sebastian. 
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the declarations to the Press of Eduardo Lastagaray, a prominent local 
Falangist who had replaced Antonio Echevarria on the Athletic board in 
October 1942.31 The young and physically powerful Bilbao team was 
acclaim by the sporting Press to be the embodiment of the furia 
espanola, 32 a concept which, as illustrated in Chapter Two, had acquired 
an obvious political significance. The spectacular Athletic forward- 
line was given the good military title of the "five artillerymen", 33 
whilst the tall and courageous centre-forward Telmo Zarra was held up by 
the media as a shining example of the "virile, impetuous and furious" 
new generation that was about to lead Spain into a new and glorious 
imperial age. 34 
The dramatic triumphs of the 1943-1945 period served to revitalize 
the old network of Athletic de Bilbao supporters' clubs across the whole 
31. In Marca, 29 May 1943, for example Lastagaray was qouted as saying, 
immediately ater Athletic's 1-0 victory over Real Madrid in the cup 
final, help in Madrid, that: 
"Today's victory demonstrates the limitless potential of our 
magnificent young team. We are the authentic furia espafiola, a 
team of courageous, powerful, committed, virile young players, 
a shining example of the young generation that will lead our 
new, reborn Spain to glory. " 
After watching Athletic defeat Espafiol in their own Sarriä stadium 
on 12th November 1944, Lastagaray was moved to declare to El Mundo 
Deportivo: 
"Once again, we have demonstrated our virility, discipline and 
courage. Ours are the kind of young men that Spain will need 
in the battles that surely lie ahead if we are to fulfill our 
historic destiny. " 
32. For further details, see, for example: Marca, 29-31 May 1943,19 
March 1944,5 June 1944,1-6 June 1945; El Mundo Deportivo, 5 June 
1944,12 November 1944,4 June 1945; ABC, 4 June 1945; Arriba, 2-6 
June 1945. 
33. This title was first bestowed upon the Athletic forwards by Marca, 
30 January 1944, and subsequently adopted by the Spanish sporting 
media as a whole. 
34. The most complete examples of the politically significant 
mystification of Telmo Zarra can be found in an extensive profile of 
the player in Marca, 7-12 December 1944, and in Arriba, 3-6 June 
1945. 
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of Spain, and even to inspire the formation of new ones. In 1936, there 
Were 196 such supporters clubs outside the Basque Country, a figure 
that fell to 78 by 1941, because of the turmoil of the Civil War and 
the subsequent repression and hunger. By 1947, however, there was a 
record number of 243 local clubs in existence, and this figure would 
steadily increase throughout the Franco years, arriving at a peak of 293 
in 1968.35 In the Introduction to this thesis, it was noted that the 
motive for the proliferation of these Athletic supporters' clubs has 
allegedly been partly political, with workers in all Spanish regions 
regarding the Bilbao club as a potent anti-Francoist system. 
Real Sociedad had only a fraction of the number of supporters' 
clubs outside the Basque Country of Athletic de Bilbao, but'was 
nonetheless also largely regarded in the 1940s and 1950s as a club with 
an implicit anti-Francoist character. They aroused the suspicion of the 
Francoist sporting authorities in June 1946, when they engaged as coach 
Benito Diaz, a former footballer who had served the Republic during the 
Civil War as the Sub-Director of the Federation of Orange Exporters, and 
had then fled to France. 36 Similar suspicions were aroused in May 1949, 
when the San Sebastian club replaced Diaz With Salvador Art gas, who had 
been a Republican fighter pilot in the conflict. 37 
Artigas proved to be a useful coach for Real Sociedad, despite the 
political suspicions surrounding him, but he came nowhere near to 
35. Information revealed by an examination of the Athletic de Bilbao 
archives. 
36. For further details about the suspicions surrounding Benito Diaz' 
past, see Francisco Cerecedo, op. cit. p. 
37. LSee Cerecedo) ibid. r 
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emulating the achievements of neighbours Athletic de Bilbao. Athletic 
reached their peak of popularity and success in the Francoist period 
during the years 1955-1958, when they won the cup three times and the 
league championship once. 
In June 1958, an argument with political undertones broke out when 
the Bilbao team were due to play agaist Real Madrid in the cup final. 
Because of the centralist nature of the Franco regime, as seen in the 
Introduction to this thesis, the DND had issued a ruling in March 1941 
that the final of every national sporting competition should take place 
in Madrid. 38 Football cup finals before the Civil War had been staged 
in various Spanish cities, according to the geographical position of the 
two finalists. During the Franco years, however these finals were all 
played in the capital city, and from 1948 onwards in the Estadio 
Bernabeu of Real Madrid. 
The Bilbao Press-began a compaign against the 1958 final being 
held in the Bernabeu, thus giving Real a crucial home advantage, and 
included pleas from the Athletic players for a neutral venue, preferably 
I 
Zaragoza or Valladolid. 39 The Athletic board, still largely composed of 
Francoist local businessmen, was reluctant to complain to the RFEF about 
the issue, but was ultimately forced to do so by the pressure from the 
38. Revealed by an examination of the archives of the DND. 
39. The first Bilbao newpapers to request that the final be played in a 
neutral venue was El Correo Espanol on May 22 1958, including pleases 
to the same effect from the Athletic players Angel Carmelo and Jose 
Maria Maguregui. In La Gaceta del Norte of the following day, 
there were similar pleas to play the final outside the capital, with 
quotations from the Athletic captain Piru Gainza, and the players 
Jesus Garay and Jose Arieta. 
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Press, players and supporters. The RFEF, demonstrating its lack of 
power during the Franco period, passed the Bilbao complaint up to the 
DND, which insisted upon the final being played in Madrid, but gave- 
Athletic the choice of the Bernabeu or At. letico Madrid's Estadio 
Metropolitano. 40 The Bilbao Press urged Athletic to choose the 
Bernabeu, in order to make the injustice being visited upon the club 
appear quite clear. 41 This was exactly what the Athletic board did, and 
then, in an unprecedented move to arrange cheap coaches and trains to 
allow a record 30,000 Basque supporters to make the trip to Madrid. 42 
There was a hostile atmosphere at the match, and several fights between 
rival supporters. On the field, a tough match including six bookings 
saw Athletic record an historic 2-0 victory against the European 
Champions-Real. 
It had been alleged on various occasions that this 1958 cup final 
dispute served to reawaken the dormant political conscience of the 
40. In the author's examination of the Athletic de Bilbao archives, a 
letter, dated 29 May 1958, from the President of the RFEF was 
uncovered. The letter acknowledged a correspondence of the previous 
week from Athletic complaining about the "neutral" venue. In the 
light of the intransigence of the DND, the RFEF regretted "having to 
inform your club of the neccessity of staging the said final at 
either the Estadio Bernabeu or the Estadio Metropolitano, whichever 
of the two is more convenient to yourselves". 
41. Both of the Bilbao newspaper La ßaceta del Norte and El Correo 
Espanol, upon hearing of the intransigence of the DND, confirmed in 
the letter discussed in the above footnote, suggested that Athletic 
should choose to play the final in the Estadio Bernabeu, in their 
editions of 1 June 1958. 
42. According to the Athletic de Bilbao archives, the club arranged with 
the Spanish national railway company and two separate private coach 
companies a special low price of one hundred pesetas for the 
Athletic supporters to travel to the final in Madrid. An estimated 
20,000 Basque followers made the journey to the capital by train, 
6,000 by coach, and the remaining 4,000 by private means. 
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Athletic de Bilbao supporters, players and even directors. 43 It has 
also been claimed that the dispute caused the Basque people in general, 
not only football fans, to identify with Athletic in their struggle 
against the Francoist sporting authorities, and then Franco's team. 44 
From 1958 onwards, there was a noticeably more hostile attitude to Real 
Hadr; d in their visits to Bilbao and San Sebastian, with frequent 
outbreaks of violence both on and off the field. 45 
This new spirit of dissent and confrontation in Basque football 
culminated, during the period 1969-1975, in a joint campaign by the two 
major Basque clubs against the illegal entry into Spain of foreign 
players. As seen in Chapter Three of this thesis, because of the DND's 
unpopular and dictatorial prohibition of foreign footballers from 1962 
to 1973, the majority of clubs signed on South Americans, mostly 
Paraguayans, who has false documents to support their claim for Spanish 
nationality on the basis of their parentage. The two Basque clubs, who 
43. This allegation has been made to the author by, among other: Juan 
Crespo, veteran the football correspondent of La Gaceta del Norte; 
Julio Lamana, the veteran general secretary of Athletic; the former 
Athletic players and coaches Inaki Säez) Jose Angel Iribar and 
Javier Clemente. 
44. This was claimed to the author by all of the interviewees listed in 
the footnote above. 
45. In February 1959, for example, the Real Madrid player Francisco 
Gento was felled by a missile, in a stormy match in Athletic's 
Estadio San Mames which saw four bookings and two expulsions. In 
October 1964, the same fixture in Bilbao was suspended for twenty 
minutes because of a pitch invasion by Athletic supporters 
protesting about an allegedly offside Real goal. Exactly two years 
later, two players from each side were sent off in another tense 
Athletic-Real clash. In San Sebastian in March 1965. the Real 
Madrid team coach was attacked by angry Real Sociedad supporters, 
after a controversial 2-1 victory for the team from the Spanish 
capital. For further deatils of these incidents, see for example, 
Marca, El Correo Espafiol and La Gaceta del Norteof 26 February 
1959,10 October 1964,2 October 1966 and 19 March 1965. 
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had not used foreign players for fifty years, were obviously in favour 
of this DND import ban which did so much to help their chances of 
success. They were naturally angered when the number of these South 
Americans with dubious documents sharply increased in the period 1969- 
1971, and especially so when both the DND and the REF turned a blind eye 
to their complaints. 4S 
In October 1971, Athletic de Bilbao and Real Sociedad jointly took 
the unprecedented step of engaging a leading lawyer to pursue their case 
against the Trancoist authorities, Jdse Maria Gil Robles, the son of the 
famous monarchist politician of the same name. In order to prevent a 
huge scandal about its complicity in the issue, the DND decided to pre- 
empt Gil Robles's findings by lifting the ban on foreign players in June 
1973.47 
This joint campaign of the Basque clubs earned them the hostility 
46. The Presidents of Athletic de Bilbao and Real Sociedad, Jose Maria 
Oraa and Jose Luis Orbegozo respectively, jointly wrote five letters 
to the RFEF about the scandal of the South American players, copies 
of which are kept in the archives of Athletic. These letters, 
dated 17 February 1969,24 August 1969,28 April 1970, " 12 August 
1971 and 10 October 1971, complain, in a gradually more indignant 
tone, about the RFEF's lack of action with regard to the falsely- 
documented South American players. The final letter informed the 
RFEF about the engagement of a leading lawyer to fight the case. 
47. That trepidation about the investigations of Gil Robles was one of 
the motives of the DND in lifting the prohibition on foreign players 
is demonstrated by the actual wording of the announcement of the end 
of the eleven-year ban, published in the Boletin Of'icial de la DND, 
No. 359, July 1973: 
"It has been decided, in the light of the wishes of the 
majority of clubs and certain problems created by a possible 
evasion of the rules of the old system, to permit two foreign 
footballers per professional club rom season 1973/1974 onwards, 
whatever their nationality or conditions. " 
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of all of the clubs with illegal South American players, especially Real 
Madrid, whose visits to the Basque Country became even more tense 
affairs. 48 Nevertheless, the campaign had served to unite the two 
Basque football clubs by revealing the incompetence and lack of respect 
for the Basques of the Francoist sporting authorities. 49 
This campaign against the illegal entry' of the South American 
players broadly coincided with the gradual resurgence of Basque 
nationalism in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The businessmen on the 
boards of Athletic de Bilbao and Real Sociedad were slowly becoming more 
receptive to the ideology of the clandestine Basque Nationalist Party 
(PNV), which was in favour of a return to democracy and regional 
autonomy. 5° It has been estimated that about half of the supporters of 
48. In November 1971, or example, the visit of Real Madrid to Athletic's 
Estadio San Mamees resulted in six players booked, one expelled, and 
27 Basque supporters arrested for attempting to invade the field and 
attack the Real players. In the return match in the Estadio 
Bernabeu in March 1972, the Real fans retaliated by jeering the 
Athletic team as they took the field, and then showering them with 
missiles. In January 1973, as the investigations of Gil Robles 
began to uncover the illegality of the documents of many South 
American players, including those of Real Madrid's Paraguayan 
forward Ruben Fleitas, another fierce Athletic-Real battle in Bilbao 
saw four players booked, the Real defender Gregorio Benito laid out 
by a bottle, and another attempted pitch invasion. For further 
details of these incidents, see Marca, As and La Gaceta del Norte, 
of 1 December 1971,7 March 1972 and 21 January 1973. 
49. This is the opinion of Juan Crespo, Julio Lamana, Inaki Säez, Jose 
Angel Iribar and Javier Clemente. 
50. This was alleged to the author by Juan Crespo, Julio Lamana, and the 
former Real Sociedad President Jose Luis Orbegozo. This point is 
also evidenced by the large number of directors of the two major 
Basque clubs who became members of the PNV after its legalization in 
1977: the then President of Athletic de Bilbao Jesus Dun"abeita; the 
former Athletic President Jose Antonio Eguidazu; the Athletic 
directors Iäaki Aguirre and Jose Maria Gorriz; the former Real 
Sociedad President Jose Luis Orbegozo; the Real Sociedad director 
Jose Lopez Iturbe. 
these two clubs were broadly in agreement with the objectives and 
methods of the PNV, while approximately a quarter of them supported the 
armed-struggle of ETA against the Franco regime. 51 It was this latter 
radical group of Basque supporters who dared to bring out the outlawed 
national flag, the ikurrina, on the Athletic terraces for the first time 
in January 1971, thus provoking a scuffle with the Policia Armada. 52 
Three months later, the pro-ETA minority of Real Sociedad supporters 
followed the Bilbao example. Furthermore, a group of young hooligans, 
the first of its kind in Spain, formed out of the most politically 
radical Athletic supporters in the years 1973-1975. This group, which 
adopted the name Frente-Norte, was responsible, in October 1974, for the 
throwing of missiles at the'Real Madrid players, and for afterwards 
stoning the coaches of the travelling Real supporters, the first 
incidents in a catalogue of partly politically-motivated hooliganism 
which continues in the present day. 
In the early 1970s, the stadia of Athletic de Bilbao and Real 
Sociedad became centres of clandestine Basque political activity. This 
process began in December 1970, when leaflets in support of the accused 
at the infamous Burgos military show trials were distributed on the 
terraces. '3 From then onwards, the two stadia were primary targets for 
the propaganda of both the PNV and the more radical abertzale pro-ETA 
51. These estimates were made to the author by Juan Crespo, Julio 
Lamana, Jose Angel Iribar, Javier Clemente and Jose Luis Orbegozo. 
52. This incident was neither reported or discussed in the Press, but 
was referred to in the archieves of Athletic, as "an unfortunate 
happening regarding a group of supporters with a forbidden flag and 
members of the Policia Armada". 
53. This was confirmed to the author by various veteran Athletic 
supporters, as well as by Julio Lamana and Juan Crespo. 
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groupings that would later come together to form the Herri Batasuna 
coalition. 54 The Policia Armada occasionally made arrests outside the 
stadia after discovering spectators trying to enter carrying such 
propaganda or the ikurrina flag. 
It is perhaps not surprising, given the circumstances described 
above, that the Basque footballers began to develop a political 
consciousness. The first player to do so was the Athletic de Bilbao 
goalkeeper Jose Angel Irfbar, an immensly popular figure across the 
whole of Spain because of both his magnificent-performance for the 
national team and his devout Catholicism. Like so many Basques, Iribar 
was deeply affected by the Burgos military trials, which, as he himself 
explains, were the catalyst for his own political development: 
"The Burgos trials caused me to think politically, in a profound 
way, for probably the first time in my life. It seems that these 
trials effected a change in many other Basques as well, in 
colleagues in the team. Before, I had been too wrapped up in 
football to give much thought to politics. It had obviously seemed 
wrong to me since childhood that we could not speak our mother 
tongue in the street or learn it in the schools. But until the 
Burgos business I did not give it much attention. The events of 
December 1970 really shook me up, because the militAiy prosecutors 
were trying to have the Basqueshung with only the flimsiest of 
evidence, without giving them a fair trial. I really believe that 
the trials were counter-productive for the Franco regime, because 
they demonstrated to the Basques the real nature of Francoist 
justice, and also gave a glimpse into the ideology of ETA. It was 
then that I really began to think about the repression of Euzkadi, 
and it occurred to me that perhaps one day I could use my fame and 
popularity to make a significant political gesture. "55 
Five years passed until Iribar! s "significant political gesture" 
54. This was confirmed to the author by the same sources as in the above 
footnote. 
55. Author's interview with Jose Angel Iribar. 
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occurred. In that time, the number of political leaflets and ikurridas 
on the Basque football terraces increased, 56 the joint campaign of the 
Basque clubs against the illegal South American players gained strength, 
the clashes with Real Madrid became more ferocious, 57 and the Basque 
language came increasingly into use at the two clubs. 58 
Iribar's gesture occurred in September 1975, and turned out to be 
the most politically significant gesture made against the Franco regime 
through football. On the 27th of that month, the ageing dictator, who 
had only two months left to live, ignored the pleas for clemency from 
the Pope and the European Community, and insisted upon the execution of 
three FRAP and two ETA members convicted of terrorism by a military 
tribunal, because of confessions allegedly made under torture. Like the 
great majority of Basques, Iribar was enraged by the executions, " and 
decided to demonstrate his contempt for the Franco regime. He explained 
to his Athletic team-mates that he was going to wear a black armband for 
the following match, away to Granada, and persuaded them to do the same. 
Iribar afterwards claimed to the suspicious Press that the armbands had 
served to commemorate the anniversary of the death of the obscure ex- 
Athletic player and director Luis Albert, but nontheless the real motive 
was generally realized, even though it could obviously not be expressed 
56. This was confirmed by the same sources as in footnotes 55 and 56. 
57. As already seen in footnote 49 of this chapter, the joint campaign 
of Athletic and Real Sociedad contributed towards the DND lifting 
the prohibition on the important of foreign players in June 1973. 
58. As revealed by the archives of the two major Basque clubs, Real 
Sociedad adopted a policy of making all official club announcements 
in both Basque and Castilian from August 1972 onwards, and Athletic 
de Bilbao decided to follow suit exactly a year later. 
59. Author's interview with Jose Irrbar. 
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in print. 60 
Before carrying out the gesture, Iribar had informed Athletic de 
Bilbao President Jose Antonio Eguidazu of his intentions, and the latter 
offered his tacit approval. 61 He also attempted to persuade the Real 
Sociedad players to follow suit, but without success62. Iribar was 
successful, however, in persuading Aitor Aguirre, the Basque centre- 
forward of Räcing de Santander, and his politically conscious team-mate 
Sergio, "a PSOE supporter from Valencia, to join in the armband gesture 
for their team's home match with Elche. - Three members of the Francoist 
political police, the Brigada Socio-Politico, actually entered the 
Racing dressing-room at half-time and obliged the two politically- 
conscious players tö remove the armbands. Four days later, Aguirre and 
Sergio were fined the considerable sum of a hlundred thousand pesetas 
each, equivalent to almost two months' wages, by the Civil Governor of 
Santander for "provoking a possible breach of the peace". 63 
Iribar summed up"the impact of the gesture in the following way: 
"The gesture was really successful, even more than I had hoped for, 
despite the Real Sociedad disappointment. The public clearly 
60. This was alleged to the author by Julio Lamana, Juan Crespo, Inaki 
Säez, by the Marca journalists Jose Maria Lorente and Rodolfo 
"Belarmo" and by Juan Jose Castillo, the veteran editor of 
El Mundo Deportivo. 
61. Author's interview with Jose Angel Iribar. 
62. Ibid. 
63. Although the news of the fining of Aguirre and Sergio was not 
published in the local, national or specialist sporting Press, it 
was revealed by Sergio to Don Balön No. 7,18 November 1975. In 
this interview, Sergio ironically added that "the armbands were not 
worn out of friendship". 
309 
realized the true motive for the armbands, and this hopefully 
caused them, both Basque and Spaniard, to think deeply about the 
repression of Euzkadi. "64 
As will be fully illustrated in the Epilogue to this thesis, this 
black armband gesture was the prelude to the adoption of a clear 
political position by the two major Basque football clubs; players and 
supporters during the years of transition from dictatorship to 
democracy. It would be a position similar to the one adopted by Basque 
football in the years preceding the Civil War, unequivocally in favour 
of nation-wide democracy, Basque autonomy, and the promotion of the 
Basque language. In this way, the political significance of Basque 
football completed a full circle, leaving behind almost forty years of 
largely pro-Francoist leadership and politically passive players and 
supporters. 
A few words about the lesser Catalan football clubs are appropriate 
at this point, before the political significance of FC Barcelona is 
discussed in detail. The first other Catalan club to be mentioned 
should be Espanol de Barcelona. As illustrated in the Introduction to 
this thesis, the Espanol-FC Barcelona rivalry was, and indeed continues 
to be, a local version of the Real Madrid-Ba rr9a rivalry, with a similar 
political significance. During the Franco period, FC Barcelona was the 
club of the vast majority of Catalonia's six million inhabitants, 
64. Author's interview with Jose Angel Iribar. 
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including the provinces of Gerona, Lerida and Tarragona65 and also 
including the majority of the immigrants to the region from other parts 
of Spain. 66 Espaäol, in contrast, had a very small following, mostly 
composed of non-Catalan State officials posted in Barcelona temporarily, 
professionals and skilled workers from other regions, policemen and 
military personnel. 67 Broadly speaking, the Ba ra supporters were 
mostly anti-Francoist, and in favour of a return to nation-wide 
65. That FC Barcelona was, and indeed continues to be, the effective 
national team of Catalonia is evidenced by the number of Ba'rca 
supporters club and members in the provinces of Gerona, Lerida and 
Tarragona, in comparison with the same numbers for the local clubs. 
As revealed by an investigation of the archives of El Mundo 
Deportivo: carried out by the author in September and October 1984, 
in the summer of 1970 there were 73 local FC Barcelona supporters 
clubs in Gerona province, while there weere only 46 for the local 
second division club, Girona Futbol Club. Furthermore, there were 
approximately 4,000 FC Barcelona members in this province, almost as 
many as Girona's total membership of 5,788. In the province Lerida, 
there were 57 Barca supporters clubs and approximately 3,500 members 
of the premier Catalan club, compared with the 4,334 members and 39 
supporters clubs of the local Uniö Esportiva Lleida. In 1970, there 
were 76 Bar ;a clubs and an estimated 4,000 members in Tarragona 
province, whilst the Gimnastic de Tarragona club could only boast 27 
local clubs and 3,293 members. 
66. The archives of FC Barcelona included lists of the club members for 
every year, although not their place of birth. Although it is an 
imprecise method of evaluation, it can be estimated by means of 
these lists, that approximately 40% of the surnames were either 
completely or half non-Catalan, meaning that the member was either 
an immigrant from another region or the offspring of a marriage 
between an immigrant and a local Catalan. Juan Jose Castillo 
estimates that approximately half of the 40% were immigrants to 
Catalonia during the Franco period. 
67. The same as at FC Barcelona, the archives of the Espanol club, 
include lists of the club members for every year. The significant 
feature of these lists, during the Franco period as well as during 
the pre-Civil War years and the transition from dictatorship to 
democracy, is the almost complete absence of Catalan surnames. Only 
approximately 5% of the members have had two Catalan surnames, and 
between 15% and 20% one Catalan surname and the other from another 
Spanish region. The names of the other 75% or 80% of Espafiol 
members are wholly non-Catalan. 
311 
/ 
democracy and regional autonomy, 68 while the Espanol followers were, in 
their majority, pro-Francoist, in favour of a centralist, unitarian 
State, and opposed to all hints of Catalan separatism or even 
regionalism. 69 The FC Barcelona devotees regarded the Espanol club as a 
kind of "spectre of centralism in their own house", 70 whilst the Espafiol 
supporters largely looked upon Bar, ca as a club with a suspect political 
character, whose supporters dared to converse in an outlawed language. 71 
68. In this case, rather than presenting an extensive and exhaustive 
list of publications and interviewees who have made this generally- 
held allegation, along with the evidence to support this allegation, 
it seem appropriate to point out that this allegation has never been 
challenged, neither by supporters of the Catalan club nor its 
opponents, and that detailed evidence in support of it will be 
presented in the course of this chapter. 
69. This allegation has been made in the following publications; 
Cerecedo op. cite; Artells, op. cit., pp. 24-26; Sabartes, op. cit., 
pp. 13,29,34,22; Manuel Väque z. MDntalän, "Barra, Barga, Barga" 
in Triunfo, 26 October 1969: Julian Garcia Candau, op. cit. p"The 
current President of Espanol, Antonio Bars, however, claimed that 
although their club had a different conception of Catalonia to that 
of FC Barcelona and their supporters, this did not mean to say that 
Espanol was completely in opposition to Catalan autonomy. 
Nevertheless, it must be pointed out that, from the early 1970's 
onwards, there have been frequent burnings of the senyera Catalan 
national flag in the Espanol stadium. Furthermore, the Real Madrid 
team has always enjoyed a far more friendly reception there than FC 
Barcelona. 
70. This phrase is taken from the article"Barc$a, Bar a, Barga" by 
Alfredo Relano and Emilio Perez de Rosas, E1 Pais Semanal, 12 
October 1982. This allegation has been either made or supported in 
practically all the articles and all of the interviews listed in the 
above footnote. 
71. Again, this claim has either been made or supported in the articles 
and interviews listed in Footnote 72. In addition, the Espanol 
President from 1963 until 1969, Antonio Vilä-Reyes, the chairman of 
the fraudulent MATESA textile company who ended up in Madrid's 
Carabanchel Prison, was quoted thus in El_Mundo Deportivo, 7 April 
1968: 
"It does not seem at all right to me that the supporters of a 
certain football club should be effectively permitted to wave a 
flag that is formally forbidden and speak a language that is 
not Castilian, the national language of Spain. In my opinion, 
the game should not be politicized in this way" 
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It is no exaggeration to say that Espanol was the club of the Civil 
War victors, and FC Barcelona the club of the losers. The huge 
superiority of support in Catalonia for Barte has ensured that they have 
always had a far more talented team from their local rivals. Espaßol, 
however, have traditionally considered the two local derby matches to be 
their most important games of the season, with the result that FC 
Barcelons has frequently been humbled by their modest neighbours. The 
vast majority of Espanol supporters have preferred to see Real Madrid 
rather than Ba_ ra as Spanish league champions, and their victories in 
the local derby matches often converted this wish into reality. 72 
The 1940s were the glory years of Espanol. The directors, players 
and supporters, many of whom had fought for the Nationalists in the 
Civil War, 73 had the pleasure of winning the Copa del Generalisimo in 
1940, and battling their way through to the finals of 1941 and 1947. 
Furthermore, they had the perverse pleasure of seeing FC Barcelona 
struggling to survive. 
In later years, there would be no more triumphs for Espafiol to 
celebrate. There would be, however, frequent defeats of Baca to 
maintain enthusiasm at the club, in addition to the occasional transfer 
humiliation of their powerful neighbours, such as occurred with the 
72. During the Franco years, Espanol made a significant contribution to 
Real Madrid winning the league championship by defeating their local 
Catalan rivals in April 1958, March, 1962, April 1968, February 
1969, and April 1975. 
73. As revealed by an investigation of the archives of the club, op. 
cit., two Espaäol players, Jose Luis Perez and Antonio Martin, were 
wounded in the Civil War, fighting in the Nationalist army. 
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controversial signing of the phenomenal former FC Barcelona player and 
coach Ladislas Kubala in June 1963. The dispute over the signing of 
Kubala caused even more animosity between the two Catalan clubs than the 
transfer of the famous goalkeeper Ricardo Zamora had done in 1928.7+ In 
June 1969, Barca obtained partial revenge for the alleged "stealing" of 
Kubala, by controversially signing Espafiol's Spanish international 
forward Marcial Pina, thus further embittering relations between the two 
clubs.? 
The other Catalan clubs that need to be mentioned at this stage are 
Sant Andreu of Barcelona, despite the fact that they have never played 
in the Spanish first division, and Sabadell. Both clubs have played a 
minor role as catalysts for repressed Catalan nationalism and opposition 
to the Franco regime. Their stadia, like those of Athletic de Bilbao, 
Real Sociedad and FC Barcelona, became tolerated centres for the 
speaking of the local language and, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, 
the scene of the distribution of illegal political pamphlets and the 
flying of the outlawed senyera Catalan national flag. 76 
74. For further details of the Kubala signing controversy, see 
El Mundo Deportivo, 24 June -4 July 1963. 
75. See El Mundo Deportivo, 15-28 June 1969 for details of the Marcial 
transfer. 
76. This has been alleged to the author by several Sabadell and Sant 
Andreu supporters, in addition to: Juan Jose Castillo, Joan Josep 
Artells; Antonio Hernäez, the veteran editor of Sport; Jordi 
Golobart, the current President of the Sant Andreu club, a position 
he had occupied since 1975. 
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In January 1941, Sant Andren was ordered by the Jefqtura Provincial 
de Propaganda, to "castilianize" Their club title to San Andres. TT 
In addition, they were the only club to be requested by the DND to 
change their colours, because their traditional red and yellow stripes, 
a perfect copy of the senyera, the Catalan national flag, were 
considered to have "a possible separatist significance". 78 The club was 
"advised" to change to an all-white uniform, the same as Real Madrid's 
and duly did so. 
The Sabadell club possessed a special importance in assimilating 
immigrant workers from the Southern Spanish regions into the mainstream 
of Catalan society. 79 Approximately half of the Sabadell supporters 
during the Franco period were immigrants, many of whom were helped in 
picking up the local language by the native Catalan fans. There was 
practically no division or direction at the club, between the two groups 
partly helped by the fact the Sabadell team has always been a homo- 
geneous combination of local Catalan players and signings from other 
Spanish regions. From August 1972 onwards, all club announcments were 
made in both Catalan and Castilian, and throughout the early 1970s there 
77. Information revealed by an examination of the archives of 
El Mundo Deportivo. 
78. According to the archives of E1 Mundo Deportivo, the Sant Andreu 
club received a letter from the Catalan regional football 
federation, in August 1939, passing on the request from the DND for 
the offending strip to be changed, "because it is feared the highest 
sporting authorities of the land that your team uniform could have a 
possible separatist significance. " Sant Andreu immediately obeyed 
the request, which was never made public, before the start of the 
1939/1940 season. 
79. This subject is fully discussed in the book La historia del 
Centre d'Esports_Sabadell, Barcelona, 1984,, in El Mundo 
Deportivo, 5 February 1974 and 7 August 1977. 
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Were almost as many senyeras waving on the Sabadell terraces as at FC A 
Barcelona's Camp Nou stadium, with the immigrants apparently just as I 
ready to wave the flag of opposition and attonomy as the natives. 80 
It is now appropriate to offer a detailed illustration of the 
political significance of FC Barcelona during the Franco years. As 
seen in the Introduction to this thesis, the Catalan club had clearly 
come out in favour of the Republic during the Civil War. Just as with 
Athletic de Bilbao and Real Sociedad, many Ba_9a directors and 
supporters died fighting the Nationalists. The club President Josep 
Sunyol, for example, lost his life on the Jarama front in March 1937, 
and the director Albert Reventös in the defence of Catalonia against the 
advances of the army of General Juan Yagüe, in November 1938. It is 
estimated that approximately 9,500 of the 16,000 club members that FC 
Barcelona had upon the outbreak of the Civil War either died in the 
conflict, were "purged" afterwards by the National conquerers, were 
imprisoned, or left for exile, mostly crossing the French border on 
foot. 81 Furthermore, only four of the Barca team that left for Mexico 
in April 1937 could bear to return to a, Catalonia under military 
occupation. '2 
80. For further details, see, for example, El Mundo Deportivo, 7 August 
1977. 
81. This is the estimate of Juan Castillo, Joan Josep Artells, 
Nicolau Casaus and Agusti Montal. 
82. The four Barca players who returned from Mexico with club 
sectretary Ro send Calvet in June 1938 were Josep Raich, Josep 
Escolä, Antons Pedrol and Domingo Balmanya. As will presently be 
seen, they would be punished by the DND for having taken part in 
this politically significant venture. 
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In spite of all these problems, FC Barcelona managed to survive. 
As in the case of Athletic de Bilbao, the new Francoist authorities were 
presented with the choice of their allowing the club to die by natural 
causes because of its lack of active directors, members and players, or 
of stepping in to save it from extinction. Given the clear political 
significance of FC Barcelona, the new rulers of Catalonia were extremely 
tempted to permit the club simply to disappear. e3 This would have meant 
depriving the inhabitants of Barcelona of one of their major sources of 
entertainment and, as seen in Chapter Three of this thesis, the Franco 
regime allegedly wanted football to serve as a "social drug" or 
political soporific that would help in mitigating the poverty and misery 
of the post-Civil War years that obviously lay ahead. Partly with these 
arguments in mind, the new authorities decided to assist in the 
preservation of the club, contenting themselves with attempting 
completely to transform its political character. A public call from the 
Civil Governor of Barcelona led to the formation of a new board of 
directors in May 1939.84 This board, to be headed by the Francoist 
textile manufacturer Joan Soler, was largely composed of right-wing 
83. It was alleged in Sabartes, op. cit., p. 17 that the following 
leading Francoist personalities in Catalonia in 1939 were prepared 
to see FC Barcelona cease to exist: the Fascist poet Ernesto Gimenez 
Caballero, installed in Barcelona an enthusiastic supporter of the 
Espanol club; Luis Galinsonga, the editor of the leading Barcelona 
newspaper LaVanguardia_Espanola, a close personal friend of 
Franco and another Espafiol supporter; Juan Fontana Tarrats, the head 
of the Falange in Tarragona province; Jose Diaz de Gomara, the 
apostolic administrator of Barcelona; Enrique Genaro de la Riva, a 
volunteer officer in the Nationalist army during the Civil War, 
appointed President of Espanol by General Moscardo in April 1939. 
There is no documentary evidence, however, that any of these person- 
alities attempted to dissuade the Civil Governor from launching 
his campaign, in May 1939, to save the club from extinction. 
84. This call was published in El_Mundo_Deportivo, on 6 May 1939. 
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Catalan businessmen who had previously been mildly in favour of a degree 
of regional autonomy, and had therfore supported the initiative of 
Fran f esc Camdand, afterwards, Lluis Companys. The revolutionary 
events in Barcelona at the beginning of the Civil War, however, 
especially the enforced collectivization of their businesses by the 
powerful Catalan anarcho-syndicalist movement, had largely horrified 
these future Bam director, who generally considered the Nationalist 
conquest of Catalonia to be a lesser evil. 85 The newly-composed Bapa 
board included the two obligatory Falangists Antonio Valles and Agapit 
Vallmitjana, and the, army colon@1 Manuel Bravo Moreno, who had fought 
ender the command of General Juan Yagüe in the Nationlist invasion of 
the city. FC Barcelona was back in business, but with a completely 
different political character from the one that it had possessed in 
1936. 
The formation of this new right-wing board, however, was certainly 
not the end of Bay's problems. In June 1939, the new DND, under the 
command of the Civil War hero General Jose Moscardö suspended the club 
secretary Rosend Calvet from holding sporting office for 20 years for 
having organized the tour of Mexico, and suspended the four players who 
85. This is the view of Agusti Montal, who recounted to the author that 
his father, himself President of Barr a from 1946 to 1953, was a 
supporter of Cambo's Lliga and then of the Republic upon the 
outbreak of the Civil War, but changed-his political perspective 
when his textile business was collectivized. When the Nationalist 
troops of General Yagüe entered Barcelona in January 1939, Montal 
recalled, his father was sad that the experiment in Catalan autonomy had obviously come to an end, but pleased about the prospect of his business being returned to him. 
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returned for two years each. 86 Therefore, Barca had a very difficult 
task in fielding a decent team for the 1939/1940 league championship. 
The poor performances of the young FC Barcelona team caused a club 
crisis in March 1940, which was promptly resolved by Moscardö using his 
full dictatorial powers to appoint as President his good friend and ex- 
Civil War colleague Enrique Pineiro, the Marques de la Mesa de Asta. 
As pointed out in his inaugural speech, Pineiro considered that he had a 
mission to convert the Catalan club into: 
"... Henceforth a rosette in the crown of triumphs of Spanish sport, 
and its colours will contribute to demonstrate up to what point the 
glorious deeds of our invincible Caudillo Franco have rejuvenated 
the heart of Spain, the heart of thousands and thousands of good 
Spaniards born in Catalonia, who only feel love and admiration for 
the immortal destinies of our beloved homeland. "8? 
Pineiro behaved in the FC Barcelona presidency exactly as the above 
speech indicated that he would. He accepted without a murmur of protest 
the order, in January 1941, to change the club name to Club de Fütbol de 
Barcelona from the Jefatura Provincial de Propaganda. 8e Exactly two 
years later, Pineiro began to promote special radio broadcasts of 
football commentaries for the Blue Division of Falangists fighting 
alongside the Nazis on the Russian front. 
86. In the archives of FC Barcelona, the author uncovered the letter, 
signed by Moscardo and dated 6 June 1939, suspending Calvet and the 
four players, "for having been a part of a tour that offered to the 
outside world a negative view of Spanish sport". 
87. Quoted in El Mundo Deportivo, 27 March 1940 and in Sabartes, op. 
cit., p. 14. 
88. Information revealed by the archives of FC Barcelona. 
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The great majority of Barca supporters detested Pineiro and all 
that he reprpesented. 89 Such supporters, however, were primarily 
concerned, in the difficult early 1940s, with supporting themselves and 
their families, holding down a job and steering clear of any political 
suspicion. In as far as their thoughts centred on football, they wished 
for little more than a winning Bam team that would distract them away 
from the daily grind. The transformation in political character of the 
FC Barcelona leadership was regarded by most Catalan supporters as 
regrettable, but largely only to be expected given the post-Civil War 
political climate. 90 
Nevertheless, there was a small minority of radical Catalanist 
Baarrca-fans who had survived the Civil War and the subsequent purges, 
who, in May 1943, upset all of Pineiro's plans to change permanently the 
character of the club. As seen on various occasions previously in the 
course of this thesis, the oppositon of FC Barcelona to the Franco , 
regime was largely reflected through its stormy relationship with Real 
Madrid, the club regarded by the majority of Catalans as "another arm of 
the repression". 91 Pineiro hoped that the radical section of Barra 
89. This has been alleged in print by Sabartes, op. cit., pp. 14-15, and 
in interviews with the following; Manuel Vazquez Montalbän, Agustf 
Montal, Nicolau Casaus, and Juan Jose Castillo. This allegation is 
also partly borne out by the events of May 1943, to be discussed 
presently. 
90. This has been the view of the majority of veteran FC Barcelona 
supporters interviewed by the author, and of the four interviewees 
mentioned in the above footnote. 
91. This phrase is taken from the article "Barra, Barra, Barra", written 
by Alfredo Relano and Emilio P4rez de Rosas, op. cit. That the 
majority of Barca supporters looked upon Real Madrid in this way was 
alleged to the uthor in many interviews with old FC Barcelona 
followers, and with the four interviewees listed in Footnote 93. 
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supporters had been so reduced by the Civil War and its aftermath so as 
to permit relatively peaceful relations with the Madrid club. " During 
the cup semi final between the two giant clubs in May 1943, however, the 
hopes of Pineiro were dramatically dashed. A minority of the Catalan 
crowd at the Les Corts stadium pelted the Real Madrid players and the 
allegedly biased referee with all manner of missiles. When the referee 
temporarily suspended the match, the anger and frustration was directed 
towards the presidential box, with insults and threats being directed 
not only towards the Real Madrid directors, but also towards Pineiro 
himself. 93 
The DND was just as horrified as Pineiro by this unexpected 
reappearance of the spectre of a politicized FC Barcelona. The 
punishment decreed by General Moscardo was not suprisingly very severe: 
"To impose upon the Club de Futbol Barcelona a fine of two thousand 
five hundred pesetas for the behaviour of the crowd, which 
comported itself with O%tense threats and hostility against the 
visiting team and the referee, and also for the disrespectful and 
inconvenient way in which a notable section of its supporters 
directed themselves repeatedly towards the presidential box, 
occupied by the highest sporting authorities. "94 
92. Before the match with Real Madrid, Pineiro was asked by 
El Mundo Deportivo if he feared crowd trouble. The reply of the 
Barga President was unequivocal: 
"Those unfortunate days of hostility towards the team of the 
capital city have long gone, let there be no doubt about that. 
The FC Barcelona supporters, or so called supporters, who used 
to cause these problems before the "War of Liberation" seem to 
stay away from our stadium now and thankfully so. " 
For further details, see ElMundoDeportivo, 13 May 1943. 
93. For further details of the incidents, see ElMundo Deportivo, and 
Marca, of 15 May 1943. These newspaper accounts, however, do not 
reveal the full scale of the trouble, especially with regard to the 
insults directed at Pineiro and the Real directors. For a more 
accurate report, see Sabartes, op. cit., pp. 15-16. 
94. Quoted in the Boletin Oficial de la DND, No. 4 June 1943. 
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The return match in Madrid took place in an even more hostile 
atmosphere, which contributed to Barga being trounced by the amazing 
scoreline of 11-1.95 The magnitude of Real Madrid's victory has caused 
several allegations of political interference in the result, none of 
which have been supported by any tangible evidence. 96 There were more 
violent acts from the Madrid crowd than had occurred in Barcelona, and 
for this reason Pineiro expected that Real would be punished as least as 
severely by the DND as had been the Catalan club before-97 He was 
indignant, therefore, when the DND ruled that Real would be fined only 
half the amount of Ba. 98 This indignation combined with the effect 
of the-insults received in Les Corts and the humiliation of the 11-1 
95. For further details of the incidents in the return match, see 
Sabartes. op. cit., pp. 16-17, El Mundo Deportivo, and Marca, of 22 
May 1943. 
96. Although none of these allegations have been put into print, even 
since 1975, this claim of political interference to assure the 
passage of Real Madrid into the final has been made to the author by 
the following: Manuel Vazquez Montalban, Alex J. Botines, Joan Josep 
Artells, and several old Barra supporters. Neither Agusti Montal 
nor Nicolau Casaus, however, effectively the official voice of FC 
Barcelona past and present, have alleged political interference in 
the result or partisan refereeing: As pointed out by Montal: 
"What this club complained to the RFEF about at the time, is 
that the hostility and violence of the crowd contributed 
towards the heavy defeat suffered. Indeed, one of the many 
missiles thrown laid out our player Josep Escola, with the 
score at 3-0. Whilst Escola was off the pitch being treated 
for about fifteen minutes, reducing Barca to ten men, Real 
Madrid scored more goals. These are the kind of events that 
make players nervous and force them into mistakes. " 
97. Revealed by an interview in E1 Mundo Deportivo, 23 May, 1943. 
98. When the news of the fine on Real Madrid imposed by the DND was made 
public, Pineiro declared to El Mundo Deportivo, 3 June 1943 that: 
"This news does not please me. Although I obviously respect 
the DND and its reasons for only fining Real Madrid half of the 
amount that it fined us, I believe that their punishment should 
possibly have been more severe because of the unprecedented 
events in Madrid of ten days ago. " 
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defeat to provoke his impetuous resignation. 99 General Moscardö was so 
annoyed by this show of petulance from his formerly obedient colleague- 
in-arms that he decided to replace him with an even more dutiful and 
reliable man, a President who could finally and permanently bring FC 
Barcelona under -centralist control. His choice for this difficult task 
was the-army colonel Jose Vendrell, who had previously served the new 
regime as the delegate for Public Order in La Coruda province. 
Vendrell knew that his mission would be difficult, because the 
incidents of May 1943 and reawakened all of the bitterness of the Baý- 
Real Madrid rivalry, with its obvious political significance. 10° Partly 
because of these incidents, the presidency of Real Madrid was assumed by 
Santiago Bernabeu in September 1943. His ascendancy to power almost 
immediately Worsened relations between the two giant clubs because, as 
seen in detail in the Introduction to this thesis, his personality was 
abrasive and intolerant,. and moreover, he has taken part in the 
Nationalist invasion of Catalonia as a volunteer lieutenant in the army 
of General Agustin Munoz Grandes. It was expected that his first visit 
99. As revealed by the archives of both FC Barcelona and 
E1 Mundo Deportivo, Pineiro offered his resignation to Moscardö on 5 
June 1943. El Mundo Deportivo of 16 June announced curtly that: 
"From the beginning of next week onwards, the President of Club 
de Futbol Barcelona will be the honourable Colonel Jose 
Vendrell Costa. " 
100. This is confirmed by Vendrell's declaration to El Mundo 
Deportivo 22 June 1943, upon assuming control at the Catalan club: 
"I know that the task assigned to me will not be easy. The 
unfortunate incidents of last month have made relations between 
this club and Real Madrid and the sporting authorities of the 
nation difficult. " 
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to the Les Corts stadium would provoke further incidents among the 
Catalan supporters. 10' This was exactly what happened in April 1944, 
when abuse was directed towards Bernabeu and missiles were thrown at the 
Real players. Barca were fined five thousand pesetas by the DND, double 
the amount of the previous fine, and were threatened with having to play 
their-home matches against Real on neutral ground. 102 
Acting on the instructions of an enraged Moscardö. 103 Vendrell 
organized a series of friendly matches between the two rival clubs in 
the summer and autumn of 1944. In this way, relations between Real and 
Barr temporarily improved, but the pattern of politically significant 
problems had already established itself in Francoist Spain, and would 
reappeaion many occasions in the following thirty years. 
In September 1946, Vendrell died and was replaced by Moscardö with 
the former Vice-President Agusti Montal, a wealthy Francoist textile 
101. In the archives of FC Barcelona, examined by the author, op. cit., 
there is a letter from the President of the RFEF, Javier Barroso 
Sanchez-Guerra to Vendrell, dated 7 April 1944, requesting the 
Barca President to assure that there would be no more incidents in 
the forthcoming match in Les Corts. 
102. For further incidents, see El Mundo Depotivo, and Marca, of 22 
April 1944, or Sabartes, op. cit., yp. 17-18. For details of the 
fine and the threat, see the Boletin Oficial de la DND, No. 15, May 
1944. 
103. The autijpr uncovered in the archives of the DND, a letter from 
Moscardo to Vendrell, dated 2 May 1944, in which the 
Delegado_Nacional expressed his "profound sadness and indignation 
at the incidents that occurred in the Las Cortes stadium of your 
club last month". Moscardo went on to suggest that Vendrell 
"organize several exhibition matches with the Real Madrid club, 
in order for relations between the two most important sporting 
clubs in Spain to lift themselves out of the abyss in which they 
now find themselves". 
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manufacturer who had effectively hid himself during the Civil War. 104 
His seven years as Bartaa President were characterized by spectacular 
success on the field, due to a remarkable all-Catalan team, and by the 
celebration of the club's fiftienth anniversary in 1949. 
The man charged with the arrgngement of these celebrations was 
Nicolau Casaus, the former Catalanist Esuuerra Republicans militant who, 
as seen in Chapter Four, had escaped from a death sentence in 1939, and 
had since been forbidden by the DND from holding any sporting office. 
In normal circumstances, Casaus would have been an FC Barcelona director 
and probably also a presidential candidate, because he was-very 
intelligent, hardworking and popular within the club. 105 During the 
Franco period, however, he had to content himself with various unoffical 
posts and temporary responsibilities that the sympathetic Presidents 
offered him over the years. Not surprisingly, his responsibility for 
the anniversary festivities caused political problems for the club. The 
Civil Governor of Barcelona intervened upon hearing that Casaus's speech 
inaugurating the celebrations had referred to Barra traditionally 
serving as a symbol of opposition to centralist Madrid dictatorship, 
without actually mentioning the Franco regime. Furthermore, Casaus had 
104. Author's interview with his son, Agusti Montal, op. cit. 
105. The popularity of Casaus at the club, and his possible assent to 
the presidency in normal circumstances was affirmed to the author 
by the following interviewees: Aqusti Montal, the former Barra 
players Caries Rexach and Joagvlm Rife, Manuel Vazquez Montbalban, 
Juan Jose Castillo, and by many old FC Barcelona supporters. 
325 
allegedly smashed up a photograph of the Caudillo himself. According to 
i 
Casaus: 
"The incidents of-1949 have to be seen in the context of FC 
Barcelona being a very successful club despite the undoubted 
partiality of the RFEF and the other Francoist authorities, while 
by 1949 their beloved Real Madrid had not managed to win a single 
league title since the Civil War. I think that they were anxious 
to stop the success of Bar a, and saw my appointment as head of the 
1949 celebrations as the perfect opportunity. The Civil Governor 
summoned me, and even threatened me with exile on two charges. 
Firstly, he claimed that my inaugural speech had given a 
separatist, anti-centralist message, and then accused me of having 
smashed up a picture of Franco that used to be in the boardroom, 
when in reality I had simply taken it down and put it in a less 
prominent position because it used to fall down every time that the 
door was closed. It would really have given me a lot of pleasure 
to have done the things-that he accused me of, but I had to act 
responsibly in the name of FC Barcelona. In the end, lack of 
evidence forced him to let-me off with a warning. The anniversary 
celebrations went ahead exactly as planned, culminating in the 
dancing, on the Les Corts pitch in front of a capacity 40,000 
crowd, of the biggest sardana organized since the Civil War. "106 
Four years later, FC Barcelona was at the centre of another 
political storm. Both Barca and Real Madrid were eager to sign the 
world-famous Argentine forward Alf redo Di Stefano. The problems partly 
arose because the phenomenal Argentine was playing in the "private" 
Colombian league that had been outlawed by the world football governing 
body FIFA. Marti Carreto, the Catalan textile manufacturer, followed 
the correct procedure and approached the River Plate club of Buenos 
Aires, recognized by FIFA as Di Stefano's proper club. 107 Santiago 
Bernabeu of Real Madrid, however, was not so respectful of the FIFA 
rules, and made direct contact with the Millionarios club of Bogota, 
106. Author's interview with Nicolau Casaus. 
107. For further details of the Barca approaches to River Plate, see 
El Mundo Deportivo, throughou- the whole of June and July 1953. 
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thus hoping to steal 1a march on Marti Carreto. 108 This was exactly 
What Bernabeu had done nine years earlier, in May 1944, when he had sent 
an aeroplane to the Canary Islands to sign up the remarkable Luis 
Kolowny; before the boat sent by Ba ýa arrived. 109 
Di St 
fano 
arrived in Spain in August 1953, unsure about which of 
the two giant clubs he had actually signed for. 'Because of this, 
confusion, the RFEF and ultimately the DND were obliged to intervene. 110 
In the opinion of practically all of the neutral observers, the case of 
FC Barcelona was far stronger, because of their having exactly followed 
FIFA procedure. ill Nevertheless, the DND after having received a full 
report from the RFEF, "2 arrived at the unexpected and bizarre decision 
108. For further details about the efforts of Bernabeu, see either 
Marca, throughout June and July 1953, or Boletin del Real Madrid 
CF, Nos. 25 and 26 July and August 1953. 
109. The battle for the signature of Molowny marked the beginning of the 
dramatic transfer war between the two giant clubs, a war that 
reached its most bitter moment with the Di St4fano affair and still 
continues in the present day. For further details of the Molowny 
transfer, see Marca, and El Mundo Deportivo, 19-27 May 1944. 
110. In the archives of the RFEF, were uncovered letters to the RFEF 
from Real Madrid and FC Barcelona, dated 20 and 22 August 
respectively, asking for that organization to intervene in the 
affair whilst stating their own case. As was usual in these cases 
of arbitration between clubs, the RFEF passed the problem up to the 
DND. 
111. This opinion has been expressed, not surprisingly, to the author by 
all of the interviewees connected with FC Barcelona mentioned 
already in the footnotes to this chapter. In addition, the 
following neutral observers have alleged that the case of Barca 
was far stronger than the Real: Pablo Porta, the former President 
of the RFEF, the former Delegado Nacional de Deportes Benito 
Castejon; Juliän Garcia Candau; Miguel Vidal. 
112. According to the archives of the RFEF, this report about the Di 
Stefano affair was sent to the DND on 29 August 1953. 
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that Di Stefano should be shared, season by season, by the two rival 
clubs. 113 
That Marti Carreto should have accepted this unprecedented ruling 
in a docile manner should come as no suprise in the light of his passive 
role in an incident in Caracas in June of that same year. The episode 
was, for obvious reasons, not recounted in the Press of the time. As 
recalled by Nicolau Casaus, 114 the Barca team was in Venezuela playing UI) 
in the famous Mundialito tournament, with an exiled Catalan on the 
terraces enthusiastically waving a senyera national flag. This type of 
manifestation of defiant nationalism was frequent at FC Barcelona 
matches in South America and France during the Franco years, and 
clearly demonstrates the political significance of the club for Catalan 
Civil War exiles and emigrants. On this occasion, the Spanish 
ambassador in Venezuela and former Falangist President of the RFEF 
Manuel Valdes Larranaga was present, and angarily demanded to Mart f 
Carreto that the offending flag be removed before the match could begin. 
The Falangist ambassador had no right to make such a demand, because 
the senyera was obviously not illegal outside Spain; nonetheless, the 
obedient Marti Carreto despatched his assistant Joan Prado to restrain 
the flag waver, thus causing the indignant exiled Catalans to direct 
accusations of treachery and collaboration with the Franco regime at the 
Barca President. 
113. The descision of the DND, was published in the Bolet n Oficial de 
la DND, No. 1,26 October 1953 and in Marca, and El Mundo 
Deportivo, of 12 September 1953. 
114. Author's interview with Nicolau Casaus. 
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The reaction to the servility of Kart 
( Carreto in Caracas, however, 
was as nothing in comparison to the reaction in Barcelona in September. 
1953; when he returned from Madrid with the news of the agreement about 
sharing Di Stefano. The angry reaction of the Barca directors forced him 
to resign the presidency, the majority of them largely sharing the view 
of most Barr fans that Di Stefano had been "stolen" by Real Madrid in a 
campaign, encouraged by the Francoist sporting authorities, to apply a 
brake to the successes of the Catalan club for political reasons. 115 
The interim committee of ex-Barr Presidents that took over the running 
of the club was so indignant about the ruling of the DND that it took 
the symbolic decision angrily to sell to Real Madrid complete rights 
over-the contract of Di Stefano. 116 The supposed injustice committed 
against FC Barcelona by the DND assumed gigantic proportions over the 
following years, largely because the Argentinian immediately transformed 
Real into an unstoppable team, inspiring a total of eight league 
championships, a record five European Cups and the World Club Cup in the 
period 1954-1964. 
115. That the majority of FC Barcelona supporters and directors held 
this opinion of the Di Stefano affair has been alleged in print by 
Sarbartes, op. cit., pp. 59,64, by Vazquez Montalbän, op. cit., 
and by Cerecdo, op. cit.. Furthermore, this has been alleged to the 
author in interviews with the following: Agustf Montal, Nicolau 
Casaus, Manuel Vazquez Montalban, Juan Jose Castillo, Alex J. 
Botines, and Joan Josep Artells. 
116. The press reports of the Bam decision, in El Mundo Deportivo, 17 
September 1953, for example, do not convey the ambience in which 
the decision was taken, because of the fear of breaking the rules 
of the DND's Comision de Prensa Y Propaganda about reporting the 
decisions of the Francoist sporting authorities. A fuller account 
of the episode can be found in Sabartes, op. cit., p. 60. Agusti 
Montal, interviewed op. cit., recalled to the author that his 
father, the chairman of the BarCa committee of ex-Presidents, was 
extremely angry about the DND'srsruling. 
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Of even greater significance to the aggrieved Barga fans, however, 
was the fact that Di Stefano's arrival at Real was undoubtedly the 
turning point in the sporting struggle between the two giant clubs of 
Spain. Up until 1953, FC Barcelona had completely dominated Spanish 
football, but afterwards, throughout the Franco period, they were always 
in the shadow of Real Madrid. 
The Di Stefano affair caused the political consciousness of the 
direction and especially the supporters of FC Barcelona to be raised. 
The Francoist sporting authorities were regarded as being afraid that 
a4, strengthened by the acquisition of the Argentine forward, would 
continue to dominate, and so committed an injustice in order to weaken 
the Catalan club. 1"7 
From September 1953 onwards, there was a noticeable increase in the 
hostility of the Bar a crowd towards both Real Madrid and the visiting 
leaders of the RFEF and the DND. It has been alleged on many occasions 
that the various Presidents of the RFEF, beginning with Sancho Davila 
Fernandez in December 1953, and the Delegados Nacionales de Deportes, 
beginning with Moscardo in March 1955, were granted a hostile reception 
upon visiting the Les Corts and later Camp Nou stadia, without any 
mention of this hostility, for obvious reasons, being made in the 
Press. 11e It has even been alleged that Moscardö was so infuriated by 
117. The evidence to support this allegation is exactly the same as for 
Footnote-120. 
'- 118. This allegation has been made to the author by)the following 
interviewees: Manuel Vazquez Montalbän, Joan Josep Artells, Nicolau 
Casaus, and Alex J. Botines. 
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the abuse directed towards him that he had to be restrained from 
reacting violently by the Baraa President Franfesc Mire Sans. 119 
The controversial decision taken by the interim committee of ex-FC 
Barcelona Presidents, in October 1953, to hold popular presidential 
elections with all of the club's 19,000 adults members being allowed to 
vote, is generally considered to be a consequence of the Di Stefano 
affair. From that date onwards, the Barca directors were markedly less 
respectful and more critical towards the sporting authorities. 120 The 
first manifestation of this change of attitude was the decision about 
the presidental elections, taken in spite of the knowledge that such 
elections would infuriate Moscardö and other Francoist authorities. 121 
Nirö Sans, the winner of the 1953 elections and another prosperous 
Catalan textile manufacturer, was essentially a cautious Barra President 
who was careful to make flattering tributes towards Franco and his 
ministers when neccessary. In March 1955, for example, he did his best 
119. This has been alleged by the four interviewees listed at the 
beginning of the above footnote, of whom, however, only Casaus, was 
present at that particular match. Not surprisingly, the incident 
was not mentioned in Press reports of the match. 
120. This allegation has been made in print by Sabartes, op. cit., 
p. 31, and by Vazquez Montalban, op. cit., and to the author by the 
following interviewees: Manuel Vazquez Montalbän, Juan Jose 
Castillo, Alex J. Botines, Joan Josep Artells, Julian Garcia 
Candau, and, most significently due to their close connection with 
the Bar ca board of directors, Agusti Montal, and Nicolau Casaus. 
121. Agusti Montal, recalled that his father acknowledged to him at the 
time that the decision would probably annoy Moscardo, but was 
indifferent about the wishes of the Delgado Nacional because of the 
unfavourable outcome of the Di Stefano affair. That the committee 
of ex-Barra Preside is knew that their election arrangements would 
not please Moscardo has also been alleged by Sabart6s, op, cit., 
p. 31. 
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to ingratiate himself with the visiting Moscardo, and the same occurred 
during the visits of Interior Minister General Camilo Alonso Vega and 
Foreign Minister Fernando 'Maria Castiella, in April 1957 and November 
1958 respectively. Furthermore, Mire Sans, in August 1957, offered the 
Caudillo himself the honorary presidency of the Inauguration Committee 
of the Camp Nou stadium which the club had been forced to construct 
because of the massive increase in membership numbers in the 1950s. 122 
It has been argued, however, that Miro Sans had no option but to 
ingratiate himself With the highest levels of the Franco regime, and 
that any other approach would have caused problems for the Catalan 
club. 123 Moreover, Miro Sans almost exactly reflected the spirit of 
defiance of the sporting authorities that was provoked at the club by 
the Di Stefano affair. To begin with, he was in complete agreement with 
the decision to hold popular presidential elections. 124 One of the 
bases of his election campaign was the condemnation of Marti Carreto's 
docility in the Di Stefano affair, and the affirmation of the need to 
insist upon fair treatment from the referees. During his eight years as 
Barca President, Mire Sans frequently complained to the RFEF about 
allegedly partisan referees125 and even arrived at the extreme, in 
122. For further details of the nomination of Franco, see ýBar a, _, 
No. 88, 
22 August 1957, and El Mundo Deportivo, 20 August 1957. 
ne 
mainly 
to the spectacular triumphs of the team led by the Hungarian exile 
Ladislas Kubala, the members of FC Barcelona had increased from 
26,459 in January 1950 to 38,966 in January 1957. 
123. This is the view of Augusti Montal and Juan Jose Castillo. 
124. Mir' Sans expressed his approval of the holding of popular 
presidential elections in El Mundo Deportivo, 27 October 1957. 
125. As revealed by the examination of the archives of FC Barcelona, 
Miro Sans sent letters complaining about specific referees to the 
RFEF in March 1955, September 1955, May 1956, February 1959 and 
February 1960. 
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/ 
November 1957, of suggesting that the RFEF import referees from 
abroad. 126 Furthermore, he frequently referred to the Di Stefano affair 
in a bitter tone, without these comments being reproduced by the 
Press. 12T 
Mire Sans was a politically significant . Ba_ryca President in two 
other main ways. Firstly, he encouraged several Catalan cultural and 
folkloric activities that were frowned upon by the Frciaicoist autfrities. 
During the ceremony of inauguration of the Camp Nou stadium, for 
example, in September 1957, gigantic sardanas were danced by folklore 
groups, while traditional Catalan songs were sung by the famous L'Orfeo 
Gracienc. The winning of every league and cup trophy from 1957 onwards 
was celebrated in this way. The second way in which Mirö Sans proved to 
be a politically significant President concerns his gradual promotion of 
the Catalan language. This promotion also began during the celebrations 
of the inauguration of the new stadium, with singing of songs in 
Catalan. In the October 1957 issue of the official club magazine Baarrca, 
which was under the direct editorial control of the club President, 
there was reproduced a fanciful "Hymn of the Stadium" written in both 
Catalan and Castilian, as well as the poem Blau i Grana in only a 
Catalan version, attributed toU celebro äJosep Mariä de Segarra, a name 
126. Mirö Sans issued a note to the Press, which was published by Bar9a, 
No. 99,7 November 1957, and by El Mundo Deportivo, 6 November 
1957, in which he denounced the "habitually incompetent and, on 
occasions, clearly partial refereeing which is systematically 
prejudicing the whole Spanish professional football, and of which 
our club has frequently been the victim". 
127. This has been alleged in print by Sabartes, op. cit., p. 42, and to 
the author by Augusti Montal, Nicolau Casaus and Juan Jose 
Castillo. 
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that was almost always Castilianized to "Jose" during the Franco 
period. 12e Thenceforth, Catalan appeared in the magazine Bar a with 
ever-increasing frequency. 129 
During the presidency of Mirö Sans, the struggle on the field 
between Barca and Real Madrid became even more impassioned and 
potentially violent, 130 partly because of the added incentive from 1955 
onwards, of the domestic chamption entering the European Cup. Real 
Madrid spectacularly won the first five editions of the new trophy, 
until being controversially eliminated from the competition in November 
1960 by their Catalan rivals, who had qualified due to having won the 
Spanish league championship in season 1959/1960.131 
Despite this highly-acclaimed victory over Real, Miro' Sans' 
popularity evaporated in March 1961. The construction of the new 
stadium caused a massive club debt, which in turn led to the sale of 
128. See Barsa, No. 94,5 October 1957. 
129. The front cover of Barca, No. 118,21 March 1958, for example, 
consisted of a photograph of the club's new Hungarian player Zoltan 
Czibor holding up a French phrase book clearly entitled Apprenez Le 
Catalan Avec Moi, demonstrating both Miro Sans's policy of 
promoting Catalan through Barca and the Francoist prohibition on 
such tuition books being published in Spain. The front cover of 
am, No. 211,31 December 1957, showed the children of the 
players holding up a banner which read Bon Any 1960., Visý cael 
Barra! Furthermore, from February 1960 onwards, Bar $a contained a 
regular column with the Catalan title of Cau d'Orella. 
130. In February 1956, for example, two players from each team were sent 
off in a stormy Bam-Real clash at the Les Corts stadium. In 
November 1957, the first game between the two giant clubs in the 
Nou Camp stadium ended with two Barra players being expelled, and 
the Real team and the allegedly partisan referee being pelted with 
a hail of missiles. 
131. For further details of this famous Catalan victory, see El Mundo 
Deportivo, and Marca, 7-24 November 1960. 
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star midfider Luis Suarez, the hero of the defeat of Real, to 
Internazionale of Milan, and the subsequent deterioration of the team. 
In the elections which followed Mire Sans enforced resignation, another 
wealthy textile manufacturer, Enric Llaudet, defeated the shipping agent 
Jaume Fuset, with only 270 fortunate members drawn out of a hat entitled 
to vote. 
In his six years as FC Barcelona President, Llaudet intensified 
Miro Sans' policies of defiance towards the Francoist sporting 
authorities and the promotion of the Catalan language and folklore, and, 
furthermore, launched a powerful campaign against the lack of democracy 
in football. According to Manuel Vazquez Montalbän, a young, highly- 
politicized Bam supporter during this period, Llaudet exactly 
reflected the growing defiance of the Catalan middle classes in the 
1960s, who constituted the greated majority of club members, in the same 
way as Miro Sans, Marti Carreto and Agusti Montal had earlier reflected, 
to a varying extent, the docility and ineffectiveness of these middle 
classes vis-a-vis the Francoist authorities. 132 
In September 1961, Llaudet began his long-standing dispute with 
Spanish national television (RTVE). In spite of his protests, RTVE 
insisted on entering the Camp Nou to broadcast the Baraa-Real Madrid 
clash, thus reducing an expected capacity crowd 120,000 to just 38,000. 
Llaudet campaigned for a complete change in the system of compensating 
clubs for televizing matches, and this he managed to achieve by 
controversially forbidding the entry of the cameras before the games 
132. Author's interview with Manuel Vazquez Montalbän. 
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against Valencia in April 1962 and Zaragoza in October 1962, and then by 
threatening similar prohibition of the transmission of the home match 
with Real Madrid in January 1963.133 
Another of Llaudet's campaigns against the practices of the 
Francoist sporting authorities concerned the unpopular DND ban on the 
entry of further foreign players, adopted after the failure of the 
Spanish national team in the 1962 World Cup in Chile. Llaudet 
challenged this prohibition in 1963 by signing the Uruguayan Luis 
Cubilla and the Brazilian Joao Silveira, and demanding the right to 
play them in the national league. After a fierce debate at the 1963 
RFEF assembly however, Llaudet was forced to back down on this issue 
because of lack of support from the other clubs. 134 
Llaudet continued with Miro San's policy of strongly protesting 
about allegedly partisan referees, especially in March 1964 and November 
1966 when crucial defeats by Real Madrid were attributed to partial 
arbitration. 135 At the 1964 and 1966 RFEF assemblies, Llaudet proposed 
a motion in favour of the importation of English referees for the most 
important matches, the original idea of Mire Sans, but was again 
isolated by the lack of support from the other club Presidents. 
133. For further details of these prohibitions and these threats, see 
El Mundo Deportivo, 26-28 April 1962,7-8 October 1962,20-23 
January 1963. 
134. For further details of this debate, see El Mundo Deportivo, and 
Marca, 13 July 1963. 
135. On each occasion, Llaudet complained by issuing a note to the 
Press, published in El Mundo Deportivo, 4 March 1964 and 10 
November 1966, and writing a letter to the RFEF. In the course of 
these notes and letters, he recommenced the campaign for the 
importation of foreign referees. 
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In Chapter Four, it was seen in detail how Llaudet launched several 
attacks in the club magazine Barca against the dictatorial style of the 
DND and the RFEF. In addition, he proposed motions at the RFEF 
assemblies of 1963,1965 and 1966. in favour of a return to the old 
system of the clubs voting for the RFEF President and directors, and all 
adult club members voting for their own Presidents. 136 These 
progressive initiatives came to nothing because, once again, the bulk of 
the other clubs declined to support the Barca proposal. In this case, 
the other club Presidents were mostly in favour of continuing with the 
"organic democracy" system that permitted them to continue in power 
without being especially popular. 
Annoyed by this lack of backing from the other clubs, Llaudet 
decided, in August 1965, to make a politically significant gesture 
against the lack of democracy in the game. He organized a referendum to 
decide the name of the club's eight-year old stadium, and 46,000 out of 
48,000 FC Barcelona members demonstrated their support for football 
club democracy by voting. 137 At any other club, such a straightforward 
decision would simply have been taken by the directors. Those of Barca, 
however, had a point to prove. 
With regard to the language question, the magazine Barca continued 
136. For further details of these motions of Llaudet, see El Mundo 
Deportivo, and Marca, 14 July 1963,10 July 1965, and 15 July 1966. 
137. For further details, see El Mundo Deportivo, 8-9 and 29-31 August 
1965, and Barca, Nos. 508-511,12 August -2 September 1965. 
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to play an extremely positive role during the Llaudet presidency. 13e In 
very much the same way, Llaudet continued with Miro Cans. 'pol i9y of 
promoting Catalan culture and folklore. There were displays of 
traditional singing and dancing to celebrate the winning of every 
trophy, while an extensive folkloric festival was organized to com- 
memorate the tenth anniversary of the Camp Nou stadium, in September 
1967. 
It has been alleged that the challenge presented by Llaudet to the 
the Francoist sporting authorities encouraged the underground opposition 
to the Franco regime to use the-club's stadium as a means of expression 
and diffusion of their messages. 139 During the 1960s, the walls of the 
Camp Nou began to be covered with political grafitti, particularly by 
militants of the Catalan Communist Party (PSUC) and the anarcho- 
syndicalist movement CNT-FAI. These graffiti reached their peak during 
the trial and execution of the Communist agent Julian Grimau in April 
1963, and during the regime's campaign for a "yes" vote in the 
referendum of December 1966.140 
138. From March 1965 onwards, the Cau d'Orella column was written in 
Catalan, whilst, begining in November 1965, all of the declar- 
ations and speeches by Llaudet himself were reproduced in regional 
language. 
139. This allegation, never made in print, was made to the author by 
Manuel Vazquez Montalbän and Joan Josep Artells, as well as by 
several. radical, highly-politicized Barca supporters. 
140. Because of the censorship of the Press no written evidence can be 
offered as proof. This was alleged to the-author by the 
interv,. ewees mentioned in the above footnote, and confirmed by 
Agusti Montal, Nicolau Casaus and Juan Jose Castillo. 
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Llaudet succeeded in earning for FC Barcelona the image of a club 
in opposition to the Francoist sporting system, and in favour of a 
democratization of the game and a promotion of Catalan language and 
culture. Be failed, however, to build a team to challenge the supremacy 
of Real Madrid, despite having spent heavily on leading non-Catalan 
players. 141 Because of this failure on the field, he resigned in 
September 1967, and was succeeded by Narcis de Carreras, the result of 
an agreement between the various factions at the club without elections 
being necessary. 
In his short period of power, Carreras, a lawyer who broke the 
tradition of textile manufacturer Presidents, proved to be the most 
politically conscious and controversial Barga leader since the Civil War 
fighter Josep Sunyol. 
From 1921 to 1926, Carreras had served as private secretary to 
Franjesc Cambo, the founder and leader of the centre-right Catalanist 
party the Lliga. Carreras had supported the Republic during the Civil 
War, but was not purged after the conflict because he had not occupied 
any public or political post. He was not included on the DND's list of 
persons prevented from holding any sporting office due to their 
political past, unlike his close friend Nicolau Casaus. Nevertheless, 
141. Llaudet broke the Spanish domestic transfer fee record on three 
occasions, by bringing to the Catalan club Jesüs Pereda in June 
1961, Lucien Muller in July 1965 and Jose MendonFa in July 1967. 
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upon assuming office he quickly became an object of suspicion, as he 
recounted himself: 
"I accepted the presidency, even though they tried to torpedo it 
from Madrid. The President of the (Football) Federation (Jose Luis 
Costa) rang to ask me if I was a Falangist, and I answered that I 
wasn't, that I was of the Lliga. "142 
As can be expected from his defiant response to Costa's 
questioning, Carreras was not a man to ingratiate himself with the 
Francoist sporting authorities. He accelerated the speed of all of the 
campaigns of Llaudet mentioned above, especially the promotion of 
Catalan in the magazine Barýa. 143 Furthermore, he launched his own 
vociferous protest campaign against having to play the 1968 cup final 
against Real Madrid in that club's Estadio Bernabeu, and, in addition, 
on a Wednesday evening, meaning that fewer Catalan supporters could make 
the trip than would have been able to had the final been played on a 
Saturday, as usual. '44 In spite of the venue and the hostility of the 
crowd, Bam surprisingly won 1-0, which caused an angry and 
unprecedented hail of missiles. The disappointment on the faces of 
Franco himself and his ministers, as they presented the Bar ca players 
with the trophy and their medals, shows up quite clearly in all of the 
photographs. 145 
142. Quoted in El Pais Semanal, 12 October 1982. 
143. From 1968 onwards, approximately a quarter of Barra magazine 
appeared in Catalan. 
144. The 1968 final of the Copa del Generalisimo was the first ever not 
to be played on a Saturday. 
145. An example of such a photograph can be found accompanying the 
article "The Politics of Fütbol"", written by the author of this 
thesis, which appeared in History Today (London) August 1985. 
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Quite understandably, Carreras called for the RFEF to punish Real 
Madrid severely for the violent behaviour of their supporters at the 
final. 146 The RFEF, however, took no action whatsoever against Real, on 
the dubious grounds that the final was played at a supposedly neutral 
venue rather than as a Real home match, with the conclusion that the 
blame for the anti-Barra hooliganism lay with themselves, the RFEF, 
rather than with Real. 147 At the annual RFEF assembly in July 1968, 
Carreras denounced this lack of punishment as "ridiculous", and proposed 
a motion that the final never again be held in the Bernabeu when Real 
Madrid was a finalist. '48 Unlike the motions presented to the assembly 
by Llaudet, this one proved to be popular with the other clubs, but even 
when passed overwhelmingly could still not be incorporated into the RFEF 
statutes because of the DND ruling of March 1941 that the final of all 
national sports competition should always be held in Madrid. 149 
The Real Madrid President Santiago Bernabeu was indignant about the 
Catalan victory in the stadium bearing his name, and about Carreras 
motion at the assembly. While on holiday in Santa Pola the following 
week, he gave vent to all of his latent anti-Catalan sentiments: 
"I admire Vila Reyes (the President of, the Espafiol club, and 
shortly to be embroiled in the MATESA scandal) simply because of 
the fact that he presides over a club in Catalonia which carries 
146. Carreras made this call in El Mundo Deportivo, 12 July 1968, and in 
Barra, No. 660. 
147. This decision was justified by the RFEF President Jose Luis Costa 
in Marca, 19 July 1968. 
148. For further details, see Marca, or El Mundo Deportivo, 23 July 
1968. 
149. Information revealed by an examination of the archives of the RFEF. 
For details of the reaction in Catalonia to the obstruction of 
Carreras'motion, see either Barra, No. 662,26 July 1968, or 
El Mundo Deportivo, 24-27 July 1968. 
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the name Espanol which is worthy of admiration. And those that say 
that I don't like Catalonia are not correct. I like her and admire 
her, in spite of the Catalans. "5° 
This outburst was very popular with the great majority of Real - 
supporters. 151 The FC Barcelona followers and most Catalans, however, 
were infuriated and looked to Carreras to launch a counter-attack. In 
September 1968, Carreras replied to Bernabeu by coining his own 
belligerent catchprase: 
"We must struggle against everybody and against everything, because 
we are the best, and we represent what we represent. "152 
It was the almost perfect response to the attack of Bernabeu, because it 
made a clear reference to the political significance of Bara, but was 
nonetheless sufficiently ambiguous to avoid any possible punishment from 
the Madrid authorities. The phrase opened a new phase in the 
recognition of the political significance of the club, which had never 
been publically alluded to before by any director or even journalist. 
Henceforth, this significance became one of the leading subjects of 
debate and discussion in Catalonia, partly due to the challenging 
articles of Manuel Vazquez Montalbän and Alex J. Botines. 153 
Furthermore, Carreras's catchphrase also referred quite clearly to the 
alleged partiality of the Francoist sporting authorities. 
150. Quoted in Murcia Deportiva, No. 416,27 July 1968. 
151. This has been alleged in print by Sabartes, op. cit., p. 92, and to 
the author not only by well-known Barca figures such as Nicolau 
Casaus, Manuel Vazquez Montalbän and Joan Josep Artells, but also 
by Madrid-based journalists Jose Maria Lorente, Rodolfo Belarmino 
"Belarmo" and Miguel Vidal. 
152. Quoted in Sabartes, op. cit., p. 95. 
153. See the article by Manuel Vazquez Montalban in Triunfo, 25 October 
1969, and by Alex J. Botines in Dicen, 11 January 1970,9 March 
1970 and 6 October 1970, for example. 
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The first major contribution to the debate provoked by Carreras's 
recognition of the political significance of FC Barcelona was made by 
Vazquez Montalban in the October 1969 edition of Triunfo. 154 His 
article offered a vivid illustration of the hostility with which Real 
Madrid was welcomed to the Camp Nou since Bernabeu's outburst of the 
previous summer: 
"In general, this a tolerant crowd which does not vent its anger on 
the visiting team. Except for one exception: Real Madrid. The 
reception which was dispensed to Real Madrid in the second half-of 
the last league was memorable. A reception which not even Miguel 
Orts himself (a pro-Real, Francoist Catalan radio football 
commentator, and columnist in ABC, Madrid) would have been able to 
ignore. A constant shouting, butane gas sirens, whistles, pipes. 
The tarring and feathering of the madrilenos? No way. It is 
something deeper, which is not restricted to present concrete 
politics, but which rather goes back to a historic consciousness of 
the evils of centralism, ". 155 
Vazquez Montalban also referred to the general use of the Catalan 
langauge at the Camp Nou, and of the increasing appearance of formally 
outlawed senyera flags, being provocatively displayed by the most 
politically conscious group Barya supporters: 
"This crowd would be unusual at any other ground in Spain, As would 
also be unusual those cars which shove to pass through the 
impenetratable mass of human bodies and which, in the back window, 
154. Manuel Vazquez Montalbän, "Barca, Barca, Barca! ", Triunfo, 25 
October 1969.0 J. #1 
155. Vazquez Montalbän, ibid. 
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carry the message: "Speak in Catalan". In many of these cars there 
slowly flutters the flag of Bam and that of Catalonia. "156 
Carreras, just as both Llaudet and Mire Sans before him, was forced 
to resign in October 1969 because of further frustrations on the field. 
In the elections that followed, the democracia organica system insisted 
upon by the DND permitted only 283 Ba rga members to vote. The winner 
was Agustf Montal, the 32 year-old son of the 1964-1953 President of the 
same name, a name which was the decisive factor in the 1969 elections 
because of its association with former success and glory. 
This result meant that the presidency of FC Barcelona returned tc 
the hands of wealthy textile manufactures. Montal, however, proved to 
be similar to Carreras in a political sense, being a democratic Catalan 
bourgeois, a group that was becoming increasingly defiant towards the 
Francoist authorities in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Montal 
demonstrated his solidarity with the political objectives and methods of 
this group by personally supporting the December 1970 protest lock-in 
of leading Catalan personalities at the mountain-top monastery of 
Montserrat. '57 
After only six months as Bar 5a President, Montal found himself 
embroiled in a controversy of extensive political significance, in the 
156. Vazquez Montalbän, ibid. 
157. Although, for obvious reasons, Montal's support for the lock-in did 
not appear in print, it was alleged to the author by the former FC 
Barcelona President that the majority of the club's supporters 
were aware of his position. This has also been alleged to the 
author by Nicolau Casaus, Manuel Vazquez Montalbän, Alex J. Botines 
and Joan Josep Artells. 
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shape of the most bitter argument involving his club and Madrid since 
the Di Stefano affair of 1953. In June 1970, the Basque referee Emilio 
Guruceta was in charge of a tense cup quarter-final between the two 
giant Spanish clubs in the Camp Nou. With half an hour remaining, 
Guruceta awarded a penalty to Real which, in the opinion of every 
neutral observer, 158 was clearly fictitious. This dubious decision 
provoked a violent pitch invasion by the furious Catalan supporters, 
reacting angrily against what they regarded as the latest in a long 
series of injustices visited upon their club by the Francoist sporting 
authories. 1S9 
The RFEF was compelled to accept that Guruceta had made a bad 
decision, and accordingly suspended him or six months, "for provoking a 
problem of public order by his deficient action". 16o This suspension, 
however, did extremely little to satisfy the demands of Montal for the 
resignation of the allegedly pro-Real Madrid Chairman of the RFEF 
158. The neutral observers who have made this claim to the author are 
the following: Juan Jose Castillo, Miguel Vidal, Antonio Bare, 
Pablo Porta, Jose Angel Iribar. 
159. The anger of the FC Barcelona supporters was best reflected by the 
magazine Bar a, which, in its issue No. 760,9 June 1970, 
indignantly stated that: 
"Guruceta is mainly responsible for what happened in the 
stadium... Because the performance of Guruceta, let us say it 
one more time, exhausted the patience of the supporters who are 
understandably fed up of so much injustice that it is suffering 
from, week after week, season after season. " 
160. This decision was published in El Mundo Deportivo, and Marca, among 
other newspapers, on 12 June 1970. 
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referee's committee Jose Plaza, -and also for the complete democrat- 
ization of the RFEF. 161 
Catalan indignation only began to subside in September 1970, when 
Juan Gich, the FC Barcelona secretary, was surprisingly named Delegado 
Nacional de DeporteS in succession to Juan Antonio Samaranch. As 
stated in the Introduction to this thesis, the dismissal of the latter 
had nothing to do with the Guruceta affair. Nonetheless, the Barca 
supporters expected that the appointment of Gich would terminate the 
alleged campaign against their club. 
The section of FC Barcelona followers most affected by the Guruceta 
afair was the so-called gauche divine group of intellectual supporters 
that had formed in the late 1960s, informally led by Va01 zquez Montalbän 
and Josep Termes, both lecturers at Barcelona's Universitat Autönoma. 
Many of these intellectuals witessed for the first time, an example of 
the injustice'that the majority of supporters had been denouncing for 
years. Furthermore, the reaction of the Camp Nou crowd in the face of 
this alleged injustice demonstrated to them that the club could serve as 
a popular pole of resistance, occasionally violent, to the Franco regime. 162 
161. These demands of Montal, and his disappointment at the limited 
nature of the RFEF's decision, were expressed through interviews in 
Bam, Nos. 760,761 and 762,9,16 and 23 June 1970, as well as in 
El Mundo Deportivo, 8 and 19 June, and Dicen, 10,16,19 and 22 
June 1970. 
162. Tele-Expres, (Barcelona) published a special feature on this so- 
called gauche divine group in its edition of 23 October 1970, in 
which Franpesc de Carreras, the law lecturer son of the former 
Barra President, commented in the following way on the Guruceta 
affair: 
"On the day of the Real Madrid game, the crowd jumped onto the 
field for an extra-footbalistic reason, the famous penalty. " 
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The political consciousness of the Bar ca supporters increased in 
proportion to the increase in strength of the myth about the campaign 
from Madrid to prevent the Catalan club from regaining the league 
championship that. it last won in 1960. By around 1972, the majority of 
these supporters had arrived at'the conclusion that very little had 
changed in the sporting corridors of power. 163 
As-pointed out in the Introduction to this thesis,,. no evidence has 
been uncovered to support this theory about the alleged campaign, 164 and 
it is quite probable that this theory partly evolved in order to explain 
and excuse the frequent' failures of the costly Barca team on the field. 
With respect to, this thesis, however, the important point is that this 
theory or myth existed, and made a massive contribution to the politi- 
cization of everybody connected to FC Barcelona. Llufs Pujol, one the 
few native Catalan players at the club, illustrated the political 
awareness of the player when, in December 1972, he was asked about the 
alleged anti-Barr campaign: 
"It is very clear that in certain circles the fact that FC 
Barcelona is, week after week, the leader of this present league 
163. This opinion was expressed in Sabartes, op. cit., pp. 137-138, and 
by many ordinary Barga supporters in special reports published in 
Dicen, 17-20 April 1972, and 9 October 1972. In addition, this 
view was expressed to the author by several veteren FC Barcelona 
supporters, and by Manuel Vazquez Montalban, Nicolau Casaus, Agusti 
_ 
Montal and Alex J. Botines. 
164. The author expected that such evidence was contained in the 
archives of FC Barcelona, having been told that this was the case 
by Manuel Vazquez Montalbän, Alex J. Botines and Joan Josep 
Artells. The widely-held view that Barca had evidence about the 
alleged campaign waged by the Francoist 
sporting 
authorities 
against the club, however, proved to be a myth. Upon examining the 
archives of the club, in April and May 1986, the'author uncovered 
no such evidence, and, furthermore, was then informed by both 
Nicolau Casaus and Agusti Montal that this kind of proof simply 
does not exist. 
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championship is disturbing, and every kind of hindrance and 
obstacle is being invented in order to put a brake on the forward 
march of our club. 19165 
The 1973/1974 season was of crucial importance for FC Barcelona. 
The DND finally lited its ban on foreign players, and Baýrca immediately 
bought the Dutchman Johann Cruyff, then undoubtedly the world's leading 
player. Inspired by Cruyff, the Catalan club won its first league 
championship for fourteen years, spectacularly defeating Real Madrid by 
a historic 5-0 score-line in their own Estadio Bernabeu on the way. 
It-was also in this season that the politically significant phrase 
about FC Barcelona being "more than a football club" made its appear- 
ance. The creator of the phrase was the publicist Xavier Coma, who was 
commissioned in November 1973, to devise a slogan for Agusti Montal's 
presidential election campaign against Lluis Casacuberta. It has 
frequently been alleged that this phrase contributed just as much to 
Montal's re-election as did the goals of Johann Cruyff. 166 
165. Quoted in Bam, No. 890,5 December 1972. 
166. This has been alleged by Coma himself in El Pais Semanal, 12 
October 1982, by Sabartes, op. cit., p. 139, and by Alex J. Botines 
in Dicen, 28 November and 2 December 1974. 
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In April 1974, amidst all of the league title celebrations, Montal 
persuaded the DND to permit the club to revert to its original title of 
Fütbol Club Barcelona. 167 These celebrations constituted the 
culmination of Barca's long-standing policy of promoting repressed 
Catalan folklore and popular culture. There was dancing from the Escola 
de Dansa Popular, songs from L'Orfeo Gracienc, and moving perormances 
from the immensely popular Nova Cans o- artistes Joan Manuel Serrat, 
Raimon and Guillermina Motta, all of whom were keen Ba rca supporters and 
had confessed to the Press their support for the club's political 
significance. 168 These celebrations culminated in the visit to 
Montserrat that was discussed in the Introduction to this thesis. 
The complaints about the alleged campaign against FC Barcelona 
temporarily abated. In February 1975, however, Johann Cruyff was sent 
off in dubious circumstances in a game at Malaga. All of the indig- 
nation and bitterness that exploded during the Guruceta affair came to 
167. In the archives of FC Barcelona, examined by the author, there is 
the copy of a letter, dated 20 April 1974, from Montal to the RFEF 
President Jose Luis Perez Paya, informing the latter of "the 
unanimous desire of this club to revert to our original title. of 
F6tbol Club Barcelona". Montal went on to request that Perez Pay' 
"kindly arrange with the neccessary authorities, especially the 
Delecacion Nacional de Deportes and the Jefatura Provincial de 
Propaganda, that this club be known by its original title from the 
commencement of season 1974/75 onwards. " Perez Payä granted this 
request, and persuaded tha two institutions mentioned above to 
accept the name change. Following the example of Barca, both 
Athletic de Bilbao and Spörting de Gijön revereted to their 
original, foreign-influenced names in the summer of 1974. 
168. See, for example, the interview with Motta in Ba, No. 830,12 
October 1971, the interview with Serrat in Dicen, 30 April 1974, 
and with Raimon, 3 May 1974. 
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d 
the surface again. 169" Montal responded with a typically aggressive 
note which condemned "the vast campaign unleashed against the Futbol 
Club Barcelona and everything that it represents". 'To 
While the whole of Spain, during the long illness of Franco in the 
autumn of 1975, was contemplating a future without the dictator, there 
was absolutely no doubt about the political position of FC Barcelona, 
because Montal expressed himself with his usual clarity: 
"If you ask me if I like it that FC Barcelona is considered a 
democratic club, I will tell you yes. FC Barcelona is a reflection 
of the currents of the town and of the country (Catalonia), which 
are democratic and liberal. "171 
The great majority of Barca supporters, the same as the great 
majority of Catalans, were waiting for the death of the dictator with 
optimism, anxious to commence down the road that would lead to a return 
to democracy and regional autonomy. When this death finally-occurred, 
there was little sadness at the Catalan club, but rather hope for the 
future. 172 As on many previous occasions, Montal almost perfectly 
reflected the sentiments of the supporters in the unequivocal telegram 
169. For details of the reaction to the Malaga aff air, see Dicen, 
El Mundo Deportivo and Bar a, from 16-26 February 1975. 
170. This note, was published in Dicen and El Mundo Deportivo on 16 
February 1975, and in Bam, No. 1005,18 February 1975. 
171. Quoted in Barca, No. 1039,14 October 1975. 
172. This has been -alleged to the author by many veteran FC Barcelona 
supporters, Agusti Montal and NicolaICasaus,, as well as by the 
former Barca players Carles Rexach and Joaquim Rife. That there 
was little sadness at the Catalan club upon the death of Franco is 
also demonstrated by the fact that the magazine Ba rca'was 
practically the only Spanish publication of that--we-7e--k which did not 
carry a reverential photograh of the dictator on its front cover, 
choosing instead one of theAnew Head of State, King Juan Carlos. 
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that he sent to King Juan Carlos, the man who would hopefully preside 
over the reintroduction of democracy: 
"Excmo. Sr. Marques de Mond6jar, Civil House of His Royal Highiness 
the Prince of Spain, Palacio de la Zarzuela, Madrid. In these 
transcendental historic moments, I beg you to pass on to his Royal 
Highness the testimony of personal adhesion of our club, casting 
votes for a future of pacific and democratic coexistence which your 
Royal Highness represents. Agustin Montal, President, Fd'tbol Club 
Barcelona. "173 
The history of the political significance of FC Barcelona during 
the Franco years arrived at its conclusion with this telegram. More 
space in this thesis has been dedicated to the Catalan club than to the 
two major Basque clubs, because Barca was at the centre of many more 
politically significant controversies and gestures against the Francoist 
sporting authorities, despite the truth being, as pointed out at the 
beginning of this chapter, that Athletic de Bilbao and Real Sociedad de 
San Sebastian reflected the general Basque opposition to the Franco 
regime just as effectively as FC Barcelona reflected Catalan opposition. 
The regionalist significance of Spanish football obviously did not 
completely terminate in November 1975. On the contrary, as shall be 
fully illustrated in the Epilogue to this thesis which now follows, both 
FC Barcelona and the Basque clubs, as well as clubs such as Valencia and 
Celta de Vigo which had possessed no meaningful political significance 
during the Franco period, had an important role to play in the 
transition from dictatorship to democracy. 
173. Reproduced in Bam, Barcelona, No. 1045,25 November 1975, and in 
El Mundo Deportivo and Dicen, on'21 November 1975. 
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CHAPTER NINE: EPILOGUE: FOOTBALL DURING 
THE TRANSITION FROM DICTATORSHIP TO DEMOCRACY 
This study has attempted to illustrate the many ways in which football 
reflected Spanish life in general during the Franco period. The game 
continued to be a reflection of the country during the transition from 
dictatorship to democracy, changing more in the four years from 1976 to 
1980 than it had done in the previous forty years. 
- The most important personalities in the political transformation of 
Spain were King Juan Carlos and Adolfo Suarez, the President of the 
Government from 1976 to 1981, both of whom were determined to translate 
the desire of the majority of Spaniards for a pluralist democracy, with 
a limited degree of regional autonomy, into reality. 
Speaking metaphorically, in the transformation of Spanish football 
the king, or overlord, was Benito Castejon, whilst it could be said that 
the role of Suarez was played by Pablo Porta. Castejon was, the an who 
presided over the transition from dictatorship to democracy in Spanish 
sport in general. As seen in the Introduction to this thesis, he was, 
along with his good friend Juan Antonio Samaranch, a rare example of a 
competent and respected sports administrator in Francoist Spain. He was 
appointed to be the last Delegado Nacional de Deportes in September 
352 
1976, with'the task of dissolving the Falangist DND, and thereafter 
remained at the helm of Spanish sport because of being regarded by the 
government of Suarez as the ideal man to implement democracy., Castejön 
supervised the transformation of the DND into, firstly, in March 1977, 
the Direction General de Deportes, and secondly, five months later, the 
permanent Consejo Superior de Deportes. The latter institution still 
remains as the supreme organ of Spanish sport, a testimony to the 
organizational long-sightedness of Castejon, who himself retired from 
public life in June 1981. 
In a similar way to Castejon, Porta was the last and, in the 
opinion of the majority of sports journalists, officials and 
footballers, 2 the most efficient of the many short-lived and obedient 
RFEF Presidents during the Franco years. Despite vociferous criticism 
from Madrid, 3 partly because of his being Catalan, Porta was 
sufficiently popular to remain as President for a record nine years. He 
was twice re-elected unopposed, in 1977 and 1981, and was only compelled 
to retire from the presidency in November 1984 because of a decree from 
the socialist government preventing the Presidents of various sports 
federations from remaining in power for more than two four-year terms 
of office. It ýkell to Porta to apply the democratic principles of 
1. For further details, see the special feature on Castejön in As, 7-11 
November 1979. 
2. This view of Porta has been expressed in Garcia Candau, op. cit., 
pp. 82-84. in practically all of the Press, both sporting and 
general, when the government decree curtailing his term of office 
was published in March 1984. 
3. This criticism mostly came from Marca, and, to a far lesser extent, 
As, for concrete examples, see Marca, 30 October 1977.28 June 
1978,2 October, 1981,17 February 1983,10 April, 1983. 
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Castejon to football, and this task he carried out with enthusiasm, 
despite, as seen in the Introduction, his Falangist past. Porta also 
attempted to reduce the significance of the various politicizing 
aspects that had existed in Spanish football during the Franco years. 
As shall be seen in the course of this Epilogue, circumstances largely 
combined to assist Porta in his mission of de-politicizing the game, 
with the important exception of the regionalist aspect. 
The method of this Epilogue will be to illustrate the fate during 
the transition from dictatorship to democracy of each of the seven 
aspects of the politicization of football in the Franco period isolated 
in this thesis. Before this systematic approach is adopted, a brief 
discussion about Spain's staging of the 1982 World Cup finals tournament 
is necessary. 
The World Cup finals tournament undoubtedly served as a catalyst or 
motor of change, mainly because, in order to stage it, the RFEF was 
forced to change many of its former incompetent ways. 4 It was 
frequently suggested, both before and after the tournament, that the 
4. One example of the RFEF having to change its former ways for the 
World Cup finals was the appointment, in February 1980, of a public 
relations officer, for the first time in the history of the 
organization. 
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World Cup would have been staged with fewer organizational problems if 
Spain had still been a dictatorship. 8 Despite these problems for the 
approximately one million foreign footballers, journalists and 
supporters who visited Spain for the finals, and despite the 
embarrassing failure on the fields of the Spanish national team, the 
overall impression given by the Spanish hosts to the watching world was 
not unfavourable. ' 
It is now necesssary to examine the fate of Spanish football's 
seven aspects of politicization since 1976. With regard to the first 
aspect, the Fascist influence that existed in the game during the Franco 
period, it must be stated that this influence quickly disappeared from 
football in very much the same way as it largely disappeared from 
Spanish politics and society. As illustrated in Chapter Two of this 
thesis, Fascist influence over sport in general and football in 
particular was institutionalized in the Franco period through the 
Falangist DND, a mere department of the Movimiento. From 
1976 onwards, therefore, football could only be completely de- 
5. This allegation was made in practically every Spanish publication 
both during the immediately after the tournament, when the organiz- 
ational defects, for example the inadequacy of the public transport 
system to cope with the one million visiting supporters and 
journalists and the lack of competent translators available, were 
manifest. See, for example, As, 13 July and 4 August 1982, or 
El Mundo Deportivo, 15 July 1982. This allegation has also been 
made to the author by the majority of his interviewees, especially 
by overseas sports journalists such as Brian Glanville of the Sunday 
Times, David Lacey of The Guardian, Keir Radnedge of World Soccer, 
and Jaques Ferran of L' Equipe the near-perfect organization of the 
tournament in the Argentina of General Videla four years earlier. 
6. This was the opinion of the four visiting journalists mentioned 
above, who pointed out that Spanish hospitality partly mitigated the 
organizational shortcomings. 
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fascistified with the abolition of the DND, a move which was campaigned 
for by the majority of the country's extensive sporting Press.? The 
immediate object of the contempt of the Press, eager to assert a freedom 
of expression completely denied to it during the Franco years, was the 
allegedly incompetent Delgado Nacional de Deportes Tomas Pelayo Ros. 8 
Partly because of this critical campaign, and partly because of the 
dismal Spanish performance at the Montreal Olympic Games, Pelayo Ros was 
dismissed in September 1976. His successor, Benito Castejön, 
immeasurably more respected by the sporting Press, 9 was also more 
aperturista ( reform-minded ) with regard to the dissolution of the DND 
and the institutional future of Spanish sport. 
By the beginning of 1977, it was quite clear that Spain was heading 
in the direction of pluralist democracy and the consequent dismantling 
of the pillars of Francoism, even if this was by no means a smooth 
process. In March 1977, both the Movimiento and the DND were 
dissolved by the Suarez government. A temporary solution to the problem 
of sports administration was to create the new Direcion General de 
7. This campaign was headed by Don Balon and Sport,, both published in 
Barcelona. For concrete examples, see Don Bal6n, No. 23,7 March 
1976, No. 27,6 April 1976, No. 35,1 June 1976, No. 38,22 June 
1976, No. 57,3 November 1976, and Sport, 8 June 1976,23 August 
1976,8 December 1976 and 27 January 1977. 
8. The competence of Pelayo Ros was called into question in all of the 
articles in the above footnote dated before his dismissal in 
September 1976. 
9. This respect was fully demonstrated when Castejon's appointment was 
announced. See, for example, As, 10 September 1976, and 
El Mundo Deportivo, Sport and Dicen, on 11 September 1976. The 
warmest welcome for Castejon was offered by Don Balon, No. 50,16 
September 1976. 
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Deportes, taking over the staff, the offices and the functions of the 
DND, and placing it under the control of the President's Office. In 
August 1977, after an extensive debate about the required administrative 
structure for Spanish sport in a democracy, '° the permanent 
Consejo Superior de Deportes was created, under the auspices of the 
Ministry of Culture. It was the task of Benito Castejon to establish a 
completely distinct attitude at the new institution from that which had 
existed at the DND, and this he achieved by either replacing the 
Falangist staff that he had inherited from Pelayo Ros, or by convincing 
them that Spanish sport needed a new kind of flexible, reform-minded and 
dynamic leadership. " 
The demise of the DND obviously dealt a powerful blow to what 
little Fascist influence remained in Spanish football. As seen in 
Chapter Two, by the early 1970s, apart from the institutional framework, 
this influence was limited to the national football team being used as a 
catalyst for virulent and aggressive nationalism. The rhetoric 
surrounding the national team became noticeably less potent after 1976, 
largely because of the failure of the team to impress at the 1980 
European Championship tournament in Italy, and most disappointingly, as 
10. This debate found echo in practically all Spanish publications of 
August 1977, not just in the specialist sporting Press. The debate 
was most fully treated in As, 17 August -5 September 1977. 
11. As revealed by author's interview with Castej6n, he replaced 24 of 
the CSD's permanent staff of 93 during the period 1977-1979, "those 
who could not accept that the days of cracking the whip at the 
sports federations and the offending clubs were completely finished" 
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the host team at the 1982 World Cup finals. 12 Furthermore, the formerly 
potent and politically significant myth of the furia_espafiola suffered a 
steady decline from 1976 onwards. 13 
In addition, the number of Falangist footballers declined steeply. 
As seen in Chapter Three, there was always a sizeable minority of 
Falangist players during the Franco years. A May 1977 inquest by 
Don Balön into the political sympathies of the footballers revealed, 
however, that only one professional player, Antonio Maria Nozal of the 
Burgos club, was a supporter of the Fascist Fuerza Nueva party. 14 
Nevertheless, in one sense Fascist influence in Spanish football 
has actually increased during the transition from dictatorship to 
democracy. The same as in every other footballing country, football 
hooliganism has increased dramatically in Spain in the last ten years. 15 
Connections between this hooliganism and ultra-right-wing groupings have 
been widely accepted. 16 The now defunct Fuerza Nueva and its successor 
12. Ultra-nationalistic phrases such as "we battled for victory like 
true Spaniards" or "the national team triumphed in the face of all 
adversity, as only Spaniards can", which had, as illustrated in 
Chapter Two of this thesis, been systematically employed by the 
sporting Press during the Franco years, gradually faded away in the 
early 1970s, and had completely disappeared by 1980. 
13. Since 1976, this phrase has very rarely been employed, in part due 
to the consistently disappointing performances of the national team. 
14. See Don Balön, No. 86,30 May 1977. 
15. Organized football hooliganism did not exist in Spain in 1977, but 
has since converted itself into, in the words of Jose Barrionuevo, 
the current Spanish Minister of the Interior, quoted in AS, 29 April 
1987, "a very worrying problem of public order". 
16. These connections have been discussed to some extent or other in 
practically every contemporary Spanish publication, especially in 
the wake of the serious problems provoked by Real Madrid's Ultra Sur 
hooligans at the &tadio Bernabeu during the April 1987 European Cup 
semi final against Bayern Munich. For a detailed expose of these 
connections, see As, 27-1 May 1987, or World Soccer. April 1987. 
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the'Frente Nacional, both led by the demagogic former Falangist Blas 
Pinar, appear to have followed the example of the British -National Front 
in-building up a significant influence within the many groups and sub- 
groups of the potentially violent young football supporters. 
The two hooligan groupings with the biggest Fascist or 
reo-Fascist 
influence are the Ultra Sur of Real Madrid and the Frente Atlgtico of 
Atletico de Madrid, which specialized in attacking supporters of 
visiting foreign teams and of the unpopular Basque and Catalan clubs. '? 
Partly in response to these Madrid groups, there have emerged the 
Boixos Nois and the Herri Norte factions at FC Barcelona and Athletic de 
Bilbao respectively. 1e Both groups are heavily influenced by radical 
Catalan and Basque nationalism. 19 
Fascist or neo-Fascist influence in Spanish football, therefore, 
17. The most vicious hooligan attack in Spanish football history was 
perpetrated by the Ultra Sur against the visiting FC Barcelona 
supporters in September 1984, partly provoked by Ba_rca winning the 
match 3-0.16 Catalan supporters were admitted too hospital, half of 
whom were injured in the stoning of one of their coaches. The visit 
of the Athletic de Bilbao supporters for a cup match with Real 
Madrid in February 1985 produced numerous fights and the blocking of 
the famous thoroughfare the Paseo de la Castellana. The Ultra Sur 
and the Frente Atletico joined forces to combat supporters 
accompanying a visiting national team. In February 1987, these 
combined forces provoked countless brawls with followers of the 
England team, three of whom needed hospital treatment. 
18. The Boixos Nois group came into existence during the football season 
1981/1982, and Herri Norte approximately a year later. 
19. As illustrated in detail in El Mundo_Deportivo, 10 February 1986, 
the Boixos Nois regularly chant slogans in favour of the neo- 
terrorist, separatist faction Ter a Lliure. The Herri Norte group at 
Bilbao can frequently be heard chanting in favour of ETA, for 
example during the match against Valladolid on 7 March, 1987, the 
first Athletic home game since the death in Algeria of the ETA 
leader Txomin Iturbe Domingo. 
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continues in the form of these politically significant hooligan groups, 
long after the institutional framework that imposed this influence 
during the Franco period, and the rhetoric and mystification which 
accompanied it, have disappeared. 
It is a matter of some debate whether the second aspect of the 
politicization of football in Francoist Spain, the game's manipulation 
by the regime as a political soporific, has completely disappeared. The 
blatant utilization of televized football matches during the May Day 
public holidays did not terminate immediately. Adolfo Suarez, the 
Minister-Secretary of the Movimiento in the short-lived government of 
Carlos Arias Navarro, insisted upon the Real Madrid-FC Barcelona match 
scheduled for 3 May 1976 being brought forward to Friday 1 May and 
transmitted by Spanish national television (RTVE). 2° In this way, the 
numbers of workers and students who took to the streets on the first May 
Day after the death of Franco were, to an incalculable extent, partially 
reduced. This proved to be the last such blatant example of. using 
televized football as a political soporific, because, from 1977 onwards, 
RTVE was formally subjected to the same kind of liberal guidelines and 
democratic political control as existed in the other Western pluralist 
democracies. 
Nevertheless, it has been alleged that the socialist government of 
Felipe Gonzalez has possibly revived the tradition of RTVE transmitting 
20. The fullest account of these events is offered in Garcia Candau, op. 
cit., pp. 51-52. 
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football matches on politically significant dates. 21 It is claimed, for 
example, that it was more than a mere coincidence that a friendly 
match between Spain and Austria was arranged for 20 November 1985 and 
broadcast by RTVE, thus contributing to distract attention away from the 
commemorations of the tenth anniversary of Franco's death. 22 It is also 
claimed that Gonzalez set the date for the fourth general elections as 
22 June 1986, knowing that on the same day the Spanish national team 
would probably be playing in the World Cup quarter-finals in Mexico. 23 
The suspicion that the government may have been manipulating RTVE's 
football coverage for political purposes was fuelled by an occurrence 
during the 1976 World Cup finals tournament in Mexico. With only three 
days remaining before the general elections, when an estimated 70% of 
Spaniards were excitedly watching their national team defeat highly- 
fancied Denmark in cavalier style, the PSOE's clenched fist and red rose 
symbol was "accidentally" flashed on to the television screens instead 
of the name of the scorer of the fifth Spanish goal, together with the 
government's election slogan of "T. o Continued Advancing Down The Right 
Road". The impressive performance of the national team in Mexico 
certainly did nothing to damage the credibility of this vote-catching 
slogan. 
21. This allegation, which has never been put into print, was made to 
the author by the Marca journalists Jose Maria Lorente and Rodolfo 
Belarmino "Belarmo" interview. 
22. It should be pointed out that there were precious few other dates 
when this match could have been played, because most of the other 
Wednesday nights, the traditional night for international matches in 
Europe, in the autumn of 1985 were occupied by games of the Spanish 
teams in the European club competitions. 
23. This allegation was also made by the Marca pair, op. cit. 
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The third aspect of the politicization of football in the Franco 
period, the complete lack of authentic democracy throughout the game, is 
the aspect that has undergone the. st profound changes since 1976. As 
seen in Chapter Four of this thesis, this lack of democracy was 
unpopular with the great majority of football supporters, and with 
approximately half of the club directors. It was widely expected that 
the re-establishment of democracy at national, regional and local level 
would be accompanied by its return to the world of football. 24 
These expectations have, by now, been completely converted into 
reality. In 1988, the RFEF and various regional football federations 
are at least as democratic as their West European counterparts, and in 
many cases more so. Furthermore, democracy has been restored at the 
clubs, with the result that every adult member, male and female alike, 
has the right to vote at least every four years for the club President, 
a right which is denied to football supporters in practically every 
other country. 
By 1976, the demand for the return of democracy to football was 
huge and vociferous. 25 It has been alleged that, because of the 
24. This expectation was best expressed by Agusti Montal, interviewed by 
Don Balön, No. 36,8 June 1976: 
"If the country is experiencing a democratization in various 
sectors, then it is logical that this should reach football. " 
25. This capaign was spearheaded by the Barcelona Publications 
Don Balon, Sport, Dicen and the short-lived Barrabäs. 
El Mundo Deportivo, and As, were luke-warm in their attitude towards 
the return of democracy to football, whilst in the few articles that 
Marca, dedicated to the subject, for example 15 September 1976, the 
would-be reformers were myopically accused of "attempting to raise 
the level of political content in Spanish sport to an intolerable 
height", a bizarre and ironic accusation given Marca's history, 
discussed in the Introduction of this thesis. 
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strength of this campaign in favour of reform, the arrival of "democracy 
without adjectives" to football was really inevitable. 26 Nevertheless, 
the situation did not begin to change until the well-received 
appointment of Benito Castejön as Delegado_Nacibnal in September 1976, 
an appointment that, ironically, was made by the Movimiento in the anti- 
democratic style that had characterized the whole of the Franco period. 
Castejön immediately declared that one of his priorities was the 
"gradual but complete democratization of Spanish sport". 27 The first 
step that he took down this road, just one month after taking office, 
was to decree that all of the Presidents of the various sports 
federations would have to face elections within six months, -and there- 
after at least every four years. These elections duly took place in the 
winter and spring of 1977, although in some cases it was alleged that 
the incumbent President managed to retain power by skilfully arranging 
the conditions of the election himself. 28 
Pablo Porta was elected unopposed in December 1976. His victory 
was a demonstration both of the general esteem in which he was held, 
unlike the earlier RFEF Presidents, and of the general belief that he 
26. This allegation was made to the author, with the use of hindsight, 
by the following interviewees: Julian Garcia Candau, Agust ( Montal, 
Nicolau Casaus, Manuel Vazquez Montalban, and Pablo Porta. 
27. Quoted in an interview with Don Balon, No. 50,16 September 1976. 
28. It was alleged, for example in Barrabäs, No. 223, '6 January 1977, 
that Miguel Garcia Redondo partially owed his victory in the recent 
presidential elections at the Spanish handball federation to his 
limiting the franchise to the Presidents and Vice-Presidents-of the 
various clubs, excluding from the election the players and referees. 
363 
Was genuine about his campaign for democracy in football, Indeed, FC 
Barcelona, Athletic de Bilbao and Real Sociedad, the three most 
democratic clubs, as illustrated in detail in Chapter Four, voted for 
Porta to continue in office. 
During 1977, Porta lived up to the image of a convert to democracy. 
In March of that year, he personally drafted rules for the future 
election of the RFEF President and of all of the members of the 
executive committee, with a far more extensive franchise than had 
existed for the December 1976 elections. 29 In addition, he planned new 
democratic norms to be adopted by the regional federation. These 
reform proposals of Porta were almost unanimously accepted at the annual 
RFEF assembly in July 1977.30 
The response of Porta to the demand for the return of internal 
democracy at the football clubs was to establish, in January 1977, a 
special commission, under the chairmanship of RFEF and Real Madrid Vice- 
President Gregorio Paunero, to draft proposals for reform. Three 
months later, this commission recommended a system in which every adult 
club member of at least three years standing would vote, at least every 
four years, for the President, who would afterwards choose his own Vice- 
President and directors. This proposal was criticised by certain 
29. According to the archives of the RFEF, Porta created a form of 
electoral college, in which 50% of the votes were allocated to the 
professional clubs, 30% to the local amateur clubs, organized into 
the regional federations, and 15% each to the players and the 
referees. 
30. For details of this assembly, see any of the specialist sports 
newspapers, 14-16 July 1977. 
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sections of the sporting Press, who unfavourably compared the proposals 
with the democratic norms which existed at the football clubs before the 
Civil War. 31 Despite these criticisms, the proposals were received very 
favourably by practically all of the clubs, and were overwhelmingly 
accepted at the July 1977 RFEF assembly. Thenceforth, democratic- 
presidential elections recommenced at the clubs, and the "organic 
democracy" system of only approximately 200 members whose names had been 
drawn out of a hat being able to vote was consigned to history. 
1977, therefore, was the important year for the re-establishment of 
democracy in Spanish football, in the same way as it was the significant 
year for the re-establishment of democracy at national level. The speed 
of this democratization of the game was partly the consequence of the 
fact that neither the leadership of the RFEF nor of the football clubs 
had much to lose by embracing the powerful campaign for reform. With 
regard to the fourth aspect of politicization, however, the poor, 
patronized treatment received by the players during the Franco years, 
the situation was completely different. Both the clubs and the RFEF 
obviously had much to lose from an improvement in the working conditions 
of the footballers. In consequence, they did practically everything in 
their power to maintain the unequal status quo that had existed for 
almost forty years. 
The obvious way for the footballers of Spain to resolve their seven 
major grievances, discussed in detail in Chapter Five of this thesis, 
31. For details of these criticisms, see Dicen, April 1977, Barrabäs 
No. 232,11 April 1977 and Don Balön, No. 79,11 April 1977. 
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was to form an independent trade union or association, as the pro- 
fessional players of most others countries had already done. 32 The 
Spanish players had made several attempts toward this goal from 1968 
onwards, but on every occasion had come up against the implacable 
opposition of the clubs and the Francoist sporting authorities. From 
1976 onward, however, the desire of the footballers to unite became 
stronger, partly because of the exciting and challenging political 
climate. The-first tentative step towards the formation of a trade 
union took place in Madrid in January 1976, when Jose Angel Iribar, the 
organizer of the Athletic de Bilbao black armbands gesture discussed in 
Chapter Eight, arranged a meeting of the captains of the 54 professional 
teams. 
Despite this promising start, the Association of Spanish 
Footballers (AFE) did not come into existence until December 1977. This 
two-year delay had two major causes. Firstly, the clubs and the RFEF 
put every possible obstacle in the path of the players. 33 Secondly, the 
players themselves were extremely passive due to having been 
"conditioned to be docile, unquestioning robots for so many years". 34 
One of the objectives of the AFE was to demonstrate that 
32. The French footballers were the first to form a united and lasting 
trade union. In 1968 the Dutch players followed suit in 1970, the 
West Germans in 1971, the British in 1975 and the Portuguese in 
1976. 
33. For example, many clubs prevented their players from attending, 
during the period 1976-1977, the meetings that eventually culminated 
in the formation of the AFE, claiming that they were needed for 
training even before completely insignificant friendly matches. 
34. These are the words of Carles Rexach to the author. 
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footballers were intelligent professionals, `deserving of respect for 
their opinions and demands. A sign of this new respect for the players 
achieved by the AFE was the high number of enquiries carried out by the 
Press into their political views. 35 
The Spanish footballers quickly discovered, however, that it was 
far easier to gain respect than a material improvement in their working 
conditions. The three concrete objectives of the AFE were to obtain 
affiliation to the social security system, to have the clubs' right of 
retention when a player's contract had expired abolished, and to compel 
the clubs to keep ahead with their payments of wages and bonuses. 
Largely because of the intransigence of the clubs and the RFEF, little 
progress was made towards the settlement of these three problems in the 
negotiations of 1977 and 1978. In frustration, the AFE shocked the 
whole of Spain by resorting to strike action in January 1979. 
The French footballers had unsuccessfully been on strike in 1969 
and 1971, and there had been several brief players' strikes in South 
America, the biggest occurring in Argentina in 1971. Apart from these 
few examples, the action of the Spanish players was unprecedented, and 
demonstrated how desperate they had become. The sporting authorities, 
the football clubs and the Press, with several notable exceptions, " 
35. See, for example, Dicen, 8 October 1976 and 11 May 1977, or 
Don Balon, No. 30 27 April, 1976 and No. 86,30 May 1977. 
36. The exception to the rule of hostile reaction to the strike were 
Don Balön and the centre-left Madrid daily newspapertEl Pafs and 
Diario 16. For concrete examples, see any of these publications 
from 12 January to 7 February 1979. 
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reacted with hostility, an attitude which the players had. expected. 37 
They did not expect, however, that the majority of supporters would be 
just as hostile, and this largely explains why the footballers had to 
return to work after three weeks on strike with the mere undertaking 
that their grievances would be examined. 30 
The intransigence of the clubs and the RFEF remained so rigid that 
further controversial strikes by the players in September 1981, April 
1982 and September 1984 were necessary before any meaningful reforms 
were conceded to the AFE. From the autumn of 1984 onwards, the Spanish 
footballers were to enjoy'the same rights as their colleagues throughout 
Western Europe: affiliation to the social security system: freedom of 
movement after the expiry of their contract; a proper labour contract 
which recognized them as professional workers, rather than as artists or 
showmen as during the Franco years. 
The problem of the-debting clubs, however, has still not been, 
resolved, and consequently there are still several examples each season 
of unpaid players locking themselves in their dressing room or 
protesting in some other dramatic way. 39 Despite this remaining 
37. That the players had expected such a reaction was alleged to the 
author by Caries Rexach, by the former Athletic_de Bilbao players 
Jose Angel Iribar and Javier Clemente, by Luis Aragones, the former 
Atletico de Madrid player, and by the former Real Madrid player 
Manuel Velazquez. 
38. Luis Aragones and Manuel Velazquez recalled to the author their 
disappointment at the attitudes of the majority of supporters, and 
added that, had this attitude been favourable, then perhaps the 
footballers would have received a boost to their morale which would 
have helped them to prolong the strike. 
39. See, for example, As, 8 October 1985, for details of the lock-in 
dressing-room protest of the disgruntled, players of second division 
club Jerez. 
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problem, however, the footballers of Spain have managed considerably to 
improve their working conditions through ten years of hard struggle. A 
major consequence of these years of struggle is that the social and 
political consciousness of the players has been raised to an 
unprecedented level. 40 
The fifth aspect of politicization during the Franco years, the 
presence in Spain of the East European players and coaches, completely 
lost any remaining significance during the transition from dictatorship 
to democracy. Several Yugoslavs entered Spanish football in-the late 
1970s, but they were certainly not converted into "anti- 
Communist symbols" like the Hungarians in the 1950s. 
In a similar way, little can be said about the fate since 1976 of 
the sixth aspect of the politicization of football in Francoist Spain. 
The country is no longer diplomatically ostracized and isolated, but 
instead, on the contrary, a full member of both the European Economic 
Community and of the NATO military alliance. In consequence, the 
Spanish Foreign Ministry now has neither the necessity nor desire to 
attempt to extract any kind of advantage from the numerous international 
footballing successes of the Real Madrid club or of the national team. 
The regionalist significance of Spanish football, the seventh and 
final -aspect of politicization isolated in this thesis, has undoubtedly 
been the most important aspect during the transition from dictatorship 
40. This allegation has been made in Garcia Candnau, op, cit. P. 87, and 
to the author by Caries Rexach, Luis Aragones and Manuel Velazquez. 
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to democracy. To the surprise of many who thought that the passing, away 
of Franco would reduce this regionalist tension, 41 the rivalry, 
between FC Barcelona and Real Madrid has assumed even fiercer political 
proportions than during the Franco years. Relations between the two 
giant clubs have never been worse than at present. 42 In addition, 
further tension in football has been created by the players and , 
supporters of the two major Basque clubs clearly demonstrating their 
support for the cause of Basque autonomy. 
It is possible to claim that it was inevitable that Spanish 
football during the past eleven years should have served as an important 
arena for the expression of regionalist sentiment. 43 The principle 
argument to support this claim is that, as illustrated in Chapter Eight, 
there had been plenty of regionalist incidents and gestures in football 
even before the death of the dictator. As remarked at the conclusion of 
Chapter Eight, these incidents and gestures should be seen as a prelude 
to the events during the transition from dictatorship to democracy. 
41. Caries Rexach, Agusti Montal and Nicolau Casaus and most people 
connected with FC Barcelona expected that this tension would 
decrease with the death of the dictator. Manuel Vazquez Montalban 
and Alex J. Botines, the late Dicen journalist, however, claimed 
that this was an unrealistic expectation, given the stormy history 
of pre-Civil War Barca-Real Madrid relations and the amount of 
regionalist antagon si that forty years of centralist dictatorship 
had stored up. 
42. This state of affairs is demonstrated by the fact that, since 1981, 
the President and directors of both giant clubs have consistently 
snubbed their counterparts by refusing to attend the match in the 
opposing stadium, and by refusing to greet each other at the annual 
RFEF assemblies in July. Further evidence is the unprecedented 
"transfer war" declared by Bam on Real in February 1979, which 
still continues at the time of writing. 
43. This claim has been made to the author by Manuel Vazquez Montalbän, 
Julian Garcia Candau and Alex J. Botines, and in Vicente Marco, 
Historias del deporte, Madrid, 1981, -. pp. 203-205. 
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The second arguement to support this claim concerns the veritable 
explosion of regionalist sentiment that occurred after 1975, principally 
in the Basque Country and Catalonia, and to a lesser extent in Galicia, 
Valencia, and Andaluia. This explosion affected all aspects of life in 
these regions, and it was impossible for football to remain apart from 
the process. After the long-awaited death of Franco, the regional clubs 
expected to be finally permitted to come out in the open with their 
support for the re-establishment of national democracy and regional 
autonomy. The directors and players of these clubs largely demonstrated 
their support for these two causes with their gestures and-. comments, 
whilst the supporters did so by means of formerly outlawed flags and 
songs. 
It is safe to argue that the involvement in football-of-the - 
regionalist political forces was just as inevitable as the clubs of-the 
disaffected regions politicizing themselves. During the'long years of 
exile or clandestine existence, the regionalist parties and politicians 
had gradually come to realize the social and political importance'of the 
major football clubs of their regions. In a Catalan context, the two 
events that contributed most to these political activists recognizing 
the political significance of Bam were-the June, 1970. Guruceta°scandal 
and the February 1975 controversial expulsion of Johann-, Cruyff. 44 With 
44. This is evidenced by Josep Tarradellas, in a brief interview with 
E1 Mundo Doportivo, 9 February 1979, declaring that: __ 
"I have always been a Barca supporter, 'even though I know-next 
to nothing about football. I think that I. have always, deep, 
down, been aware of the social. and political"significance of 
Bam, of it being, as they say, more-than just a club. But: I 
remember being reminded of this significance when reading, in 
exile in Saint Martin le Beau,: about the popular reaction to-. 
the Guruceta and Cruyff scandals. " 
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regard to the Basque situation, the significant . occurrence'was the black 
armbands protest of September 1975. 
With these recent events still fresh in their memory, it was only 
to be expected that one of the first publicized visits made by these 
politicians., upon. returning from exile or emerging from clandestinety, 
would be to the football stadium. Both Josep Terradellas and Jordi 
Pujol were often to be found receiving a warm welcome at Barca's 
Camp Nou in the immediate post-Franco years, whilst Carlos Garaicoechea, 
Javier ArzalluS and 1aki Esnaola have frequently enjoyed the ambience 
of either and Athletic de Bilbao or Real Sociedad home match. 4 
It should not be assumed from the above, however, 'that only these 
three clubs have served as a focus for Catalan or Basque sentiment. 
With reference to the Catalan situation, 'the home matches of both the 
Sabadell and Sant Andreu clubs continued to serve as collective 
expressions of regionalist sentiment, as they had begun-to do in the. 
late 1960s and early 1970s. 46 In the Basque context, mention should 
45. For a complete report on the presence of these political person- 
alities at the football stadia of Spain, see Don'Bal6n, No. 284,4 
March 1981. For specific details of Josep. Tarradella's dramatic 
appearance at the Bar a-Real Madrid game of January 1980, see 
El Mundo Deportivo and'Dicen, 24 January 1980, and 
World Soccer, March 1980. 
46. As testified to the author by Jordi Golobart, the President of: the 
Sant Andreu club since 1975, the return to the previously forbidden 
senyera red and yellow team uniform in the summer of 1976 was-- 
extremely popular with the supporters. - In the Mords of Golobart, 
"during the transition years, our home games, were a festival of red 
and yellow stripes, both on the field and on the terraces"., For the 
political significance of the post-Franco situation at the Sabadell 
club, see the book La historia del Centre d' Esports Sabadell, 
Barcelona, 1984 and El MMundo Deportivo, 7 August 1977, or Sport 29 
February 1980. 
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again be made of the fact that Osasuna has, since ,. 1975, -, played a 
significant role in the debate over whether the, region of Navarre, of. 
which Pamplona is the capital, should be part of the Basque autonomous 
region or not. 47 The club directors, for their part, have refused to 
return to the all-Basque player policy that. Osasuna maintained before- 
the Civil War, and the team has, in consequence, continued to be a 
mixture of local Navarrese players and imports-from other Spanish 
regions, with practically no players from the, other Basque provinces of 
Guipüzcoa, Vizcaya and Alava. 48 A large section of the Osasuna 
supporters, however, have demonstrated theirrpolitical sympathies by 
waving the Basque flag that ikurrifia, and,: less unequivocally, by 
causing violent incidents during the visitsofReal. Madrid. 4' The 
smaller Basque clubs, Sestao and Alaves of, Vitoria,, for example, have 
also acted as arenas for the expression of-Basque. sentiment"to a lesser 
extent in proportion to their reduced number of. supporters.,;, 
In the same way as it should not be assumed that only. FCýBarcelona, 
Athletic de Bilbao and Real Sociedad have, served as_a, focus for, Catalan 
r';; ..,,. ., 
47. This was alleged in As, 26 April 1983 and, in Don-Balon,, No.. 431, 
12 January 1984. 
48. At the time of writing, for example,:; in, season: 1987/88,, the. Osasuna 
first team squad of 23 players, 15 were from Navarre province, five 
from Madrid, one from Cadiz, two from England, and none from the 
other Basque provinces. 
49. During the visit of Real Madrid to Pamplona in October 1986, their 
team coach was stoned before the game, and later their Spanish 
international Ricardo Gallego was hospitalized by a, missile from the 
crowd. When Real next visited, for a cup match in February 1987, 
the referee came close to abandoning the match because of the 
unprecedented number of missiles. For further details, see Marca° 
and As, of 6 October 1986 and 26 February 1987. 
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and Basque nationalist sentiment, neither should it be supposed that the 
connection between football and regionalism since 1975 has been confined 
to these two regions. 
During the transition from dictatorship to democracy, the Valencia 
club gradually moved towards adopting a regionalist image, after having 
been traditionally regarded as the non-valencianista club of the region, 
in contrast to local rivals Levante. 5° This change of posture was 
largely due to the ascendancy to club President, in October 1975, of 
Antoni Ramos Costa, successful businessman and supporter of the Partit 
Socialista de Valencia. Immediately upon assuming office, Ramos Costa 
carried out one of his election promises and ordered the monthly club 
magazine Mestalla to be written in both Castilian and the Valencian 
dialect of Catalan. 51 In August 1977, he introduced a shirt that was an 
exact copy of the Valencia regional flag, red, and yellow stripes with a 
blue edge, for use in matches when the team had to change out of its 
traditional all-white stripe. This new shirt received a hostile 
reception because of its political significance when it was worn for 
the first time in a league match against Real Madrid in the Estadio 
Bernabeu. 52 
Three other clubs had a regionalist significance during the 
transition from dictatorship to democracy, a significance that was 
50. For further details, see a special report 
February 1980. 
51. See Mestalla, from No. 164, December 1975 
52. For further details of this hostile recep 
October 1977. The political significance 
discussed in Garcia Candau, op. cit., pp. 
in Don Balön, No. 230 17 
onwards. 
tion, see Marca and As, 23 
of this reception was also 
25/26. 
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reflected, in the same way as that of the Valencia club, by the wearing 
of a team uniform of the same colours and design of the flag of that 
particular region: Celta de Vigo; 53 Real Betis of Seville; 54 Las 
Palmas. 55 
It is appropriate at this stage, however, to examine in detail the 
political significance from 1975 onwards of FC Barcelona, the club with 
the sharpest regionalist projection during the Franco period. The death 
of the dictator provoked a veritable avalanche of articles by' the club's 
gauche divine intellectual supporters about what the role of Barca 
should be in the transition from dictatorship, to democracy that was 
expected to follow. 56 
The Catalan club President Agusti Montal demonstrated, in the 
course of 1976 and 1977, that he largely accepted the role for the club 
desired by these intellectuals. He was-eager-to see FC Barcelona fully 
developed into, in his own words, "more than a club". -by playing a- 
positive and influential role in political events. -; Montal, himself a 
53. For further details, see Don Balön, No. 232,23 December 1979. 
54. For details of the regionalist significance of Real Betis, see 
Don Balon, No. 230,17 February 1980 and As, 10 November 1980. 
55. See Garcia Candau, op. cit., p. 26 for further details about the 
regionalist significance of the Las Palmas club. 
56. Three of the most significant of these articles appeared in the 
Christmas special edition of Bar9a,. No.. 1049, -23 December 1915: "El 
Barra, bandera democrätica deCa7talunya, by Joan Antont_Gonzalez 
Ca-Tsarnovas; "El Bar a-y el futuro democratico" by Josep Ramoneda; 
Armand Caraben's article in Catalan "Futbol i politica". The 
following week's edition of Barra, No. 1050,30 December 1975, 
containe, the article "PolitecaTy, futbol"- by Manuel Väzquez 
Montalban, the undisputed leader of the gauche divine group, and 
three weeks later there commenced a three-part series of articles, 
beginning in Barca, No. 1053 20 January 1976, by Joan Josep Artelle 
entitled "Fütbol Club Barcelona: Democracia y deporte". 
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founder member of Pujol's Conaeraincia i"Unix party, allowed newly- 
formed or reconstituted Catalan parties of all political tendencies to 
stage rallies in the club's immense Palau Blauarana completely free of 
charge. 57 He also continued the policy ofthis predecessors-in further, 
increasing the use of the Catalan language in the` club' magazine Barca, 
and, in December 1976, installed a wholly'Catalan electronic scoreboard. 
This scoreboard complemented the increasing number of senyeras, the 
Catalan national flag, which appeared in'the'"Cämp-Nou. 
In February 1977, a controversy occurred which raised the political 
consciousness of the Barra supporters to new heights. Dutch star Johann 
Cruyff was expelled for dubious reasons for, a' second 'time in a match 
against Malaga, on this occasion in the Camp Nou. The sending-off 
produced a pitch invasion similar to the one during the Guruceta affair 
of June 1970, in which Castilian referee Antonio Melero was violently 
attacked. Cruyff received a harsh three-match suspension from the RFEF, 
a verdict which provoked an outraged response from the whole Catalan 
media. 58 Montal launched a bitter attack on'the "dictatorial 
57. In June 1976, for example, the PalauBlaugrana was used for the 
inaugural assembly of the PartitSocialistade Catalunya, at which 
the Barca players Caries Rexach and Antoni Torres-were present, and 
two monfhs later by the broad-based L'Assemblea de Catalunva to 
launch its campaign Per L'Amnistia i -la 
Libertat, a meeting which 
featured speeches from both the then Barra President Agustr' 
Montal and the future Vice-President Niiccollau Casaus. For further 
details of these events, see Don Balon, ýNo. `"39, June'1976, and No. 
45,10 August 1976. '= v 
58. For further details of the Cruyff expulsion 'and . the reaction of the 
Catalan media, see El Mundo Deportivo and Sport, from 7 to 18 
February 1977. 
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methods" of the RFEF, and called for the resignation of the RFEF 
President Pablo Porta. 59 
It was cynically suggested at the time that the real objective of 
Montal's attack on the RFEF was to distract Catalan attention away from 
the failures of Barra on the field. 60 This allegation was made even 
more strongly when, in July 1977, Montal delighted the annual club 
assembly by demanding the restoration of-Catalonia's Autonomy Statute 
and the subsequent re-establishment of the Generalitat, the traditional 
Catalan autonomous governing body. 61 
Because of this lack of success on the field, Montal declined to 
present himself for re-election in January 1978. There were two 
presidential candidates with a clear political significance: Nicolau 
Casaus, the former Catalanist Esguerra_Republicana militant who, as seen 
in Chapters Three and Eight, was prevented from holding any sporting 
office during the Franco years: Antoni Ferran Arino, a member of the 
Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya, whose candidature was supported 
59. Agusti Montal was quoted in Don Balon, No. 72,21 February 1977, as 
saying the following about the RFEF, in the light of the suspension 
of Cruyf f: 
"The principal persons responsible for what has happened, what 
is happening and what can happen are the leaders of the RFEF. 
The structure of Spanish football -have'to be radically changed 
and brought up to date with the growing democratization of the 
country. " 
60. This allegation was made by Jose Maria Lorente in Marca, 11 February 
1977, and by his colleague Antonio Valencia in the same newspaper 
ten days later. 
61. This allegation was affirmed in Marca 27 July 1977 -'by Jose Maria 
Lorente, who spoke of "an increasingly unpopular President who is 
resorting to political stunts in order to cover-up for-the lack of 
trophies for the past three years". 
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by the majority of the gauche divine intellectuals, and who proposed to 
adopt an all-Catalan player policy similar to that of the Basque 
clubs. 62 Neither of these two, however, was elected. The winner was 
Josep Lluis Nunez, a self-made construction millionaire actually born in 
Vizcaya province, who aggressively promised to put Real Madrid in the 
shade both on the field and in the sporting corridors of power. 63 This 
result, and Nünez"s subsequent re-election in December 1981 and May' 
1985, has caused many, including both Montal and Casaus, to claim that 
practical sporting factors outweigh political considerations with the FC 
Barcelona members. 64 
In spite of his low political profile, however, Nüfiez proved to be 
a far more controversial Barca President than Montal., Nildez immediately 
began his reign by accusing Real Madrid of having been. "Franco's team" 
and of having consistently benefited due to dominating the RFEF, 
although without offering any concrete evidence to support these 
allegations. 65 He then proceeded to declare, in February 
1979: a "transfer war" on Real, which, from May 1980 onwards, reached 
the bizarre situation of Barca agreeing automatically to raise by 20% 
62. For further details of this presidential election campaign and the 
proposals of each candidate, see either El Mundo Deportiyo, Diceg or 
Sport from 16 December 1977 to 10 January 1978. 
63. See interviews with Nünez in Dicen, 17 December 1977 and 4 January 
1978, in El Mundo Deportivo, 23 December 1977, and 7 January 1978, 
and in Sport 2 January 1978. 
64. This allegation has been made to the author by Agusti Montal, 
Nicolau Casaus, Cartes Rexach and Juan Jose Castillo; and in the 
Barcelona sport newspapers after the presidential elections, i. e. 8- 
10 January 1977,5-8 December 1981 and 27-30 May 1985. 
65. See interview with Nu ez in Dicen, 29 January 1978. 
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t- 
any offer made to any club about any player by Real-66 Largely because 
of the aggressive and provocative Nunez, relations between the two giant 
clubs of Spain reached an unprecedented low-in the early 1980s and since 
then have failed substantially to improve. 
Throughout the Franco period, as seen in detail in Chapter Eight, 
there was a huge contrast between the style of FC Barcelona and that of 
the two major Basque clubs. This contrast remained just as clear during 
the transition from dictatorship to democracy. There continued to be 
very few native Catalans in the Bar ca team, and this meant 
that the players possibly did not 
share 
the political aspirations. of the 
club's supporters. The Basque players, in, contrast, were completely in 
touch with their supporters and the Basque community as a whole. 
Practically all of them learnt the difficult Basque language to one 
level or other, and they were all willing, as, - shall shortly be seen,..: 
to use their high profile and popularity to-further the 'cause of Basque 
autonomy. Rýt 
This willingness was clearly demonstrated: in, December 1976, when 
the Basque players made a political gesture that produced even more 
controversy than the black armbands gestureýof-September-1975. Before 
the local derby match in San Sebastian, transmitted. -to-the whole of 
Spain by RTVE, the Real Sociedad and Athletic de Bilbao players ran out 
66. This 20% extra promise by Nüßez caused Ba rqa to sign-up'many.. 
overpriced players who were not required in the first team by the 
coach, and so spent several seasons playing only, a handful of 
competitive matches, the clearest examples being Jesus Landäburu, 
Marcos Alonso, Urbann Ortega and. Raul- Amarilla.. '.: 
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together holding the still-outlawed ikurrifia flag, to the delight of the 
capacity crowd. The armed police present actually -'attempted to impound 
the flag, in the same way as they were doing'at exactly the same time on 
the stadium terraces, but officials of Real Sociedad physically, ' 
prevented them from doing so. During the'same match, the television 
microphones had to be turned down, in order to prevent the crowd's 
chants in favour of an amnesty for Basque political prisoners from being 
heard in homes and bars across Spain. 67 
The ikurrifia gesture, like the earlier armbands gesture, was the 
idea of the Athletic de Bilbao goalkeeper Jose Angel Iribar. `" The most 
significant and controversial gesture of Iribar, ' however, was a' 
completely personal one. By June 1975, Iribar had played'a record 49 
international matches for the national team, but mysteriously never made 
his fiftieth appearance. It was alleged at the time either that Iribar 
had been requested by the abertzale (radical Basque nationalist) party 
HASI, which later became the largest component in'the Herri Batasuna 
coalition, of which he was a prominent member, to refuse to continue in 
the national team in order to draw maximum attention to the Bilbao, 
goalkeeper's political views, 69 or that the RFEF had requested the 
national manager Ladislas Kubala to overlook Irrbar because of his= 
political stance. 7° According to Irrbar, himself, neither of these 
67. For a full account of the event, see Garcia Candau, op. cit., 
pp. 30-32. 
68. Information revealed during author's interview with Jose Angel 
Iribar. 
69. This was alleged in As, 19 September 1976,, and in- 
Don Balön, No. 54 13 October 1976. 
70. This allegation was made in Dicen, 20 October 1976. 
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allegations is correct: "ý ý.: 
"I failed to play for the national for. -. 
the fiftieth time in in the 
latter part of 1975 because I was injured. By 1976, it had 
occurred to me that it would be a highly, effective gesture against 
the Spanish State to turn down all of Kubala's invitations to make 
a fiftieth and farewell appearance. I believe that the gesture was 
a success, because nationwide attention was drawn to the cause of 
Basque autonomy and an amnesty for political prisoners. But to 
suggest that this was requested of me by HASI is completely wrong, 
just as it is wrong to allege that the-RFEF., expelled me from the 
national team. It was completely my own decision, and one that I 
by no means regret". 71 1 2, 
The impact of Iribar's boycott was enormous.. The applause and, 
cheers that he used to receive throughout Spain'gradually', turned to 
jeers and, in Madrid and SevillL for example, abuse: and even missile- 
throwing. 72 A degree of hostility is still, directed; at, Iribar today, 
when he travels outside the Basque Country with-, the Athletic de Bilbao- 
reserve team of which he is now coach. 73 fa; 
It is not only Iribar, however, who has received politically 
motivated abuse in the Spanish stadia during the transition from 
dictatorship to democracy. Chants of "Viva Espana! " and "Etarras! " 
(crudely connecting the Basque clubs with ETA terrorism) have frequently 
greeted the appearance of the Athletic de. Bilbao and Real-Sociedad. -, 
teams, accompanied by the waving of hundreds of Spanish flags and'even, - 
71. Author's interview with Jose Angel Irrbar. 
72. Irihar recalled to the author that he has been struck by missiles 
thrown from the crowd on four occasions, in, Madrid, Sevilla,. Burgos 
and Santander. 
73. Author's interview with Irrbar. 
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on occasions, the burning of the ikurrina.? 4-, Furthermore, as already 
stated in this Epilogue, there have also been violent attacks by groups, 
of young hooligans, especially the Ultra Sur of Real Madrid, on 
travelling Basque supporters. _., 
This politically significant tension surrounding the. Basque. clubs 
was fuelled by the controversial declarations of, Javier Clemente, ' the 
highly successful Athletic de Bilbao coach from 1981 to 1986. Unlike 
Irrbar, Clemente is a supporter of the Basque Nationalist Party, but his 
political profile has nevertheless remained higher-than-that of the ex- 
national team goalkeeper. Clemente has, boldly, declared that "we Basques 
have not yet gained our freedom from the Spanish State", that ". the 
mother of violence is injustice", and that "Navarre is an integral part 
of Euzkadi". 75 In addition, he has frequently used' racial, explanations 
to account for Athletic's bard-fought victories. 76; ;, -', 
,_ ý_ r_ 
74. As revealed to the author by Javier Clemente, whilst he'was the .. Athletic de Bilbao coach, he noticed, before an October 1982 game 
away to Racing de Santander, that an ikurrina was-being symbolically 
burned on the terraces. He attempted to intervene, along with 
several of his players, but the national police refused: to allow him 
to enter onto the terraces. 
75. Those quotations are taken from an interview with Clemente. in 
Cambio 16 No. 731,2 December 1985. 
76. After the decisive victory away to Valencia in April'1984, which 
meant that Athletic would retain their Spanish championship crown, 
Clemente was quoted as saying that: 
"We won because we are Basques, a special people". 
The following month, after Athletic had beaten FC Barcelona in a 
violent cup final, meaning that the Bilbao team had achieved the 
prestigious league and cup "double", -he declared to the ý Press. that: 
"We Basques are a tough people. We know how to struggle 
against opponents with superior- resources*'and eventually ; 
triumph. " 
For details of Clemente's declarations, and-thereaction to them, 
see As, 23 April and 5-6 May 1984. 
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The politically-motivated hostility towards the Basque teams, 
Iribar and Clemente, was partly offset by a general respect for Athletic 
de Bilbao and Real Sociedad's complete domination of the Spanish league 
championship in the early 1980s, despite a certain lack of appreciation 
of their defensive and occasionally over-physical tactics. The majority 
of this respect, however, was lost when the Basque dominated Spanish 
national team unexpectedly failed to make any impact as the host team at 
the 1982 World Cup finals tournament. 
It is necessary at this stage to arrive at a conclusion about the 
politicization of Spanish football during the transition from dictator- 
ship to democracy. 
The radical changes that have transformed Spanish football since 
1975 reflect the radical changes to the whole of Spanish society and the 
Spanish political system. Football is no longer systematically 
manipulated as a political soporific for the Spanish working classes, 
and Fascist influence in the game, except for the connection between 
hooliganism and ultra-Right groups, has disappeared. Spanish football 
has been completely democratized since the death of Franco, both at 
institutional and club level, whilst after eight years of struggle and 
four strikes, the players have gained the fundamental rights and respect 
previously denied to them. East Europe players and coaches in Spain are 
no longer converted into "anti-Communist symbols", and the international 
victories of the Spanish teams are not now used in an attempt to improve 
the poor overseas image and diplomatic position of the country. The 
regional aspect of the politicization was clearly the most important one 
during the transition, responsible for capturing the newspaper headlines 
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and contributing to keeping the stadia filled with impassioned spect- 
ators. Football continues to serve as an important arena for the 
expression of regionalist sentiment, and indeed the political signific- 
ance of Spanish football appears likely to be maintained in the 
foreseeable future mainly with regard to this particular aspect of 
politicization. 
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APPENDIX OF AUTHOR'S INTERVIEWS: 1 
Name Place Date 
Luis Aragones Madrid 22 November 1986 
Joan Josep Artells Barcelona 23 May 1986 
Antonio Bars Barcelona 10 May 1986 
Rodolfo Belarmo Madrid 3 May 1986 
Alex J. Botines Barcelona 10 October 1984 
Paul Breitner Paris 19 June 1984 
Nicolau Casaus Barcelona 21 May 1986 
Javier Castedo Madrid 21 November 1986 
Benito Castejdä Madrid 7 January 1986 
Juan Jose Castillo Barcelona 3 September 1984 
Javier Clemente Bilbao 2 June 1986 
Enrique Collar Madrid 22 November 1986 
Juan Crespo Bilbao 30 June 1986 
Ferdinand Daucik Barcelona 14 April 1985 
Julio De Miguel Valencia 28 September 1985 
Sheelagh Ellwood Madrid 23 April 1985 
Jacques Ferran Saint Etienne 8 June 1984 
Juan Pablo Fusi Madrid 22 October 1984 
Jose Maria Garcia Madrid 9 February 1986 
Julian Garcia Candau Madrid 22 July 1986 
Enrique Gil de la Vega, Madrid 28 November 1985 
Jordi Golobart Barcelona 27 May 1987 
Brian Glanville London 12 August 1984 
Antonio Hernäez Barcelona 10 October 1984 
Jose Angel Iribar Bilbao 1 July 1986 
Sandor Kocsis Barcelona 12 April 1985 
Ladislao Kubala Barcelona 14 April 1985 
David Lacey Paris 27 June 1984 
Julio Lamana Bilbao 1 July 1986 
Jose Maria Lorente Madrid 3 May 1986 
Jose Luis Karin Madrid 11 December 1986 
David Miller London ý 
22 August 1984 
Luis Molowny Madrid 20 January 1986 
385 
APPENDIX OF AUTHOR'S INTERVIEWS: 2 
Name Place Date 
Agust i Montal Barcelona 30 April 1986 
Robin Mortensen Barcelona 24 May 1987 
Manuel Orantes Madrid 4 November 1986 
Jose Luis Orbegozo San Sebastian 28 June 1986 
Jesus Pereda Barcelona 26 May 1987 
Jose Luis Perez Payä Madrid 17 February 1987 
Pablo Porta Barcelona 4 May 1986- '- 
Matias Prats Madrid 10 November 1986 
Keir Radnedge London 26 January 1984 
Caries Rexach Barcelona 3 May 1986 
Joaquim Rife Barcelona 25 May 1987 
Sir Stanley Rous London 29 June 1985 
Iäaki Säez Bilbao 29 June 1986 
Raimundo Saporta Madrid 23 October 1986 
Juan Jose Totono Madrid 13 December 1986 
Manuel Väz5uez Montalbaä Barcelona 21 May 1986 
Manuel Velazquez Madrid 17 February 1986 
Miguel Vidal Madrid 27 October 1984 
Sir Kenneth Volstenholme London 11 August 1987 
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known, had a far more Catalan image than its local rival. The gulf 
between the supporters of the two clubs was huge. 6 The great majority 
of the Barra followers were Catalan speakers who favoured regional 
autonomy, whilst the Espanol supporters were mostly middle-class 
immigrants to Catalonia from other regions, professional men, state 
officials, and even a good number of policemen and military personnel.? 
Practically none of the Espanol club members could speak Catalan, and it 
was widely thought that the very club name had been chosen as both a 
slight and a provocation to the native Catalans. 9 
In this way, the political context of the FC Barcelona-Espanol 
rivalry was important from the very beginning of the century, and 
considerably contributed towards the many violent local derby matches. ' 
In April 1912, a pitched battle between the players and supporters of 
the two rival clubs led to the local authorities suspending these derby 
matches for two years. Similarly violent clashes occurred in October 
1921, March 1923, October 1927, May 1924 and March 1935. 
The hostility of the Barra supporters, however, was directed with 
more ferocity towards actual manifestations of Castilian centralism thaa 
towards Espanol. In June 1925 during the centralist dictatorship of 
General Miguel Primo de Rivera, the military governor of Barcelona 
closed Bar a's Les Corts stadium for six months because the crowd had 
6. This gulf has been best illustrated by Artells, op. cit., p. 25-28. 
7. See Artells, op. cit. p. 27. 
8. This view has been expressed by Artells, op. cit., and in an 
interview with the author. This view has also been expressed to the 
author in many other interviews, for example with Manuel Vazquez 
Montalban and Alex J. Botines. 
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